| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
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On some stalls the receiver can go inactive and NACK-driven HoL
retransmits and brief snd-window drains can deliver a DRF-flagged
packet that's still part of the current receive epoch (rxm_pkt_prepare
preserves the original flags). This treats in-window DRF and
RXM-flagged DRF arrivals as same-epoch once the window is seeded and
skip the release_rq + lwe/rwe rebase that would otherwise wipe valid
OOO fragments from rq[].
Bootstrap (lwe == rwe) still rebases unconditionally so a NACK-driven
retransmit of a lost initial DRF can seed the receiver.
Harden seqno_rotate to redraw the ISN until it falls outside the
peer's current rcv window, closing the ~RQ_SIZE / 2^32 collision where
a true new epoch would be misclassified as same-epoch.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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There was a missing crypt_secure_malloc_fini() in the process
init/fini path.
Also fixes a 0 return from OpenSSL RAND_bytes() being interpreted as
succes instead of failure.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The Flow and Retransmission Control Protocol (FRCP) runs end-to-end
between two peers over a flow. It provides reliability, in-order
delivery, flow control, and liveness. Note that congestion avoidance
is orthogonal to FRCP and handled in the IPCP.
A fixed 16-octet header, network byte order, is prefixed to every FRCP
packet:
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| flags | hcs |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| window |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| seqno |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| ackno |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| payload (variable) ...
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
hcs is a CRC-16-CCITT-FALSE checksum over the PCI (and the stream
extension when present), verified before any flag-driven dispatch. A
single packet can simultaneously carry DATA + ACK + FC + RXM by OR-ing
flag bits. An optional CRC trailer covers the body on DATA when qs.ber
== 0, and on every SACK packet; an optional AEAD wrap (per-flow keys)
sits outermost.
Flag bits (MSB-first; bits 13..15 reserved, MUST be zero):
+------+--------+--------+----------------------------------------+
| Bit | Mask | Name | Meaning |
+------+--------+--------+----------------------------------------+
| 0 | 0x8000 | DATA | Carries caller payload |
| 1 | 0x4000 | DRF | Start of a fresh data run |
| 2 | 0x2000 | ACK | ackno field valid |
| 3 | 0x1000 | NACK | Pre-DRF nudge (seqno informational) |
| 4 | 0x0800 | FC | window field valid (rwe advertisement) |
| 5 | 0x0400 | RDVS | Rendezvous probe (window-closed) |
| 6 | 0x0200 | FFGM | First Fragment of a multi-fragment SDU |
| 7 | 0x0100 | LFGM | Last Fragment of a multi-fragment SDU |
| 8 | 0x0080 | RXM | Retransmission |
| 9 | 0x0040 | SACK | Block list follows in payload |
| 10 | 0x0020 | RTTP | RTT probe / echo (payload follows) |
| 11 | 0x0010 | KA | Keepalive |
| 12 | 0x0008 | FIN | End of stream marker |
| 13-15| -- | -- | Reserved (MUST be zero) |
+------+--------+--------+----------------------------------------+
(FFGM, LFGM) encodes the fragment role of a DATA packet (SCTP-style
B/E): 11=SOLE, 10=FIRST, 00=MID, 01=LAST. Each fragment carries its
own seqno; Retransmission recovers fragments individually, reassembly
runs at consume time. In stream mode FFGM/LFGM are unused; per-byte
position is carried by the stream extension below and end-of-stream is
signalled by FIN on a 0-byte DATA packet.
SACK payload (FRCT_ACK | FRCT_FC | FRCT_SACK):
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| n_blocks | padding (2 octets) |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| start[0] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| end[0] |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
... n_blocks pairs total ...
Each block describes a *present* (received) range strictly above the
cumulative ACK in the PCI ackno. D-SACK (RFC 2883) is signalled
in-band as block[0] - no flag bit, no extra framing - and consumed by
the RACK reo_wnd_mult scaler (RFC 8985 sec. 7.2).
RTTP payload (FRCT_RTTP only; 24 octets):
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| probe_id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| echo_id |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
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+ nonce (16 octets, echoed verbatim) +
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
Stream PCI extension (in_order == STREAM only; 8 octets after the base
PCI on every DATA packet):
0 1 2 3
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| start |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
| end |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
start, end are monotonic 32-bit byte offsets; end - start equals the
on-wire payload length. Stream mode is negotiated at flow allocation;
the extension is present iff stream mode is in use, never on a
per-packet basis.
Service modes are an orthogonal (in_order, loss, ber) vector selected
at flow_alloc; the cubes above map to the axes:
+----------------+---------+------+-----+-----------------------+
| Cube | in_order| loss | ber | Engaged |
+----------------+---------+------+-----+-----------------------+
| qos_raw | 0 | 1 | 1 | Raw passthrough |
| qos_raw_safe | 0 | 1 | 0 | Raw + CRC trailer |
| qos_rt | 1 | 1 | 1 | FRCP, no FRTX, no CRC |
| qos_rt_safe | 1 | 1 | 0 | FRCP, no FRTX, CRC |
| qos_msg | 1 | 0 | 0 | FRCP + FRTX |
| qos_stream | 2 | 0 | 0 | FRCP + FRTX, stream |
+----------------+---------+------+-----+-----------------------+
in_order=0 sends raw datagrams with no PCI (UDP-equivalent);
in_order=1 engages FRCP with SDU framing; in_order=2 (stream) requires
loss=0 and is rejected otherwise. loss=0 engages the FRTX retransmit
machinery. ber=0 appends the CRC-32 trailer; QOS_DISABLE_CRC at build
time forces ber=1 for development. Encryption is a separate per-flow
attribute layered as an AEAD wrap outside the FRCP packet.
Heritage: delta-t (Watson 1981) supplies timer-based connection
management - no SYN/FIN handshake, the DRF marker, the t_mpl / t_a /
t_r timers. RINA (Day 2008) supplies the unified flow_alloc(name, qos,
...) primitive and the orthogonal QoS-cube axes. Loss detection
follows TCP/QUIC practice (RFCs 2018, 2883, 6582, 6298, 8985); RTT
probing is nonce-authenticated like QUIC PATH_CHALLENGE.
Adds oftp, a minimal file-transfer tool over an FRCP stream flow. The
client reads from stdin or --in FILE and writes through a
flow_alloc(qos_stream); the server (--listen) calls flow_accept and
writes to stdout or --out FILE. Both sides compute a CRC-64/NVMe over
the bytes they handle and print the result. The server rejects flows
whose negotiated qs.in_order != STREAM.
Two FRCP knobs are exposed via env vars on either side:
OFTP_FRCT_RTO_MIN fccntl FRCTSRTOMIN (ns)
OFTP_FRCT_STREAM_RING_SZ fccntl FRCTSRRINGSZ (octets)
The ocbr_client gains an OCBR_QOS env var to pick the cube the client
uses for flow_alloc; recognised values are raw, safe, rt, rt_safe,
msg, stream. Unknown values fall back to raw with a warning on
stderr. Without the env set behaviour is unchanged.
Removes the deprecated lib/timerwheel.c
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Renames the allocation for head/tail to push/pop instead of
alloc/release as it's simpler and shorter. Took this approach insted
of adopting the kernel's push/pull/put/trim.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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RXM_BUFFER_ON_HEAP and SSM_POOL_BLOCKS were no longer used.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Mark ssm_pk_buff_get_off, _head, _tail, and _len as taking a const
struct ssm_pk_buff *. Cast through the flex array in _head and _tail
since the buffer view they return remains mutable.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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FRCT needs to know the MTU for fragmentation. The MTU is now passed
from the layer serving the flow to the process as part of flow
allocation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Introduce a generic 3-level / 256-slot deadline-ordered callback queue
(1 ms / 16 ms / 256 ms per-slot resolution at levels 0/1/2). Will
replace the existing timerwheel.c.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Per-process flow / fd / fqueue limits are properties of a process, not
a program; align the naming. Mechanical rename of PROG_MAX_FLOWS,
PROG_RES_FDS, and PROG_MAX_FQUEUES to PROC_*.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The threadpool manager (TPM) test unnecessarily included the source
instead of the header.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Moves the atomics macros that were defined between eth and ssm_pool to
their own header.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The test was not correctly taking the correct size class. Moved the
select_size_class to the common header so tests can use it.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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ssm_rbuff_close used to unmap the SHM page immediately, leaving any
in-flight peer-process thread that was inside pthread_mutex_lock or
pthread_cond_wait on the SHM-resident sync primitives reading freed
memory. Adds an n_users counter, bumped on entry and dropped on exit
of every function that touches the mutex / cond vars (write, write_b,
read, read_b, fini), and have ssm_rbuff_close poll-spin until the
counter drains before tearing down.
ssm_rbuff_read now re-checks IS_EMPTY after taking the mutex, plugging
a TOCTOU where two readers could both pass a lock-free fast path and
the loser would read a stale TAIL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The RIB lock only needs to protect operations on the components
list. This avoids holding the lock on longer RIB reads.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The shared memory pool is now offset based instead of block
index-based like the old shm_rdrbuff allocator. This renames the API
more consistently. Also changes variables names to off instead of idx
for consistency.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The pool_copy_spb function was consuming the packet buffer on error,
causing double free errors.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Fixes detection of PMULL on aarch64 without crypto extensions. Adds a
crc64_nvme_step helper function in CRC64 to avoid code
duplication and cleans up the comments.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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These checksum will be handy for header checksums.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Add CRC-64/NVMe implementation with compile-time hardware backend
selection:
x86 PCLMUL+SSE4.1 fold-by-16 (HAVE_PCLMUL)
aarch64 PMULL fold-by-16 when (HAVE_PMULL)
and a byte-table fallback.
It's added as HASH_CRC64 to enum hash_algo (in the internal-use-only
section after HASH_MD5). Both mem_hash() and hash_len() early-return
for HASH_CRC64 because libgcrypt has no CRC-64/NVMe.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Add cmake/utils/CPUUtils.cmake providing detect_cpu_feature() plus
detect_pclmul() and detect_pmull() that compile-test for x86
PCLMULQDQ+SSE4.1 and aarch64 FEAT_PMULL respectively.
This will be useful for hardware accelerated CRC64/NVMe integrity
checks.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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i2d_X509() allocated buf->data via OPENSSL_malloc(), but callers free
it with freebuf() which uses free(). Fix by allocating with malloc()
and encoding directly into the buffer. Also replaces MSGBUFSZ with
CRYPT_KEY_BUFSZ (4096) for key material buffers and removes leftover
debug logging.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Now uses calloc to zero the previously uninitialized security path
fields. Also fixes a check in protobuf.c
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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When auth_verify_crt fails (e.g., missing root CA),
crypt_get_pubkey_crt has already allocated pk but only crt was freed.
Adds a crypt_cleanup() function to wrap OpenSSL_cleanup(), as OpenSSL
lazily initializes a global decoder/provider registry the first time
PEM_read_bio or OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey is called, and this
leaves some memory owned by OpenSSL that triggers the leak sanitizer.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This adds authentication tests to verify flows are rejected with a
missing root CA certificate in the store. Also adds one for the OAP
protocol.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The Global Shared Packet Pool (GSPP) was not correctly chowned to the
ouroboros group.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Remove double-free in ssm_pool_destroy — ssm_pool_close already frees
the pool. The pool sharding test had a free spbs/ptrs on partial
malloc failure. Now initializes children array to -1 to prevent
reading uninitialized values.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The static analyzer complained about the struct in6_addr malloc being
converted to uint8_t *. Fixed by casting IN6_LEN to a size_t numeric
value instead of the direct sizeof.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The DHT uses a struct {struct list_head, size_t len} pattern, which is
also useful in the registry and other places. Having a struct llist
(defined in list.h) with consistent macros for addition/deletion etc
removes a lot of duplication and boilerplate and reduces the risk of
inconsistent updates.
The list management is now a macro-only implementation.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This replaces the single HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC/DISABLE_PQC with
per-algorithm CMake variables (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), gated by the
OpenSSL versions: ML-KEM and ML-DSA require >= 3.4, SLH-DSA >= 3.5.
SLH-DSA was already working, but now added explicit authentication
tests for it with a full certificate chain (root CA, intermediate CA,
server) to show full support.
Rename PQC test files and cert headers to use algorithm-specific names
(ml_kem, ml_dsa, slh_dsa) and move cert headers to
include/test/certs/.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Each side's configured cipher, KDF, and KEX algorithm now
represents a minimum security floor ("at least this strong").
Cipher and KDF use strongest-wins: the server compares ranks
and selects the stronger of client vs server config. The
negotiated values are sent in the response header. The client
verifies the server's response meets its own minimum, which
prevents downgrade attacks on the wire.
KEX uses a minimum-floor check: the server extracts the
client's algorithm from its public key and rejects if it
ranks below the server's configured algorithm. A server
configured with ML-KEM will reject all classical algorithms.
Special case: for client-encap KEM, the client has already
derived its key using its KDF, so the server must use the
same KDF and can only reject if it is too weak.
The supported_nids arrays are ordered weakest to strongest
and serve as the single source of truth for ranking.
Cipher ranking (weakest to strongest):
aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr,
aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm,
chacha20-poly1305
KDF ranking (weakest to strongest):
blake2s256, sha256, sha3-256, sha384,
sha3-384, blake2b512, sha512, sha3-512
KEX ranking (weakest to strongest):
ffdhe2048, prime256v1, X25519, ffdhe3072,
secp384r1, ffdhe4096, X448, secp521r1,
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024,
X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Negotiation outcomes:
strong srv cipher + weak cli cipher -> use strongest
weak srv cipher + strong cli cipher -> use strongest
srv encryption + cli none -> server rejects
srv none + cli encryption -> use client's
strong srv KEX + weak cli KEX -> server rejects
weak srv KEX + strong cli KEX -> succeeds
wire tamper to weaker cipher -> client rejects
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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OS X doesn't support chmod on shm files after creation. Since we
already set the mode at creation, that call was redundant. Fixed the
getpeereid() function was not accessible because of the guards. Fixed
some differences between macOS and Linux with gid_t vs int usage.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The result of fchown and fchmod weren't checked, causing some
compilers to complain. Updated the test to create a PUP instead of
"non-root" version of the GSPP. Removed the environment variable for
the test suffix as this is not needed.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This moves the build definitions back to src/ subdirectories
(CMakeLists.txt per component). Configuration and dependencies are
kept out of tree. Configuration options are bundled into cmake/config/
modules. Dependencies are grouped by component (system/, crypt/, eth/,
coverage/, etc.). It now consistently uses target-based commands
(target_include_directories, target_link_libraries) instead of global
include_directories(). Proper PRIVATE/PUBLIC visibility for executable
link libraries. CONFIG_OUROBOROS_DEBUG now properly set based on being
a valid debug config (not just checking the string name).
It also adds OuroborosTargets export for find_package() support and
CMake package config files (OuroborosConfig.cmake) for easier
integration with CMake projects.
The build logic now follows more idiomatic CMake practices with
configuration separated from target definitions.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The IRMd will now check the user UID and GID for privileged access,
avoiding unprivileged users being able to disrupt all IPC (e.g. by
shm_open the single pool and corrupting its metadata).
Non-privileged users are now limited to a PUP (per-user pool) for
sending/receiving packets. It is still created by the IRMd, but owned
by the user (uid) with 600 permissions. It does not add additional
copies for local IPC between their own processes (i.e. over the local
IPCP), but packets between processes owned by a different user or
destined over the network (other IPCPs) will incur a copy when
crossing the PUP / PUP or the PUP / GSPP boundary.
Privileged users and users in the ouroboros group still have direct
access to the GSPP (globally shared private pool) for packet transfer
that will avoid additional copies when processing packets between
processes owned by different users and to the network.
This aligns the security model with UNIX trust domains defined by UID
and GID by leveraging file permission on the pools in shared memory.
┌─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┐
│ Source Pool │ Dest Pool │ Operation │ Copies │
├─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┤
│ GSPP │ GSPP │ Zero-copy │ 0 │
│ PUP.uid │ PUP.uid │ Zero-copy │ 0 │
│ PUP.uid1 │ PUP.uid2 │ memcpy() │ 1 │
│ PUP.uid │ GSPP │ memcpy() │ 1 │
│ GSPP │ PUP.uid │ memcpy() │ 1 │
└─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────┘
This also renames the struct ai ("application instance") in dev.c to
struct proc (process).
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The include headers and NIDs are different on macOS X. It also doesn't
have explicit_bzero.
The crypt.h includes are now guarded to work on OS X (trying to avoid
the includes by defining the OpenSSL mac header guard led to a whole
list of other issues).
The explicit zero'ing of buffers temporarily holding secrets has now
been abstracted in a crypt_secure_clear() function defaulting to
OpenSSL_cleanse, explicit_bzero (if present) or a best-effort option
using a volatile pointer.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The crypt_test had a HAVE_OPENSSL guard missing and was trying to
execute tests that required OpenSSL without it being installed. The
SECMEM values need to be set by CMake without OpenSSL installed.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This is a first step towards the Secure Shared Memory (SSM)
infrastructure for Ouroboros, which will allow proper resource
separation for non-privileged processes.
This replaces the rdrbuff (random-deletion ring buffer) PoC allocator
with a sharded slab allocator for the packet buffer pool to avoid the
head-of-line blocking behaviour of the rdrb and reduce lock contention
in multi-process scenarios. Each size class contains multiple
independent shards, allowing parallel allocations without blocking.
- Configurable shard count per size class (default: 4, set via
SSM_POOL_SHARDS in CMake). The configured number of blocks are
spread over the number of shards. As an example:
SSM_POOL_512_BLOCKS = 768 blocks total
These 768 blocks are shared among 4 shards
(not 768 × 4 = 3072 blocks)
- Lazy block distribution: all blocks initially reside in shard 0
and naturally migrate to process-local shards upon first
allocation and subsequent free operations
- Fallback with work stealing: processes attempt allocation from
their local shard (pid % SSM_POOL_SHARDS) first, then steal
from other shards if local is exhausted, eliminating
fragmentation while maintaining low contention
- Round-robin condvar signaling: blocking allocations cycle
through all shard condition variables to ensure fairness
- Blocks freed to allocator's shard: uses allocator_pid to
determine target shard, enabling natural load balancing as
process allocation patterns stabilize over time
Maintains existing robust mutex semantics including EOWNERDEAD
handling for dead process recovery. Internal structures exposed in
ssm.h for testing purposes. Adds some tests (pool_test,
pool_sharding_test.c. etc) verifying lazy distribution, migration,
fallback stealing, and multiprocess behavior.
Updates the ring buffer (rbuff) to use relaxed/acquire/release
ordering on atomic indices. The ring buffer requires the (robust)
mutex to ensure cross-structure synchronization between pool buffer
writes and ring buffer index publication.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The tests were not correct as the library was compiled with the
default 1 << 20 epoch. Added a parametere to the sk configuration that
specifies the epoch size. Set to 1 << KEY_ROTATION_BIT in dev.c, but
lowered to 7 in unit tests.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The hardcoded certificates were re-introduced in ea52d5275, breaking
the build.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Implement forward-secret key rotation using HKDF key derivation. The
operation is based on QUIC RFC 9001 and wireguard.
Keys rotate every 2^KEY_ROTATION_BIT packets, with the current phase
(P) signaled via controlling a bit in the IV (bit 7, first bit on the
wire). Default 20 (1M packets).
The wire format, after the DT header is:
[ P | random IV ][ encrypted blob ][ AEAD tag ]
Works with and without retransmission, and the FRCT header is fully
contained in the encrypted blob if used.
The receiver detects phase changes and rotates accordingly, keeping
the previous key valid during a grace period. This handles packet
reordering in unreliable flows: the 3/4 period protection window
prevents premature rotation when late packets arrive, while the
1/2 period grace window ensures the old key remains available for
decryption.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The packet buffer was allocating a fixed header for the IV, but did
not account for the tag at all (remnant of the old hardcoded CBC
mode-only proof-of-concept). Never ran into issues because we always
reserved ample space. But it now properly reserves the correct space
for IV and tag.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The openssl_crt_str function was using BIO_get_mem_data() but this is
not guaranteed to be NULL-terminated, causing buffer overruns. This
was the root cause of ASan tests with certificates running for
minutes and eventually getting killed on the CI/CD pipeline:
Start 1: lib/auth_test
1/26 Test #1: lib/auth_test ......................***Skipped 312.75 sec
Start 16: irmd/oap/oap_test
16/26 Test #16: irmd/oap/oap_test ..................***Skipped 345.87 sec
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The test_oap_piggyback_data was not cleaning up the passed data
correctly.
Also, a FILE * was not properly closed in the openssl
load_pubkey_raw_file_to_der() wrapper. Refactored some fail paths to
make them easier to read.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This prevents them from swapping to disk and killing performance. It
also enhances security a little bit by reducing the risk of sensitive
(even encrypted) data being paged out and captured.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and
post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication
(ML-DSA).
Supported key exchange algorithms:
ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448
Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Supported ciphers:
AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305
CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr
Supported HKDFs:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
Supported Digests for DSA:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via
CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when
available.
KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles:
one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a
coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The
kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles:
kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy)
kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key)
The enc.conf file format supports:
kex=<algorithm> # Key exchange algorithm
cipher=<algorithm> # Symmetric cipher
kdf=<KDF> # Key derivation function
digest=<digest> # Digest for DSA
kem_mode=<mode> # Server (default) or client
none # Disable encryption
The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX
data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication
infrastructure for integrity and replay protection.
Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC
compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c).
Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0
(required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The test output is a bit polluted with logs originating fomr the
logging system, e.g.:
23: test_bind_prog started.
23: ==16636== reg/name(DB): Add prog reg_test to name testname.
23: ==16636== reg(EE): Removing from names.
23: test_bind_prog succeeded.
This adds a flag DISABLE_TEST_LOGGING that suppresses log_* output in
tests to keep them clean:
23: test_bind_prog started.
23: test_bind_prog succeeded.
The status is printed in CMake output:
-- Ouroboros logging in test output disabled
-- Ouroboros logging in test output enabled
By default the flag is ON (clean test output).
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Renames the macros and adds functions for handling the robust mutexes
to reduce the preprocessor invasions.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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