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Removes the UDP and Ethernet shim IPCPs. The unicast and broadcast
IPCPs can now directly attach to a "legacy" socket. We adopt Saltzer's
Point-of-Attachment terminology, also advocated in Day's "Patterns in
Network Architecture". The "poa" component manages these
PoA's with one management thread, one link monitoring thread and one
thread per attached point.
For Ethernet PoA's the irm connect and enroll can resolve the
destination IPCP or Layer name with a broadcast name query over the
attached PoAs (first reply wins). UDP PoA's require a destination IP
address or FQDN.
attach to a local endpoint (required both server and client side):
irm ipcp poa attach name a udp 10.0.0.1
irm ipcp poa attach name a udp 10.0.0.1:3435
irm ipcp poa attach name a udp [::1]:3435
irm ipcp poa attach name a eth dev eth0
irm ipcp poa attach name a eth dev eth0 ethertype 0xA000
release a PoA (refused while it carries a flow):
irm ipcp poa detach name a udp 10.0.0.1:3435
irm ipcp poa detach name a eth eth0
list an IPCP's PoAs:
irm ipcp poa list name a
connect to a peer, by name or at an address:
irm ipcp connect name b dst a
irm ipcp connect name b dst a eth
irm ipcp connect name b dst a eth dev eth0
irm ipcp connect name b dst a udp 10.0.0.1:3435
irm ipcp connect name b dst a udp peer.example.com:3435
disconnect by peer name, no address:
irm ipcp disconnect name b dst a
irm ipcp disconnect name b dst a component mgmt
enroll has the same shape as connect:
irm ipcp enroll name b layer lr autobind
irm ipcp enroll name b layer lr autobind eth dev eth0
irm ipcp enroll name b layer lr autobind udp 10.0.0.1:3435
the IRMd config file attaches PoAs and names peers the same way:
udp = [ "10.0.0.1", "10.0.0.1:3436" ]
eth = [ "eth0", {dev="eth1", ethertype=0xA007} ]
enrol={dst="LAN", eth={dev="eth0"}}
conn=[{dst="lan3", eth={}}, {dst="lan4", udp="10.0.0.1:3435"}]
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Adds support for:
Server key confirmation: the session key is bound to the
negotiated algorithm via the HKDF info. The server returns a
key-confirmation tag (rsp_tag, replacing the bare request-hash echo),
so a cipher downgrade or key desync is detected. The cleartext path
keeps a request echo, compared in constant time.
Sealed server identity: AEAD-seal the certificate, signature and
piggybacked data in the encrypted response (kex and rsp_tag move
ahead as AAD), hiding the server identity and response sizes.
Cert-less re-key: let the client omit its certificate, verifying the
peer against the cached certificate. On PQC flows, ephemeral
server-encap KEX (preserving forward secrecy) is used, even if the
original flow allocation was client-encap.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and
post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication
(ML-DSA).
Supported key exchange algorithms:
ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448
Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Supported ciphers:
AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305
CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr
Supported HKDFs:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
Supported Digests for DSA:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via
CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when
available.
KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles:
one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a
coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The
kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles:
kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy)
kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key)
The enc.conf file format supports:
kex=<algorithm> # Key exchange algorithm
cipher=<algorithm> # Symmetric cipher
kdf=<KDF> # Key derivation function
digest=<digest> # Digest for DSA
kem_mode=<mode> # Server (default) or client
none # Disable encryption
The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX
data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication
infrastructure for integrity and replay protection.
Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC
compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c).
Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0
(required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This adds a DEBUG_PROTO_OAP option to show some information in the OAP
headers received by the IRMd during flow allocation.
Example for unencrypted flow (send):
OAP_HDR [528b7bf81df8e9bc @ 2025-08-05 17:05:29 (UTC) ] -->
Certificate: <none>
Ephemeral Public Key: <none>
Data: <none>
Signature: <none>
Example for encrypted flow (rcv):
OAP_HDR [4ff83072e0ed54b3 @ 2025-08-05 17:06:23 (UTC) ] <--
Certificate: <none>
Ephemeral Public Key [91 bytes]:
Data: <none>
Signature: <none>
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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This adds the initial version for the flow allocation protocol header
between IRMd instances. This is a step towards flow authentication.
The header supports secure and authenticated flow allocation,
supporting certificate-based authentication and ephemeral key
exchange for end-to-end encryption.
id: 128-bit identifier for the entity.
timestamp: 64-bit timestamp (replay protection).
certificate: Certificate for authentication.
public key: ECDHE public key for key exchange.
data: Application data.
signature: Signature for integrity/authenticity.
Authentication and encryption require OpenSSL to be installed.
The IRMd compares the allocation request delay with the MPL of the
Layer over which the flow allocation was sent. MPL is now reported by
the Layer in ms instead of seconds.
Time functions revised for consistency and adds some tests.
The TPM can now print thread running times in Debug builds
(TPM_DEBUG_REPORT_INTERVAL) and abort processes with hung threads
(TPM_DEBUG_ABORT_TIMEOUT). Long running threads waiting for input
should call tpm_wait_work() to avoid trigger a process abort.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
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