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This cleans up a few debug logs related to encryption to not show KEM
info for non-KEM algorithms. Also removes refcount logs for the PUP.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Each side's configured cipher, KDF, and KEX algorithm now
represents a minimum security floor ("at least this strong").
Cipher and KDF use strongest-wins: the server compares ranks
and selects the stronger of client vs server config. The
negotiated values are sent in the response header. The client
verifies the server's response meets its own minimum, which
prevents downgrade attacks on the wire.
KEX uses a minimum-floor check: the server extracts the
client's algorithm from its public key and rejects if it
ranks below the server's configured algorithm. A server
configured with ML-KEM will reject all classical algorithms.
Special case: for client-encap KEM, the client has already
derived its key using its KDF, so the server must use the
same KDF and can only reject if it is too weak.
The supported_nids arrays are ordered weakest to strongest
and serve as the single source of truth for ranking.
Cipher ranking (weakest to strongest):
aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr,
aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm,
chacha20-poly1305
KDF ranking (weakest to strongest):
blake2s256, sha256, sha3-256, sha384,
sha3-384, blake2b512, sha512, sha3-512
KEX ranking (weakest to strongest):
ffdhe2048, prime256v1, X25519, ffdhe3072,
secp384r1, ffdhe4096, X448, secp521r1,
ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024,
X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Negotiation outcomes:
strong srv cipher + weak cli cipher -> use strongest
weak srv cipher + strong cli cipher -> use strongest
srv encryption + cli none -> server rejects
srv none + cli encryption -> use client's
strong srv KEX + weak cli KEX -> server rejects
weak srv KEX + strong cli KEX -> succeeds
wire tamper to weaker cipher -> client rejects
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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The include headers and NIDs are different on macOS X. It also doesn't
have explicit_bzero.
The crypt.h includes are now guarded to work on OS X (trying to avoid
the includes by defining the OpenSSL mac header guard led to a whole
list of other issues).
The explicit zero'ing of buffers temporarily holding secrets has now
been abstracted in a crypt_secure_clear() function defaulting to
OpenSSL_cleanse, explicit_bzero (if present) or a best-effort option
using a volatile pointer.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and
post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication
(ML-DSA).
Supported key exchange algorithms:
ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448
Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Supported ciphers:
AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305
CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr
Supported HKDFs:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
Supported Digests for DSA:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via
CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when
available.
KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles:
one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a
coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The
kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles:
kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy)
kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key)
The enc.conf file format supports:
kex=<algorithm> # Key exchange algorithm
cipher=<algorithm> # Symmetric cipher
kdf=<KDF> # Key derivation function
digest=<digest> # Digest for DSA
kem_mode=<mode> # Server (default) or client
none # Disable encryption
The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX
data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication
infrastructure for integrity and replay protection.
Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC
compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c).
Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0
(required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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