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authorDimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>2026-02-17 22:37:39 +0100
committerSander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>2026-02-18 07:53:35 +0100
commit040bdfb18684d809cb5edacf9867d3378b7e093b (patch)
treed0b337c83ea4af5312834541acce584719a52ca0 /src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_ml_dsa.c
parent2c717b2fc9773a74d6c9df01a2f873deea163918 (diff)
downloadouroboros-040bdfb18684d809cb5edacf9867d3378b7e093b.tar.gz
ouroboros-040bdfb18684d809cb5edacf9867d3378b7e093b.zip
lib: Add SLH-DSA tests and per-algorithm PQC gating
This replaces the single HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC/DISABLE_PQC with per-algorithm CMake variables (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), gated by the OpenSSL versions: ML-KEM and ML-DSA require >= 3.4, SLH-DSA >= 3.5. SLH-DSA was already working, but now added explicit authentication tests for it with a full certificate chain (root CA, intermediate CA, server) to show full support. Rename PQC test files and cert headers to use algorithm-specific names (ml_kem, ml_dsa, slh_dsa) and move cert headers to include/test/certs/. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_ml_dsa.c')
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_ml_dsa.c447
1 files changed, 447 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_ml_dsa.c b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_ml_dsa.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f9e6bdb2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_ml_dsa.c
@@ -0,0 +1,447 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Unit tests of OAP ML-KEM/ML-DSA key exchange
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
+
+#include <test/certs/ml_dsa.h>
+
+#include "oap.h"
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#define CLI_AUTH 1
+#define NO_CLI_AUTH 0
+#define CLI_ENCAP KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP
+#define SRV_ENCAP KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP
+
+extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
+extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
+
+static int get_random_kdf(void)
+{
+ static int idx = 0;
+ int count;
+
+ if (md_supported_nids[0] == NID_undef)
+ return NID_undef;
+
+ for (count = 0; md_supported_nids[count] != NID_undef; count++)
+ ;
+
+ return md_supported_nids[(idx++) % count];
+}
+
+struct test_cfg test_cfg;
+
+/* KEM keypair storage for tests (server-side keypair for KEM modes) */
+static void * test_kem_pkp = NULL; /* Private key pair */
+static uint8_t test_kem_pk[4096]; /* Public key buffer */
+static size_t test_kem_pk_len = 0;
+
+/* Mock load - called by load_*_credentials in common.c */
+int mock_load_credentials(void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, pkp) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ml, crt) < 0) {
+ crypt_free_key(*pkp);
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_keypair(const char * name,
+ bool raw_fmt,
+ void ** pkp)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ struct sec_config local_cfg;
+ ssize_t pk_len;
+
+ (void) name;
+ (void) raw_fmt;
+
+ /*
+ * Uses reference counting. The caller will call
+ * EVP_PKEY_free which decrements the count.
+ */
+ if (test_kem_pkp != NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_up_ref((EVP_PKEY *)test_kem_pkp) != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ *pkp = test_kem_pkp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate a new KEM keypair from test_cfg.srv.kex.
+ */
+ memset(&local_cfg, 0, sizeof(local_cfg));
+ if (test_cfg.srv.kex == NID_undef)
+ goto fail;
+
+ SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(&local_cfg, test_cfg.srv.kex);
+
+ pk_len = kex_pkp_create(&local_cfg, &test_kem_pkp, test_kem_pk);
+ if (pk_len < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ test_kem_pk_len = (size_t) pk_len;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_up_ref((EVP_PKEY *)test_kem_pkp) != 1)
+ goto fail_ref;
+
+ *pkp = test_kem_pkp;
+
+ return 0;
+ fail_ref:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(test_kem_pkp);
+ test_kem_pkp = NULL;
+ test_kem_pk_len = 0;
+ fail:
+ return -1;
+
+#else
+ (void) name;
+ (void) raw_fmt;
+ (void) pkp;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ buffer_t * pk)
+{
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ (void) name;
+
+ if (test_kem_pk_len > 0) {
+ pk->data = malloc(test_kem_pk_len);
+ if (pk->data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(pk->data, test_kem_pk, test_kem_pk_len);
+ pk->len = test_kem_pk_len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate keypair on demand if not already done */
+ len = kex_pkp_create(cfg, &test_kem_pkp, test_kem_pk);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ test_kem_pk_len = (size_t) len;
+ pk->data = malloc(test_kem_pk_len);
+ if (pk->data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(pk->data, test_kem_pk, test_kem_pk_len);
+ pk->len = test_kem_pk_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void reset_kem_state(void)
+{
+ if (test_kem_pkp != NULL) {
+ kex_pkp_destroy(test_kem_pkp);
+ test_kem_pkp = NULL;
+ }
+ test_kem_pk_len = 0;
+}
+
+static void test_cfg_init(int kex,
+ int cipher,
+ int kdf,
+ int kem_mode,
+ bool cli_auth)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server config */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = cipher;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = kdf;
+ test_cfg.srv.kem_mode = kem_mode;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = true;
+
+ /* Client config */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = cipher;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = kdf;
+ test_cfg.cli.kem_mode = kem_mode;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = cli_auth;
+}
+
+static int oap_test_setup_kem(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx,
+ const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca)
+{
+ reset_kem_state();
+ return oap_test_setup(ctx, root_ca, im_ca);
+}
+
+static void oap_test_teardown_kem(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx)
+{
+ oap_test_teardown(ctx);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, 0, false);
+
+ return roundtrip_auth_only(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_request(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_MLKEM768, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ SRV_ENCAP, CLI_AUTH);
+
+ return corrupted_request(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_response(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_MLKEM768, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ SRV_ENCAP, NO_CLI_AUTH);
+
+ return corrupted_response(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_truncated_request(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_MLKEM768, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ SRV_ENCAP, NO_CLI_AUTH);
+
+ return truncated_request(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kem(int kex,
+ int kem_mode)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * kex_str = kex_nid_to_str(kex);
+ const char * mode_str = kem_mode == CLI_ENCAP ? "cli" : "srv";
+
+ test_cfg_init(kex, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ kem_mode, NO_CLI_AUTH);
+
+ TEST_START("(%s, %s encaps)", kex_str, mode_str);
+
+ if (oap_test_setup_kem(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.cli.nid == NID_undef ||
+ ctx.srv.nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher not set in flow.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown_kem(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s, %s encaps)", kex_str, mode_str);
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown_kem(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s, %s encaps)", kex_str, mode_str);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kem_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kem(kex_supported_nids[i], SRV_ENCAP);
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kem(kex_supported_nids[i], CLI_ENCAP);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_kem_srv_uncfg(int kex)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * kex_str = kex_nid_to_str(kex);
+
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: auth only, no KEX configured */
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = true;
+
+ /* Client: requests KEM with server-side encapsulation */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = get_random_kdf();
+ test_cfg.cli.kem_mode = SRV_ENCAP;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = false;
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", kex_str);
+
+ if (oap_test_setup_kem(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ml,
+ im_ca_crt_ml) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.cli.nid == NID_undef ||
+ ctx.srv.nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher not set in flow.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown_kem(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", kex_str);
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown_kem(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", kex_str);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_kem_srv_uncfg_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo;
+
+ algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_kem_srv_uncfg(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int oap_test_ml_dsa(int argc,
+ char **argv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ (void) argc;
+ (void) argv;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_ML_KEM
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kem_all();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_kem_srv_uncfg_all();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_request();
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_response();
+ ret |= test_oap_truncated_request();
+#else
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_kem;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_kem_all;
+ (void) test_oap_kem_srv_uncfg;
+ (void) test_oap_kem_srv_uncfg_all;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_request;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_response;
+ (void) test_oap_truncated_request;
+
+ ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}