| Commit message (Collapse) | Author | Age | Files | Lines |
|---|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Stop the non-OpenSSL runners from masking a real failure as SKIP by
only downgrading to SKIP if they passed.
Fix a stray call that ran test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo in the skip branch.
Fix double free + free of an uninitialised pointer in test_store_add.
Test that a KDF- less derive must fail.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
ML-KEM, ML-DSA and SLH-DSA all landed in OpenSSL 3.5.0, not 3.4.0.
ML-KEM+ML-DSA and SLH-DSA can be disabled by DISABLE_ML / DISABLE_SLH.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
Nest the flat req_auth and cacert members of struct sec_config into a
sub-struct a { req; cacert; }, keeping the authentication settings
together.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This contains a few improvements and fixes in the OpenSSL backed. We
now zeroize shared secrets with OPENSSL_clear_free. The i2d_PUBKEY
output is bound against CRYPT_KEY_BUFSZ. We now return NULL rather
than silently falling back to SHA-256 when a digest is unknown. FILE
handles are now closed via pthread cleanup so a cancelled thread
cannot leak them. The DHE kex tests now set the KDF NID explicitly,
since the SHA-256 fallback is gone.
Also refactors the PEM string loaders to clean up some code duplication.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
A peer certificate that verifies against the CA store could have
been issued by any trusted CA, and a peer could pick any supported
digest for its signature. Tighten the authentication contract with
two local policies.
cacert= pins the issuing CA: a peer certificate, if presented, must
chain through the pinned CA. Whether a certificate is mandatory at
all remains controlled by auth= alone.
digest= now also pins the signature digest: a classical peer must sign
with the locally configured digest, and may not omit the digest NID to
fall back to the key's default digest. PQC signatures (ML-DSA,
SLH-DSA) have an intrinsic digest and may be NID_undef.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
OAP accepted requests and responses without a certificate even when
the peer was expected to authenticate. An on-path attacker could
strip the certificate and signature from a flow allocation response
and substitute its own key exchange, silently downgrading the
handshake to unauthenticated.
Add an auth=required|optional policy to enc.conf, enforced per role: a
client config requires the server to present a valid certificate, a
server config requires the same from the client. Default is required
for client side (https), optional server side. The client side default
can be changed via OAP_CLIENT_AUTH_DEFAULT for testing.
Replace the bare 'none' keyword with encryption=none, which disables
encryption only: the digest and the authentication policy are kept, so
authenticated but unencrypted flows can be configured. Configs using
bare 'none' are now rejected.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
i2d_X509() allocated buf->data via OPENSSL_malloc(), but callers free
it with freebuf() which uses free(). Fix by allocating with malloc()
and encoding directly into the buffer. Also replaces MSGBUFSZ with
CRYPT_KEY_BUFSZ (4096) for key material buffers and removes leftover
debug logging.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
| |
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
This replaces the single HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC/DISABLE_PQC with
per-algorithm CMake variables (ML-KEM, ML-DSA, SLH-DSA), gated by the
OpenSSL versions: ML-KEM and ML-DSA require >= 3.4, SLH-DSA >= 3.5.
SLH-DSA was already working, but now added explicit authentication
tests for it with a full certificate chain (root CA, intermediate CA,
server) to show full support.
Rename PQC test files and cert headers to use algorithm-specific names
(ml_kem, ml_dsa, slh_dsa) and move cert headers to
include/test/certs/.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
| |
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
|
| |
The include headers and NIDs are different on macOS X. It also doesn't
have explicit_bzero.
The crypt.h includes are now guarded to work on OS X (trying to avoid
the includes by defining the OpenSSL mac header guard led to a whole
list of other issues).
The explicit zero'ing of buffers temporarily holding secrets has now
been abstracted in a crypt_secure_clear() function defaulting to
OpenSSL_cleanse, explicit_bzero (if present) or a best-effort option
using a volatile pointer.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
|
|
This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and
post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication
(ML-DSA).
Supported key exchange algorithms:
ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448
Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Supported ciphers:
AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305
CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr
Supported HKDFs:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
Supported Digests for DSA:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via
CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when
available.
KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles:
one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a
coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The
kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles:
kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy)
kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key)
The enc.conf file format supports:
kex=<algorithm> # Key exchange algorithm
cipher=<algorithm> # Symmetric cipher
kdf=<KDF> # Key derivation function
digest=<digest> # Digest for DSA
kem_mode=<mode> # Server (default) or client
none # Disable encryption
The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX
data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication
infrastructure for integrity and replay protection.
Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC
compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c).
Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0
(required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
|
