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-rw-r--r--cmake/dependencies/openssl.cmake21
-rw-r--r--cmake/ipcp/eth.cmake4
-rw-r--r--cmake/irmd.cmake12
-rw-r--r--cmake/tests.cmake3
-rw-r--r--cmake/utils/TestUtils.cmake6
-rw-r--r--doc/man/ouroboros.86
-rw-r--r--enc.conf.in150
-rw-r--r--include/ouroboros/crypt.h285
-rw-r--r--include/ouroboros/flow.h4
-rw-r--r--include/ouroboros/name.h4
-rw-r--r--include/ouroboros/serdes-irm.h4
-rw-r--r--include/ouroboros/utils.h7
-rw-r--r--include/test/certs.h125
-rw-r--r--include/test/certs_pqc.h656
-rw-r--r--include/test/test.h (renamed from include/ouroboros/test.h)22
-rw-r--r--irmd.conf.in4
-rw-r--r--src/ipcpd/config.h.in9
-rw-r--r--src/ipcpd/eth/eth.c8
-rw-r--r--src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/CMakeLists.txt6
-rw-r--r--src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/dht_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/ipcpd/unicast/pff/tests/CMakeLists.txt4
-rw-r--r--src/ipcpd/unicast/routing/tests/CMakeLists.txt4
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/config.h.in6
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/main.c746
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap.c290
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap.h93
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/auth.c252
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/auth.h (renamed from src/irmd/tests/irm_test.c)20
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/cli.c553
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/hdr.c456
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/hdr.h159
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/internal.h133
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/io.c132
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/io.h40
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/srv.c462
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/CMakeLists.txt78
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/common.c457
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/common.h100
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c947
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_pqc.c363
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/ipcp.c1
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/CMakeLists.txt4
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/flow_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/ipcp_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/name_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/proc_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/prog_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/reg/tests/reg_test.c4
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/tests/CMakeLists.txt28
-rw-r--r--src/irmd/tests/oap_test.c948
-rw-r--r--src/lib/config.h.in4
-rw-r--r--src/lib/crypt.c647
-rw-r--r--src/lib/crypt/openssl.c1190
-rw-r--r--src/lib/crypt/openssl.h99
-rw-r--r--src/lib/dev.c101
-rw-r--r--src/lib/pb/irm.proto9
-rw-r--r--src/lib/protobuf.c3
-rw-r--r--src/lib/serdes-irm.c24
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt14
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/auth_test.c157
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c356
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c262
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/hash_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/kex_test.c844
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c549
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/time_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c2
-rw-r--r--src/lib/utils.c19
-rw-r--r--src/tools/irm/irm_name_create.c4
70 files changed, 10289 insertions, 1629 deletions
diff --git a/cmake/dependencies/openssl.cmake b/cmake/dependencies/openssl.cmake
index 604d5d99..19edfa2b 100644
--- a/cmake/dependencies/openssl.cmake
+++ b/cmake/dependencies/openssl.cmake
@@ -1,21 +1,36 @@
find_package(OpenSSL QUIET)
if (OPENSSL_FOUND)
set(HAVE_OPENSSL_RNG TRUE)
- if (OPENSSL_VERSION VERSION_LESS "1.1.0")
- message(STATUS "Install version >= \"1.1.0\" to enable OpenSSL support "
+ if (OPENSSL_VERSION VERSION_LESS "3.0.0")
+ message(STATUS "Install version >= 3.0.0 to enable OpenSSL support "
"(found version \"${OPENSSL_VERSION}\")")
else ()
set(DISABLE_OPENSSL FALSE CACHE BOOL "Disable OpenSSL support")
if (NOT DISABLE_OPENSSL)
message(STATUS "OpenSSL support enabled")
set(HAVE_OPENSSL TRUE CACHE INTERNAL "")
+ set(IRMD_SECMEM_MAX 1048576 CACHE STRING "IRMd secure heap size")
+ set(PROC_SECMEM_MAX 1048576 CACHE STRING "Process secure heap size")
+ set(SECMEM_GUARD 32 CACHE STRING "Secure heap min size")
+ set(DISABLE_PQC FALSE CACHE BOOL "Disable post-quantum cryptography support")
+ if (OPENSSL_VERSION VERSION_GREATER_EQUAL "3.4.0")
+ if (NOT DISABLE_PQC)
+ set(HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC TRUE CACHE INTERNAL "")
+ message(STATUS "OpenSSL PQC support enabled")
+ else()
+ message(STATUS "OpenSSL PQC support disabled by user")
+ unset(HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC CACHE)
+ endif()
+ else()
+ message(STATUS "Install OpenSSL >= 3.4.0 for PQC support")
+ endif()
else()
message(STATUS "OpenSSL support disabled")
unset(HAVE_OPENSSL CACHE)
endif()
endif ()
else()
- message(STATUS "Install openSSL version >= \"1.1.0\" to enable OpenSSL support")
+ message(STATUS "Install OpenSSL version >= 3.0.0 to enable OpenSSL support")
unset(HAVE_OPENSSL_RNG)
unset(HAVE_OPENSSL CACHE)
set(OPENSSL_INCLUDE_DIR "")
diff --git a/cmake/ipcp/eth.cmake b/cmake/ipcp/eth.cmake
index 0d37bf9b..c14a1d6e 100644
--- a/cmake/ipcp/eth.cmake
+++ b/cmake/ipcp/eth.cmake
@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ set(IPCP_ETH_WR_THR 1 CACHE STRING
"Number of writer threads in Ethernet IPCP")
set(IPCP_ETH_QDISC_BYPASS false CACHE BOOL
"Bypass the Qdisc in the kernel when using raw sockets")
-set(IPCP_ETH_LO_MTU 1500 CACHE STRING
+set(IPCP_ETH_LO_MTU 9000 CACHE STRING
"Restrict Ethernet MTU over loopback interfaces")
+set(IPCP_ETH_MGMT_FRAME_SIZE 9000 CACHE STRING
+ "Management frame buffer size for Ethernet IPCPs")
set(IPCP_ETH_MPL 100 CACHE STRING
"Default maximum packet lifetime for the Ethernet IPCPs, in ms")
diff --git a/cmake/irmd.cmake b/cmake/irmd.cmake
index d4b4808c..f02f37d6 100644
--- a/cmake/irmd.cmake
+++ b/cmake/irmd.cmake
@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ set(CONNECT_TIMEOUT 20000 CACHE STRING
"Timeout to connect an IPCP to another IPCP (ms)")
set(FLOW_ALLOC_TIMEOUT 20000 CACHE STRING
"Timeout for a flow allocation response (ms)")
+set(OAP_REPLAY_TIMER 20 CACHE STRING
+ "OAP replay protection window (s)")
set(IRMD_MIN_THREADS 8 CACHE STRING
"Minimum number of worker threads in the IRMd")
set(IRMD_ADD_THREADS 8 CACHE STRING
@@ -55,8 +57,12 @@ if (LIBTOML_LIBRARIES)
set(INSTALL_DIR "${CMAKE_INSTALL_PREFIX}/${CMAKE_INSTALL_BINDIR}")
configure_file("${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/irmd.conf.in"
"${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_FILE}.example" @ONLY)
+ configure_file("${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/enc.conf.in"
+ "${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/enc.conf.example" @ONLY)
install(FILES "${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_FILE}.example"
DESTINATION "${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR}")
+ install(FILES "${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/enc.conf.example"
+ DESTINATION "${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR}")
install(CODE "
if (NOT EXISTS \"${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR}/${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_FILE}\")
file(WRITE \"${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR}/${OUROBOROS_CONFIG_FILE}\" \"\")
@@ -81,7 +87,11 @@ set(IRMD_SOURCES
"${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/ipcp.c"
"${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/configfile.c"
"${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/main.c"
- "${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/oap.c"
+ "${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/oap/io.c"
+ "${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/oap/hdr.c"
+ "${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/oap/auth.c"
+ "${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/oap/srv.c"
+ "${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/oap/cli.c"
"${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/reg/flow.c"
"${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/reg/ipcp.c"
"${IRMD_SOURCE_DIR}/reg/proc.c"
diff --git a/cmake/tests.cmake b/cmake/tests.cmake
index 4c16171c..456ad120 100644
--- a/cmake/tests.cmake
+++ b/cmake/tests.cmake
@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
include(CTest) # Sets BUILD_TESTING by default to on.
+include(utils/TestUtils)
include(utils/DisableTestLogging)
@@ -16,7 +17,7 @@ if (BUILD_TESTS)
# Add test subdirectories
add_subdirectory(src/lib/tests)
- add_subdirectory(src/irmd/tests)
+ add_subdirectory(src/irmd/oap/tests)
add_subdirectory(src/ipcpd/unicast/pff/tests)
add_subdirectory(src/ipcpd/unicast/routing/tests)
add_subdirectory(src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests)
diff --git a/cmake/utils/TestUtils.cmake b/cmake/utils/TestUtils.cmake
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e40bdda1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/cmake/utils/TestUtils.cmake
@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+# Compute test name prefix from directory structure
+function(compute_test_prefix)
+ file(RELATIVE_PATH _prefix "${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/src" "${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}")
+ string(REGEX REPLACE "/tests$" "" _prefix "${_prefix}")
+ set(TEST_PREFIX "${_prefix}" PARENT_SCOPE)
+endfunction(compute_test_prefix)
diff --git a/doc/man/ouroboros.8 b/doc/man/ouroboros.8
index 5d3d9475..759b1433 100644
--- a/doc/man/ouroboros.8
+++ b/doc/man/ouroboros.8
@@ -389,11 +389,11 @@ not accept future flow allocation requests for \fIname\fR.
.SH IRM NAME COMMANDS
.PP
\fBirm name create \fIname\fR lb \fIpolicy\fR
-[sencpath \fI/path/to/server/enc.cfg\fR]
+[sencpath \fI/path/to/server/enc.conf\fR]
[scrtpath \fI/path/to/server/crt.pem\fR]
[skeypath \fI/path/to/server/key.pem\fR]
-[cencpath \fI/path/to/client/enc.cfg\fR]
+[cencpath \fI/path/to/client/enc.conf\fR]
[ccrtpath \fI/path/to/client/crt.pem\fR]
[ckeypath \fI/path/to/client/key.pem\fR]
.RS 4
@@ -401,7 +401,7 @@ Create a name \fIname\fR with a load-balancing policy and security credentials
.br
\fIpolicy\fR: round-robin, spillover
.br
-\fI/path/to/enc.cfg\fR: The path to the server and client encryption configuration.
+\fI/path/to/enc.conf\fR: The path to the server and client encryption configuration.
\fI/path/to/pem\fR: The path to the server and client certificates and
private keys, in pem format.
.br
diff --git a/enc.conf.in b/enc.conf.in
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..64502fbb
--- /dev/null
+++ b/enc.conf.in
@@ -0,0 +1,150 @@
+### Example Ouroboros encryption configuration file
+#
+# This file specifies the key exchange (KEX) algorithm and cipher to use
+# for encrypted flows.
+#
+# File Locations:
+# ---------------
+#
+# This file should be placed at one of:
+# @OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR@/security/server/<name>/enc.conf (server-side config)
+# @OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR@/security/client/<name>/enc.conf (client-side config)
+#
+# Where <name> is the service name registered with 'irm name create'.
+#
+# You can override the default paths using:
+# irm name create <name> sencpath <server-enc-path> cencpath <client-enc-path>
+#
+# Configuration Options:
+# ----------------------
+#
+# kex=<algorithm> Key exchange/encapsulation algorithm
+# cipher=<cipher> Symmetric cipher algorithm
+# kdf=<hash> Key derivation function hash algorithm
+# kem_mode=<mode> KEM encapsulation mode (server or client)
+# none Explicitly disable encryption
+#
+# Supported KEX algorithms (kex=):
+# --------------------------------
+#
+# ECDH Curves:
+# prime256v1 NIST P-256 (default)
+# secp384r1 NIST P-384
+# secp521r1 NIST P-521
+# X25519 Curve25519
+# X448 Curve448
+#
+# Finite Field Diffie-Hellman (RFC 7919):
+# ffdhe2048 2048-bit MODP Group
+# ffdhe3072 3072-bit MODP Group
+# ffdhe4096 4096-bit MODP Group
+#
+# ML-KEM (FIPS 203):
+# ML-KEM-512 CRYSTALS-Kyber-512
+# ML-KEM-768 CRYSTALS-Kyber-768
+# ML-KEM-1024 CRYSTALS-Kyber-1024
+#
+# Hybrid KEMs:
+# X25519MLKEM768 X25519 + ML-KEM-768
+# X448MLKEM1024 X448 + ML-KEM-1024
+#
+# Supported cipher algorithms (cipher=):
+# --------------------------------------
+#
+# Authenticated encryption:
+# aes-128-gcm AES-128 in GCM mode
+# aes-192-gcm AES-192 in GCM mode
+# aes-256-gcm AES-256 in GCM mode (default)
+# chacha20-poly1305 ChaCha20-Poly1305
+#
+# Stream ciphers (not recommended):
+# aes-128-ctr AES-128 in CTR mode
+# aes-192-ctr AES-192 in CTR mode
+# aes-256-ctr AES-256 in CTR mode
+#
+# Key Derivation Functions (kdf=):
+# ---------------------------------
+#
+# Hash algorithms for key derivation in KEX operations:
+#
+# sha256 SHA-256 (default)
+# sha384 SHA-384
+# sha512 SHA-512
+# sha3-256 SHA3-256
+# sha3-384 SHA3-384
+# sha3-512 SHA3-512
+# blake2b512 BLAKE2b-512 (requires OpenSSL 1.1.0+)
+# blake2s256 BLAKE2s-256 (requires OpenSSL 1.1.0+)
+#
+# KEM Mode (kem_mode=):
+# ---------------------
+#
+# For KEM algorithms (ML-KEM-* and hybrid KEMs), specify which side
+# performs the encapsulation operation:
+#
+# server Server encapsulates to client's ephemeral public key (default, matches TLS 1.3)
+# - Client generates ephemeral keypair, sends public key in request
+# - Server encapsulates and sends ciphertext in response
+# - Client decapsulates with ephemeral private key
+# - Standard approach, no pre-shared keys needed
+#
+# client Client encapsulates to server's static public key (alternative)
+# - Requires cached server public key at:
+# @OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR@/security/client/<service>/kex.srv.pub.[pem|raw]
+# - Client encapsulates and sends ciphertext in initial request
+# - Server decapsulates with its static private key from:
+# @OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR@/security/server/kex.key.pem
+# - More efficient (0 round-trip) but requires key distribution
+# and forfeits forward secrecy
+#
+# Note: Both sides must use the same kem_mode setting.
+# This option is ignored for ECDH/DH key exchange algorithms.
+#
+# Key Management for Client Mode:
+# --------------------------------
+#
+# For client encapsulation mode, you must:
+# 1. Generate server KEM keypair:
+# openssl genpkey -algorithm ML-KEM-768 \
+# -out @OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR@/security/server/kex.key.pem
+# 2. Extract and distribute server public key:
+# openssl pkey -in kex.key.pem -pubout -out kex.srv.pub.pem
+# 3. Cache on clients at:
+# @OUROBOROS_CONFIG_DIR@/security/client/<service-name>/kex.srv.pub.pem
+#
+# File formats:
+# - Pure ML-KEM: PEM format (.pem extension)
+# - Hybrid KEMs: Raw bytes (.raw extension)
+#
+# Examples:
+# ---------
+#
+# Default configuration (NIST P-256 ECDH + AES-256-GCM):
+kex=prime256v1
+cipher=aes-256-gcm
+kdf=sha256
+#
+# Post-quantum KEX with server encapsulation (default, like TLS 1.3):
+# kex=ML-KEM-768
+# cipher=chacha20-poly1305
+# kdf=sha256
+# kem_mode=server
+#
+# Post-quantum KEX with client encapsulation (requires key distribution):
+# kex=ML-KEM-768
+# cipher=chacha20-poly1305
+# kdf=sha256
+# kem_mode=client
+#
+# Hybrid KEX (quantum-resistant):
+# kex=X25519MLKEM768
+# cipher=aes-256-gcm
+# kdf=sha256
+#
+# High security configuration:
+# kex=secp521r1
+# cipher=aes-256-gcm
+# kdf=sha512
+#
+# Disable encryption:
+# none
diff --git a/include/ouroboros/crypt.h b/include/ouroboros/crypt.h
index 2d7cda6d..c463d9a8 100644
--- a/include/ouroboros/crypt.h
+++ b/include/ouroboros/crypt.h
@@ -26,25 +26,255 @@
#include <ouroboros/shm_du_buff.h>
#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
-#define IVSZ 16
-#define SYMMKEYSZ 32
-#define MSGBUFSZ 2048
+#include <assert.h>
+
+#define IVSZ 16
+#define SYMMKEYSZ 32
+#define MAX_HASH_SIZE 64 /* SHA-512/BLAKE2b max */
+#define KEX_ALGO_BUFSZ 32
+#define KEX_CIPHER_BUFSZ 32
+#define MSGBUFSZ 2048
+
+/* Cipher NIDs (match OpenSSL values) */
+#define NID_undef 0
+#define NID_aes_128_gcm 895
+#define NID_aes_192_gcm 898
+#define NID_aes_256_gcm 901
+#define NID_aes_128_ctr 904
+#define NID_aes_192_ctr 905
+#define NID_aes_256_ctr 906
+#define NID_chacha20_poly1305 1018
+
+/* KDF NIDs (match OpenSSL values) */
+#define NID_hkdf 1036
+#define NID_sha256 672
+#define NID_sha384 673
+#define NID_sha512 674
+#define NID_sha3_256 1096
+#define NID_sha3_384 1097
+#define NID_sha3_512 1098
+#define NID_blake2b512 1056
+#define NID_blake2s256 1057
+
+/* KEX algorithm NIDs (match OpenSSL values) */
+#define NID_X9_62_prime256v1 415
+#define NID_secp384r1 715
+#define NID_secp521r1 716
+#define NID_X25519 1034
+#define NID_X448 1035
+#define NID_ffdhe2048 1126
+#define NID_ffdhe3072 1127
+#define NID_ffdhe4096 1128
+#define NID_MLKEM512 1454
+#define NID_MLKEM768 1455
+#define NID_MLKEM1024 1456
+#define NID_X25519MLKEM768 2053 /* !! not in OpenSSL */
+#define NID_X448MLKEM1024 2054 /* !! not in OpenSSL */
+
+#define IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo) \
+ (strstr(algo, "ML-KEM") != NULL || strstr(algo, "MLKEM") != NULL)
+
+#define IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo) \
+ ((strstr(algo, "X25519") != NULL || strstr(algo, "X448") != NULL) && \
+ strstr(algo, "MLKEM") != NULL)
+
+#define X25519MLKEM768_PKSZ 1216 /* 32 + 1184 */
+#define X25519MLKEM768_CTSZ 1120 /* 32 + 1088 */
+#define X25519MLKEM768_SKSZ 2432 /* 32 + 2400 */
+#define X448MLKEM1024_PKSZ 1624 /* 56 + 1568 */
+#define X448MLKEM1024_SKSZ 3224 /* 56 + 3168 */
+
+#define KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP 0 /* Server encapsulates (default) */
+#define KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP 1 /* Client encapsulates */
+#define IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(cfg) ((cfg)->x.nid != NID_undef)
+#define IS_KEX_CIPHER_SET(cfg) ((cfg)->c.nid != NID_undef)
+
+
+struct crypt_sk {
+ int nid;
+ uint8_t * key;
+};
+
+struct sec_config {
+ struct {
+ const char * str;
+ int nid;
+ int mode;
+ } x; /* key exchange */
+ struct {
+ const char * str;
+ int nid;
+ } k; /* kdf */
+ struct {
+ const char * str;
+ int nid;
+ } c; /* cipher */
+ struct {
+ const char * str;
+ int nid;
+ } d; /* digest */
+};
+
+/* Helper macros to set sec_config fields consistently */
+#define SET_KEX_ALGO(cfg, algo_str) do { \
+ (cfg)->x.nid = kex_str_to_nid(algo_str); \
+ (cfg)->x.str = kex_nid_to_str((cfg)->x.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->x.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->x.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(cfg, nid_val) do { \
+ (cfg)->x.nid = (nid_val); \
+ (cfg)->x.str = kex_nid_to_str((cfg)->x.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->x.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->x.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_KEM_MODE(cfg, mode_val) do { \
+ (cfg)->x.mode = (mode_val); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_KDF(cfg, kdf_str) do { \
+ (cfg)->k.nid = md_str_to_nid(kdf_str); \
+ (cfg)->k.str = md_nid_to_str((cfg)->k.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->k.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->k.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_KDF_NID(cfg, nid_val) do { \
+ (cfg)->k.nid = (nid_val); \
+ (cfg)->k.str = md_nid_to_str((cfg)->k.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->k.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->k.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_CIPHER(cfg, cipher_str) do { \
+ (cfg)->c.nid = crypt_str_to_nid(cipher_str); \
+ (cfg)->c.str = crypt_nid_to_str((cfg)->c.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->c.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->c.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_CIPHER_NID(cfg, nid_val) do { \
+ (cfg)->c.nid = (nid_val); \
+ (cfg)->c.str = crypt_nid_to_str((cfg)->c.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->c.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->c.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_DIGEST(cfg, digest_str) do { \
+ (cfg)->d.nid = md_str_to_nid(digest_str); \
+ (cfg)->d.str = md_nid_to_str((cfg)->d.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->d.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->d.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define SET_KEX_DIGEST_NID(cfg, nid_val) do { \
+ (cfg)->d.nid = (nid_val); \
+ (cfg)->d.str = md_nid_to_str((cfg)->d.nid); \
+ assert((cfg)->d.nid != NID_undef || (cfg)->d.str == NULL); \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CLEAR_KEX_ALGO(cfg) do { \
+ (cfg)->x.nid = NID_undef; \
+ (cfg)->x.str = NULL; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CLEAR_KEX_KDF(cfg) do { \
+ (cfg)->k.nid = NID_undef; \
+ (cfg)->k.str = NULL; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CLEAR_KEX_CIPHER(cfg) do { \
+ (cfg)->c.nid = NID_undef; \
+ (cfg)->c.str = NULL; \
+} while (0)
+
+#define CLEAR_KEX_DIGEST(cfg) do { \
+ (cfg)->d.nid = NID_undef; \
+ (cfg)->d.str = NULL; \
+} while (0)
struct auth_ctx;
struct crypt_ctx;
-struct crypt_ctx * crypt_create_ctx(const uint8_t * key);
+struct auth_ctx * auth_create_ctx(void);
+
+void auth_destroy_ctx(struct auth_ctx * ctx);
+
+int auth_add_crt_to_store(struct auth_ctx * ctx,
+ void * crt);
+
+int auth_verify_crt(struct auth_ctx * ctx,
+ void * crt);
+
+int auth_sign(void * pkp,
+ int md_nid,
+ buffer_t msg,
+ buffer_t * sig);
+
+int auth_verify_sig(void * pk,
+ int md_nid,
+ buffer_t msg,
+ buffer_t sig);
+
+int load_sec_config_file(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ const char * path);
+
+int kex_pkp_create(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ void ** pkp,
+ uint8_t * pk);
+
+void kex_pkp_destroy(void * pkp);
+
+int kex_dhe_derive(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ void * pkp,
+ buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * s);
+
+ssize_t kex_kem_encap(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
+
+ssize_t kex_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
+
+int kex_kem_decap(void * pkp,
+ buffer_t ct,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
+
+int kex_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo);
+
+int kex_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo);
+
+int kex_validate_algo(const char * algo);
+
+int kex_validate_nid(int nid);
+
+const char * kex_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid);
+
+uint16_t kex_str_to_nid(const char * algo);
+
+struct crypt_ctx * crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk);
void crypt_destroy_ctx(struct crypt_ctx * ctx);
-int crypt_dh_pkp_create(void ** pkp,
- uint8_t * pk);
+int crypt_validate_nid(int nid);
+
+const char * crypt_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid);
+
+uint16_t crypt_str_to_nid(const char * cipher);
+
+int md_validate_nid(int nid);
+
+const char * md_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid);
-void crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp);
+uint16_t md_str_to_nid(const char * kdf);
-int crypt_dh_derive(void * pkp,
- buffer_t pk,
- uint8_t * s);
+ssize_t md_digest(int md_nid,
+ buffer_t in,
+ uint8_t * out);
+
+ssize_t md_len(int md_nid);
int crypt_encrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx,
buffer_t in,
@@ -77,6 +307,18 @@ int crypt_load_privkey_str(const char * str,
int crypt_load_pubkey_str(const char * str,
void ** key);
+int crypt_load_pubkey_file(const char * path,
+ void ** key);
+
+int crypt_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf);
+
+int crypt_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf);
+
+int crypt_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ void ** key);
+
int crypt_cmp_key(const void * key1,
const void * key2);
@@ -91,24 +333,17 @@ int crypt_crt_der(const void * crt,
int crypt_check_crt_name(void * crt,
const char * name);
-struct auth_ctx * auth_create_ctx(void);
-
-void auth_destroy_ctx(struct auth_ctx * ctx);
+int crypt_get_crt_name(void * crt,
+ char * name);
-int auth_add_crt_to_store(struct auth_ctx * ctx,
- void * crt);
+/* Secure memory allocation for sensitive data (keys, secrets) */
+int crypt_secure_malloc_init(size_t max);
-void auth_destroy_ctx(struct auth_ctx * ctx);
-
-int auth_verify_crt(struct auth_ctx * ctx,
- void * crt);
+void crypt_secure_malloc_fini(void);
-int auth_sign(void * pkp,
- buffer_t msg,
- buffer_t * sig);
+void * crypt_secure_malloc(size_t size);
-int auth_verify_sig(void * pk,
- buffer_t msg,
- buffer_t sig);
+void crypt_secure_free(void * ptr,
+ size_t size);
#endif /* OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_H */
diff --git a/include/ouroboros/flow.h b/include/ouroboros/flow.h
index 77b7737e..f9aa0d83 100644
--- a/include/ouroboros/flow.h
+++ b/include/ouroboros/flow.h
@@ -27,7 +27,9 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
- enum flow_state { /* DO NOT CHANGE ORDER! */
+#define SYMMKEYSZ 32
+
+enum flow_state { /* DO NOT CHANGE ORDER! */
FLOW_INIT = 0,
FLOW_ALLOC_PENDING,
FLOW_ACCEPT_PENDING,
diff --git a/include/ouroboros/name.h b/include/ouroboros/name.h
index 14fdd504..892f2a1f 100644
--- a/include/ouroboros/name.h
+++ b/include/ouroboros/name.h
@@ -35,8 +35,8 @@ enum pol_balance {
struct name_sec_paths {
char enc[NAME_PATH_SIZE + 1]; /* path to crypt for this name */
- char key[NAME_PATH_SIZE + 1]; /* path to key for this name */
- char crt[NAME_PATH_SIZE + 1]; /* path to crt for this name */
+ char key[NAME_PATH_SIZE + 1]; /* path to key for this name */
+ char crt[NAME_PATH_SIZE + 1]; /* path to crt for this name */
};
struct name_info {
diff --git a/include/ouroboros/serdes-irm.h b/include/ouroboros/serdes-irm.h
index 1d041541..246db23d 100644
--- a/include/ouroboros/serdes-irm.h
+++ b/include/ouroboros/serdes-irm.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#ifndef OUROBOROS_LIB_SERDES_IRM_H
#define OUROBOROS_LIB_SERDES_IRM_H
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
#include <ouroboros/ipcp.h>
#include <ouroboros/time.h>
@@ -54,10 +55,9 @@ int ipcp_flow_alloc_reply__irm_msg_ser(buffer_t * buf,
int response,
const buffer_t * data);
-/* response to alloc / join / accept / flow_req_arr */
int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf,
struct flow_info * flow,
- buffer_t * sk);
+ struct crypt_sk * sk);
int flow_dealloc__irm_req_ser(buffer_t * buf,
const struct flow_info * flow,
diff --git a/include/ouroboros/utils.h b/include/ouroboros/utils.h
index b93b345d..5d082d5c 100644
--- a/include/ouroboros/utils.h
+++ b/include/ouroboros/utils.h
@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@
#define MIN(a,b) (((a) < (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define MAX(a,b) (((a) > (b)) ? (a) : (b))
#define ABS(a) ((a) > 0 ? (a) : -(a))
-#define clrbuf(buf) do { memset(&(buf), 0, sizeof(buf)); } while (0);
-#define freebuf(buf) do { free((buf).data); clrbuf(buf); } while (0);
+#define clrbuf(buf) do { memset(&(buf), 0, sizeof(buf)); } while (0)
+#define freebuf(buf) do { free((buf).data); clrbuf(buf); } while (0)
#define BUF_INIT { 0, NULL }
#define BUF_IS_EMPTY(buf) ((buf)->data == NULL && (buf)->len == 0)
@@ -50,9 +50,10 @@ int bufcmp(const buffer_t * a,
*/
int n_digits(unsigned i);
-/* gets the application name */
char * path_strip(const char * src);
+char * trim_whitespace(char * str);
+
/* functions for copying and destroying arguments list */
size_t argvlen(const char ** argv);
diff --git a/include/test/certs.h b/include/test/certs.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..1b847406
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/test/certs.h
@@ -0,0 +1,125 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Test certificates - ECDSA/P-256 signed certificates
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * version 2.1 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TEST_CERTS_H
+#define TEST_CERTS_H
+
+/*
+* Certificates created following the guide
+* Building an openssl certificate authority
+* on
+* https://community.f5.com/kb/technicalarticles/
+*/
+
+/* Root certificate for CA ca.unittest.o7s */
+static const char * root_ca_crt_ec = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIICXTCCAgOgAwIBAgIURlENlCOy1OsA/AXFscPUQ2li8OYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
+"fDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAKBgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAK\n"
+"BgNVBAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UECwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51\n"
+"bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWASAwHhcNMjUwODAzMTg1MzE1WhcN\n"
+"NDUwNzI5MTg1MzE1WjB8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQ4wDAYD\n"
+"VQQHDAVHaGVudDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n"
+"GDAWBgNVBAMMD2NhLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEQMA4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYBIDBZMBMG\n"
+"ByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEPMseCScbd/d5TlHmyYVszn/YGVeNdUCnFR\n"
+"naOr95WlTNo3MyKKBuoiEFwHhjPASgXr/VDVjJLSyM3JUPebAcGjYzBhMB0GA1Ud\n"
+"DgQWBBQkxjMILHH6lZ+rnCMnD/63GO3y1zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQkxjMILHH6lZ+r\n"
+"nCMnD/63GO3y1zAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBhjAKBggq\n"
+"hkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiEA1jVJWW4idkCgAYv0m2LT9C33Dq42aLyRkJ+9YdzDqLwC\n"
+"IHT6MS4I0k52YP/hxoqWVBbpOW79PKYMRLyXTk1r7+Fa\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+/* Certificate for intermediary im.unittest.o7s used for signing */
+static const char * im_ca_crt_ec = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIICbTCCAhOgAwIBAgICEAMwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwfDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n"
+"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAKBgNVBAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UE\n"
+"CwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkq\n"
+"hkiG9w0BCQEWASAwHhcNMjUwODAzMTkwMjU3WhcNNDUwNzI5MTkwMjU3WjBaMQsw\n"
+"CQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsM\n"
+"DHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEYMBYGA1UEAwwPaW0udW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMFkwEwYHKoZI\n"
+"zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEdlra08XItIPtVl5veaq4UF6LIcBXj2mZFqKNEXFh\n"
+"l9uAz6UAbIc+FUPNfom6dwKbg/AjQ82a100eh6K/jCY7eKOBpjCBozAdBgNVHQ4E\n"
+"FgQUy8Go8BIO6i0lJ+mgBr9lvh2L0eswHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUJMYzCCxx+pWfq5wj\n"
+"Jw/+txjt8tcwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYwEQYD\n"
+"VR0fBAowCDAGoASgAoYAMCoGCCsGAQUFBwEBBB4wHDAMBggrBgEFBQcwAoYAMAwG\n"
+"CCsGAQUFBzABhgAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAN3ZYhqu6mVLGidmONsbANk5\n"
+"rzT6aHJcmvj19OxMusaXAiBKy0gBFCri/GLizi4wZo09wf31yZMqfr8IrApvPaLw\n"
+"qA==\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+/* Server test-1.unittest.o7s private-public key pair */
+static const char * server_pkp_ec = \
+"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+"MHcCAQEEIA4/bcmquVvGrY4+TtfnFSy1SpXs896r5xJjGuD6NmGRoAoGCCqGSM49\n"
+"AwEHoUQDQgAE4BSOhv36q4bCMLSkJaCvzwZ3pPy2M0YzRKFKeV48tG5eD+MBaTrT\n"
+"eoHUcRfpz0EO/inq3FVDzEoAQ2NWpnz0kA==\n"
+"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+/* Public key for the Private key */
+static __attribute__((unused)) const char * server_pk_ec = \
+"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+"MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE4BSOhv36q4bCMLSkJaCvzwZ3pPy2\n"
+"M0YzRKFKeV48tG5eD+MBaTrTeoHUcRfpz0EO/inq3FVDzEoAQ2NWpnz0kA==\n"
+"-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+
+/* Valid signed server certificate for test-1.unittest.o7s */
+#define SSC_TEXT_SIZE 2295 /* size of cleartext certificate */
+static const char * signed_server_crt_ec = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIIDiTCCAy+gAwIBAgICEAUwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwWjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n"
+"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n"
+"GDAWBgNVBAMMD2ltLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNTA4MDgxODQ4NTNaFw00NTA4\n"
+"MDMxODQ4NTNaMG4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMQwwCgYDVQQIDANPVkwxDjAMBgNVBAcM\n"
+"BUdoZW50MQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsMDHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEcMBoG\n"
+"A1UEAwwTdGVzdC0xLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEH\n"
+"A0IABOAUjob9+quGwjC0pCWgr88Gd6T8tjNGM0ShSnlePLRuXg/jAWk603qB1HEX\n"
+"6c9BDv4p6txVQ8xKAENjVqZ89JCjggHPMIIByzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBEGCWCGSAGG\n"
+"+EIBAQQEAwIGQDA4BglghkgBhvhCAQ0EKxYpbzdzIHVuaXR0ZXN0IEdlbmVyYXRl\n"
+"ZCBTZXJ2ZXIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFI+htsK0xxy6e1CqCyxn7mqi\n"
+"wRrpMIGoBgNVHSMEgaAwgZ2AFMvBqPASDuotJSfpoAa/Zb4di9HroYGApH4wfDEL\n"
+"MAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAKBgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAKBgNV\n"
+"BAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UECwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51bml0\n"
+"dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWASCCAhADMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAT\n"
+"BgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAoBgNVHR8EITAfMB2gG6AZhhdodHRwczovL291\n"
+"cm9ib3Jvcy5yb2NrczBYBggrBgEFBQcBAQRMMEowIwYIKwYBBQUHMAKGF2h0dHBz\n"
+"Oi8vb3Vyb2Jvcm9zLnJvY2tzMCMGCCsGAQUFBzABhhdodHRwczovL291cm9ib3Jv\n"
+"cy5yb2NrczAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiBZuw/Yb2pq925H7pEiOXr4fMo0wknz\n"
+"ktkxoHAFbjQEPQIhAMInHI7lvRmS0IMw1wBF/WlUZWKvhyU/TeMIZfk/JGCS\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+/* Self-signed by server test-1.unittest.o7s using its key */
+static __attribute__((unused)) const char * server_crt_ec = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIIBfjCCASWgAwIBAgIUB5VYxp7i+sgYjvLiwfpf0W5NfqQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
+"HjEcMBoGA1UEAwwTdGVzdC0xLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNTA4MDMxOTI4MzVa\n"
+"Fw00NTA3MjkxOTI4MzVaMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMME3Rlc3QtMS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mw\n"
+"WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATgFI6G/fqrhsIwtKQloK/PBnek/LYz\n"
+"RjNEoUp5Xjy0bl4P4wFpOtN6gdRxF+nPQQ7+KercVUPMSgBDY1amfPSQo0EwPzAe\n"
+"BgNVHREEFzAVghN0ZXN0LTEudW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSPobbCtMcc\n"
+"untQqgssZ+5qosEa6TAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiAoFC/rqgrRXmMUx4y5cPbv\n"
+"jOKpoL3FpehRgGkPatmL/QIgMRHc2TSGo6q1SG22Xt1dHAIBsaN2AlSfhjKULMH5\n"
+"gRo=\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+#endif /* TEST_CERTS_H */
+
diff --git a/include/test/certs_pqc.h b/include/test/certs_pqc.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..b533ca60
--- /dev/null
+++ b/include/test/certs_pqc.h
@@ -0,0 +1,656 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Test certificates - ML-DSA-65 (post-quantum) signed certificates
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or
+ * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License
+ * version 2.1 as published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU
+ * Lesser General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public
+ * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#ifndef TEST_CERTS_PQC_H
+#define TEST_CERTS_PQC_H
+
+/*
+ * ML-DSA-65 certificates for testing post-quantum cryptography
+ * Root CA: ca.unittest.o7s
+ * Intermediate CA: im.unittest.o7s (pathlen:0)
+ * Server: test-1.unittest.o7s
+ */
+
+/* PEM certificate strings will go here */
+static const char * root_ca_crt_ml = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIIWEDCCCQ2gAwIBAgIUKA3Abd0Hre9KpmyKRcMhFpm1QqcwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAMS\n"
+"MFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMQwwCgYDVQQIDANPVkwxDjAMBgNVBAcMBUdoZW50MQww\n"
+"CgYDVQQKDANvN3MxGDAWBgNVBAMMD2NhLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNjAxMDUx\n"
+"OTE1MTJaFw00NTEyMzExOTE1MTJaMFMxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMQwwCgYDVQQIDANP\n"
+"VkwxDjAMBgNVBAcMBUdoZW50MQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxGDAWBgNVBAMMD2NhLnVu\n"
+"aXR0ZXN0Lm83czCCB7IwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAMSA4IHoQC+5s/VK8kGvHlluvSftuBs\n"
+"GWeyLsQp1vQLDet2gVp5tv7GaGWB5RCzNMw0KsGZqHX8oVZIUHHVpY3Dm7rSmlPQ\n"
+"zy1Bq0lv4nT+jc9vYlqlhlQtiefd8PJmyMvi/JM3Pxq1whyXXR30dr45FRCUIlKs\n"
+"nbIXeMOxpEDRhNpZBVBkppWuFf17+jykTVxh6uvNWYmnZhFv0XLY30wfRL8/fpmI\n"
+"eExKE3qmFk2CONXkXGjUcprHoaUHx+E54+hEPK5hPNP7K609z/GaP9VbbR+UtuXA\n"
+"6ndYwCSuF5MPWl66ov9Jtyc2odfodnIM+PR2tx/SzvOzgwUrINVtEdt1A3SbO8r6\n"
+"hY/4iFASG+kYhDIYrGmfIRI9E1BujsQBPONVAOWUQv2puMUEkPUaw/nuQkk2dbJ4\n"
+"YZ2lyhnRmmiy7XJlLhgqjONNrP3Yym9kB55A20eez7dnw6Su+pqwCtaEr9LStPKk\n"
+"pdoat8MKdXts+5RjgslDhNK/aySOvFBXzhs73lakxqUmjH2Cz4vqwRnzCyzQ/5Rf\n"
+"cnRBgdfqxWm4LvjrKaTcwAk6KEkloRF9QnwLiHsN6sT+GzNEPzUE2DTIRHDR9IrF\n"
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+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static const char * im_ca_crt_ml = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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+"AAAAAAAABQoQFyIo\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static const char * server_pkp_ml = \
+"-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
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+"Dcwy1o/j36PKNUWEWBorbxssML7FWEdZvwqoJ7F2u+bno5lCpPHumrfULdzKinH4\n"
+"/JpMpTft6CCOL/zOX8TYOo3Uns4E+ziEH3E5kS2IC6LZwia2uqEOD738DEgHmUrI\n"
+"xcdPXb2KiHTCSFOzTLjOOWzsK/QLhauYTh4wdaRwI6XqMzN3c0xG80Le0fPBROtd\n"
+"DngTH/g89SEnGxqKXe7RxVof\n"
+"-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
+
+static __attribute__((unused)) const char * server_pk_ml = \
+"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
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+"0veeNg4LI+GVny7Zk7dSH6GtYZjl79DzhnHQ+n6tTl3I7dCMOgKtyZN51/LVyRZ+\n"
+"8/3WwgkUDG1DMIH6D7beW7+4FlC4OZR9a3uFclPX+4X1b6Jl9VuN1zaXeIyC5lBY\n"
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+"k1M8ksQo\n"
+"-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
+
+static const char * signed_server_crt_ml = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
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+"SCi1GpUaRhnM72Ub0J8IreoeZB0mE+EFmXW0ZD/AKwD4r3jJmZKRZEFzwzp1OFOg\n"
+"ljLUR7LNTV/M6nfYXihU10D9UpJYnXf32Jjtntiw6/mfCKs36gvKjt8MLzeZsxEZ\n"
+"KDwXTmsPnHoPQfk9sy5vuzb9PJl3Z6xR+vsaTfQwMzXPiCVEcH85k0VlkTNKNMfF\n"
+"iyeh0f0hBd8+gM3ah3AWnTfKNCI55p6KwOOPu7YtfUExlw3QIXO55vBdvcK0PPH4\n"
+"w6T+9sptOqQQ596Q/p6oGuHSlf+FJ5DTM3CTIxz6TjWmQ8wABkheyowPCgQ8dRtt\n"
+"heaWakbbOSUFWO24Dv+WFdaGXu6SXwRffwoCzIM+geCGz1KY4WxAWnXwySQ1fx16\n"
+"wy6wTd+Fnd02DcC0gpxnGycE13ZjvSWFB4BSs/2YMgHfGO9m/ve+32kEU1Aw7RYA\n"
+"WVJGvgaHG0/ECFV8h0nGaIxpUeln6u+VTd5fuFTblp4GMH48gWOoxpwtQepIOxS7\n"
+"TDADutYr+VHgCFRPqLht+Q6SovbQT9ddUdOEJhWJs721i3z5nvs8xpIRVoOZEhhU\n"
+"Qzz/EB/uLOkg4q8me2UNN4mpjQNbrwKsw+0u7WEaRiRD7eQP0pGz7podTRe/HRaM\n"
+"xrsddxHhj/h8d8+9EFsyNHTDgAcIN9aC6h512LOlGLWKlW6q96ZiQrQ+gXJldP7z\n"
+"XM0jvOlAlbrQ5/4ahYgKqbT7/QE0R7f4BwxidI9AaXzGAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA\n"
+"AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAABgkOExgc\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+static __attribute__((unused)) const char * server_crt_ml = \
+"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
+"MIIVtjCCCLOgAwIBAgIUS/okpA0M+TarUc6SknL4NJuAwKAwCwYJYIZIAWUDBAMS\n"
+"MB4xHDAaBgNVBAMME3Rlc3QtMS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3MwHhcNMjYwMTA1MTkyMDMz\n"
+"WhcNNDUxMjMxMTkyMDMzWjAeMRwwGgYDVQQDDBN0ZXN0LTEudW5pdHRlc3Qubzdz\n"
+"MIIHsjALBglghkgBZQMEAxIDggehAOum4NJL/Zbq+yMC5YbG/cLeS61RZLMw0rZ3\n"
+"mBkdbUluk3cm3nnBOZHlKiM36m040cgrYqE/h7VqzgkeuupRrOYjq2OiI+Qb9hnX\n"
+"rDM+++8tHNfHxbFEU8qMokOrilVlqAXVaUW/R92x5w3I10vnJVRHkVmpMOh68s4L\n"
+"+rQtSZM4AtnYToJd4DBI0tzV6Id6Synvp7fPPbkU8EpUHbuAegjoEmLLQdDWF4H+\n"
+"CAU0yzFtPT5yTl7S/Kz/XC8dZ2ie56jTTj10K9c1pfjqMdkfz+PGgL6Sprq5/G84\n"
+"upK4DZqUobS/dVcYraOBcWXw5Rpiyjbrsd1zCiV+WQo5oIHBNjQ8dwaMARM2gfOp\n"
+"PbSpIScrabla0w6aklyRTLrjkY4EoByJK964PFBrqvh3FTU+rrYogSo85EeZYKgR\n"
+"MF6bbtmNPoFoaBhEW19S6HYnXbZ4HTfGe6ceGF5i/lmBkbWWDOH2i+TLsRoGubi4\n"
+"hc3Fj7DFMK0TlNjB2z0yOnwLC1MZKxTktvZ3DDAW696Ke6YIg+cvchJy3G61kpKD\n"
+"0plsaK23todSIGpZDAiH9Ohxep2Jv/LJs9aE+EJ9fNYkrolnDSKCqXU/FVuvup0n\n"
+"k9tiWq5gEYGWAUt1Qaqv7I8PaMm7hlhVwmmjZXxElLtwKvlg22Krl6sXHIBmTQIx\n"
+"DS/fFJbrHPkKOFHBhvrfmCFr+h2ihVXvZbq9fvCAik2V3Qtvmot552N5jq48WgXq\n"
+"mnHs0BPscilVieg4I4/VBiCzff1uexLknLD/5Xoak60uw37djDUJe5GR+/REHHNu\n"
+"vTcGjnBmWFKKAaDpnaje1IP7rLcJAC4PRdbuZ4hbjrxUEDR40MMlT2W3BBr7avE5\n"
+"8dgjmtPrVhPqOV4jfzp5ySOMDdeN4iJJQS5giwzI5p6PRi32J1IMsQKHH8nJHZys\n"
+"BxW9TjNomt8K6jU/bP0iH4Xvjz3FdV9M44Ppar8QyTJIlFC9mRw2CjbU7B7Lx9oE\n"
+"2j92zCN6D5/cpM6WjgVNcDihbcYtO9RvhuBlr1RZ7KAhCGrq0Gtggd4pbbJmHoJk\n"
+"7OJVWpocATKfWemo+3e704cYYXiYzQXCmKeZofFFhxsPrxfdWoS03lXfK/+6RR9W\n"
+"tpZgK75OyG40S102UDvjArICbITkMad/hkQOrDixkuAQdE9ZzD2L6MOEjnIF+WUK\n"
+"pUq+JvHbZYKT16RwN33jQ6V7RHtE7qNgziDbluH5RsGmEdO2QFfbAFRanY3CeIlW\n"
+"G/AyQIJtxm5qDkQVNF72eK9jq/NzkA5eEt3uRcJR1B+DwimVD15Jn/22gLF8ETEi\n"
+"E3zp3CxoCeI7paC3V5v0wRsVXlX/hOBWS3JJyBHgT7UXHIA19UT9vnZg9G53XRie\n"
+"T6a1pUav4JFFYBz+6prcoz648uxbcVlUQMiQencVBnQy+yFP67uMhR9hjz2oQOiP\n"
+"2tITIT6B1HNbqmXTvokoCR4eFNtranA3ARAmNW58zICPts3PrvZzZRQ/Wgi14Ao8\n"
+"lvPx8MRDWR0HGchjukbqvS7RBPMsIWnbR+qAOySfBR5T7K/0nIScQ/crP/79JCG+\n"
+"NmzEuJPOhIZDySK7cWoSHedHIx/6I6tTBceMumZVQXmCganZC+xz7MlKnUFeutxE\n"
+"4j8RWeBxCjSB+W4a1XXy+J0WMebVgDyc/b2eQ/MlNL0jnEjpD9T7YPfYGGZd6qbl\n"
+"+o0OqoTzxbJDXGmsoko0l0VYXFxCsoFfNYLWBkTvYS2lX59YCpUrtiftxlaccEYG\n"
+"6ZTf/lkmveMUClBvLyFzjD6sHw0Wis2j1ySNbq72I83nP7QrL/d6xReR82dxrymU\n"
+"zbg8Xuc6b+ZwrXhbO0CmXnyNuiX1Kq+JIv96l08CqY57MMOon7MahkXUJq+8hEQ9\n"
+"AVelRhR851+15uNrtftaTNipWGRlqDxlJaBWOgj/wtuLzSDLcKMsytaprVrf+Ez/\n"
+"EBaaKRhtZsAumtE+HUc7PwS+slgDsCCg0HD75h7g1UDtlYgGEiLHW9qqCgNBJ9xx\n"
+"1ORDKvzVMJWnerECKk1afTNt2NaGXDHE6fe/AokP0lhHHIw90bplQbZn+LFFYohv\n"
+"GbEnBoPIdRPUse1drJr0Lc5b7Jp+n7lDS9uQQg0Sys8o6gfNd7Nme1MlDh9O7mpW\n"
+"0veeNg4LI+GVny7Zk7dSH6GtYZjl79DzhnHQ+n6tTl3I7dCMOgKtyZN51/LVyRZ+\n"
+"8/3WwgkUDG1DMIH6D7beW7+4FlC4OZR9a3uFclPX+4X1b6Jl9VuN1zaXeIyC5lBY\n"
+"kXcfXRT0yF2PauGQL+Qzv0J+kM9HqBO0U+p0uqkzbblIPMf1Gkff6MeM4I1RAiB7\n"
+"RqsoHekxIWkNyhLenxaKJRDCO4BOoa7QKO2FGYaUdQSKTUKO9PWFRJFmXk4YlYmi\n"
+"pFCS69VCns4mElOXm4ep/+E2tAxlxNyx2LyUVJkwySbTnSOLJuNplUf4j4EwAxid\n"
+"3gGoznQMipLhYyemI/iQQ+TtaGSSz9STTjky3ajrNUI92Rr1n3M66z7hx8Zhh3dp\n"
+"0WfJ47y3KBtFjN4pVHDs+RAhcF5f58vy1iFWdHqB1clV1SU6g40D0YXAlcdPN2cV\n"
+"k1M8ksQoo3MwcTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUJPWgYA8LLq4MCf1piahVdRM2L1kwHwYDVR0j\n"
+"BBgwFoAUJPWgYA8LLq4MCf1piahVdRM2L1kwDwYDVR0TAQH/BAUwAwEB/zAeBgNV\n"
+"HREEFzAVghN0ZXN0LTEudW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMAsGCWCGSAFlAwQDEgOCDO4AqzJ/\n"
+"0OXl6WB18z5y1YM/8A7SM8JozXzq7Jdngg2GmFNiWLGW3TR3FI7KCVw1AT88gpK7\n"
+"Fu7FMaZZ9gIGGzO+aUH0NcKpfXTTCjDISabzXc4+lAc/9jCNO3uL5lYbWuSJOCBf\n"
+"5eAbvdv4y2kAnnP1uw2YYKFeBJLo/pZAm1jvXniOEIwan+Z1KUDNU3qFBG7I/zQW\n"
+"rqzDFkdqyI+bHgMgWsOAvRu0rtoM4qOlbvdLlpULT+Nj25jCf2p18W19SN8MoQLZ\n"
+"bQH+Y/F6i6yXv9CpzAT9RWRSJyI8mdh3n5F6QlNYrJt7xzeDxXiTgICxNpxWtTx9\n"
+"+D+YEMhxGs2R6UAk+hn1P2nZgZ/HPIBgqGg8rXyDfAecRNbDUMJxRLhPGRdvidFy\n"
+"UqfjWoasltAbEricq5wPWObNrOPHWI43JWQ5Efk4CqZORhIiiash1K2kMyYeiY3E\n"
+"hteoCOUeOKMSu06pFtR6f7khGJUfiXIe9HPAJL4ZwnnisGvI7cnmM7JCMXSC/H86\n"
+"h1z7d+XMvFTNnMBsOpAm1nBV+ZoIHzyQ2n770I31CBq+ZmS/bSAqjAlC4CJ8wjNH\n"
+"LD7sB2Rek22wB518Jy8MJSShAeF8vHk7EGijukOdre0tVLDDPOcGjZL1bgi91XVW\n"
+"VQcO7EsLIf/kdyfAUZQGc/6LMwRCp+1BeDFp0wT74rYUpn3+MOXjWoTou4N97xnd\n"
+"w862gnU/e70wsBGgPuDgVlB9gnAnkoQB0C1s3ecBo7HrWRIeYDHr6JTUMrdCAYJx\n"
+"aw88edY1rWAdUGgk0UlT7lm+MBBJIyBtVY6mYWZkL7IU3DSk0Z9yrXciHC1H4sOw\n"
+"h9ahd1seUT4G4GobMM19t7q6ibAlgvVWWlVDi7TG/LPoySlIwdkmGt2PQn0pjmPj\n"
+"jXfg4He4bTKbu8SPuH9r22nPKz/0ffw/SgP7F/F6nb6KVAZnxoyo9SWLQVC8EVDP\n"
+"H/mhQ6GLfZEDfr0dGtFxCJgYF1F7E6+qUbEKC7BtqMvUBCkiLUO/2Cwa+xFiz8Py\n"
+"SKrumacBRG+PD128wZDBhStM+U52cCKeh7h1ENDejL9IK8YsbQn514h03EhlrwRw\n"
+"3xHKFGQKk/iv5tgU9nZ+tPj5J7b3nM8jdGYyFw9Dl4h+pf27DXAVzkiFONCbbedZ\n"
+"zCazjwX8fXOOgEvI82y/60/SlX+679/HoYGjyJVctyLfBlGEavx6SerTZZsNaWe3\n"
+"jIVDf0OWvF6fzK4/VWEr/iULJquQlxnTOvhtxFVuvK0DoTFSzPCgF7U+inrJ5i+3\n"
+"31JHuoBYtfEa6SS7dQVrRG74L7aqmbzPLkAz/k07hLGW+6WhLtPHCqQVAt4v0DHe\n"
+"iWVkMEjXdqEQqYyu0ObSenZLPDkcvJNNaFH4A7wvJJXWXtm5UfBq9RR1IR+VErf/\n"
+"Da9hEOJP1n0wcKyE6sfLwNTn/wAWCc4BF+XRQFhdUcmMNzoMd3YNlRcLWBlFxvVI\n"
+"FFd4/nbuwCplrD/H6Loq3McgOoDY6L1nXjfgnFSmzN/83yzaUJdp6dVaXMsrDGiT\n"
+"Zda57l4oUcTJgoNtU6DGyvQoZlF11gBZVi7M+3YAPnnHmy8w4W6dN1tyCaxOcaht\n"
+"I8eapuA+Gl0mYYcf8FGLXmFt8s8GvC/vP6snlxN0wxzEwzwEUS9zi+KNKokvahRn\n"
+"M8wYMXMuKBgOGVv3nzicXLNOAoLe56Y5Hnm7a9FGNrRenUQeRQ7yA0/iWg1v2hNi\n"
+"wJX1DQw89awbiv+d920Te0VJFrV39jdNE8pQItWKoBlPMvBpXOks6rBGo6wl1+lE\n"
+"RXqZVgdxC9/b7gCK/DrRQPoixTZWyX/Gyr+r+cnduMAECDeAcoyghK6/OfAo0JF+\n"
+"5kjb0xcMYwbRNoPEWVRwmO6Y/FMVVj4yURow2Pkdm/Ng9J19QpgJa5zpih+xawVb\n"
+"U3Jz3SMvIIfoi1eUdwSklH2XPIS0qxz/aEtqaNX6FGUwbK8j2fVbRmxiy7buoJ0i\n"
+"ya/EfXW+enc1z1mjKHKESy66JZwhaEXpDpllw6U3rNDGXDBIB3AlA1Zm7FbiDB2h\n"
+"eq1jhee8ldHC1X/wMu6TTaP3JNPkJ2/BNVqUvtjLLVAIzJ2GJZEiWA5Fni415gWX\n"
+"9IGq9HqG29LM86RMq0ElP9U0YGUsQrFmrQnB7m0jP+bcQLLJNI5A193GdT9GyGiq\n"
+"oyoUptuAZ7e9gqbc8m9LCwhamZaRDLdknxYD7F3tDmOoawApE7wk5PVgSK1tKNUB\n"
+"QkdILE6sxkglv10JhkwI5nrQTDJqDNW2gmpQlFOpJm35iJpaJtyz2iqS/mmGfNiZ\n"
+"vXuxdDIHOraA7NRVuJadB+UX1+/w7CBzyPm3bAPRMgvfOLoU5ARcy1S0VFwjP72o\n"
+"Rx/ccStVtStLFV4yEPa2+GIukRjYrKf4TQbQcHXdRfb7vh1mk8+33GHd6cYLYYIb\n"
+"6gPBEdyDOvFliD5AZsib8/0K92ldD2uZoJuj1SgBP4T3FDlFlmxdzTydM+fzmvh8\n"
+"PRYwY8ZsGfMbYkDzcqPrP6YY5m49toA2/PFscxP3ThJEmBh9GfU/4N1oY2cRqhnX\n"
+"9BbWTMz/aHyj2t3C/CkcavOIH0R80w6dN5bumylsI0iK2w60DHfOIWG44rakc0qr\n"
+"TR2Zx+sMWwlfgYOMGEc+XE5wjqLJqywLbobfE3bMjLjBTKNjSCyOaooh3UFOJO5k\n"
+"iY7MxCtCASSMeU0lsvtWfHH9c5bMEvFYnF6WgJ05kUvUmHRJFTlMb3uhyXae8mDh\n"
+"qrSyp8vMYQmZEZzVaG1D/cDlnNuG+kCPtxoqtnEnFNGH9zNO2NTOV70tNl9tS/7G\n"
+"/abEGKZnrk0BZ+6ViE2V8F7bm0JpUpwdNOpohjiVp06PIKVHamlwa9TcAGVNo+vK\n"
+"YD0MK4HMaFget5OsvqRCOv3J3d+Ukih6/LLYyAmgW/+04G567SSqhB5HL6qrV99G\n"
+"lmXGeCNtZ4Ypdu1xzsfQRiDSJWT2a5GZdNVGFgoiZyI0LNI8hKudemYcUk0R61eO\n"
+"vBRiny8U59ZMx3JwHZuJ88Wu2MXtzQxuIAfRgh1gXVnZ3YSRxa0xviWkLq4Z/MH4\n"
+"o0VhJ7LqdfJNP/PvFapddi53pMbANvuou0OoKhDn0otwCCzgU/Ye2DMhU/2o1oRT\n"
+"x5gRZPxp80r8tO1iNW9789dxw+Q6icof1vQJ6zeJVdQDQND2jtP15IZGOrG71Ohz\n"
+"54mOu+eHMif4FJvPodYPgqBPFsn8wjow81lhU+nBPYzVpWjaQ1ZpbGwymLkqXR36\n"
+"5Xol+wA8Xr1znB7wmhJVNOvhMbn/lHekzXuoST8HGy+RPUhZ+DPIkihWmEL1LSDB\n"
+"IwdYM9TO1fRMXzCXQRL4KSoYObVWy8gE/GIKevivvlM/FNr1fNh/xyPE6OqGOchx\n"
+"w2NAP6uBxnwPwk2dA7uqFQi18klen/b1JA5hKdhEttK/uOmcb+Scy4wjyw39YCSW\n"
+"Ybf2r8lvqW55SfYBIfk59B7vSCttQgqLqs8CR6ynTybUsleb2EtfU/iCOqkKUFVu\n"
+"CzrWzZEC54QrzE074nKQ/VVidrMXbFe/bWLd84a1CF+Lc2jlh3r2Vqp6K4QJOQS/\n"
+"1nXWu+DolDhWubBjTHlpN0LuyvIRSaFaBKrHckYGTUi24YHHuk5PrVb+LNm14H2z\n"
+"Slv/m+BWsB94Gs4EXOO0yxDWc2dY8s0+v7j40f4pxavE24ehFceD7SxouyegFA/x\n"
+"OPGGYWYVi1A73X0B4SbUJuazhZa3J03iGNxdPQ3tW6GPT9Z2ewJOkS91e5iABbw9\n"
+"DB0kJoZMY05a9X0SlrWDF/2MPRr7XasHzAaOiO8DO2TFp6gpCeSLzzbjw6dBa5Yh\n"
+"86oKLxfSZPIQnF5jS84DhAHvQ6K7P9v7bqk5SD2kIOronCwEAQYulWADvByijGQy\n"
+"+cx4CULZ2eO/Bsf0+d1EgsfpTG/7s/hCY3U/+1Gr2iKXQfiNIFUo8l0V4YKBon+0\n"
+"3Eits0tHG1+WS/7QvgoB5+43md6ANnyyhH64WAR3wMFiG3/ThLRfND3DvkuFwdkJ\n"
+"kPiJw1k6RwuCp7Pg4iaWpvNymeMnEl28ewB9yIjO8Cnp/olo8FuTCjrJtMIouxTY\n"
+"2kyjB35id4d/NjxHYl257Fxh4XFRbfyG+U5g7f/fTB17OzzoY39kIOdINMulQB8y\n"
+"jn2Fd9Kw3rWMUWgwqiEsVU2EoO/YWY1EmKCU5WF3bHXwXgGZLEZP3zIfmy/h2bAt\n"
+"+EIJO/yec956WkxuFzMAu2GcMxya2I2ZQsR1lyYqe9uXKOIMu18OEQ+0I90haNSb\n"
+"1mXUsGxiKDsXHBwkCX/eeJmVIQDPSJfj1D5nQ4gAO01RVVhdYXCH/Q4PLX6eyesH\n"
+"b3t9ma4mb36DrMjKTFFWwtgya56fo+f6AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAACxIYHyQr\n"
+"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+
+#endif /* TEST_CERTS_PQC_H */
+
diff --git a/include/ouroboros/test.h b/include/test/test.h
index bccf9ccd..b524d8ec 100644
--- a/include/ouroboros/test.h
+++ b/include/test/test.h
@@ -34,14 +34,21 @@
#define TEST_RC_SKIP 1
#define TEST_RC_FAIL -1
-#define TEST_START() \
+#define TEST_START(...) \
do { \
- printf("%s started.\n", __func__); \
+ printf("%s", __func__); \
+ if (sizeof(#__VA_ARGS__) > 1) \
+ printf(" " __VA_ARGS__); \
+ printf(" started.\n"); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
-#define TEST_SUCCESS() \
+
+#define TEST_SUCCESS(...) \
do { \
- printf("\x1b[32m%s succeeded.\x1b[0m\n", __func__); \
+ printf("\x1b[32m%s", __func__); \
+ if (sizeof(#__VA_ARGS__) > 1) \
+ printf(" " __VA_ARGS__); \
+ printf(" succeeded.\x1b[0m\n"); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
@@ -51,9 +58,12 @@
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
-#define TEST_FAIL() \
+#define TEST_FAIL(...) \
do { \
- printf("\x1b[31m%s failed.\x1b[0m\n", __func__); \
+ printf("\x1b[31m%s", __func__); \
+ if (sizeof(#__VA_ARGS__) > 1) \
+ printf(" " __VA_ARGS__); \
+ printf(" failed.\x1b[0m\n"); \
fflush(stdout); \
} while (0)
diff --git a/irmd.conf.in b/irmd.conf.in
index da5a3288..dee88392 100644
--- a/irmd.conf.in
+++ b/irmd.conf.in
@@ -56,10 +56,10 @@ prog=["@INSTALL_DIR@/ovpn"] # Defaults to [].
prog=["@INSTALL_DIR@/oping"] # Defaults to [].
args=["--listen"] # Defaults to disabled. Autostart server with these args.
lb="round-robin" # Defaults to spill (load-balancing options: spill, round-robin).
-# server_enc_file=/path/to/enc.cfg Default: @OUROBOROS_SRV_CRT_DIR@/<name>/enc.cfg
+# server_enc_file=/path/to/enc.conf Default: @OUROBOROS_SRV_CRT_DIR@/<name>/enc.conf
# server_crt_file=/path/to/crt.pem Default: @OUROBOROS_SRV_CRT_DIR@/<name>/crt.pem
# server_key_file=/path/to/key.pem Default: @OUROBOROS_SRV_CRT_DIR@/<name>/key.pem
-# client_enc_file=/path/to/enc.cfg Default: @OUROBOROS_CLI_CRT_DIR@/<name>/enc.cfg
+# client_enc_file=/path/to/enc.conf Default: @OUROBOROS_CLI_CRT_DIR@/<name>/enc.conf
# client_crt_file=/path/to/crt.pem Default: @OUROBOROS_CLI_CRT_DIR@/<name>/crt.pem
# client_key_file=/path/to/key.pem Default: @OUROBOROS_CLI_CRT_DIR@/<name>/key.pem
diff --git a/src/ipcpd/config.h.in b/src/ipcpd/config.h.in
index 61506196..a39789a5 100644
--- a/src/ipcpd/config.h.in
+++ b/src/ipcpd/config.h.in
@@ -72,10 +72,11 @@
#cmakedefine HAVE_BPF
#cmakedefine HAVE_RAW_SOCKETS
#cmakedefine IPCP_ETH_QDISC_BYPASS
-#define IPCP_ETH_RD_THR @IPCP_ETH_RD_THR@
-#define IPCP_ETH_WR_THR @IPCP_ETH_WR_THR@
-#define IPCP_ETH_LO_MTU @IPCP_ETH_LO_MTU@
-#define IPCP_ETH_MPL @IPCP_ETH_MPL@
+#define IPCP_ETH_RD_THR @IPCP_ETH_RD_THR@
+#define IPCP_ETH_WR_THR @IPCP_ETH_WR_THR@
+#define IPCP_ETH_LO_MTU @IPCP_ETH_LO_MTU@
+#define IPCP_ETH_MGMT_FRAME_SIZE @IPCP_ETH_MGMT_FRAME_SIZE@
+#define IPCP_ETH_MPL @IPCP_ETH_MPL@
/* local */
#define IPCP_LOCAL_MPL @IPCP_LOCAL_MPL@
diff --git a/src/ipcpd/eth/eth.c b/src/ipcpd/eth/eth.c
index d2e7a7c8..29c5ff4f 100644
--- a/src/ipcpd/eth/eth.c
+++ b/src/ipcpd/eth/eth.c
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@
#define NAME_QUERY_TIMEO 2000 /* ms */
#define MGMT_TIMEO 100 /* ms */
-#define MGMT_FRAME_SIZE 2048
+#define MGMT_FRAME_SIZE IPCP_ETH_MGMT_FRAME_SIZE
#define FLOW_REQ 0
#define FLOW_REPLY 1
@@ -937,6 +937,12 @@ static void * eth_ipcp_packet_reader(void * o)
#endif
ipcp_sdb_release(sdb); /* No need for the N+1 buffer. */
+ if (length > MGMT_FRAME_SIZE) {
+ log_warn("Management frame size %u exceeds %u.",
+ length, MGMT_FRAME_SIZE);
+ goto fail_frame;
+ }
+
frame = malloc(sizeof(*frame));
if (frame == NULL) {
log_err("Failed to allocate frame.");
diff --git a/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 870603dc..3dda8104 100644
--- a/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -21,6 +21,8 @@ include_directories(${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/src/ipcpd/unicast)
get_filename_component(PARENT_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR} DIRECTORY)
get_filename_component(PARENT_DIR ${PARENT_PATH} NAME)
+compute_test_prefix()
+
create_test_sourcelist(${PARENT_DIR}_tests test_suite.c
# Add new tests here
dht_test.c
@@ -31,8 +33,8 @@ add_executable(${PARENT_DIR}_test ${${PARENT_DIR}_tests}
${DHT_PROTO_SRCS})
disable_test_logging_for_target(${PARENT_DIR}_test)
-target_link_libraries(${PARENT_DIR}_test ouroboros-common)
+target_link_libraries(${PARENT_DIR}_test ouroboros-common)
add_dependencies(build_tests ${PARENT_DIR}_test)
set(tests_to_run ${${PARENT_DIR}_tests})
@@ -44,5 +46,5 @@ endif()
foreach (test ${tests_to_run})
get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
- add_test(${test_name} ${C_TEST_PATH}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${C_TEST_PATH}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
endforeach (test)
diff --git a/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/dht_test.c b/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/dht_test.c
index cb6b0f9f..4f0ee00a 100644
--- a/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/dht_test.c
+++ b/src/ipcpd/unicast/dir/tests/dht_test.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#endif
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <ouroboros/list.h>
#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
diff --git a/src/ipcpd/unicast/pff/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ipcpd/unicast/pff/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 358da56e..ccca26a0 100644
--- a/src/ipcpd/unicast/pff/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/ipcpd/unicast/pff/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -19,6 +19,8 @@ include_directories(${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/src/ipcpd)
get_filename_component(PARENT_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR} DIRECTORY)
get_filename_component(PARENT_DIR ${PARENT_PATH} NAME)
+compute_test_prefix()
+
create_test_sourcelist(${PARENT_DIR}_tests test_suite.c
# Add new tests here
pft_test.c
@@ -39,5 +41,5 @@ endif()
foreach (test ${tests_to_run})
get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
- add_test(${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
endforeach (test)
diff --git a/src/ipcpd/unicast/routing/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/ipcpd/unicast/routing/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index e4168600..f97d03bb 100644
--- a/src/ipcpd/unicast/routing/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/ipcpd/unicast/routing/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -18,6 +18,8 @@ include_directories(${CMAKE_BINARY_DIR}/src/ipcpd)
get_filename_component(PARENT_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR} DIRECTORY)
get_filename_component(PARENT_DIR ${PARENT_PATH} NAME)
+compute_test_prefix()
+
create_test_sourcelist(${PARENT_DIR}_tests test_suite.c
# Add new tests here
graph_test.c
@@ -39,5 +41,5 @@ endif()
foreach (test ${tests_to_run})
get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
- add_test(${test_name} ${C_TEST_PATH}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${C_TEST_PATH}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
endforeach (test)
diff --git a/src/irmd/config.h.in b/src/irmd/config.h.in
index 527694c0..06d51ccd 100644
--- a/src/irmd/config.h.in
+++ b/src/irmd/config.h.in
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@
#define FLOW_ALLOC_TIMEOUT @FLOW_ALLOC_TIMEOUT@
#define FLOW_DEALLOC_TIMEOUT @FLOW_DEALLOC_TIMEOUT@
+#define OAP_REPLAY_TIMER @OAP_REPLAY_TIMER@
+
#define BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT @BOOTSTRAP_TIMEOUT@
#define ENROLL_TIMEOUT @ENROLL_TIMEOUT@
#define REG_TIMEOUT @REG_TIMEOUT@
@@ -73,6 +75,10 @@
#cmakedefine IRMD_KILL_ALL_PROCESSES
#cmakedefine HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
#cmakedefine HAVE_OPENSSL
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#define IRMD_SECMEM_MAX @IRMD_SECMEM_MAX@
+#cmakedefine HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
+#endif
#ifdef CONFIG_OUROBOROS_DEBUG
#cmakedefine DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
#endif
diff --git a/src/irmd/main.c b/src/irmd/main.c
index daaf4129..57703254 100644
--- a/src/irmd/main.c
+++ b/src/irmd/main.c
@@ -85,13 +85,6 @@ enum irm_state {
IRMD_SHUTDOWN
};
-struct oaph {
- struct list_head next;
-
- uint64_t stamp;
- uint8_t id[OAP_ID_SIZE];
-};
-
struct cmd {
struct list_head next;
@@ -105,12 +98,6 @@ struct {
#ifdef HAVE_TOML
char * cfg_file; /* configuration file path */
#endif
- struct {
- struct auth_ctx * ctx; /* default authentication ctx */
- struct list_head list; /* OAP headers seen before */
- pthread_mutex_t mtx; /* mutex for OAP headers */
- } auth;
-
struct lockfile * lf; /* single irmd per system */
struct shm_rdrbuff * rdrb; /* rdrbuff for packets */
@@ -456,7 +443,7 @@ static void name_update_sec_paths(struct name_info * info)
assert(info != NULL);
if (strlen(info->s.enc) == 0)
- sprintf(info->s.enc, "%s/%s/enc.cfg", srv_dir, info->name);
+ sprintf(info->s.enc, "%s/%s/enc.conf", srv_dir, info->name);
if (strlen(info->s.crt) == 0)
sprintf(info->s.crt, "%s/%s/crt.pem", srv_dir, info->name);
@@ -465,7 +452,7 @@ static void name_update_sec_paths(struct name_info * info)
sprintf(info->s.key, "%s/%s/key.pem", srv_dir, info->name);
if (strlen(info->c.enc) == 0)
- sprintf(info->c.enc, "%s/%s/enc.cfg", cli_dir, info->name);
+ sprintf(info->c.enc, "%s/%s/enc.conf", cli_dir, info->name);
if (strlen(info->c.crt) == 0)
sprintf(info->c.crt, "%s/%s/crt.pem", cli_dir, info->name);
@@ -613,18 +600,21 @@ static int unbind_program(const char * prog,
if (name == NULL) {
if (reg_destroy_prog(prog) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to unbind %s.", prog);
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
}
log_info("Program %s unbound.", prog);
} else {
if (reg_unbind_prog(name, prog) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to unbind %s from %s", prog, name);
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
}
log_info("Name %s unbound for %s.", name, prog);
}
return 0;
+
+ fail:
+ return -1;
}
static int unbind_process(pid_t pid,
@@ -633,18 +623,21 @@ static int unbind_process(pid_t pid,
if (name == NULL) {
if (reg_destroy_proc(pid) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to unbind %d.", pid);
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
}
log_info("Process %d unbound.", pid);
} else {
if (reg_unbind_proc(name, pid) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to unbind %d from %s", pid, name);
- return -1;
+ goto fail;
}
log_info("Name %s unbound for process %d.", name, pid);
}
return 0;
+
+ fail:
+ return -1;
}
static int list_ipcps(ipcp_list_msg_t *** ipcps,
@@ -716,8 +709,7 @@ int name_reg(const char * name,
if (ipcp_reg(pid, hash)) {
log_err("Could not register " HASH_FMT32 " with IPCP %d.",
HASH_VAL32(hash.data), pid);
- freebuf(hash);
- return -1;
+ goto fail_hash;
}
log_info("Registered %s with IPCP %d as " HASH_FMT32 ".",
@@ -726,6 +718,10 @@ int name_reg(const char * name,
freebuf(hash);
return 0;
+
+ fail_hash:
+ freebuf(hash);
+ return -1;
}
static int name_unreg(const char * name,
@@ -760,8 +756,7 @@ static int name_unreg(const char * name,
if (ipcp_unreg(pid, hash)) {
log_err("Could not unregister %s with IPCP %d.", name, pid);
- freebuf(hash);
- return -1;
+ goto fail_hash;
}
log_info("Unregistered %s from %d.", name, pid);
@@ -769,6 +764,10 @@ static int name_unreg(const char * name,
freebuf(hash);
return 0;
+
+ fail_hash:
+ freebuf(hash);
+ return -1;
}
static int proc_announce(const struct proc_info * info)
@@ -796,266 +795,26 @@ static int proc_exit(pid_t pid)
return 0;
}
-static void __cleanup_pkp(void * pkp)
-{
- if (pkp != NULL)
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
-}
-
static void __cleanup_flow(void * flow)
{
reg_destroy_flow(((struct flow_info *) flow)->id);
}
-static bool file_exists(const char * path)
-{
- struct stat s;
-
- if (stat(path, &s) < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
- log_dbg("File %s does not exist.", path);
- return false;
- }
-
- return true;
-}
-
-static int load_credentials(const char * name,
- const struct name_sec_paths * paths,
- void ** pkp,
- void ** crt,
- bool * crypt)
-{
- assert(paths != NULL);
- assert(pkp != NULL);
- assert(crt != NULL);
-
- *pkp = NULL;
- *crt = NULL;
-
- /* TODO: Allow configuration. For now, encrypt if path exists */
- *crypt = file_exists(paths->enc);
- if (*crypt)
- log_info("Encryption enabled for %s.", name);
-
- if (!file_exists(paths->crt) || !file_exists(paths->key)) {
- log_info("No security info for %s.", name);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (crypt_load_crt_file(paths->crt, crt) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to load %s for %s.", paths->crt, name);
- goto fail_crt;
- }
-
- if (crypt_load_privkey_file(paths->key, pkp) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to load %s for %s.", paths->key, name);
- goto fail_key;
- }
-
- log_info("Loaded security keys for %s.", name);
-
- return 0;
-
- fail_key:
- crypt_free_crt(*crt);
- *crt = NULL;
- fail_crt:
- return -EAUTH;
-}
-
-static int load_srv_credentials(const char * name,
- void ** pkp,
- void ** crt,
- bool * crypt)
-{
- struct name_info info;
-
- assert(name != NULL);
- assert(pkp != NULL);
- assert(crt != NULL);
-
- if (reg_get_name_info(name, &info) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to get name info for %s.", name);
- return -ENAME;
- }
-
- return load_credentials(name, &info.s, pkp, crt, crypt);
-}
-
-static int load_cli_credentials(const char * name,
- void ** pkp,
- void ** crt,
- bool * crypt)
-{
- struct name_info info;
-
- assert(name != NULL);
- assert(pkp != NULL);
- assert(crt != NULL);
-
- if (reg_get_name_info(name, &info) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to get name info for %s.", name);
- return -ENAME;
- }
-
- return load_credentials(name, &info.c, pkp, crt, crypt);
-}
-
-#define ID_IS_EQUAL(id1, id2) (memcmp(id1, id2, OAP_ID_SIZE) == 0)
-static int irm_check_oap_hdr(const struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr,
- time_t mpl)
-{
- struct list_head * p;
- struct list_head * h;
- struct timespec now;
- struct oaph * new;
- uint64_t stamp;
- uint64_t cur;
- uint8_t * id;
- ssize_t delta;
-
- assert(oap_hdr != NULL);
-
- stamp = oap_hdr->timestamp;
- id = oap_hdr->id.data;
-
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
-
- cur = TS_TO_UINT64(now);
-
- delta = (ssize_t)(cur - stamp) / MILLION;
- if (delta > mpl)
- log_warn("Transit time exceeds MPL by %zd ms.", delta);
- if (delta < -TIMESYNC_SLACK)
- log_warn("OAP header sent %zd ms from the future.", -delta);
-
- new = malloc(sizeof(*new));
- if (new == NULL) {
- log_err("Failed to allocate memory for OAP element.");
- return -ENOMEM;
- }
-
- pthread_mutex_lock(&irmd.auth.mtx);
-
- list_for_each_safe(p, h, &irmd.auth.list) {
- struct oaph * oaph = list_entry(p, struct oaph, next);
- if (cur > oaph->stamp + OAP_SEEN_TIMER * BILLION) {
- list_del(&oaph->next);
- free(oaph);
- continue;
- }
-
- if (oaph->stamp == stamp && ID_IS_EQUAL(oaph->id, id)) {
- log_warn("OAP header already known: " HASH_FMT64 ".",
- HASH_VAL64(id));
- goto fail_replay;
- }
- }
-
- memcpy(new->id, id, OAP_ID_SIZE);
- new->stamp = stamp;
-
- list_add_tail(&new->next, &irmd.auth.list);
-
- pthread_mutex_unlock(&irmd.auth.mtx);
-
- return 0;
-
- fail_replay:
- pthread_mutex_unlock(&irmd.auth.mtx);
- free(new);
- return -EAUTH;
-}
-
-static int irm_auth_peer(const char * name,
- const struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr,
- const struct oap_hdr * r_oap_hdr)
-{
- void * crt;
- void * pk;
- buffer_t sign;
- const char * n = name == NULL ? "<client>" : name;
-
- if (memcmp(r_oap_hdr->id.data, oap_hdr->id.data, OAP_ID_SIZE) != 0) {
- log_err("OAP ID mismatch in flow allocation.");
- goto fail_check;
- }
-
- if (r_oap_hdr->crt.len == 0) {
- log_info("No certificate provided by %s.", n);
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (crypt_load_crt_der(r_oap_hdr->crt, &crt) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to load certificate from %s.", n);
- goto fail_check;
- }
-
- log_dbg("Loaded peer certificate for %s.", n);
-
- if (name != NULL) {
- if (crypt_check_crt_name(crt, n) < 0) {
- log_err("Certificate does not match %s.", n);
- goto fail_crt;
- }
- log_dbg("Certificate matches name %s.", n);
- }
-
- if (crypt_get_pubkey_crt(crt, &pk) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to get pubkey from certificate for %s.", n);
- goto fail_crt;
- }
-
- log_dbg("Got public key from certificate for %s.", n);
-
- if (auth_verify_crt(irmd.auth.ctx, crt) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to verify peer %s with CA store.", n);
- goto fail_crt;
- }
-
- log_info("Successfully verified peer certificate for %s.", n);
-
- sign = r_oap_hdr->hdr;
- sign.len -= (r_oap_hdr->sig.len + sizeof(uint16_t));
-
- if (auth_verify_sig(pk, sign, r_oap_hdr->sig) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to verify signature for peer %s.", n);
- goto fail_check_sig;
- }
-
- crypt_free_key(pk);
- crypt_free_crt(crt);
-
- log_info("Successfully authenticated %s.", n);
-
- return 0;
-
- fail_check_sig:
- crypt_free_key(pk);
- fail_crt:
- crypt_free_crt(crt);
- fail_check:
- return -1;
-}
-
static int flow_accept(struct flow_info * flow,
- buffer_t * symmkey,
buffer_t * data,
- struct timespec * abstime)
+ struct timespec * abstime,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
- struct oap_hdr oap_hdr; /* incoming request */
- struct oap_hdr r_oap_hdr; /* outgoing response */
- uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; /* buffer for local ephkey */
- buffer_t lpk = BUF_INIT; /* local ephemeral pubkey */
- char name[NAME_SIZE + 1]; /* name for flow */
- void * pkp = NULL; /* signing private key */
- void * crt = NULL; /* signing certificate */
- int err;
- bool crypt;
+ buffer_t req_hdr;
+ buffer_t resp_hdr;
+ char name[NAME_SIZE + 1];
+ struct name_info info;
+ int err;
- /* piggyback of user data not yet implemented */
assert(data != NULL && BUF_IS_EMPTY(data));
- assert(symmkey != NULL && BUF_IS_EMPTY(symmkey));
+
+ clrbuf(req_hdr);
+ clrbuf(resp_hdr);
if (!reg_has_proc(flow->n_pid)) {
log_err("Unknown process %d calling accept.", flow->n_pid);
@@ -1077,7 +836,7 @@ static int flow_accept(struct flow_info * flow,
pthread_cleanup_push(__cleanup_flow, flow);
- err = reg_wait_flow_accepted(flow, &oap_hdr.hdr, abstime);
+ err = reg_wait_flow_accepted(flow, &req_hdr, abstime);
pthread_cleanup_pop(false);
@@ -1097,119 +856,38 @@ static int flow_accept(struct flow_info * flow,
if (reg_get_name_for_flow_id(name, flow->id) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to get name for flow %d.", flow->id);
err = -EIPCP;
- goto fail_cred;
- }
-
- log_dbg("IPCP %d accepting flow %d for %s.",
- flow->n_pid, flow->id, name);
-
- if (load_srv_credentials(name, &pkp, &crt, &crypt) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to load security keys for %s.", name);
- err = -EAUTH;
- goto fail_cred;
- }
-
- if (oap_hdr_decode(oap_hdr.hdr, &oap_hdr) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to decode OAP header from %s.", name);
- err = -EIPCP;
- goto fail_oap_hdr;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
- debug_oap_hdr_rcv(&oap_hdr);
-#endif
- if (irm_check_oap_hdr(&oap_hdr, flow->mpl) < 0) {
- log_err("OAP header failed replay check.");
- goto fail_oap_hdr;
- }
-
- if (crypt && oap_hdr.eph.len == 0) {
- log_warn("Encryption required but no key provided.");
- err = -ECRYPT;
- goto fail_oap_hdr;
+ goto fail_oap;
}
- if (oap_hdr.eph.len > 0) { /* crypto requested */
- uint8_t * s; /* symmetric encryption key */
- ssize_t key_len; /* length of local pubkey */
- void * pkp = NULL; /* ephemeral private key pair */
-
- s = malloc(SYMMKEYSZ);
- if (s == NULL) {
- log_err("Failed to malloc symmkey.");
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto fail_keys;
- }
-
- key_len = crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp, buf);
- if (key_len < 0) {
- free(s);
- log_err("Failed to generate key pair.");
- err = -ECRYPT;
- goto fail_keys;
- }
-
- lpk.data = buf;
- lpk.len = (size_t) key_len;
-
- log_dbg("Generated ephemeral keys for %d.", flow->n_pid);
-
- if (crypt_dh_derive(pkp, oap_hdr.eph, s) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to derive secret for %d.", flow->id);
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
- free(s);
- err = -ECRYPT;
- goto fail_derive;
- }
-
- symmkey->data = s;
- symmkey->len = SYMMKEYSZ;
-
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ if (reg_get_name_info(name, &info) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to get name info for %s.", name);
+ err = -ENAME;
+ goto fail_oap;
}
- if (oap_hdr_init(oap_hdr.id, pkp, crt, lpk, *data, &r_oap_hdr) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to create OAP header.");
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto fail_r_oap_hdr;
- }
+ log_dbg("IPCP %d accepting flow %d for %s.",
+ flow->n_pid, flow->id, name);
- if (irm_auth_peer(NULL, &r_oap_hdr, &oap_hdr) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to auth %s client, flow %d.", name, flow->id);
- err = -EAUTH;
- goto fail_r_oap_hdr;
+ err = oap_srv_process(&info, req_hdr, &resp_hdr, data, sk);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ log_err("OAP processing failed for %s.", name);
+ goto fail_oap;
}
- crypt_free_crt(crt);
- crypt_free_key(pkp);
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
- debug_oap_hdr_snd(&r_oap_hdr);
-#endif
- if (ipcp_flow_alloc_resp(flow, 0, r_oap_hdr.hdr) < 0) {
+ if (ipcp_flow_alloc_resp(flow, 0, resp_hdr) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to respond to flow allocation.");
goto fail_resp;
}
- log_info("Flow %d accepted by %d for %s.",
- flow->id, flow->n_pid, name);
+ log_info("Flow %d accepted by %d for %s.", flow->id, flow->n_pid, name);
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
- oap_hdr_fini(&r_oap_hdr);
+ freebuf(req_hdr);
+ freebuf(resp_hdr);
return 0;
- fail_r_oap_hdr:
- freebuf(*symmkey);
- fail_derive:
- clrbuf(lpk);
- fail_keys:
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
- fail_oap_hdr:
- crypt_free_crt(crt);
- crypt_free_key(pkp);
- fail_cred:
- assert(lpk.data == NULL && lpk.len == 0);
- ipcp_flow_alloc_resp(flow, err, lpk);
+ fail_oap:
+ ipcp_flow_alloc_resp(flow, err, resp_hdr);
fail_wait:
reg_destroy_flow(flow->id);
fail_flow:
@@ -1217,10 +895,8 @@ static int flow_accept(struct flow_info * flow,
fail_resp:
flow->state = FLOW_NULL;
- oap_hdr_fini(&r_oap_hdr);
- freebuf(*symmkey);
- clrbuf(lpk);
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
+ freebuf(req_hdr);
+ freebuf(resp_hdr);
reg_destroy_flow(flow->id);
return -EIPCP;
}
@@ -1361,78 +1037,31 @@ static int get_ipcp_by_dst(const char * dst,
return err;
}
-static int flow_alloc(struct flow_info * flow,
- const char * dst,
- buffer_t * symmkey,
+static int flow_alloc(const char * dst,
+ struct flow_info * flow,
buffer_t * data,
- struct timespec * abstime)
+ struct timespec * abstime,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
- struct oap_hdr oap_hdr; /* outgoing request */
- struct oap_hdr r_oap_hdr; /* incoming response */
- uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; /* buffer for local ephkey */
- buffer_t lpk = BUF_INIT; /* local ephemeral pubkey */
- void * pkp = NULL; /* ephemeral private key pair */
- uint8_t * s = NULL; /* symmetric key */
- void * cpkp = NULL; /* signing private key */
- void * ccrt = NULL; /* signing certificate */
- buffer_t hash;
- uint8_t idbuf[OAP_ID_SIZE];
- buffer_t id;
- int err;
- bool crypt;
+ buffer_t req_hdr = BUF_INIT;
+ buffer_t resp_hdr = BUF_INIT;
+ buffer_t hash = BUF_INIT;
+ struct name_info info;
+ void * ctx;
+ int err;
/* piggyback of user data not yet implemented */
assert(data != NULL && BUF_IS_EMPTY(data));
- assert(symmkey != NULL && BUF_IS_EMPTY(symmkey));
log_info("Allocating flow for %d to %s.", flow->n_pid, dst);
- if (random_buffer(idbuf, OAP_ID_SIZE) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to generate ID.");
- err = -EIRMD;
- goto fail_id;
- }
-
- id.data = idbuf;
- id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
-
- if (load_cli_credentials(dst, &cpkp, &ccrt, &crypt) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to load security keys for %s.", dst);
- err = -EAUTH;
- goto fail_cred;
- }
-
- if (crypt > 0) {
- ssize_t key_len;
-
- s = malloc(SYMMKEYSZ);
- if (s == NULL) {
- log_err("Failed to malloc symmetric key");
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto fail_malloc;
- }
-
- key_len = crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp, buf);
- if (key_len < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to generate key pair.");
- err = -ECRYPT;
- goto fail_pkp;
- }
-
- lpk.data = buf;
- lpk.len = (size_t) key_len;
-
- log_dbg("Generated ephemeral keys for %d.", flow->n_pid);
+ /* Look up name_info for dst */
+ if (reg_get_name_info(dst, &info) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to get name info for %s.", dst);
+ err = -ENAME;
+ goto fail_flow;
}
- if (oap_hdr_init(id, cpkp, ccrt, lpk, *data, &oap_hdr) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to create OAP header.");
- err = -ENOMEM;
- goto fail_oap_hdr;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
- debug_oap_hdr_snd(&oap_hdr);
-#endif
if (reg_create_flow(flow) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to create flow.");
err = -EBADF;
@@ -1445,109 +1074,70 @@ static int flow_alloc(struct flow_info * flow,
goto fail_ipcp;
}
- reg_prepare_flow_alloc(flow);
+ if (reg_prepare_flow_alloc(flow) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to prepare flow allocation.");
+ err = -EBADF;
+ goto fail_prepare;
+ }
- if (ipcp_flow_alloc(flow, hash, oap_hdr.hdr)) {
+ if (oap_cli_prepare(&ctx, &info, &req_hdr, *data) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to prepare OAP request for %s.", dst);
+ err = -EBADF;
+ goto fail_prepare;
+ }
+
+ if (ipcp_flow_alloc(flow, hash, req_hdr)) {
log_err("Flow allocation %d failed.", flow->id);
- err = -ENOTALLOC;
+ err = -EIPCP;
goto fail_alloc;
}
pthread_cleanup_push(__cleanup_flow, flow);
- pthread_cleanup_push(__cleanup_pkp, pkp);
pthread_cleanup_push(free, hash.data);
- pthread_cleanup_push(free, s);
- err = reg_wait_flow_allocated(flow, &r_oap_hdr.hdr, abstime);
+ err = reg_wait_flow_allocated(flow, &resp_hdr, abstime);
pthread_cleanup_pop(false);
pthread_cleanup_pop(false);
- pthread_cleanup_pop(false);
- pthread_cleanup_pop(false);
if (err == -ETIMEDOUT) {
log_err("Flow allocation timed out.");
- goto fail_alloc;
- }
-
- if (err == -1) {
- log_dbg("Flow allocation terminated.");
- err = -EIPCP;
- goto fail_alloc;
+ goto fail_wait;
}
- log_dbg("Response received for flow %d to %s.", flow->id, dst);
+ log_dbg("Response for flow %d to %s.", flow->id, dst);
if (err < 0) {
- log_warn("Flow allocation rejected for %s: %d.", dst, err);
- goto fail_alloc;
+ log_warn("Allocation rejected: %s (%d).", dst, err);
+ goto fail_peer;
}
- if (oap_hdr_decode(r_oap_hdr.hdr, &r_oap_hdr) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to decode OAP header.");
- err = -EIPCP;
- goto fail_r_oap_hdr;
- }
-#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
- debug_oap_hdr_rcv(&r_oap_hdr);
-#endif
- if (irm_check_oap_hdr(&r_oap_hdr, flow->mpl) < 0) {
- log_err("OAP header failed replay check.");
- err = -EAUTH;
- goto fail_r_oap_hdr;
- }
-
- if (irm_auth_peer(dst, &oap_hdr, &r_oap_hdr) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to authenticate %s (flow %d).", dst, flow->id);
- err = -EAUTH;
- goto fail_r_oap_hdr;
- }
-
- if (lpk.len > 0) { /* crypto requested */
- if (crypt_dh_derive(pkp, r_oap_hdr.eph, s) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to derive secret for %d.", flow->id);
- err = -ECRYPT;
- goto fail_r_oap_hdr;
- }
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
-
- symmkey->data = s;
- symmkey->len = SYMMKEYSZ;
- s = NULL;
+ err = oap_cli_complete(ctx, &info, resp_hdr, data, sk);
+ if (err < 0) {
+ log_err("OAP completion failed for %s.", dst);
+ goto fail_complete;
}
- oap_hdr_fini(&r_oap_hdr);
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
-
- crypt_free_crt(ccrt);
- crypt_free_key(cpkp);
-
- /* TODO: piggyback user data if needed */
-
+ freebuf(req_hdr);
+ freebuf(resp_hdr);
freebuf(hash);
- free(s);
return 0;
- fail_r_oap_hdr:
+ fail_complete:
+ ctx = NULL; /* freee'd on complete */
+ fail_peer:
flow->state = FLOW_DEALLOCATED;
- oap_hdr_fini(&r_oap_hdr);
+ fail_wait:
+ freebuf(resp_hdr);
fail_alloc:
+ freebuf(req_hdr);
+ oap_ctx_free(ctx);
+ fail_prepare:
freebuf(hash);
fail_ipcp:
reg_destroy_flow(flow->id);
fail_flow:
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
- fail_oap_hdr:
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
- fail_pkp:
- free(s);
- fail_malloc:
- crypt_free_crt(ccrt);
- crypt_free_key(cpkp);
- fail_cred:
- clrbuf(id);
- fail_id:
return err;
}
@@ -1744,19 +1334,21 @@ static void __cleanup_irm_msg(void * o)
static irm_msg_t * do_command_msg(irm_msg_t * msg)
{
- struct ipcp_config conf;
- struct ipcp_info ipcp;
- struct flow_info flow;
- struct proc_info proc;
- struct name_info name;
- struct timespec * abstime;
- struct timespec max = TIMESPEC_INIT_MS(FLOW_ALLOC_TIMEOUT);
- struct timespec now;
- struct timespec ts = TIMESPEC_INIT_S(0); /* static analysis */
- int res;
- irm_msg_t * ret_msg;
- buffer_t data;
- buffer_t symmkey = BUF_INIT;;
+ struct ipcp_config conf;
+ struct ipcp_info ipcp;
+ struct flow_info flow;
+ struct proc_info proc;
+ struct name_info name;
+ struct crypt_sk sk;
+ uint8_t kbuf[SYMMKEYSZ]; /* stack buffer for OAP */
+ uint8_t * hbuf = NULL; /* heap copy for response */
+ struct timespec * abstime;
+ struct timespec max = TIMESPEC_INIT_MS(FLOW_ALLOC_TIMEOUT);
+ struct timespec now;
+ struct timespec ts = TIMESPEC_INIT_S(0); /* static analysis */
+ int res;
+ irm_msg_t * ret_msg;
+ buffer_t data;
memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow));
@@ -1858,15 +1450,27 @@ static irm_msg_t * do_command_msg(irm_msg_t * msg)
msg->has_pk = false;
assert(data.len > 0 ? data.data != NULL : data.data == NULL);
flow = flow_info_msg_to_s(msg->flow_info);
- res = flow_accept(&flow, &symmkey, &data, abstime);
+ sk.key = kbuf;
+ res = flow_accept(&flow, &data, abstime, &sk);
if (res == 0) {
- ret_msg->flow_info = flow_info_s_to_msg(&flow);
- ret_msg->has_symmkey = symmkey.len != 0;
- ret_msg->symmkey.data = symmkey.data;
- ret_msg->symmkey.len = symmkey.len;
- ret_msg->has_pk = data.len != 0;
- ret_msg->pk.data = data.data;
- ret_msg->pk.len = data.len;
+ ret_msg->flow_info = flow_info_s_to_msg(&flow);
+ ret_msg->has_pk = data.len != 0;
+ ret_msg->pk.data = data.data;
+ ret_msg->pk.len = data.len;
+ ret_msg->has_cipher_nid = true;
+ ret_msg->cipher_nid = sk.nid;
+ if (sk.nid != NID_undef) {
+ hbuf = malloc(SYMMKEYSZ);
+ if (hbuf == NULL) {
+ log_err("Failed to malloc key buf");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(hbuf, kbuf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ ret_msg->sym_key.data = hbuf;
+ ret_msg->sym_key.len = SYMMKEYSZ;
+ ret_msg->has_sym_key = true;
+ }
}
break;
case IRM_MSG_CODE__IRM_FLOW_ALLOC:
@@ -1876,15 +1480,26 @@ static irm_msg_t * do_command_msg(irm_msg_t * msg)
assert(data.len > 0 ? data.data != NULL : data.data == NULL);
flow = flow_info_msg_to_s(msg->flow_info);
abstime = abstime == NULL ? &max : abstime;
- res = flow_alloc(&flow, msg->dst, &symmkey, &data, abstime);
+ sk.key = kbuf;
+ res = flow_alloc(msg->dst, &flow, &data, abstime, &sk);
if (res == 0) {
- ret_msg->flow_info = flow_info_s_to_msg(&flow);
- ret_msg->has_symmkey = symmkey.len != 0;
- ret_msg->symmkey.data = symmkey.data;
- ret_msg->symmkey.len = symmkey.len;
- ret_msg->has_pk = data.len != 0;
- ret_msg->pk.data = data.data;
- ret_msg->pk.len = data.len;
+ ret_msg->flow_info = flow_info_s_to_msg(&flow);
+ ret_msg->has_pk = data.len != 0;
+ ret_msg->pk.data = data.data;
+ ret_msg->pk.len = data.len;
+ ret_msg->has_cipher_nid = true;
+ ret_msg->cipher_nid = sk.nid;
+ if (sk.nid != NID_undef) {
+ hbuf = malloc(SYMMKEYSZ);
+ if (hbuf == NULL) {
+ log_err("Failed to malloc key buf");
+ return NULL;
+ }
+ memcpy(hbuf, kbuf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ ret_msg->sym_key.data = hbuf;
+ ret_msg->sym_key.len = SYMMKEYSZ;
+ ret_msg->has_sym_key = true;
+ }
}
break;
case IRM_MSG_CODE__IRM_FLOW_JOIN:
@@ -1938,14 +1553,16 @@ static irm_msg_t * do_command_msg(irm_msg_t * msg)
else
ret_msg->result = res;
+ explicit_bzero(kbuf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
return ret_msg;
}
static void * mainloop(void * o)
{
- int sfd;
- irm_msg_t * msg;
- buffer_t buffer;
+ int sfd;
+ irm_msg_t * msg;
+ buffer_t buffer;
(void) o;
@@ -2170,7 +1787,7 @@ static int irm_load_store(char * dpath)
goto fail_file;
}
- if (auth_add_crt_to_store(irmd.auth.ctx, crt) < 0) {
+ if (oap_auth_add_ca_crt(crt) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to add certificate from %s to store.",
path);
goto fail_crt_add;
@@ -2295,27 +1912,19 @@ static int irm_init(void)
goto fail_tpm_create;
}
- if (pthread_mutex_init(&irmd.auth.mtx, NULL) < 0) {
- log_err("Failed to initialize auth mutex.");
- goto fail_auth_mtx;
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to initialize OAP module.");
+ goto fail_oap;
}
- irmd.auth.ctx = auth_create_ctx();
- if (irmd.auth.ctx == NULL) {
- log_err("Failed to create auth store context.");
- goto fail_auth_ctx;
- }
-
- list_head_init(&irmd.auth.list);
-
if (irm_load_store(OUROBOROS_CA_CRT_DIR) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to load CA certificates.");
- goto fail_auth_ctx;
+ goto fail_load_store;
}
if (irm_load_store(OUROBOROS_CHAIN_DIR) < 0) {
log_err("Failed to load intermediate certificates.");
- goto fail_auth_ctx;
+ goto fail_load_store;
}
#ifdef HAVE_FUSE
@@ -2352,11 +1961,10 @@ static int irm_init(void)
#ifdef HAVE_FUSE
rmdir(FUSE_PREFIX);
#endif
- auth_destroy_ctx(irmd.auth.ctx);
#endif
- fail_auth_ctx:
- pthread_mutex_destroy(&irmd.auth.mtx);
- fail_auth_mtx:
+ fail_load_store:
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ fail_oap:
tpm_destroy(irmd.tpm);
fail_tpm_create:
shm_rdrbuff_destroy(irmd.rdrb);
@@ -2388,18 +1996,7 @@ static void irm_fini(void)
if (irmd_get_state() != IRMD_INIT)
log_warn("Unsafe destroy.");
- pthread_mutex_lock(&irmd.auth.mtx);
-
- list_for_each_safe(p, h, &irmd.auth.list) {
- struct oaph * oaph = list_entry(p, struct oaph, next);
- list_del(&oaph->next);
- free(oaph);
- }
-
- pthread_mutex_unlock(&irmd.auth.mtx);
- pthread_mutex_destroy(&irmd.auth.mtx);
-
- auth_destroy_ctx(irmd.auth.ctx);
+ oap_auth_fini();
tpm_destroy(irmd.tpm);
@@ -2637,6 +2234,11 @@ int main(int argc,
goto fail_reg;
}
+ if (crypt_secure_malloc_init(IRMD_SECMEM_MAX) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to initialize secure memory allocation.");
+ goto fail_reg;
+ }
+
pthread_sigmask(SIG_BLOCK, &sigset, NULL);
if (irm_start() < 0)
@@ -2656,6 +2258,8 @@ int main(int argc,
pthread_sigmask(SIG_UNBLOCK, &sigset, NULL);
+ crypt_secure_malloc_fini();
+
reg_clear();
reg_fini();
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap.c b/src/irmd/oap.c
index 500da6f1..085e06a3 100644
--- a/src/irmd/oap.c
+++ b/src/irmd/oap.c
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
*
- * Ouroboros flow allocation protocol header
+ * OAP - Shared credential and configuration loading
*
* Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
* Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
@@ -29,260 +29,102 @@
#define OUROBOROS_PREFIX "irmd/oap"
#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
-#include <ouroboros/endian.h>
+#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
#include <ouroboros/logs.h>
-#include <ouroboros/rib.h>
-#include <ouroboros/time.h>
#include "config.h"
-#include "oap.h"
-
#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
-int oap_hdr_init(buffer_t id,
- void * pkp,
- void * pubcrt,
- buffer_t ephkey,
- buffer_t data,
- struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr)
-{
- struct timespec now;
- uint64_t stamp;
- buffer_t hdr;
- buffer_t der = BUF_INIT;
- buffer_t sig = BUF_INIT;
- buffer_t sign;
- uint16_t len;
- off_t offset;
-
- assert(id.data != NULL && id.len == OAP_ID_SIZE);
- assert(oap_hdr != NULL);
- memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
-
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
- stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(now));
-
- if (pubcrt != NULL && crypt_crt_der(pubcrt, &der) < 0)
- goto fail_der;
-
- hdr.len = id.len +
- sizeof(stamp) +
- sizeof(len) + der.len +
- sizeof(len) + ephkey.len +
- sizeof(len) + data.len +
- sizeof(len); /* sig len */
-
- hdr.data = malloc(hdr.len);
- if (hdr.data == NULL)
- goto fail_hdr;
-
- offset = 0;
-
- memcpy(hdr.data, id.data, id.len);
- offset += id.len;
-
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, &stamp, sizeof(stamp));
- offset += sizeof(stamp);
-
- /* pubcrt */
- len = hton16((uint16_t) der.len);
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, &len, sizeof(len));
- offset += sizeof(len);
- if (der.len != 0)
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, der.data, der.len);
- offset += der.len;
-
- /* ephkey */
- len = hton16((uint16_t) ephkey.len);
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, &len, sizeof(len));
- offset += sizeof(len);
- if (ephkey.len != 0)
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, ephkey.data, ephkey.len);
- offset += ephkey.len;
-
- /* data */
- len = hton16((uint16_t) data.len);
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, &len, sizeof(len));
- offset += sizeof(len);
- if (data.len != 0)
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, data.data, data.len);
- offset += data.len;
-
- sign.data = hdr.data;
- sign.len = hdr.len - sizeof(len);
-
- if (pkp != NULL && auth_sign(pkp, sign, &sig) < 0)
- goto fail_sig;
-
- len = hton16((uint16_t) sig.len);
- memcpy(hdr.data + offset, &len, sizeof(len));
- offset += sizeof(len);
-
- oap_hdr->hdr = hdr;
+/*
+ * Shared credential and configuration loading helpers
+ */
- assert((size_t) offset == hdr.len);
+#ifndef OAP_TEST_MODE
- if (sig.len > 0) {
- oap_hdr->hdr.len += sig.len;
- oap_hdr->hdr.data = realloc(hdr.data, oap_hdr->hdr.len);
- if (oap_hdr->hdr.data == NULL)
- goto fail_oap_hdr;
+static bool file_exists(const char * path)
+{
+ struct stat s;
- memcpy(oap_hdr->hdr.data + offset, sig.data, sig.len);
- clrbuf(hdr);
+ if (stat(path, &s) < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
+ log_dbg("File %s does not exist.", path);
+ return false;
}
- if (oap_hdr_decode(oap_hdr->hdr, oap_hdr) < 0)
- goto fail_decode;
-
- freebuf(der);
- freebuf(sig);
-
- return 0;
-
- fail_decode:
- oap_hdr_fini(oap_hdr);
- fail_oap_hdr:
- freebuf(sig);
- fail_sig:
- freebuf(hdr);
- fail_hdr:
- freebuf(der);
- fail_der:
- memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
- return -1;
+ return true;
}
-void oap_hdr_fini(struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr)
+int load_credentials(const char * name,
+ const struct name_sec_paths * paths,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
{
- assert(oap_hdr != NULL);
-
- freebuf(oap_hdr->hdr);
- memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
-}
-
-int oap_hdr_decode(buffer_t hdr,
- struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr)
-{
- off_t offset;
-
- assert(oap_hdr != NULL);
- memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
-
- if (hdr.len < OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE)
- goto fail_decode;
-
- oap_hdr->id.data = hdr.data;
- oap_hdr->id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ assert(paths != NULL);
+ assert(pkp != NULL);
+ assert(crt != NULL);
- offset = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
- oap_hdr->timestamp = ntoh64(*(uint64_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
-
- offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
-
- oap_hdr->crt.len = (size_t) ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
- oap_hdr->crt.data = hdr.data + offset + sizeof(uint16_t);
-
- offset += sizeof(uint16_t) + oap_hdr->crt.len;
-
- if ((size_t) offset + sizeof(uint16_t) >= hdr.len)
- goto fail_decode;
-
- oap_hdr->eph.len = (size_t) ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
- oap_hdr->eph.data = hdr.data + offset + sizeof(uint16_t);
-
- offset += sizeof(uint16_t) + oap_hdr->eph.len;
-
- if ((size_t) offset + sizeof(uint16_t) >= hdr.len)
- goto fail_decode;
-
- oap_hdr->data.len = (size_t) ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
- oap_hdr->data.data = hdr.data + offset + sizeof(uint16_t);
-
- offset += sizeof(uint16_t) + oap_hdr->data.len;
-
- if ((size_t) offset + sizeof(uint16_t) > hdr.len)
- goto fail_decode;
-
- oap_hdr->sig.len = (size_t) ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
- oap_hdr->sig.data = hdr.data + offset + sizeof(uint16_t);
+ if (!file_exists(paths->crt) || !file_exists(paths->key)) {
+ log_info("No authentication certificates for %s.", name);
+ return 0;
+ }
- offset += sizeof(uint16_t) + oap_hdr->sig.len;
+ if (crypt_load_crt_file(paths->crt, crt) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s for %s.", paths->crt, name);
+ goto fail_crt;
+ }
- if ((size_t) offset != hdr.len)
- goto fail_decode;
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_file(paths->key, pkp) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s for %s.", paths->key, name);
+ goto fail_key;
+ }
- oap_hdr->hdr = hdr;
+ log_info("Loaded authentication certificates for %s.", name);
return 0;
- fail_decode:
- memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
- return -1;
-}
-
-#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
-static void debug_oap_hdr(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
-{
- assert(hdr);
-
- if (hdr->crt.len > 0)
- log_proto(" Certificate: [%zu bytes]", hdr->crt.len);
- else
- log_proto(" Certificate: <none>");
-
- if (hdr->eph.len > 0)
- log_proto(" Ephemeral Public Key: [%zu bytes]", hdr->eph.len);
- else
- log_proto(" Ephemeral Public Key: <none>");
- if (hdr->data.len > 0)
- log_proto(" Data: [%zu bytes]", hdr->data.len);
- else
- log_proto(" Data: <none>");
- if (hdr->sig.len > 0)
- log_proto(" Signature: [%zu bytes]", hdr->sig.len);
- else
- log_proto(" Signature: <none>");
+ fail_key:
+ crypt_free_crt(*crt);
+ *crt = NULL;
+ fail_crt:
+ return -EAUTH;
}
-void debug_oap_hdr_rcv(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
+int load_kex_config(const char * name,
+ const char * path,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
{
- struct tm * tm;
- char tmstr[RIB_TM_STRLEN];
- time_t stamp;
+ assert(name != NULL);
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
- assert(hdr);
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
- stamp = (time_t) hdr->timestamp / BILLION;
-
- tm = gmtime(&stamp);
- strftime(tmstr, sizeof(tmstr), RIB_TM_FORMAT, tm);
-
- log_proto("OAP_HDR [" HASH_FMT64 " @ %s ] <--",
- HASH_VAL64(hdr->id.data), tmstr);
-
- debug_oap_hdr(hdr);
-}
+ /* Load encryption config */
+ if (!file_exists(path))
+ log_dbg("No encryption %s for %s.", path, name);
-void debug_oap_hdr_snd(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
-{
- struct tm * tm;
- char tmstr[RIB_TM_STRLEN];
- time_t stamp;
-
- assert(hdr);
+ if (load_sec_config_file(cfg, path) < 0) {
+ log_warn("Failed to load %s for %s.", path, name);
+ return -1;
+ }
- stamp = (time_t) hdr->timestamp / BILLION;
+ if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(cfg)) {
+ log_info("Key exchange not configured for %s.", name);
+ return 0;
+ }
- tm = gmtime(&stamp);
- strftime(tmstr, sizeof(tmstr), RIB_TM_FORMAT, tm);
+ if (cfg->c.nid == NID_undef || crypt_nid_to_str(cfg->c.nid) == NULL) {
+ log_err("Invalid cipher NID %d for %s.", cfg->c.nid, name);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
- log_proto("OAP_HDR [" HASH_FMT64 " @ %s ] -->",
- HASH_VAL64(hdr->id.data), tmstr);
+ log_info("Encryption enabled for %s.", name);
- debug_oap_hdr(hdr);
+ return 0;
}
-#endif
+#endif /* OAP_TEST_MODE */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap.h b/src/irmd/oap.h
index ccdfa804..25c07408 100644
--- a/src/irmd/oap.h
+++ b/src/irmd/oap.h
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
/*
* Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
*
- * Ouroboros flow allocation protocol header
+ * Ouroboros Allocation Protocol (OAP) Component
*
* Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
* Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
@@ -23,72 +23,45 @@
#ifndef OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_H
#define OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_H
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
-#define OAP_ID_SIZE (16)
-#define OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE (OAP_ID_SIZE + sizeof(uint64_t) + 4 * sizeof(uint16_t))
+/* OAP authentication state (in oap/auth.c) */
+int oap_auth_init(void);
+void oap_auth_fini(void);
-/*
- * 0 1 2 3
- * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- * | |
- * | id (128 bits) |
- * | |
- * | |
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- * | timestamp (64 bits) |
- * | |
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- * | crt_len (16 bits) | |
- * +-----------+-----------------+ |
- * | certificate |
- * | |
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- * | eph_len (16 bits) | |
- * +-----------+-----------------+ |
- * | public key for ECDHE |
- * | |
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- * | data_len (16 bits) | |
- * +-----------+-----------------+ |
- * | piggy backed application data |
- * | |
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- * | sig_len (16 bits) | |
- * +-----------+-----------------+ |
- * | signature |
- * | |
- * +---------------------------------------------------------------+
- */
-
-struct oap_hdr {
- uint64_t timestamp;
- buffer_t id;
- buffer_t crt;
- buffer_t eph;
- buffer_t data;
- buffer_t sig;
- buffer_t hdr;
-};
-
-int oap_hdr_init(buffer_t id,
- void * pkp,
- void * pubcrt,
- buffer_t ephkey,
- buffer_t data,
- struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr);
+int oap_auth_add_ca_crt(void * crt);
-void oap_hdr_fini(struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr);
+/*
+* Prepare OAP request header for server, returns context
+* Passes client data for srv, returns srv data for client
+*/
+int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx,
+ const struct name_info * info,
+ buffer_t * req_buf,
+ buffer_t data);
-int oap_hdr_decode(buffer_t hdr,
- struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr);
+/*
+ * Server processes header, creates response header, returns secret key.
+ * data is in/out: input=srv data to send, output=cli data received.
+ */
+int oap_srv_process(const struct name_info * info,
+ buffer_t req_buf,
+ buffer_t * rsp_buf,
+ buffer_t * data,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk);
-#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
-void debug_oap_hdr_snd(const struct oap_hdr * hdr);
+/* Complete OAP, returns secret key and server data, frees ctx */
+int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx,
+ const struct name_info * info,
+ buffer_t rsp_buf,
+ buffer_t * data,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk);
-void debug_oap_hdr_rcv(const struct oap_hdr * hdr);
-#endif /* DEBUG_PROTO_OAP */
+/* Free OAP state (on failure before complete) */
+void oap_ctx_free(void * ctx);
#endif /* OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_H */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/auth.c b/src/irmd/oap/auth.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cea7b7a0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/auth.c
@@ -0,0 +1,252 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - Authentication, replay detection, and validation
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#define OUROBOROS_PREFIX "irmd/oap"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
+#include <ouroboros/list.h>
+#include <ouroboros/logs.h>
+#include <ouroboros/pthread.h>
+#include <ouroboros/time.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "hdr.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+struct oap_replay_entry {
+ struct list_head next;
+ uint64_t timestamp;
+ uint8_t id[OAP_ID_SIZE];
+};
+
+static struct {
+ struct auth_ctx * ca_ctx;
+ struct {
+ struct list_head list;
+ pthread_mutex_t mtx;
+ } replay;
+} oap_auth;
+
+int oap_auth_init(void)
+{
+ oap_auth.ca_ctx = auth_create_ctx();
+ if (oap_auth.ca_ctx == NULL) {
+ log_err("Failed to create OAP auth context.");
+ goto fail_ctx;
+ }
+
+ list_head_init(&oap_auth.replay.list);
+
+ if (pthread_mutex_init(&oap_auth.replay.mtx, NULL)) {
+ log_err("Failed to init OAP replay mutex.");
+ goto fail_mtx;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_mtx:
+ auth_destroy_ctx(oap_auth.ca_ctx);
+ fail_ctx:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void oap_auth_fini(void)
+{
+ struct list_head * p;
+ struct list_head * h;
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&oap_auth.replay.mtx);
+
+ list_for_each_safe(p, h, &oap_auth.replay.list) {
+ struct oap_replay_entry * e;
+ e = list_entry(p, struct oap_replay_entry, next);
+ list_del(&e->next);
+ free(e);
+ }
+
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&oap_auth.replay.mtx);
+ pthread_mutex_destroy(&oap_auth.replay.mtx);
+
+ auth_destroy_ctx(oap_auth.ca_ctx);
+}
+
+int oap_auth_add_ca_crt(void * crt)
+{
+ return auth_add_crt_to_store(oap_auth.ca_ctx, crt);
+}
+
+#define TIMESYNC_SLACK 100 /* ms */
+#define ID_IS_EQUAL(id1, id2) (memcmp(id1, id2, OAP_ID_SIZE) == 0)
+int oap_check_hdr(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
+{
+ struct list_head * p;
+ struct list_head * h;
+ struct timespec now;
+ struct oap_replay_entry * new;
+ uint64_t stamp;
+ uint64_t cur;
+ uint8_t * id;
+ ssize_t delta;
+
+ assert(hdr != NULL);
+
+ stamp = hdr->timestamp;
+ id = hdr->id.data;
+
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+
+ cur = TS_TO_UINT64(now);
+
+ delta = (ssize_t)(cur - stamp) / MILLION;
+ if (delta < -TIMESYNC_SLACK) {
+ log_err_id(id, "OAP header from %zd ms into future.", -delta);
+ goto fail_stamp;
+ }
+
+ if (delta > OAP_REPLAY_TIMER * 1000) {
+ log_err_id(id, "OAP header too old (%zd ms).", delta);
+ goto fail_stamp;
+ }
+
+ new = malloc(sizeof(*new));
+ if (new == NULL) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to allocate memory for OAP element.");
+ goto fail_stamp;
+ }
+
+ pthread_mutex_lock(&oap_auth.replay.mtx);
+
+ list_for_each_safe(p, h, &oap_auth.replay.list) {
+ struct oap_replay_entry * e;
+ e = list_entry(p, struct oap_replay_entry, next);
+ if (cur > e->timestamp + OAP_REPLAY_TIMER * BILLION) {
+ list_del(&e->next);
+ free(e);
+ continue;
+ }
+
+ if (e->timestamp == stamp && ID_IS_EQUAL(e->id, id)) {
+ log_warn_id(id, "OAP header already known.");
+ goto fail_replay;
+ }
+ }
+
+ memcpy(new->id, id, OAP_ID_SIZE);
+ new->timestamp = stamp;
+
+ list_add_tail(&new->next, &oap_auth.replay.list);
+
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&oap_auth.replay.mtx);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_replay:
+ pthread_mutex_unlock(&oap_auth.replay.mtx);
+ free(new);
+ fail_stamp:
+ return -EAUTH;
+}
+
+int oap_auth_peer(char * name,
+ const struct oap_hdr * local_hdr,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr)
+{
+ void * crt;
+ void * pk;
+ buffer_t sign; /* Signed region */
+ uint8_t * id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+
+ assert(name != NULL);
+ assert(local_hdr != NULL);
+ assert(peer_hdr != NULL);
+
+ if (memcmp(peer_hdr->id.data, local_hdr->id.data, OAP_ID_SIZE) != 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "OAP ID mismatch in flow allocation.");
+ goto fail_check;
+ }
+
+ if (peer_hdr->crt.len == 0) {
+ log_dbg_id(id, "No crt provided.");
+ name[0] = '\0';
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_der(peer_hdr->crt, &crt) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to load crt.");
+ goto fail_check;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Loaded peer crt.");
+
+ if (crypt_get_pubkey_crt(crt, &pk) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to get pubkey from crt.");
+ goto fail_crt;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Got public key from crt.");
+
+ if (auth_verify_crt(oap_auth.ca_ctx, crt) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to verify peer with CA store.");
+ goto fail_crt;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Successfully verified peer crt.");
+
+ sign = peer_hdr->hdr;
+ sign.len -= peer_hdr->sig.len;
+
+ if (auth_verify_sig(pk, peer_hdr->md_nid, sign, peer_hdr->sig) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to verify signature.");
+ goto fail_check_sig;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_get_crt_name(crt, name) < 0) {
+ log_warn_id(id, "Failed to extract name from certificate.");
+ name[0] = '\0';
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(pk);
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Successfully authenticated peer.");
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_check_sig:
+ crypt_free_key(pk);
+ fail_crt:
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ fail_check:
+ return -EAUTH;
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/tests/irm_test.c b/src/irmd/oap/auth.h
index d440289c..07c33a23 100644
--- a/src/irmd/tests/irm_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/auth.h
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
/*
* Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
*
- * Unit tests of IRMd functions
+ * OAP - Authentication functions
+ *
* Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
* Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
*
@@ -19,15 +20,16 @@
* Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
*/
+#ifndef OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_AUTH_H
+#define OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_AUTH_H
+#include "hdr.h"
-int irm_test(int argc,
- char **argv)
-{
- int ret = 0;
+int oap_check_hdr(const struct oap_hdr * hdr);
- (void) argc;
- (void) argv;
+/* name is updated with the peer's certificate name if available */
+int oap_auth_peer(char * name,
+ const struct oap_hdr * local_hdr,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr);
- return ret;
-}
+#endif /* OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_AUTH_H */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/cli.c b/src/irmd/oap/cli.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..12660d7f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/cli.c
@@ -0,0 +1,553 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - Client-side processing
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#define OUROBOROS_PREFIX "irmd/oap"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
+#include <ouroboros/logs.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "hdr.h"
+#include "io.h"
+#include "../oap.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+/* Client context between oap_cli_prepare and oap_cli_complete */
+struct oap_cli_ctx {
+ uint8_t __id[OAP_ID_SIZE];
+ buffer_t id;
+ uint8_t kex_buf[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t req_hash[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
+ size_t req_hash_len;
+ int req_md_nid;
+ struct sec_config kcfg;
+ struct oap_hdr local_hdr;
+ void * pkp; /* Ephemeral keypair */
+ uint8_t * key; /* For client-encap KEM */
+};
+
+#define OAP_CLI_CTX_INIT(s) \
+ do { s->id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE; s->id.data = s->__id; } while (0)
+
+/* Client-side credential loading, mocked in tests */
+
+#ifdef OAP_TEST_MODE
+extern int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+extern int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+extern int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ buffer_t * buf);
+#else
+
+int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(pkp != NULL);
+ assert(crt != NULL);
+
+ return load_credentials(info->name, &info->c, pkp, crt);
+}
+
+int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
+{
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+
+ return load_kex_config(info->name, info->c.enc, cfg);
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ buffer_t * pk)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ const char * ext;
+
+ assert(name != NULL);
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+ assert(pk != NULL);
+
+ ext = IS_HYBRID_KEM(cfg->x.str) ? "raw" : "pem";
+
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path),
+ OUROBOROS_CLI_CRT_DIR "/%s/kex.srv.pub.%s", name, ext);
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(cfg->x.str)) {
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_raw_file(path, pk) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s pubkey from %s.", ext, path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_file_to_der(path, pk) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s pubkey from %s.", ext, path);
+ return -1;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_dbg("Loaded %s pubkey from %s (%zu bytes).", ext, path, pk->len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* OAP_TEST_MODE */
+
+static int do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex;
+ uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ /* Generate ephemeral keypair, send PK */
+ len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &s->pkp, kex->data);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate DHE keypair.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ kex->len = (size_t) len;
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Generated ephemeral %s keys (%zd bytes).",
+ kcfg->x.str, len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(const char * server_name,
+ struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex;
+ uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
+ buffer_t server_pk = BUF_INIT;
+ uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ if (load_server_kem_pk(server_name, kcfg, &server_pk) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to load server KEM pk.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(kcfg->x.str))
+ len = kex_kem_encap_raw(server_pk, kex->data,
+ kcfg->k.nid, key_buf);
+ else
+ len = kex_kem_encap(server_pk, kex->data,
+ kcfg->k.nid, key_buf);
+
+ freebuf(server_pk);
+
+ if (len < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to encapsulate KEM.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ kex->len = (size_t) len;
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Client encaps: CT len=%zd.", len);
+
+ /* Store derived key */
+ s->key = crypt_secure_malloc(SYMMKEYSZ);
+ if (s->key == NULL) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to allocate secure key.");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+ memcpy(s->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ explicit_bzero(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ buffer_t * kex = &s->local_hdr.kex;
+ uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ /* Server encaps: generate keypair, send PK */
+ len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &s->pkp, kex->data);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate KEM keypair.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ kex->len = (size_t) len;
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Client PK for server encaps (%zd bytes).", len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_client_kex_prepare(const char * server_name,
+ struct oap_cli_ctx * s)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+
+ if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg))
+ return 0;
+
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str)) {
+ if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP)
+ return do_client_kex_prepare_kem_encap(server_name, s);
+ else
+ return do_client_kex_prepare_kem_decap(s);
+ }
+
+ return do_client_kex_prepare_dhe(s);
+}
+
+int oap_cli_prepare(void ** ctx,
+ const struct name_info * info,
+ buffer_t * req_buf,
+ buffer_t data)
+{
+ struct oap_cli_ctx * s;
+ void * pkp = NULL;
+ void * crt = NULL;
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ assert(ctx != NULL);
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(req_buf != NULL);
+
+ clrbuf(*req_buf);
+ *ctx = NULL;
+
+ /* Allocate ctx to carry between prepare and complete */
+ s = malloc(sizeof(*s));
+ if (s == NULL) {
+ log_err("Failed to allocate OAP client ctx.");
+ return -ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+ OAP_CLI_CTX_INIT(s);
+
+ /* Generate session ID */
+ if (random_buffer(s->__id, OAP_ID_SIZE) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to generate OAP session ID.");
+ goto fail_id;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(s->id.data, "Preparing OAP request for %s.", info->name);
+
+ /* Load client credentials */
+ if (load_cli_credentials(info, &pkp, &crt) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to load credentials for %s.",
+ info->name);
+ goto fail_id;
+ }
+
+ /* Load KEX config */
+ if (load_cli_kex_config(info, &s->kcfg) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to load KEX config for %s.",
+ info->name);
+ goto fail_kex;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(s->id.data, "KEX config: algo=%s, mode=%s, cipher=%s.",
+ s->kcfg.x.str != NULL ? s->kcfg.x.str : "none",
+ s->kcfg.x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP ? "client-encap" :
+ s->kcfg.x.mode == KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP ? "server-encap" :
+ "none",
+ s->kcfg.c.str != NULL ? s->kcfg.c.str : "none");
+
+ oap_hdr_init(&s->local_hdr, s->id, s->kex_buf, data, s->kcfg.c.nid);
+
+ if (do_client_kex_prepare(info->name, s) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to prepare client KEX.");
+ goto fail_kex;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_hdr_encode(&s->local_hdr, pkp, crt, &s->kcfg,
+ (buffer_t) BUF_INIT, NID_undef)) {
+ log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to create OAP request header.");
+ goto fail_hdr;
+ }
+
+ debug_oap_hdr_snd(&s->local_hdr);
+
+ /* Compute and store hash of request for verification in complete */
+ s->req_md_nid = s->kcfg.d.nid != NID_undef ? s->kcfg.d.nid : NID_sha384;
+ ret = md_digest(s->req_md_nid, s->local_hdr.hdr, s->req_hash);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ log_err_id(s->id.data, "Failed to hash request.");
+ goto fail_hash;
+ }
+ s->req_hash_len = (size_t) ret;
+
+ /* Transfer ownership of request buffer */
+ *req_buf = s->local_hdr.hdr;
+ clrbuf(s->local_hdr.hdr);
+
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+
+ *ctx = s;
+
+ log_dbg_id(s->id.data, "OAP request prepared for %s.", info->name);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_hash:
+ fail_hdr:
+ crypt_secure_free(s->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ crypt_free_key(s->pkp);
+ fail_kex:
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+ fail_id:
+ free(s);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+void oap_ctx_free(void * ctx)
+{
+ struct oap_cli_ctx * s = ctx;
+
+ if (s == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ oap_hdr_fini(&s->local_hdr);
+
+ if (s->pkp != NULL)
+ crypt_free_key(s->pkp);
+
+ if (s->key != NULL)
+ crypt_secure_free(s->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ memset(s, 0, sizeof(*s));
+ free(s);
+}
+
+static int do_client_kex_complete_kem(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
+ uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ];
+
+ if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP) {
+ buffer_t ct;
+
+ if (peer_hdr->kex.len == 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Server did not send KEM CT.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ ct.data = peer_hdr->kex.data;
+ ct.len = peer_hdr->kex.len;
+
+ if (kex_kem_decap(s->pkp, ct, kcfg->k.nid, key_buf) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to decapsulate KEM.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Client decapsulated server CT.");
+
+ } else if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
+ /* Key already derived during prepare */
+ memcpy(sk->key, s->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid;
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str,
+ kcfg->c.str);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ memcpy(sk->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid;
+ explicit_bzero(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_client_kex_complete_dhe(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
+ uint8_t key_buf[SYMMKEYSZ];
+
+ /* DHE: derive from server's public key */
+ if (peer_hdr->kex.len == 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Server did not send DHE public key.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_dhe_derive(kcfg, s->pkp, peer_hdr->kex, key_buf) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to derive DHE secret.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "DHE: derived shared secret.");
+
+ memcpy(sk->key, key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ sk->nid = kcfg->c.nid;
+ explicit_bzero(key_buf, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.", kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+
+static int do_client_kex_complete(struct oap_cli_ctx * s,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ struct sec_config * kcfg = &s->kcfg;
+ uint8_t * id = s->id.data;
+
+ if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg))
+ return 0;
+
+ /* Accept server's cipher choice */
+ if (peer_hdr->cipher_str == NULL) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Server did not provide cipher.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER(kcfg, peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+ if (crypt_validate_nid(kcfg->c.nid) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Server cipher '%s' not supported.",
+ peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Accepted server cipher %s.", peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+
+ /* Derive shared secret */
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str))
+ return do_client_kex_complete_kem(s, peer_hdr, sk);
+
+ return do_client_kex_complete_dhe(s, peer_hdr, sk);
+}
+
+int oap_cli_complete(void * ctx,
+ const struct name_info * info,
+ buffer_t rsp_buf,
+ buffer_t * data,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ struct oap_cli_ctx * s = ctx;
+ struct oap_hdr peer_hdr;
+ char peer[NAME_SIZE + 1];
+ uint8_t * id;
+
+ assert(ctx != NULL);
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(data != NULL);
+ assert(sk != NULL);
+
+ sk->nid = NID_undef;
+
+ clrbuf(*data);
+
+ memset(&peer_hdr, 0, sizeof(peer_hdr));
+
+ id = s->id.data;
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Completing OAP for %s.", info->name);
+
+ /* Decode response header using client's md_nid for hash length */
+ if (oap_hdr_decode(&peer_hdr, rsp_buf, s->req_md_nid) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to decode OAP response header.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ debug_oap_hdr_rcv(&peer_hdr);
+
+ /* Verify response ID matches request */
+ if (memcmp(peer_hdr.id.data, id, OAP_ID_SIZE) != 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "OAP response ID mismatch.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ /* Authenticate server */
+ if (oap_auth_peer(peer, &s->local_hdr, &peer_hdr) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to authenticate server.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify request hash in authenticated response */
+ if (peer_hdr.req_hash.len == 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Response missing req_hash.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(peer_hdr.req_hash.data, s->req_hash, s->req_hash_len) != 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Response req_hash mismatch.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify peer certificate name matches expected destination */
+ if (peer_hdr.crt.len > 0 && strcmp(peer, info->name) != 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Peer crt for '%s' does not match '%s'.",
+ peer, info->name);
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ /* Complete key exchange */
+ if (do_client_kex_complete(s, &peer_hdr, sk) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to complete key exchange.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ /* Copy piggybacked data from server response */
+ if (oap_hdr_copy_data(&peer_hdr, data) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to copy server data.");
+ goto fail_oap;
+ }
+
+ log_info_id(id, "OAP completed for %s.", info->name);
+
+ oap_ctx_free(s);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_oap:
+ oap_ctx_free(s);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/hdr.c b/src/irmd/oap/hdr.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..cdff7ab6
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/hdr.c
@@ -0,0 +1,456 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - Header encoding, decoding, and debugging
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#define OUROBOROS_PREFIX "irmd/oap"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/endian.h>
+#include <ouroboros/hash.h>
+#include <ouroboros/logs.h>
+#include <ouroboros/rib.h>
+#include <ouroboros/time.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "hdr.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <errno.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <time.h>
+
+int oap_hdr_decode(struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr,
+ buffer_t hdr,
+ int req_md_nid)
+{
+ off_t offset;
+ uint16_t kex_len;
+ uint16_t ciph_nid;
+ size_t crt_len;
+ size_t data_len;
+ size_t hash_len;
+ size_t sig_len;
+
+ assert(oap_hdr != NULL);
+ memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
+
+ if (hdr.len < OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE)
+ goto fail_decode;
+
+ /* Parse fixed header (36 bytes) */
+ oap_hdr->id.data = hdr.data;
+ oap_hdr->id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+
+ offset = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+
+ oap_hdr->timestamp = ntoh64(*(uint64_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ offset += sizeof(uint64_t);
+
+ /* cipher NID */
+ ciph_nid = ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ oap_hdr->nid = ciph_nid;
+ oap_hdr->cipher_str = crypt_nid_to_str(ciph_nid);
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ /* kdf NID */
+ oap_hdr->kdf_nid = ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ oap_hdr->kdf_str = md_nid_to_str(oap_hdr->kdf_nid);
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ /* md NID (signature hash) */
+ oap_hdr->md_nid = ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ oap_hdr->md_str = md_nid_to_str(oap_hdr->md_nid);
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ /* Validate NIDs: NID_undef is valid at parse time, else must be known.
+ * Note: md_nid=NID_undef only valid for PQC; enforced at sign/verify.
+ */
+ if (ciph_nid != NID_undef && crypt_validate_nid(ciph_nid) < 0)
+ goto fail_decode;
+ if (oap_hdr->kdf_nid != NID_undef &&
+ md_validate_nid(oap_hdr->kdf_nid) < 0)
+ goto fail_decode;
+ if (oap_hdr->md_nid != NID_undef &&
+ md_validate_nid(oap_hdr->md_nid) < 0)
+ goto fail_decode;
+
+ /* crt_len */
+ crt_len = (size_t) ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ /* kex_len + flags */
+ kex_len = ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ oap_hdr->kex.len = (size_t) (kex_len & OAP_KEX_LEN_MASK);
+ oap_hdr->kex_flags.fmt = (kex_len & OAP_KEX_FMT_BIT) ? 1 : 0;
+ oap_hdr->kex_flags.role = (kex_len & OAP_KEX_ROLE_BIT) ? 1 : 0;
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ /* data_len */
+ data_len = (size_t) ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(hdr.data + offset));
+ offset += sizeof(uint16_t);
+
+ /* Response includes req_hash when md_nid is set */
+ hash_len = (req_md_nid != NID_undef) ?
+ (size_t) md_len(req_md_nid) : 0;
+
+ /* Validate total length */
+ if (hdr.len < (size_t) offset + crt_len + oap_hdr->kex.len +
+ data_len + hash_len)
+ goto fail_decode;
+
+ /* Derive sig_len from remaining bytes */
+ sig_len = hdr.len - offset - crt_len - oap_hdr->kex.len -
+ data_len - hash_len;
+
+ /* Unsigned packets must not have trailing bytes */
+ if (crt_len == 0 && sig_len != 0)
+ goto fail_decode;
+
+ /* Parse variable fields */
+ oap_hdr->crt.data = hdr.data + offset;
+ oap_hdr->crt.len = crt_len;
+ offset += crt_len;
+
+ oap_hdr->kex.data = hdr.data + offset;
+ offset += oap_hdr->kex.len;
+
+ oap_hdr->data.data = hdr.data + offset;
+ oap_hdr->data.len = data_len;
+ offset += data_len;
+
+ oap_hdr->req_hash.data = hdr.data + offset;
+ oap_hdr->req_hash.len = hash_len;
+ offset += hash_len;
+
+ oap_hdr->sig.data = hdr.data + offset;
+ oap_hdr->sig.len = sig_len;
+
+ oap_hdr->hdr = hdr;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_decode:
+ memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void oap_hdr_fini(struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr)
+{
+ assert(oap_hdr != NULL);
+
+ freebuf(oap_hdr->hdr);
+ memset(oap_hdr, 0, sizeof(*oap_hdr));
+}
+
+int oap_hdr_copy_data(const struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ buffer_t * out)
+{
+ assert(hdr != NULL);
+ assert(out != NULL);
+
+ if (hdr->data.len == 0) {
+ clrbuf(*out);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ out->data = malloc(hdr->data.len);
+ if (out->data == NULL)
+ return -ENOMEM;
+
+ memcpy(out->data, hdr->data.data, hdr->data.len);
+ out->len = hdr->data.len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void oap_hdr_init(struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ buffer_t id,
+ uint8_t * kex_buf,
+ buffer_t data,
+ uint16_t nid)
+{
+ assert(hdr != NULL);
+ assert(id.data != NULL && id.len == OAP_ID_SIZE);
+
+ memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(*hdr));
+
+ hdr->id = id;
+ hdr->kex.data = kex_buf;
+ hdr->kex.len = 0;
+ hdr->data = data;
+ hdr->nid = nid;
+}
+
+int oap_hdr_encode(struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ void * pkp,
+ void * crt,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t req_hash,
+ int req_md_nid)
+{
+ struct timespec now;
+ uint64_t stamp;
+ buffer_t out;
+ buffer_t der = BUF_INIT;
+ buffer_t sig = BUF_INIT;
+ buffer_t sign;
+ uint16_t len;
+ uint16_t ciph_nid;
+ uint16_t kdf_nid;
+ uint16_t md_nid;
+ uint16_t kex_len;
+ off_t offset;
+
+ assert(hdr != NULL);
+ assert(hdr->id.data != NULL && hdr->id.len == OAP_ID_SIZE);
+ assert(kcfg != NULL);
+
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
+ stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(now));
+
+ if (crt != NULL && crypt_crt_der(crt, &der) < 0)
+ goto fail_der;
+
+ ciph_nid = hton16(hdr->nid);
+ kdf_nid = hton16(kcfg->k.nid);
+ md_nid = hton16(kcfg->d.nid);
+
+ /* Build kex_len with flags */
+ kex_len = (uint16_t) hdr->kex.len;
+ if (hdr->kex.len > 0 && IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str)) {
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(kcfg->x.str))
+ kex_len |= OAP_KEX_FMT_BIT;
+ if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP)
+ kex_len |= OAP_KEX_ROLE_BIT;
+ }
+ kex_len = hton16(kex_len);
+
+ /* Fixed header (36 bytes) + variable fields + req_hash (if auth) */
+ out.len = OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE + der.len + hdr->kex.len + hdr->data.len +
+ req_hash.len;
+
+ out.data = malloc(out.len);
+ if (out.data == NULL)
+ goto fail_out;
+
+ offset = 0;
+
+ /* id (16 bytes) */
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, hdr->id.data, hdr->id.len);
+ offset += hdr->id.len;
+
+ /* timestamp (8 bytes) */
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &stamp, sizeof(stamp));
+ offset += sizeof(stamp);
+
+ /* cipher_nid (2 bytes) */
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &ciph_nid, sizeof(ciph_nid));
+ offset += sizeof(ciph_nid);
+
+ /* kdf_nid (2 bytes) */
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &kdf_nid, sizeof(kdf_nid));
+ offset += sizeof(kdf_nid);
+
+ /* md_nid (2 bytes) */
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &md_nid, sizeof(md_nid));
+ offset += sizeof(md_nid);
+
+ /* crt_len (2 bytes) */
+ len = hton16((uint16_t) der.len);
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &len, sizeof(len));
+ offset += sizeof(len);
+
+ /* kex_len + flags (2 bytes) */
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &kex_len, sizeof(kex_len));
+ offset += sizeof(kex_len);
+
+ /* data_len (2 bytes) */
+ len = hton16((uint16_t) hdr->data.len);
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, &len, sizeof(len));
+ offset += sizeof(len);
+
+ /* Fixed header complete (36 bytes) */
+ assert((size_t) offset == OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE);
+
+ /* certificate (variable) */
+ if (der.len != 0)
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, der.data, der.len);
+ offset += der.len;
+
+ /* kex data (variable) */
+ if (hdr->kex.len != 0)
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, hdr->kex.data, hdr->kex.len);
+ offset += hdr->kex.len;
+
+ /* data (variable) */
+ if (hdr->data.len != 0)
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, hdr->data.data, hdr->data.len);
+ offset += hdr->data.len;
+
+ /* req_hash (variable, only for authenticated responses) */
+ if (req_hash.len != 0)
+ memcpy(out.data + offset, req_hash.data, req_hash.len);
+ offset += req_hash.len;
+
+ assert((size_t) offset == out.len);
+
+ /* Sign the entire header (fixed + variable, excluding signature) */
+ sign.data = out.data;
+ sign.len = out.len;
+
+ if (pkp != NULL && auth_sign(pkp, kcfg->d.nid, sign, &sig) < 0)
+ goto fail_sig;
+
+ hdr->hdr = out;
+
+ /* Append signature */
+ if (sig.len > 0) {
+ hdr->hdr.len += sig.len;
+ hdr->hdr.data = realloc(out.data, hdr->hdr.len);
+ if (hdr->hdr.data == NULL)
+ goto fail_realloc;
+
+ memcpy(hdr->hdr.data + offset, sig.data, sig.len);
+ clrbuf(out);
+ }
+
+ if (oap_hdr_decode(hdr, hdr->hdr, req_md_nid) < 0)
+ goto fail_decode;
+
+ freebuf(der);
+ freebuf(sig);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_decode:
+ oap_hdr_fini(hdr);
+ fail_realloc:
+ freebuf(sig);
+ fail_sig:
+ freebuf(out);
+ fail_out:
+ freebuf(der);
+ fail_der:
+ return -1;
+}
+
+#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
+static void debug_oap_hdr(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
+{
+ assert(hdr);
+
+ if (hdr->crt.len > 0)
+ log_proto(" crt: [%zu bytes]", hdr->crt.len);
+ else
+ log_proto(" crt: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->kex.len > 0)
+ log_proto(" Key Exchange Data: [%zu bytes] [%s]",
+ hdr->kex.len, hdr->kex_flags.role ?
+ "Client encaps" : "Server encaps");
+ else
+ log_proto(" Ephemeral Public Key: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->cipher_str != NULL)
+ log_proto(" Cipher: %s", hdr->cipher_str);
+ else
+ log_proto(" Cipher: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->kdf_str != NULL)
+ log_proto(" KDF: HKDF-%s", hdr->kdf_str);
+ else
+ log_proto(" KDF: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->md_str != NULL)
+ log_proto(" Digest: %s", hdr->md_str);
+ else
+ log_proto(" Digest: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->data.len > 0)
+ log_proto(" Data: [%zu bytes]", hdr->data.len);
+ else
+ log_proto(" Data: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->req_hash.len > 0)
+ log_proto(" Req Hash: [%zu bytes]", hdr->req_hash.len);
+ else
+ log_proto(" Req Hash: <none>");
+
+ if (hdr->sig.len > 0)
+ log_proto(" Signature: [%zu bytes]", hdr->sig.len);
+ else
+ log_proto(" Signature: <none>");
+}
+#endif
+
+void debug_oap_hdr_rcv(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
+ struct tm * tm;
+ char tmstr[RIB_TM_STRLEN];
+ time_t stamp;
+
+ assert(hdr);
+
+ stamp = (time_t) hdr->timestamp / BILLION;
+
+ tm = gmtime(&stamp);
+ strftime(tmstr, sizeof(tmstr), RIB_TM_FORMAT, tm);
+
+ log_proto("OAP_HDR [" HASH_FMT64 " @ %s ] <--",
+ HASH_VAL64(hdr->id.data), tmstr);
+
+ debug_oap_hdr(hdr);
+#else
+ (void) hdr;
+#endif
+}
+
+void debug_oap_hdr_snd(const struct oap_hdr * hdr)
+{
+#ifdef DEBUG_PROTO_OAP
+ struct tm * tm;
+ char tmstr[RIB_TM_STRLEN];
+ time_t stamp;
+
+ assert(hdr);
+
+ stamp = (time_t) hdr->timestamp / BILLION;
+
+ tm = gmtime(&stamp);
+ strftime(tmstr, sizeof(tmstr), RIB_TM_FORMAT, tm);
+
+ log_proto("OAP_HDR [" HASH_FMT64 " @ %s ] -->",
+ HASH_VAL64(hdr->id.data), tmstr);
+
+ debug_oap_hdr(hdr);
+#else
+ (void) hdr;
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/hdr.h b/src/irmd/oap/hdr.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..f603b169
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/hdr.h
@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - Header definitions and functions
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_HDR_H
+#define OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_HDR_H
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+#define OAP_ID_SIZE (16)
+#define OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE (OAP_ID_SIZE + sizeof(uint64_t) + 6 * sizeof(uint16_t))
+
+#define OAP_KEX_FMT_BIT 0x8000 /* bit 15: 0=X.509 DER, 1=Raw */
+#define OAP_KEX_ROLE_BIT 0x4000 /* bit 14: 0=Server encaps, 1=Client encaps */
+#define OAP_KEX_LEN_MASK 0x3FFF /* bits 0-13: Length (0-16383 bytes) */
+
+#define OAP_KEX_ROLE(hdr) (hdr->kex_flags.role)
+#define OAP_KEX_FMT(hdr) (hdr->kex_flags.fmt)
+
+#define OAP_KEX_IS_X509_FMT(hdr) (((hdr)->kex_flags.fmt) == 0)
+#define OAP_KEX_IS_RAW_FMT(hdr) (((hdr)->kex_flags.fmt) == 1)
+
+/*
+ * 0 1 2 3
+ * 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
+ * | | |
+ * + + |
+ * | | |
+ * + id (128 bits) + |
+ * | Unique flow allocation ID | |
+ * + + |
+ * | | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * | | |
+ * + timestamp (64 bits) + |
+ * | UTC nanoseconds since epoch | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * | cipher_nid (16 bits) | kdf_nid (16 bits) | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * | md_nid (16 bits) | crt_len (16 bits) | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * |F|R| kex_len (14 bits) | data_len (16 bits) | | Signed
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | Region
+ * | | |
+ * + certificate (variable) + |
+ * | X.509 certificate, DER encoded | |
+ * + + |
+ * | | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * | | |
+ * + kex_data (variable) + |
+ * | public key (DER/raw) or ciphertext (KEM) | |
+ * + + |
+ * | | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * | | |
+ * + data (variable) + |
+ * | Piggybacked application data | |
+ * + + |
+ * | | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
+ * | | |
+ * + req_hash (variable, response only) + |
+ * | H(request) using req md_nid / sha384 | |
+ * | | |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---+
+ * | |
+ * + signature (variable) +
+ * | DSA signature over signed region |
+ * +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
+ *
+ * cipher_nid: NID value for symmetric cipher (0 = none)
+ * kdf_nid: NID value for KDF function (0 = none)
+ * md_nid: NID value for signature hash (0 = PQC/no signature)
+ *
+ * kex_len field bit layout:
+ * F (bit 15): Format - 0 = X.509 DER, 1 = Raw/Hybrid
+ * R (bit 14): Role - 0 = Server encaps, 1 = Client encaps
+ * (R is ignored for non-KEM algorithms)
+ * Bits 0-13: Length (0-16383 bytes)
+ *
+ * Request: sig_len = total - 36 - crt_len - kex_len - data_len
+ * Response: sig_len = total - 36 - crt_len - kex_len - data_len - hash_len
+ * where hash_len = md_len(req_md_nid / sha384)
+ */
+
+/* Parsed OAP header - buffers pointing to a single memory region */
+struct oap_hdr {
+ const char * cipher_str;
+ const char * kdf_str;
+ const char * md_str;
+ uint64_t timestamp;
+ uint16_t nid;
+ uint16_t kdf_nid;
+ uint16_t md_nid;
+ struct {
+ bool fmt; /* Format */
+ bool role; /* Role */
+ } kex_flags;
+ buffer_t id;
+ buffer_t crt;
+ buffer_t kex;
+ buffer_t data;
+ buffer_t req_hash; /* H(request) - response only */
+ buffer_t sig;
+ buffer_t hdr;
+};
+
+
+void oap_hdr_init(struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ buffer_t id,
+ uint8_t * kex_buf,
+ buffer_t data,
+ uint16_t nid);
+
+void oap_hdr_fini(struct oap_hdr * oap_hdr);
+
+int oap_hdr_encode(struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ void * pkp,
+ void * crt,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t req_hash,
+ int req_md_nid);
+
+int oap_hdr_decode(struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ buffer_t buf,
+ int req_md_nid);
+
+void debug_oap_hdr_rcv(const struct oap_hdr * hdr);
+
+void debug_oap_hdr_snd(const struct oap_hdr * hdr);
+
+int oap_hdr_copy_data(const struct oap_hdr * hdr,
+ buffer_t * out);
+
+#endif /* OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_HDR_H */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/internal.h b/src/irmd/oap/internal.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..8363e3a2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/internal.h
@@ -0,0 +1,133 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP internal definitions
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_INTERNAL_H
+#define OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_INTERNAL_H
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/list.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
+#include <ouroboros/pthread.h>
+#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+
+#include "hdr.h"
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdint.h>
+
+/*
+ * Authentication functions (auth.c)
+ */
+int oap_check_hdr(const struct oap_hdr * hdr);
+
+int oap_auth_peer(char * name,
+ const struct oap_hdr * local_hdr,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr);
+
+/*
+ * Key exchange functions (kex.c)
+ */
+int oap_negotiate_cipher(const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg);
+
+/*
+ * Credential loading (oap.c) - shared between client and server
+ */
+#ifndef OAP_TEST_MODE
+int load_credentials(const char * name,
+ const struct name_sec_paths * paths,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+
+int load_kex_config(const char * name,
+ const char * path,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Server functions (srv.c)
+ */
+#ifndef OAP_TEST_MODE
+int load_srv_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+
+int load_srv_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+
+int load_server_kem_keypair(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ void ** pkp);
+#else
+extern int load_srv_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+extern int load_srv_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+extern int load_server_kem_keypair(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ void ** pkp);
+#endif
+
+int do_server_kex(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t * kex,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk);
+
+/*
+ * Client functions (cli.c)
+ */
+#ifndef OAP_TEST_MODE
+int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+
+int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+
+int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ buffer_t * pk);
+#else
+extern int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+extern int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+extern int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ buffer_t * pk);
+#endif
+
+int oap_client_kex_prepare(struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t server_pk,
+ buffer_t * kex,
+ uint8_t * key,
+ void ** ephemeral_pkp);
+
+int oap_client_kex_complete(const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ void * pkp,
+ uint8_t * key);
+
+#endif /* OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_INTERNAL_H */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/io.c b/src/irmd/oap/io.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..e4189d4d
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/io.c
@@ -0,0 +1,132 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - File I/O for credentials and configuration
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#define OUROBOROS_PREFIX "irmd/oap"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
+#include <ouroboros/logs.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "io.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+/*
+ * Shared credential and configuration loading helpers
+ */
+
+#ifndef OAP_TEST_MODE
+
+static bool file_exists(const char * path)
+{
+ struct stat s;
+
+ if (stat(path, &s) < 0 && errno == ENOENT) {
+ log_dbg("File %s does not exist.", path);
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+int load_credentials(const char * name,
+ const struct name_sec_paths * paths,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ assert(paths != NULL);
+ assert(pkp != NULL);
+ assert(crt != NULL);
+
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (!file_exists(paths->crt) || !file_exists(paths->key)) {
+ log_info("No authentication certificates for %s.", name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_file(paths->crt, crt) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s for %s.", paths->crt, name);
+ goto fail_crt;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_file(paths->key, pkp) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s for %s.", paths->key, name);
+ goto fail_key;
+ }
+
+ log_info("Loaded authentication certificates for %s.", name);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_key:
+ crypt_free_crt(*crt);
+ *crt = NULL;
+ fail_crt:
+ return -EAUTH;
+}
+
+int load_kex_config(const char * name,
+ const char * path,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
+{
+ assert(name != NULL);
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+
+ /* Load encryption config */
+ if (!file_exists(path))
+ log_dbg("No encryption %s for %s.", path, name);
+
+ if (load_sec_config_file(cfg, path) < 0) {
+ log_warn("Failed to load %s for %s.", path, name);
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (!IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(cfg)) {
+ log_info("Key exchange not configured for %s.", name);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (cfg->c.nid == NID_undef || crypt_nid_to_str(cfg->c.nid) == NULL) {
+ log_err("Invalid cipher NID %d for %s.", cfg->c.nid, name);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ log_info("Encryption enabled for %s.", name);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* OAP_TEST_MODE */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/io.h b/src/irmd/oap/io.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..a31ddf85
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/io.h
@@ -0,0 +1,40 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - Credential and configuration file I/O
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#ifndef OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_IO_H
+#define OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_IO_H
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
+
+#ifndef OAP_TEST_MODE
+int load_credentials(const char * name,
+ const struct name_sec_paths * paths,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+
+int load_kex_config(const char * name,
+ const char * path,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+#endif
+
+#endif /* OUROBOROS_IRMD_OAP_IO_H */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/srv.c b/src/irmd/oap/srv.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..c5a4453f
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/srv.c
@@ -0,0 +1,462 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * OAP - Server-side processing
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#define OUROBOROS_PREFIX "irmd/oap"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
+#include <ouroboros/logs.h>
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include "auth.h"
+#include "hdr.h"
+#include "io.h"
+#include "oap.h"
+
+#include <assert.h>
+#include <limits.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef OAP_TEST_MODE
+extern int load_srv_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+extern int load_srv_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg);
+extern int load_server_kem_keypair(const char * name,
+ bool raw_fmt,
+ void ** pkp);
+#else
+
+int load_srv_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(pkp != NULL);
+ assert(crt != NULL);
+
+ return load_credentials(info->name, &info->s, pkp, crt);
+}
+
+int load_srv_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
+{
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+
+ return load_kex_config(info->name, info->s.enc, cfg);
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_keypair(const char * name,
+ bool raw_fmt,
+ void ** pkp)
+{
+ char path[PATH_MAX];
+ const char * ext;
+
+ assert(name != NULL);
+ assert(pkp != NULL);
+
+ ext = raw_fmt ? "raw" : "pem";
+
+ snprintf(path, sizeof(path),
+ OUROBOROS_SRV_CRT_DIR "/%s/kex.key.%s", name, ext);
+
+ if (raw_fmt) {
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_raw_file(path, pkp) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s keypair from %s.",
+ ext, path);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_file(path, pkp) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load %s keypair from %s.",
+ ext, path);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ log_dbg("Loaded server KEM keypair from %s.", path);
+ return 0;
+}
+
+#endif /* OAP_TEST_MODE */
+
+static int get_algo_from_peer_key(const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ char * algo_buf)
+{
+ uint8_t * id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+ int ret;
+
+ if (OAP_KEX_IS_RAW_FMT(peer_hdr)) {
+ ret = kex_get_algo_from_pk_raw(peer_hdr->kex, algo_buf);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to get algo from raw key.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ ret = kex_get_algo_from_pk_der(peer_hdr->kex, algo_buf);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to get algo from DER key.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int negotiate_kex(const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg)
+{
+ uint8_t * id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+
+ if (kcfg->c.nid == NID_undef) {
+ if (peer_hdr->cipher_str != NULL) {
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER(kcfg, peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+ if (kcfg->c.nid == NID_undef) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Unsupported cipher '%s'.",
+ peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Peer requested cipher %s.",
+ peer_hdr->cipher_str);
+ } else {
+ log_err_id(id, "Encryption requested, no cipher.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+ } else {
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Using local cipher %s.", kcfg->c.str);
+ }
+
+ /* Negotiate KDF - server overrides client if configured */
+ if (kcfg->k.nid != NID_undef) {
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Using local KDF %s.",
+ md_nid_to_str(kcfg->k.nid));
+ } else if (peer_hdr->kdf_nid != NID_undef) {
+ if (md_validate_nid(peer_hdr->kdf_nid) == 0) {
+ kcfg->k.nid = peer_hdr->kdf_nid;
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Using peer KDF %s.",
+ md_nid_to_str(peer_hdr->kdf_nid));
+ } else {
+ log_err_id(id, "Unsupported KDF NID %d.",
+ peer_hdr->kdf_nid);
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg))
+ log_info_id(id, "Negotiated %s + %s.",
+ kcfg->x.str, kcfg->c.str);
+ else
+ log_info_id(id, "No key exchange.");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_server_kem_decap(const struct name_info * info,
+ const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ buffer_t ct;
+ void * server_pkp = NULL;
+ int ret;
+ uint8_t * id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+
+ ret = load_server_kem_keypair(info->name,
+ peer_hdr->kex_flags.fmt,
+ &server_pkp);
+ if (ret < 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ ct.data = peer_hdr->kex.data;
+ ct.len = peer_hdr->kex.len;
+
+ ret = kex_kem_decap(server_pkp, ct, kcfg->k.nid, sk->key);
+
+ crypt_free_key(server_pkp);
+
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to decapsulate KEM.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Client encaps: decapsulated CT.");
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_server_kem_encap(const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t * kex,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ buffer_t client_pk;
+ ssize_t ct_len;
+ uint8_t * id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+
+ client_pk.data = peer_hdr->kex.data;
+ client_pk.len = peer_hdr->kex.len;
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(kcfg->x.str))
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(client_pk, kex->data,
+ kcfg->k.nid, sk->key);
+ else
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap(client_pk, kex->data,
+ kcfg->k.nid, sk->key);
+
+ if (ct_len < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to encapsulate KEM.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ kex->len = (size_t) ct_len;
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Server encaps: generated CT, len=%zd.", ct_len);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static int do_server_kex_kem(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t * kex,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ int ret;
+
+ kcfg->x.mode = peer_hdr->kex_flags.role;
+
+ if (kcfg->x.mode == KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
+ ret = do_server_kem_decap(info, peer_hdr, kcfg, sk);
+ kex->len = 0;
+ } else {
+ ret = do_server_kem_encap(peer_hdr, kcfg, kex, sk);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int do_server_kex_dhe(const struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t * kex,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ ssize_t key_len;
+ void * epkp;
+ int ret;
+ uint8_t * id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+
+ key_len = kex_pkp_create(kcfg, &epkp, kex->data);
+ if (key_len < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to generate key pair.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ kex->len = (size_t) key_len;
+
+ log_dbg_id(id, "Generated %s ephemeral keys.", kcfg->x.str);
+
+ ret = kex_dhe_derive(kcfg, epkp, peer_hdr->kex, sk->key);
+ if (ret < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to derive secret.");
+ kex_pkp_destroy(epkp);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(epkp);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int do_server_kex(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct oap_hdr * peer_hdr,
+ struct sec_config * kcfg,
+ buffer_t * kex,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ char algo_buf[KEX_ALGO_BUFSZ];
+ uint8_t * id;
+
+ id = peer_hdr->id.data;
+
+ /* No KEX data from client */
+ if (peer_hdr->kex.len == 0) {
+ if (IS_KEX_ALGO_SET(kcfg)) {
+ log_warn_id(id, "KEX requested without info.");
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ }
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (negotiate_kex(peer_hdr, kcfg) < 0)
+ return -ECRYPT;
+
+ if (OAP_KEX_ROLE(peer_hdr) != KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP) {
+ /* Server encapsulation or DHE: extract algo from DER PK */
+ if (get_algo_from_peer_key(peer_hdr, algo_buf) < 0)
+ return -ECRYPT;
+
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(kcfg, algo_buf);
+ }
+
+ /* Dispatch based on algorithm type */
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(kcfg->x.str))
+ return do_server_kex_kem(info, peer_hdr, kcfg, kex, sk);
+ else
+ return do_server_kex_dhe(peer_hdr, kcfg, kex, sk);
+}
+
+int oap_srv_process(const struct name_info * info,
+ buffer_t req_buf,
+ buffer_t * rsp_buf,
+ buffer_t * data,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
+{
+ struct oap_hdr peer_hdr;
+ struct oap_hdr local_hdr;
+ struct sec_config kcfg;
+ uint8_t kex_buf[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t hash_buf[MAX_HASH_SIZE];
+ buffer_t req_hash = BUF_INIT;
+ ssize_t hash_ret;
+ char cli_name[NAME_SIZE + 1]; /* TODO */
+ uint8_t * id;
+ void * pkp = NULL;
+ void * crt = NULL;
+ int req_md_nid;
+
+ assert(info != NULL);
+ assert(rsp_buf != NULL);
+ assert(data != NULL);
+ assert(sk != NULL);
+
+ sk->nid = NID_undef;
+
+ memset(&peer_hdr, 0, sizeof(peer_hdr));
+ memset(&local_hdr, 0, sizeof(local_hdr));
+ clrbuf(*rsp_buf);
+
+ log_dbg("Processing OAP request for %s.", info->name);
+
+ /* Load server credentials */
+ if (load_srv_credentials(info, &pkp, &crt) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load security keys for %s.", info->name);
+ goto fail_cred;
+ }
+
+ /* Load KEX config */
+ if (load_srv_kex_config(info, &kcfg) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to load KEX config for %s.", info->name);
+ goto fail_kex;
+ }
+
+ sk->nid = kcfg.c.nid;
+
+ /* Decode incoming header (NID_undef = request, no hash) */
+ if (oap_hdr_decode(&peer_hdr, req_buf, NID_undef) < 0) {
+ log_err("Failed to decode OAP header.");
+ goto fail_auth;
+ }
+
+ debug_oap_hdr_rcv(&peer_hdr);
+
+ id = peer_hdr.id.data; /* Logging */
+
+ /* Check for replay */
+ if (oap_check_hdr(&peer_hdr) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "OAP header failed replay check.");
+ goto fail_auth;
+ }
+
+ /* Authenticate client before processing KEX data */
+ oap_hdr_init(&local_hdr, peer_hdr.id, kex_buf, *data, NID_undef);
+
+ if (oap_auth_peer(cli_name, &local_hdr, &peer_hdr) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to authenticate client.");
+ goto fail_auth;
+ }
+
+ if (do_server_kex(info, &peer_hdr, &kcfg, &local_hdr.kex, sk) < 0)
+ goto fail_kex;
+
+ /* Build response header with hash of client request */
+ local_hdr.nid = sk->nid;
+
+ /* Use client's md_nid, defaulting to SHA-384 for PQC */
+ req_md_nid = peer_hdr.md_nid != NID_undef ? peer_hdr.md_nid : NID_sha384;
+
+ /* Compute request hash using client's md_nid */
+ hash_ret = md_digest(req_md_nid, req_buf, hash_buf);
+ if (hash_ret < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to hash request.");
+ goto fail_auth;
+ }
+ req_hash.data = hash_buf;
+ req_hash.len = (size_t) hash_ret;
+
+ if (oap_hdr_encode(&local_hdr, pkp, crt, &kcfg,
+ req_hash, req_md_nid) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to create OAP response header.");
+ goto fail_auth;
+ }
+
+ debug_oap_hdr_snd(&local_hdr);
+
+ if (oap_hdr_copy_data(&peer_hdr, data) < 0) {
+ log_err_id(id, "Failed to copy client data.");
+ goto fail_data;
+ }
+
+ /* Transfer ownership of response buffer */
+ *rsp_buf = local_hdr.hdr;
+
+ log_info_id(id, "OAP request processed for %s.", info->name);
+
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_data:
+ oap_hdr_fini(&local_hdr);
+ fail_auth:
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+ fail_cred:
+ return -EAUTH;
+
+ fail_kex:
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/irmd/oap/tests/CMakeLists.txt
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..861b3590
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+get_filename_component(tmp ".." ABSOLUTE)
+get_filename_component(src_folder "${tmp}" NAME)
+
+compute_test_prefix()
+
+create_test_sourcelist(${src_folder}_tests test_suite.c
+ # Add new tests here
+ oap_test.c
+)
+
+create_test_sourcelist(${src_folder}_pqc_tests test_suite_pqc.c
+ # PQC-specific tests
+ oap_test_pqc.c
+)
+
+# OAP test needs io.c compiled with OAP_TEST_MODE
+set(OAP_TEST_SOURCES
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../io.c
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../hdr.c
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../auth.c
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../srv.c
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../cli.c
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/common.c
+)
+
+# Regular test executable (ECDSA)
+add_executable(${src_folder}_test ${${src_folder}_tests} ${OAP_TEST_SOURCES})
+set_source_files_properties(${OAP_TEST_SOURCES}
+ PROPERTIES COMPILE_DEFINITIONS "OAP_TEST_MODE"
+)
+target_link_libraries(${src_folder}_test ouroboros-irm)
+target_include_directories(${src_folder}_test PRIVATE
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../..
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/../..
+)
+
+# PQC test executable (ML-DSA)
+add_executable(${src_folder}_pqc_test ${${src_folder}_pqc_tests} ${OAP_TEST_SOURCES})
+set_source_files_properties(${OAP_TEST_SOURCES}
+ TARGET_DIRECTORY ${src_folder}_pqc_test
+ PROPERTIES COMPILE_DEFINITIONS "OAP_TEST_MODE"
+)
+target_link_libraries(${src_folder}_pqc_test ouroboros-irm)
+target_include_directories(${src_folder}_pqc_test PRIVATE
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/../..
+ ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/../..
+)
+
+add_dependencies(build_tests ${src_folder}_test ${src_folder}_pqc_test)
+
+# Regular tests
+set(tests_to_run ${${src_folder}_tests})
+if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS "3.29.0")
+ remove(tests_to_run test_suite.c)
+else ()
+ list(POP_FRONT tests_to_run)
+endif()
+
+foreach(test ${tests_to_run})
+ get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${src_folder}_test ${test_name})
+endforeach(test)
+
+# PQC tests
+set(pqc_tests_to_run ${${src_folder}_pqc_tests})
+if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS "3.29.0")
+ remove(pqc_tests_to_run test_suite_pqc.c)
+else ()
+ list(POP_FRONT pqc_tests_to_run)
+endif()
+
+foreach(test ${pqc_tests_to_run})
+ get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${src_folder}_pqc_test ${test_name})
+endforeach(test)
+
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/oap_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/oap_test_pqc PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.c b/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..0a1af100
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.c
@@ -0,0 +1,457 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Common test helper functions for OAP tests
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+
+#include "oap.h"
+
+#include <string.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+int load_srv_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
+{
+ (void) info;
+
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+
+ if (test_cfg.srv.kex == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
+ SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(cfg, test_cfg.srv.kex);
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER_NID(cfg, test_cfg.srv.cipher);
+ SET_KEX_KDF_NID(cfg, test_cfg.srv.kdf);
+ SET_KEX_DIGEST_NID(cfg, test_cfg.srv.md);
+ SET_KEX_KEM_MODE(cfg, test_cfg.srv.kem_mode);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int load_cli_kex_config(const struct name_info * info,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
+{
+ (void) info;
+
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+
+ if (test_cfg.cli.kex == NID_undef)
+ return 0;
+
+ SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(cfg, test_cfg.cli.kex);
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER_NID(cfg, test_cfg.cli.cipher);
+ SET_KEX_KDF_NID(cfg, test_cfg.cli.kdf);
+ SET_KEX_DIGEST_NID(cfg, test_cfg.cli.md);
+ SET_KEX_KEM_MODE(cfg, test_cfg.cli.kem_mode);
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int load_srv_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ (void) info;
+
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (!test_cfg.srv.auth)
+ return 0;
+
+ return mock_load_credentials(pkp, crt);
+}
+
+int load_cli_credentials(const struct name_info * info,
+ void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ (void) info;
+
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (!test_cfg.cli.auth)
+ return 0;
+
+ return mock_load_credentials(pkp, crt);
+}
+
+int oap_test_setup(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx,
+ const char * root_ca_str,
+ const char * im_ca_str)
+{
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ strcpy(ctx->srv.info.name, "test-1.unittest.o7s");
+ strcpy(ctx->cli.info.name, "test-1.unittest.o7s");
+
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail_init;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_str, &ctx->root_ca) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load root CA cert.\n");
+ goto fail_root_ca;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(im_ca_str, &ctx->im_ca) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load intermediate CA cert.\n");
+ goto fail_im_ca;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_auth_add_ca_crt(ctx->root_ca) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to add root CA cert to store.\n");
+ goto fail_add_ca;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_auth_add_ca_crt(ctx->im_ca) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to add intermediate CA cert to store.\n");
+ goto fail_add_ca;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_add_ca:
+ crypt_free_crt(ctx->im_ca);
+ fail_im_ca:
+ crypt_free_crt(ctx->root_ca);
+ fail_root_ca:
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ fail_init:
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+ return -1;
+}
+
+void oap_test_teardown(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx)
+{
+ struct crypt_sk res;
+ buffer_t dummy = BUF_INIT;
+
+ if (ctx->cli.state != NULL) {
+ res.key = ctx->cli.key;
+ oap_cli_complete(ctx->cli.state, &ctx->cli.info, dummy,
+ &ctx->data, &res);
+ ctx->cli.state = NULL;
+ }
+
+ freebuf(ctx->data);
+ freebuf(ctx->resp_hdr);
+ freebuf(ctx->req_hdr);
+
+ crypt_free_crt(ctx->im_ca);
+ crypt_free_crt(ctx->root_ca);
+
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+}
+
+int oap_cli_prepare_ctx(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx)
+{
+ return oap_cli_prepare(&ctx->cli.state, &ctx->cli.info, &ctx->req_hdr,
+ ctx->data);
+}
+
+int oap_srv_process_ctx(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx)
+{
+ struct crypt_sk res = { .nid = NID_undef, .key = ctx->srv.key };
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = oap_srv_process(&ctx->srv.info, ctx->req_hdr,
+ &ctx->resp_hdr, &ctx->data, &res);
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ctx->srv.nid = res.nid;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int oap_cli_complete_ctx(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx)
+{
+ struct crypt_sk res = { .nid = NID_undef, .key = ctx->cli.key };
+ int ret;
+
+ ret = oap_cli_complete(ctx->cli.state, &ctx->cli.info, ctx->resp_hdr,
+ &ctx->data, &res);
+ ctx->cli.state = NULL;
+
+ if (ret == 0)
+ ctx->cli.nid = res.nid;
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int roundtrip_auth_only(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca, im_ca_str) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.cli.nid != NID_undef || ctx.srv.nid != NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher should not be set for auth-only.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int roundtrip_kex_only(void)
+{
+ struct name_info cli_info;
+ struct name_info srv_info;
+ struct crypt_sk res;
+ uint8_t cli_key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ uint8_t srv_key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int cli_nid;
+ int srv_nid;
+ buffer_t req_hdr = BUF_INIT;
+ buffer_t resp_hdr = BUF_INIT;
+ buffer_t data = BUF_INIT;
+ void * cli_state = NULL;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&cli_info, 0, sizeof(cli_info));
+ memset(&srv_info, 0, sizeof(srv_info));
+
+ strcpy(cli_info.name, "test-1.unittest.o7s");
+ strcpy(srv_info.name, "test-1.unittest.o7s");
+
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare(&cli_state, &cli_info, &req_hdr,
+ data) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ res.key = srv_key;
+
+ if (oap_srv_process(&srv_info, req_hdr, &resp_hdr, &data, &res) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ srv_nid = res.nid;
+
+ res.key = cli_key;
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete(cli_state, &cli_info, resp_hdr, &data, &res) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ cli_state = NULL;
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ cli_nid = res.nid;
+ cli_state = NULL;
+
+ if (memcmp(cli_key, srv_key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (cli_nid == NID_undef || srv_nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher should be set for kex-only.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ freebuf(resp_hdr);
+ freebuf(req_hdr);
+ oap_auth_fini();
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ if (cli_state != NULL) {
+ res.key = cli_key;
+ oap_cli_complete(cli_state, &cli_info, resp_hdr, &data, &res);
+ }
+ freebuf(resp_hdr);
+ freebuf(req_hdr);
+ oap_auth_fini();
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int corrupted_request(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca, im_ca_str) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Corrupt the request */
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len > 100) {
+ ctx.req_hdr.data[50] ^= 0xFF;
+ ctx.req_hdr.data[51] ^= 0xAA;
+ ctx.req_hdr.data[52] ^= 0x55;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject corrupted request.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int corrupted_response(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ struct crypt_sk res;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca, im_ca_str) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Corrupt the response */
+ if (ctx.resp_hdr.len > 100) {
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[50] ^= 0xFF;
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[51] ^= 0xAA;
+ ctx.resp_hdr.data[52] ^= 0x55;
+ }
+
+ res.key = ctx.cli.key;
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete(ctx.cli.state, &ctx.cli.info, ctx.resp_hdr,
+ &ctx.data, &res) == 0) {
+ printf("Client should reject corrupted response.\n");
+ ctx.cli.state = NULL;
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ctx.cli.state = NULL;
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int truncated_request(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ size_t orig_len;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca, im_ca_str) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Truncate the request buffer */
+ orig_len = ctx.req_hdr.len;
+ ctx.req_hdr.len = orig_len / 2;
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject truncated request.\n");
+ ctx.req_hdr.len = orig_len;
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ ctx.req_hdr.len = orig_len;
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.h b/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.h
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d4b6733a
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.h
@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Common test helper functions for OAP tests
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#ifndef IRMD_TESTS_COMMON_H
+#define IRMD_TESTS_COMMON_H
+
+#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+
+/* Per-side security configuration for tests */
+struct test_sec_cfg {
+ int kex; /* KEX algorithm NID */
+ int cipher; /* Cipher NID for encryption */
+ int kdf; /* KDF NID for key derivation */
+ int md; /* Digest NID for signatures */
+ int kem_mode; /* KEM encapsulation mode (0 for ECDH) */
+ bool auth; /* Use authentication (certificates) */
+};
+
+/* Test configuration - set by each test before running roundtrip */
+extern struct test_cfg {
+ struct test_sec_cfg srv;
+ struct test_sec_cfg cli;
+} test_cfg;
+
+/* Each test file defines this with its own certificates */
+extern int mock_load_credentials(void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt);
+
+/* Per-side test context */
+struct oap_test_side {
+ struct name_info info;
+ struct flow_info flow;
+ uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int nid;
+ void * state;
+};
+
+/* Test context - holds all common state for OAP tests */
+struct oap_test_ctx {
+ struct oap_test_side srv;
+ struct oap_test_side cli;
+
+ buffer_t req_hdr;
+ buffer_t resp_hdr;
+ buffer_t data;
+ void * root_ca;
+ void * im_ca;
+};
+
+int oap_test_setup(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx,
+ const char * root_ca_str,
+ const char * im_ca_str);
+
+void oap_test_teardown(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx);
+
+int oap_cli_prepare_ctx(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx);
+
+int oap_srv_process_ctx(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx);
+
+int oap_cli_complete_ctx(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx);
+
+int roundtrip_auth_only(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str);
+
+int roundtrip_kex_only(void);
+
+int corrupted_request(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str);
+
+int corrupted_response(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str);
+
+int truncated_request(const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca_str);
+
+#endif /* IRMD_TESTS_COMMON_H */
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..70943d7c
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,947 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * Unit tests of Ouroboros Allocation Protocol (OAP)
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #ifndef _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+ #endif
+#else
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/endian.h>
+#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+#include <ouroboros/time.h>
+
+#include <test/test.h>
+#include <test/certs.h>
+
+#include "oap.h"
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#define AUTH true
+#define NO_AUTH false
+
+extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
+extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
+
+struct test_cfg test_cfg;
+
+/* Mock load - called by load_*_credentials in common.c */
+int mock_load_credentials(void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, pkp) < 0)
+ goto fail_privkey;
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, crt) < 0)
+ goto fail_crt;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_crt:
+ crypt_free_key(*pkp);
+ fail_privkey:
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Stub KEM functions - ECDSA tests don't use KEM */
+int load_server_kem_keypair(__attribute__((unused)) const char * name,
+ __attribute__((unused)) bool raw_fmt,
+ __attribute__((unused)) void ** pkp)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_pk(__attribute__((unused)) const char * name,
+ __attribute__((unused)) struct sec_config * cfg,
+ __attribute__((unused)) buffer_t * pk)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void test_default_cfg(void)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: X25519, AES-256-GCM, SHA-256, with auth */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: same KEX/cipher/kdf/md, no auth */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_auth_init_fini(void)
+{
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_auth_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ oap_auth_fini();
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip(int kex)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * kex_str = kex_nid_to_str(kex);
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", kex_str);
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = kex;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.cli.nid == NID_undef || ctx.srv.nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher not set in flow.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", kex_str);
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", kex_str);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only(void)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: auth only, no encryption */
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: no auth, no encryption */
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ return roundtrip_auth_only(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only(void)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: KEX only, no auth */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: KEX only, no auth */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ return roundtrip_kex_only();
+}
+
+static int test_oap_piggyback_data(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * cli_data_str = "client_data";
+ const char * srv_data_str = "server_data";
+ buffer_t srv_data = BUF_INIT;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Client prepares request with piggybacked data */
+ ctx.data.len = strlen(cli_data_str);
+ ctx.data.data = malloc(ctx.data.len);
+ if (ctx.data.data == NULL)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ memcpy(ctx.data.data, cli_data_str, ctx.data.len);
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+
+ /* Set server's response data (ctx.data will take cli data) */
+ srv_data.len = strlen(srv_data_str);
+ srv_data.data = malloc(srv_data.len);
+ if (srv_data.data == NULL)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ memcpy(srv_data.data, srv_data_str, srv_data.len);
+
+ freebuf(ctx.data);
+ ctx.data = srv_data;
+ clrbuf(srv_data);
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+
+ /* Verify server received client's piggybacked data */
+ if (ctx.data.len != strlen(cli_data_str) ||
+ memcmp(ctx.data.data, cli_data_str, ctx.data.len) != 0) {
+ printf("Server did not receive correct client data.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ freebuf(ctx.data);
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+
+ /* Verify client received server's piggybacked data */
+ if (ctx.data.len != strlen(srv_data_str) ||
+ memcmp(ctx.data.data, srv_data_str, ctx.data.len) != 0) {
+ printf("Client did not receive correct server data.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ freebuf(srv_data);
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_request(void)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = AUTH;
+
+ return corrupted_request(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_response(void)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ return corrupted_response(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_truncated_request(void)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ return truncated_request(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+/* After ID (16), timestamp (8), cipher_nid (2), kdf_nid (2), md (2) */
+#define OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET 30
+static int test_oap_inflated_length_field(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t fake;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET + 2) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set cert length to claim more bytes than packet contains */
+ fake = hton16(60000);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET, &fake, sizeof(fake));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject inflated length field.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Attacker claims cert is smaller - causes misparse of subsequent fields */
+static int test_oap_deflated_length_field(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t fake;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET + 2) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set cert length to claim fewer bytes - will misparse rest */
+ fake = hton16(1);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET, &fake, sizeof(fake));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject deflated length field.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Header field offsets for byte manipulation */
+#define OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET 24
+#define OAP_KEX_LEN_OFFSET 32
+
+/* Server rejects request when cipher NID set but no KEX data provided */
+static int test_oap_nid_without_kex(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t cipher_nid;
+ uint16_t zero = 0;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ /* Configure unsigned KEX-only mode */
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Tamper: keep cipher_nid but set kex_len=0, truncate KEX data */
+ cipher_nid = hton16(NID_aes_256_gcm);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET, &cipher_nid,
+ sizeof(cipher_nid));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_KEX_LEN_OFFSET, &zero, sizeof(zero));
+ ctx.req_hdr.len = 36; /* Fixed header only, no KEX data */
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject cipher NID without KEX data.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Server rejects OAP request with unsupported cipher NID */
+static int test_oap_unsupported_nid(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t bad_nid;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ /* Configure unsigned KEX-only mode */
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Tamper: set cipher_nid to unsupported value */
+ bad_nid = hton16(9999);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET, &bad_nid,
+ sizeof(bad_nid));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject unsupported cipher NID.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ /* Skip KEM algorithms - they're tested in oap_test_pqc */
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Cipher negotiation - client should accept server's chosen cipher */
+static int test_oap_cipher_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA3-256, SHA-384 */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_chacha20_poly1305;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha3_256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha384;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: AES-256-GCM, SHA-256, SHA-256 */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Verify: both should have the server's chosen cipher and KDF */
+ if (ctx.srv.nid != test_cfg.srv.cipher) {
+ printf("Server cipher mismatch: expected %s, got %s\n",
+ crypt_nid_to_str(test_cfg.srv.cipher),
+ crypt_nid_to_str(ctx.srv.nid));
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.cli.nid != test_cfg.srv.cipher) {
+ printf("Client cipher mismatch: expected %s, got %s\n",
+ crypt_nid_to_str(test_cfg.srv.cipher),
+ crypt_nid_to_str(ctx.cli.nid));
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Parse response header to check negotiated KDF */
+ if (ctx.resp_hdr.len > 26) {
+ uint16_t resp_kdf_nid;
+ /* KDF NID at offset 26: ID(16) + ts(8) + cipher(2) */
+ resp_kdf_nid = ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(ctx.resp_hdr.data + 26));
+
+ if (resp_kdf_nid != test_cfg.srv.kdf) {
+ printf("Response KDF mismatch: expected %s, got %s\n",
+ md_nid_to_str(test_cfg.srv.kdf),
+ md_nid_to_str(resp_kdf_nid));
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test roundtrip with different signature digest algorithms */
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_md(int md)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * md_str = md_nid_to_str(md);
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: auth + KEX with specified md */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = md;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: no auth */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = md;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_md_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Test with default (0) */
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md(0);
+
+ /* Test with all supported digest NIDs */
+ for (i = 0; md_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++)
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md(md_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Timestamp is at offset 16 (after the 16-byte ID) */
+#define OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET 16
+/* Test that packets with outdated timestamps are rejected */
+static int test_oap_outdated_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ struct timespec old_ts;
+ uint64_t old_stamp;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET + sizeof(uint64_t)) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set timestamp to 30 seconds in the past (> 20s replay timer) */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &old_ts);
+ old_ts.tv_sec -= OAP_REPLAY_TIMER + 10;
+ old_stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(old_ts));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &old_stamp,
+ sizeof(old_stamp));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject outdated packet.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test that packets from the future are rejected */
+static int test_oap_future_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ struct timespec future_ts;
+ uint64_t future_stamp;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET + sizeof(uint64_t)) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set timestamp to 1 second in the future (> 100ms slack) */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &future_ts);
+ future_ts.tv_sec += 1;
+ future_stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(future_ts));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &future_stamp,
+ sizeof(future_stamp));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject future packet.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test that replayed packets (same ID + timestamp) are rejected */
+static int test_oap_replay_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ buffer_t saved_req;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the request for replay */
+ saved_req.len = ctx.req_hdr.len;
+ saved_req.data = malloc(saved_req.len);
+ if (saved_req.data == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to allocate saved request.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(saved_req.data, ctx.req_hdr.data, saved_req.len);
+
+ /* First request should succeed */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("First request should succeed.\n");
+ free(saved_req.data);
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Free response from first request before replay */
+ freebuf(ctx.resp_hdr);
+
+ /* Restore the saved request for replay */
+ freebuf(ctx.req_hdr);
+ ctx.req_hdr = saved_req;
+
+ /* Replayed request should fail */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject replayed packet.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test that client rejects server with wrong certificate name */
+static int test_oap_server_name_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Set client's expected name to something different from cert name */
+ strcpy(ctx.cli.info.name, "wrong.server.name");
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Client should reject due to name mismatch */
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Client should reject server with wrong cert name.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int oap_test(int argc,
+ char **argv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ (void) argc;
+ (void) argv;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_auth_init_fini();
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only();
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only();
+ ret |= test_oap_piggyback_data();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_all();
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md_all();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_request();
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_response();
+ ret |= test_oap_truncated_request();
+ ret |= test_oap_inflated_length_field();
+ ret |= test_oap_deflated_length_field();
+ ret |= test_oap_nid_without_kex();
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_cipher_mismatch();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_outdated_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_future_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_replay_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_server_name_mismatch();
+#else
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only;
+ (void) test_oap_piggyback_data;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_all;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_md;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_md_all;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_request;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_response;
+ (void) test_oap_truncated_request;
+ (void) test_oap_inflated_length_field;
+ (void) test_oap_deflated_length_field;
+ (void) test_oap_nid_without_kex;
+ (void) test_oap_unsupported_nid;
+ (void) test_oap_cipher_mismatch;
+ (void) test_oap_outdated_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_future_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_replay_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_server_name_mismatch;
+
+ ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_pqc.c b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_pqc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..ed51a6b4
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/irmd/oap/tests/oap_test_pqc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,363 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Unit tests of OAP post-quantum key exchange
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+#else
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
+
+#include <test/certs_pqc.h>
+
+#include "oap.h"
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#define CLI_AUTH 1
+#define NO_CLI_AUTH 0
+#define CLI_ENCAP KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP
+#define SRV_ENCAP KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP
+
+extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
+extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
+
+static int get_random_kdf(void)
+{
+ static int idx = 0;
+ int count;
+
+ if (md_supported_nids[0] == NID_undef)
+ return NID_undef;
+
+ for (count = 0; md_supported_nids[count] != NID_undef; count++)
+ ;
+
+ return md_supported_nids[(idx++) % count];
+}
+
+struct test_cfg test_cfg;
+
+/* KEM keypair storage for tests (server-side keypair for KEM modes) */
+static void * test_kem_pkp = NULL; /* Private key pair */
+static uint8_t test_kem_pk[4096]; /* Public key buffer */
+static size_t test_kem_pk_len = 0;
+
+/* Mock load - called by load_*_credentials in common.c */
+int mock_load_credentials(void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
+{
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, pkp) < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ml, crt) < 0) {
+ crypt_free_key(*pkp);
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_keypair(const char * name,
+ bool raw_fmt,
+ void ** pkp)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ struct sec_config local_cfg;
+ ssize_t pk_len;
+
+ (void) name;
+ (void) raw_fmt;
+
+ /*
+ * Uses reference counting. The caller will call
+ * EVP_PKEY_free which decrements the count.
+ */
+ if (test_kem_pkp != NULL) {
+ if (EVP_PKEY_up_ref((EVP_PKEY *)test_kem_pkp) != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ *pkp = test_kem_pkp;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * Generate a new KEM keypair from test_cfg.srv.kex.
+ */
+ memset(&local_cfg, 0, sizeof(local_cfg));
+ if (test_cfg.srv.kex == NID_undef)
+ goto fail;
+
+ SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(&local_cfg, test_cfg.srv.kex);
+
+ pk_len = kex_pkp_create(&local_cfg, &test_kem_pkp, test_kem_pk);
+ if (pk_len < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ test_kem_pk_len = (size_t) pk_len;
+
+ if (EVP_PKEY_up_ref((EVP_PKEY *)test_kem_pkp) != 1)
+ goto fail_ref;
+
+ *pkp = test_kem_pkp;
+
+ return 0;
+ fail_ref:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(test_kem_pkp);
+ test_kem_pkp = NULL;
+ test_kem_pk_len = 0;
+ fail:
+ return -1;
+
+#else
+ (void) name;
+ (void) raw_fmt;
+ (void) pkp;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_pk(const char * name,
+ struct sec_config * cfg,
+ buffer_t * pk)
+{
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ (void) name;
+
+ if (test_kem_pk_len > 0) {
+ pk->data = malloc(test_kem_pk_len);
+ if (pk->data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(pk->data, test_kem_pk, test_kem_pk_len);
+ pk->len = test_kem_pk_len;
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Generate keypair on demand if not already done */
+ len = kex_pkp_create(cfg, &test_kem_pkp, test_kem_pk);
+ if (len < 0)
+ return -1;
+
+ test_kem_pk_len = (size_t) len;
+ pk->data = malloc(test_kem_pk_len);
+ if (pk->data == NULL)
+ return -1;
+ memcpy(pk->data, test_kem_pk, test_kem_pk_len);
+ pk->len = test_kem_pk_len;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+static void reset_kem_state(void)
+{
+ if (test_kem_pkp != NULL) {
+ kex_pkp_destroy(test_kem_pkp);
+ test_kem_pkp = NULL;
+ }
+ test_kem_pk_len = 0;
+}
+
+static void test_cfg_init(int kex,
+ int cipher,
+ int kdf,
+ int kem_mode,
+ bool cli_auth)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server config */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = cipher;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = kdf;
+ test_cfg.srv.kem_mode = kem_mode;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = true;
+
+ /* Client config */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = cipher;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = kdf;
+ test_cfg.cli.kem_mode = kem_mode;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = cli_auth;
+}
+
+static int oap_test_setup_kem(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx,
+ const char * root_ca,
+ const char * im_ca)
+{
+ reset_kem_state();
+ return oap_test_setup(ctx, root_ca, im_ca);
+}
+
+static void oap_test_teardown_kem(struct oap_test_ctx * ctx)
+{
+ oap_test_teardown(ctx);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_undef, NID_undef, NID_undef, 0, false);
+
+ return roundtrip_auth_only(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_request(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_MLKEM768, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ SRV_ENCAP, CLI_AUTH);
+
+ return corrupted_request(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_response(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_MLKEM768, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ SRV_ENCAP, NO_CLI_AUTH);
+
+ return corrupted_response(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_truncated_request(void)
+{
+ test_cfg_init(NID_MLKEM768, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ SRV_ENCAP, NO_CLI_AUTH);
+
+ return truncated_request(root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kem(int kex,
+ int kem_mode)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * kex_str = kex_nid_to_str(kex);
+ const char * mode_str = kem_mode == CLI_ENCAP ? "cli" : "srv";
+
+ test_cfg_init(kex, NID_aes_256_gcm, get_random_kdf(),
+ kem_mode, NO_CLI_AUTH);
+
+ TEST_START("(%s, %s encaps)", kex_str, mode_str);
+
+ if (oap_test_setup_kem(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ml, im_ca_crt_ml) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.cli.nid == NID_undef ||
+ ctx.srv.nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher not set in flow.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown_kem(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s, %s encaps)", kex_str, mode_str);
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown_kem(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s, %s encaps)", kex_str, mode_str);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kem_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kem(kex_supported_nids[i], SRV_ENCAP);
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kem(kex_supported_nids[i], CLI_ENCAP);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int oap_test_pqc(int argc,
+ char **argv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ (void) argc;
+ (void) argv;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kem_all();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_request();
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_response();
+ ret |= test_oap_truncated_request();
+#else
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_kem;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_kem_all;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_request;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_response;
+ (void) test_oap_truncated_request;
+
+ ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+#endif
+
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/ipcp.c b/src/irmd/reg/ipcp.c
index 474527a4..74ec4939 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/ipcp.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/ipcp.c
@@ -77,7 +77,6 @@ void reg_ipcp_update(struct reg_ipcp * ipcp,
const struct ipcp_info * info)
{
assert(ipcp != NULL);
- assert(info->state != IPCP_NULL);
ipcp->info = *info;
}
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/irmd/reg/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index e33bd056..759d29b4 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
get_filename_component(tmp ".." ABSOLUTE)
get_filename_component(src_folder "${tmp}" NAME)
+compute_test_prefix()
+
# Set include directories for tests
include_directories(${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR})
include_directories(${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR})
@@ -39,5 +41,5 @@ endif()
foreach(test ${tests_to_run})
get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
- add_test(irmd/reg/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${src_folder}_test ${test_name})
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${src_folder}_test ${test_name})
endforeach(test)
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/flow_test.c b/src/irmd/reg/tests/flow_test.c
index 27fd61b0..2066c811 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/flow_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/flow_test.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "../flow.c"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <string.h>
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/ipcp_test.c b/src/irmd/reg/tests/ipcp_test.c
index d7d8e524..6ab6443d 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/ipcp_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/ipcp_test.c
@@ -20,7 +20,7 @@
* Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
*/
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include "../ipcp.c"
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/name_test.c b/src/irmd/reg/tests/name_test.c
index 9071364b..5b42875e 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/name_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/name_test.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "../name.c"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#define TEST_PID 65534
#define TEST_PROG "/usr/bin/testprog"
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/proc_test.c b/src/irmd/reg/tests/proc_test.c
index df0527fb..d53f18ec 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/proc_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/proc_test.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "../proc.c"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#define TEST_PID 65534
#define TEST_PROG "usr/bin/testprog"
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/prog_test.c b/src/irmd/reg/tests/prog_test.c
index c394c222..3900e7d7 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/prog_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/prog_test.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "../prog.c"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#define TEST_PROG "usr/bin/testprog"
diff --git a/src/irmd/reg/tests/reg_test.c b/src/irmd/reg/tests/reg_test.c
index 4699beab..e7ae1a97 100644
--- a/src/irmd/reg/tests/reg_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/reg/tests/reg_test.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "../reg.c"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#define TEST_PID 3666
#define TEST_N_1_PID 3999
@@ -1471,7 +1471,7 @@ static int test_wait_ipcp_boot_fail(void)
struct ipcp_info resp_info = {
.name = TEST_IPCP,
.pid = TEST_PID,
- .state = IPCP_INIT
+ .state = IPCP_NULL
};
TEST_START();
diff --git a/src/irmd/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/irmd/tests/CMakeLists.txt
deleted file mode 100644
index a255ca00..00000000
--- a/src/irmd/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-get_filename_component(tmp ".." ABSOLUTE)
-get_filename_component(src_folder "${tmp}" NAME)
-
-create_test_sourcelist(${src_folder}_tests test_suite.c
- # Add new tests here
- irm_test.c
- oap_test.c
-)
-
-add_executable(${src_folder}_test ${${src_folder}_tests})
-target_link_libraries(${src_folder}_test ouroboros-irm)
-target_include_directories(${src_folder}_test PRIVATE ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/..)
-
-add_dependencies(build_tests ${src_folder}_test)
-
-set(tests_to_run ${${src_folder}_tests})
-if(CMAKE_VERSION VERSION_LESS "3.29.0")
- remove(tests_to_run test_suite.c)
-else ()
- list(POP_FRONT tests_to_run)
-endif()
-
-foreach(test ${tests_to_run})
- get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
- add_test(irmd/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${src_folder}_test ${test_name})
-endforeach(test)
-
-set_property(TEST irmd/oap_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
diff --git a/src/irmd/tests/oap_test.c b/src/irmd/tests/oap_test.c
index a5f9c706..0e7c11fc 100644
--- a/src/irmd/tests/oap_test.c
+++ b/src/irmd/tests/oap_test.c
@@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
/*
* Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
*
- * Unit tests of Ouroboros flow allocation protocol
+ * Unit tests of Ouroboros Allocation Protocol (OAP)
+ *
* Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
* Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
*
@@ -19,245 +20,824 @@
* Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
*/
-#include "oap.c"
+#if defined(__linux__) || defined(__CYGWIN__)
+ #ifndef _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
+ #endif
+#else
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+#endif
+
+#include "config.h"
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/endian.h>
+#include <ouroboros/flow.h>
+#include <ouroboros/name.h>
#include <ouroboros/random.h>
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
-
-static const char * pkp_str = \
-"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-"MHcCAQEEIC13y+5jdKe80HBJD7WITpQamcn3rrkTX1r0v+JwSk4NoAoGCCqGSM49\n"
-"AwEHoUQDQgAEcC0yLAfUtufH8cdLybrdWPc6U+xRuhDhqqrEcBO5+eob2xyqEaNk\n"
-"nIV/86724zPptGRahWz0rzW2PvNppJdNBg==\n"
-"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-/* Valid signed server certificate for server-2.unittest.o7s */
-static const char * crt_str = \
-"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
-"MIIDgjCCAyigAwIBAgICEAIwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwWzELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n"
-"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n"
-"GTAXBgNVBAMMEGltMi51bml0dGVzdC5vN3MwHhcNMjUwNzA0MTMxODI5WhcNMzUw\n"
-"NzAyMTMxODI5WjBwMQswCQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQ4wDAYDVQQH\n"
-"DAVHaGVudDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxHjAc\n"
-"BgNVBAMMFXNlcnZlci0yLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49\n"
-"AwEHA0IABHAtMiwH1Lbnx/HHS8m63Vj3OlPsUboQ4aqqxHATufnqG9scqhGjZJyF\n"
-"f/Ou9uMz6bRkWoVs9K81tj7zaaSXTQajggHFMIIBwTAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBEGCWCG\n"
-"SAGG+EIBAQQEAwIGQDA6BglghkgBhvhCAQ0ELRYrR3JpbGxlZCBDaGVlc2UgR2Vu\n"
-"ZXJhdGVkIFNlcnZlciBDZXJ0aWZpY2F0ZTAdBgNVHQ4EFgQUTt3xHTwE9amoglxh\n"
-"cEMqWv+PpDMwgb8GA1UdIwSBtzCBtIAUFfeZRx8QWWKQr7Aw8zjDu2shvcShgZek\n"
-"gZQwgZExCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMQwwCgYDVQQIDANPVkwxDjAMBgNVBAcMBUdoZW50\n"
-"MQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsMDHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEZMBcGA1UEAwwQ\n"
-"Y2EyLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEkMCIGCSqGSIb3DQEJARYVZHVtbXlAb3Vyb2Jvcm9z\n"
-"LnJvY2tzggIQAjAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCBaAwEwYDVR0lBAwwCgYIKwYBBQUHAwEw\n"
-"EQYDVR0fBAowCDAGoASgAoYAMCoGCCsGAQUFBwEBBB4wHDAMBggrBgEFBQcwAoYA\n"
-"MAwGCCsGAQUFBzABhgAwIAYDVR0RBBkwF4IVc2VydmVyLTEudW5pdHRlc3Qubzdz\n"
-"MAoGCCqGSM49BAMCA0gAMEUCIQDHuDb62w/Uah4nKwUFoJVkr4rgdNGh2Rn3SWaK\n"
-"0FV/gAIgOLKorTwSgrTFdyOUkuPOhRs8BEMpah+dp8UTO8AnLvY=\n"
-"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-
-static int test_oap_hdr_init_fini(void)
+#include <ouroboros/time.h>
+
+#include <test/test.h>
+#include <test/certs.h>
+
+#include "oap.h"
+#include "common.h"
+
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <string.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#endif
+
+#define AUTH true
+#define NO_AUTH false
+
+extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
+extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
+
+struct test_cfg test_cfg;
+
+/* Mock load - called by load_*_credentials in common.c */
+int mock_load_credentials(void ** pkp,
+ void ** crt)
{
- struct oap_hdr oap_hdr;
- struct timespec now;
- uint64_t stamp;
- buffer_t ephkey = BUF_INIT;
- buffer_t data = BUF_INIT;
- uint8_t buf[OAP_ID_SIZE];
- buffer_t id;
- void * pkp = NULL;
- void * pubcrt = NULL;
+ *crt = NULL;
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, pkp) < 0)
+ goto fail_privkey;
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, crt) < 0)
+ goto fail_crt;
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_crt:
+ crypt_free_key(*pkp);
+ fail_privkey:
+ *pkp = NULL;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Stub KEM functions - ECDSA tests don't use KEM */
+int load_server_kem_keypair(__attribute__((unused)) const char * name,
+ __attribute__((unused)) struct sec_config * cfg,
+ __attribute__((unused)) void ** pkp)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int load_server_kem_pk(__attribute__((unused)) const char * name,
+ __attribute__((unused)) struct sec_config * cfg,
+ __attribute__((unused)) buffer_t * pk)
+{
+ return -1;
+}
+
+static void test_default_cfg(void)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: X25519, AES-256-GCM, SHA-256, with auth */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: same KEX/cipher/kdf/md, no auth */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_init_fini(void)
+{
TEST_START();
- random_buffer(buf, OAP_ID_SIZE);
- id.data = buf;
- id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ if (oap_init() < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to init OAP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
- clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &now);
- stamp = TS_TO_UINT64(now);
+ oap_fini();
- if (oap_hdr_init(id, pkp, pubcrt, ephkey, data, &oap_hdr) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to init OAP request header.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr;
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip(int kex)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * kex_str = kex_nid_to_str(kex);
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", kex_str);
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = kex;
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = kex;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.hdr.len != OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE) {
- printf("OAP request header wrong: %zu < %zu.\n",
- oap_hdr.hdr.len, OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE);
- goto fail_req_hdr_chk;
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.id.len != OAP_ID_SIZE) {
- printf("OAP request header ID wrong size: %zu != %zu.\n",
- oap_hdr.id.len, (size_t) OAP_ID_SIZE);
- goto fail_req_hdr_chk;
+ if (ctx.cli.nid == NID_undef || ctx.srv.nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Cipher not set in flow.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (memcmp(oap_hdr.id.data, id.data, OAP_ID_SIZE) != 0) {
- printf("OAP request header ID mismatch.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr_chk;
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", kex_str);
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", kex_str);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only(void)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: auth only, no encryption */
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: no auth, no encryption */
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ return roundtrip_auth_only(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only(void)
+{
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: KEX only, no auth */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: KEX only, no auth */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ return roundtrip_kex_only();
+}
+
+static int test_oap_piggyback_data(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * cli_data_str = "client_data";
+ const char * srv_data_str = "server_data";
+ buffer_t srv_data = BUF_INIT;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ /* Client prepares request with piggybacked data */
+ ctx.data.len = strlen(cli_data_str);
+ ctx.data.data = malloc(ctx.data.len);
+ if (ctx.data.data == NULL)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ memcpy(ctx.data.data, cli_data_str, ctx.data.len);
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+
+ /* Set server's response data (ctx.data replaced with cli data) */
+ srv_data.len = strlen(srv_data_str);
+ srv_data.data = malloc(srv_data.len);
+ if (srv_data.data == NULL)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ memcpy(srv_data.data, srv_data_str, srv_data.len);
+
+ freebuf(ctx.data);
+ ctx.data = srv_data;
+ clrbuf(srv_data);
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+
+ /* Verify server received client's piggybacked data */
+ if (ctx.data.len != strlen(cli_data_str) ||
+ memcmp(ctx.data.data, cli_data_str, ctx.data.len) != 0) {
+ printf("Server did not receive correct client data.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.timestamp < stamp) {
- printf("OAP request header timestamp is too old.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr_chk;
+ freebuf(ctx.data);
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0)
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+
+ /* Verify client received server's piggybacked data */
+ if (ctx.data.len != strlen(srv_data_str) ||
+ memcmp(ctx.data.data, srv_data_str, ctx.data.len) != 0) {
+ printf("Client did not receive correct server data.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.timestamp > stamp + 1 * BILLION) {
- printf("OAP request header timestamp is too new.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr_chk;
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
-
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
- fail_req_hdr_chk:
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
- fail_req_hdr:
+ fail_cleanup:
+ freebuf(srv_data);
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
TEST_FAIL();
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-static int test_oap_hdr_init_fini_data(void)
+static int test_oap_corrupted_request(void)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = AUTH;
+ return corrupted_request(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_corrupted_response(void)
+{
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ return corrupted_response(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+static int test_oap_truncated_request(void)
{
- struct oap_hdr oap_hdr;
- buffer_t data;
- buffer_t ephkey = BUF_INIT;
- uint8_t buf[OAP_ID_SIZE];
- buffer_t id;
- void * pkp = NULL;
- void * pubcrt = NULL;
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ return truncated_request(root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec);
+}
+
+/* After ID (16), timestamp (8), cipher_nid (2), kdf_nid (2), md (2) */
+#define OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET 30
+static int test_oap_inflated_length_field(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t fake;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
TEST_START();
- random_buffer(buf, OAP_ID_SIZE);
- id.data = buf;
- id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
- data.len = 100;
- data.data = malloc(data.len);
- if (data.data == NULL) {
- printf("Failed to allocate data buffer.\n");
- goto fail_data;
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET + 2) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- random_buffer(data.data, data.len);
+ /* Set cert length to claim more bytes than packet contains */
+ fake = hton16(60000);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET, &fake, sizeof(fake));
- if (oap_hdr_init(id, pkp, pubcrt, ephkey, data, &oap_hdr) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to create OAP request header.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr;
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject inflated length field.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.hdr.len != OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE + data.len) {
- printf("OAP request header wrong: %zu < %zu.\n",
- oap_hdr.hdr.len, OAP_HDR_MIN_SIZE + data.len);
- goto fail_req_hdr_sz;
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Attacker claims cert is smaller - causes misparse of subsequent fields */
+static int test_oap_deflated_length_field(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t fake;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET + 2) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set cert length to claim fewer bytes - will misparse rest */
+ fake = hton16(1);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CERT_LEN_OFFSET, &fake, sizeof(fake));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject deflated length field.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- freebuf(data);
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+/* Header field offsets for byte manipulation */
+#define OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET 24
+#define OAP_KEX_LEN_OFFSET 32
+
+/* Server rejects request when cipher NID set but no KEX data provided */
+static int test_oap_nid_without_kex(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t cipher_nid;
+ uint16_t zero = 0;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ /* Configure unsigned KEX-only mode */
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Tamper: keep cipher_nid but set kex_len=0, truncate KEX data */
+ cipher_nid = hton16(NID_aes_256_gcm);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET, &cipher_nid,
+ sizeof(cipher_nid));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_KEX_LEN_OFFSET, &zero, sizeof(zero));
+ ctx.req_hdr.len = 36; /* Fixed header only, no KEX data */
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject cipher NID without KEX data.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
- fail_req_hdr_sz:
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
- fail_req_hdr:
- freebuf(data);
- fail_data:
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
TEST_FAIL();
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-static int test_oap_hdr_init_fini_signed(void)
+/* Server rejects OAP request with unsupported cipher NID */
+static int test_oap_unsupported_nid(void)
{
- struct oap_hdr oap_hdr;
- buffer_t ephkey = BUF_INIT;
- buffer_t data = BUF_INIT;
- buffer_t sign;
- buffer_t id;
- uint8_t buf[OAP_ID_SIZE];
- void * pkp;
- void * pk;
- void * pubcrt;
- void * pubcrt2;
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ uint16_t bad_nid;
TEST_START();
- random_buffer(buf, OAP_ID_SIZE);
- id.data = buf;
- id.len = OAP_ID_SIZE;
+ /* Configure unsigned KEX-only mode */
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = NO_AUTH;
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Tamper: set cipher_nid to unsupported value */
+ bad_nid = hton16(9999);
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_CIPHER_NID_OFFSET, &bad_nid,
+ sizeof(bad_nid));
- if (crypt_load_privkey_str(pkp_str, &pkp) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to load private key.\n");
- goto fail_pkp;
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject unsupported cipher NID.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(crt_str, &pubcrt) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to load public certificate.\n");
- goto fail_pubcrt;
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ /* Skip KEM algorithms - they're tested in oap_test_pqc */
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Cipher negotiation - client should accept server's chosen cipher */
+static int test_oap_cipher_mismatch(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: ChaCha20-Poly1305, SHA3-256, SHA-384 */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_chacha20_poly1305;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha3_256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = NID_sha384;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: AES-256-GCM, SHA-256, SHA-256 */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr_init(id, pkp, pubcrt, ephkey, data, &oap_hdr) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to create OAP request header.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr;
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.crt.len == 0) {
- printf("OAP request header has no public certificate.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr;
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (oap_hdr.sig.len == 0) {
- printf("OAP request header no signature.\n");
- goto fail_req_hdr;
+ /* Verify: both should have the server's chosen cipher and KDF */
+ if (ctx.srv.nid != test_cfg.srv.cipher) {
+ printf("Server cipher mismatch: expected %s, got %s\n",
+ crypt_nid_to_str(test_cfg.srv.cipher),
+ crypt_nid_to_str(ctx.srv.nid));
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_der(oap_hdr.crt, &pubcrt2) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to load public certificate from DER.\n");
- goto fail_crt_der;
+ if (ctx.cli.nid != test_cfg.srv.cipher) {
+ printf("Client cipher mismatch: expected %s, got %s\n",
+ crypt_nid_to_str(test_cfg.srv.cipher),
+ crypt_nid_to_str(ctx.cli.nid));
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- if (crypt_get_pubkey_crt(pubcrt2, &pk) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to get public key from certificate.\n");
- goto fail_crt_pk;
+ /* Parse response header to check negotiated KDF */
+ if (ctx.resp_hdr.len > 26) {
+ uint16_t resp_kdf_nid;
+ /* KDF NID at offset 26: ID(16) + ts(8) + cipher(2) */
+ resp_kdf_nid = ntoh16(*(uint16_t *)(ctx.resp_hdr.data + 26));
+
+ if (resp_kdf_nid != test_cfg.srv.kdf) {
+ printf("Response KDF mismatch: expected %s, got %s\n",
+ md_nid_to_str(test_cfg.srv.kdf),
+ md_nid_to_str(resp_kdf_nid));
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
}
- sign = oap_hdr.hdr;
- sign.len -= (oap_hdr.sig.len + sizeof(uint16_t));
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
- if (auth_verify_sig(pk, sign, oap_hdr.sig) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to verify OAP request header signature.\n");
- goto fail_check_sig;
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test roundtrip with different signature digest algorithms */
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_md(int md)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ const char * md_str = md_nid_to_str(md);
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+
+ memset(&test_cfg, 0, sizeof(test_cfg));
+
+ /* Server: auth + KEX with specified md */
+ test_cfg.srv.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.srv.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.srv.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.srv.md = md;
+ test_cfg.srv.auth = AUTH;
+
+ /* Client: no auth */
+ test_cfg.cli.kex = NID_X25519;
+ test_cfg.cli.cipher = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ test_cfg.cli.kdf = NID_sha256;
+ test_cfg.cli.md = md;
+ test_cfg.cli.auth = NO_AUTH;
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Server process failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (oap_cli_complete_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client complete failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(ctx.cli.key, ctx.srv.key, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Client and server keys do not match!\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
}
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
- crypt_free_crt(pubcrt2);
- crypt_free_crt(pubcrt);
- crypt_free_key(pk);
- crypt_free_key(pkp);
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", md_str ? md_str : "default");
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_oap_roundtrip_md_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Test with default (0) */
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md(0);
+
+ /* Test with all supported digest NIDs */
+ for (i = 0; md_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++)
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md(md_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+/* Timestamp is at offset 16 (after the 16-byte ID) */
+#define OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET 16
+/* Test that packets with outdated timestamps are rejected */
+static int test_oap_outdated_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ struct timespec old_ts;
+ uint64_t old_stamp;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET + sizeof(uint64_t)) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set timestamp to 30 seconds in the past (> 20s replay timer) */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &old_ts);
+ old_ts.tv_sec -= OAP_REPLAY_TIMER + 10;
+ old_stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(old_ts));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &old_stamp,
+ sizeof(old_stamp));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject outdated packet.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test that packets from the future are rejected */
+static int test_oap_future_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ struct timespec future_ts;
+ uint64_t future_stamp;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ if (ctx.req_hdr.len < OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET + sizeof(uint64_t)) {
+ printf("Request too short for test.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Set timestamp to 1 second in the future (> 100ms slack) */
+ clock_gettime(CLOCK_REALTIME, &future_ts);
+ future_ts.tv_sec += 1;
+ future_stamp = hton64(TS_TO_UINT64(future_ts));
+ memcpy(ctx.req_hdr.data + OAP_TIMESTAMP_OFFSET, &future_stamp,
+ sizeof(future_stamp));
+
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject future packet.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
TEST_SUCCESS();
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+/* Test that replayed packets (same ID + timestamp) are rejected */
+static int test_oap_replay_packet(void)
+{
+ struct oap_test_ctx ctx;
+ buffer_t saved_req;
+
+ test_default_cfg();
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (oap_test_setup(&ctx, root_ca_crt_ec, im_ca_crt_ec) < 0)
+ goto fail;
+
+ if (oap_cli_prepare_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("Client prepare failed.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Save the request for replay */
+ saved_req.len = ctx.req_hdr.len;
+ saved_req.data = malloc(saved_req.len);
+ if (saved_req.data == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to allocate saved request.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+ memcpy(saved_req.data, ctx.req_hdr.data, saved_req.len);
+
+ /* First request should succeed */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) < 0) {
+ printf("First request should succeed.\n");
+ free(saved_req.data);
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ /* Restore the saved request for replay */
+ freebuf(ctx.req_hdr);
+ ctx.req_hdr = saved_req;
+
+ /* Replayed request should fail */
+ if (oap_srv_process_ctx(&ctx) == 0) {
+ printf("Server should reject replayed packet.\n");
+ goto fail_cleanup;
+ }
+
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
- fail_check_sig:
- crypt_free_key(pk);
- fail_crt_pk:
- crypt_free_crt(pubcrt2);
- fail_crt_der:
- oap_hdr_fini(&oap_hdr);
- fail_req_hdr:
- crypt_free_crt(pubcrt);
- fail_pubcrt:
- crypt_free_key(pkp);
- fail_pkp:
+ fail_cleanup:
+ oap_test_teardown(&ctx);
+ fail:
TEST_FAIL();
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
@@ -270,12 +850,48 @@ int oap_test(int argc,
(void) argc;
(void) argv;
- ret |= test_oap_hdr_init_fini();
- ret |= test_oap_hdr_init_fini_data();
+ ret |= test_oap_init_fini();
+
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- ret |= test_oap_hdr_init_fini_signed();
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only();
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only();
+ ret |= test_oap_piggyback_data();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_all();
+ ret |= test_oap_roundtrip_md_all();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_request();
+ ret |= test_oap_corrupted_response();
+ ret |= test_oap_truncated_request();
+ ret |= test_oap_inflated_length_field();
+ ret |= test_oap_deflated_length_field();
+ ret |= test_oap_nid_without_kex();
+ ret |= test_oap_unsupported_nid();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_cipher_mismatch();
+
+ ret |= test_oap_outdated_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_future_packet();
+ ret |= test_oap_replay_packet();
#else
- (void) test_oap_hdr_init_fini_signed;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_auth_only;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_kex_only;
+ (void) test_oap_piggyback_data;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_all;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_md;
+ (void) test_oap_roundtrip_md_all;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_request;
+ (void) test_oap_corrupted_response;
+ (void) test_oap_truncated_request;
+ (void) test_oap_inflated_length_field;
+ (void) test_oap_deflated_length_field;
+ (void) test_oap_nid_without_kex;
+ (void) test_oap_unsupported_nid;
+ (void) test_oap_cipher_mismatch;
+ (void) test_oap_outdated_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_future_packet;
+ (void) test_oap_replay_packet;
ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
#endif
diff --git a/src/lib/config.h.in b/src/lib/config.h.in
index 4533b00e..b34e6a7b 100644
--- a/src/lib/config.h.in
+++ b/src/lib/config.h.in
@@ -23,9 +23,11 @@
#cmakedefine HAVE_SYS_RANDOM
#cmakedefine HAVE_LIBGCRYPT
#cmakedefine HAVE_OPENSSL
-
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#cmakedefine HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
#define HAVE_ENCRYPTION
+#define PROC_SECMEM_MAX @PROC_SECMEM_MAX@
+#define SECMEM_GUARD @SECMEM_GUARD@
#endif
#define SYS_MAX_FLOWS @SYS_MAX_FLOWS@
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt.c b/src/lib/crypt.c
index 8b18140e..a050fe38 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypt.c
@@ -22,32 +22,244 @@
#include <config.h>
-#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- #include "crypt/openssl.h"
-#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include "crypt/openssl.h"
+#endif
#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+
+struct nid_map {
+ uint16_t nid;
+ const char * name;
+};
+
+static const struct nid_map cipher_nid_map[] = {
+ {NID_aes_128_gcm, "aes-128-gcm"},
+ {NID_aes_192_gcm, "aes-192-gcm"},
+ {NID_aes_256_gcm, "aes-256-gcm"},
+ {NID_chacha20_poly1305, "chacha20-poly1305"},
+ {NID_aes_128_ctr, "aes-128-ctr"},
+ {NID_aes_192_ctr, "aes-192-ctr"},
+ {NID_aes_256_ctr, "aes-256-ctr"},
+ {NID_undef, NULL}
+};
+
+const uint16_t crypt_supported_nids[] = {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ NID_aes_128_gcm,
+ NID_aes_192_gcm,
+ NID_aes_256_gcm,
+ NID_chacha20_poly1305,
+ NID_aes_128_ctr,
+ NID_aes_192_ctr,
+ NID_aes_256_ctr,
+#endif
+ NID_undef
+};
+
+static const struct nid_map kex_nid_map[] = {
+ {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "prime256v1"},
+ {NID_secp384r1, "secp384r1"},
+ {NID_secp521r1, "secp521r1"},
+ {NID_X25519, "X25519"},
+ {NID_X448, "X448"},
+ {NID_ffdhe2048, "ffdhe2048"},
+ {NID_ffdhe3072, "ffdhe3072"},
+ {NID_ffdhe4096, "ffdhe4096"},
+ {NID_MLKEM512, "ML-KEM-512"},
+ {NID_MLKEM768, "ML-KEM-768"},
+ {NID_MLKEM1024, "ML-KEM-1024"},
+ {NID_X25519MLKEM768, "X25519MLKEM768"},
+ {NID_X448MLKEM1024, "X448MLKEM1024"},
+ {NID_undef, NULL}
+};
+
+const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[] = {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
+ NID_secp384r1,
+ NID_secp521r1,
+ NID_X25519,
+ NID_X448,
+ NID_ffdhe2048,
+ NID_ffdhe3072,
+ NID_ffdhe4096,
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
+ NID_MLKEM512,
+ NID_MLKEM768,
+ NID_MLKEM1024,
+ NID_X25519MLKEM768,
+ NID_X448MLKEM1024,
+#endif
+#endif
+ NID_undef
+};
+
+static const struct nid_map md_nid_map[] = {
+ {NID_sha256, "sha256"},
+ {NID_sha384, "sha384"},
+ {NID_sha512, "sha512"},
+ {NID_sha3_256, "sha3-256"},
+ {NID_sha3_384, "sha3-384"},
+ {NID_sha3_512, "sha3-512"},
+ {NID_blake2b512, "blake2b512"},
+ {NID_blake2s256, "blake2s256"},
+ {NID_undef, NULL}
+};
+
+const uint16_t md_supported_nids[] = {
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ NID_sha256,
+ NID_sha384,
+ NID_sha512,
+ NID_sha3_256,
+ NID_sha3_384,
+ NID_sha3_512,
+ NID_blake2b512,
+ NID_blake2s256,
+#endif
+ NID_undef
+};
struct crypt_ctx {
- void * ctx;
- uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ void * ctx; /* Encryption context */
};
struct auth_ctx {
void * store;
};
-int crypt_dh_pkp_create(void ** pkp,
- uint8_t * pk)
+static int parse_kex_value(const char * value,
+ struct sec_config * cfg)
+{
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(cfg, value);
+ if (cfg->x.nid == NID_undef)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* not in header, but non-static for unit testing */
+int parse_sec_config(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ FILE * fp)
+{
+ char line[256];
+ char * equals;
+ char * key;
+ char * value;
+
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+ assert(fp != NULL);
+
+ /* Set defaults */
+ SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(cfg, NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ cfg->x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP;
+ SET_KEX_KDF_NID(cfg, NID_sha256);
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER_NID(cfg, NID_aes_256_gcm);
+ SET_KEX_DIGEST_NID(cfg, NID_sha256);
+
+ while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL) {
+ char * trimmed;
+
+ /* Skip comments and empty lines */
+ if (line[0] == '#' || line[0] == '\n')
+ continue;
+
+ /* Check for 'none' keyword */
+ trimmed = trim_whitespace(line);
+ if (strcmp(trimmed, "none") == 0) {
+ memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg));
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ /* Find the = separator */
+ equals = strchr(line, '=');
+ if (equals == NULL)
+ continue;
+
+ /* Split into key and value */
+ *equals = '\0';
+ key = trim_whitespace(line);
+ value = trim_whitespace(equals + 1);
+
+ /* Parse key exchange field */
+ if (strcmp(key, "kex") == 0) {
+ if (parse_kex_value(value, cfg) < 0)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(key, "cipher") == 0) {
+ SET_KEX_CIPHER(cfg, value);
+ if (cfg->c.nid == NID_undef)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(key, "kdf") == 0) {
+ SET_KEX_KDF(cfg, value);
+ if (cfg->k.nid == NID_undef)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(key, "digest") == 0) {
+ SET_KEX_DIGEST(cfg, value);
+ if (cfg->d.nid == NID_undef)
+ return -EINVAL;
+ } else if (strcmp(key, "kem_mode") == 0) {
+ if (strcmp(value, "server") == 0) {
+ cfg->x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP;
+ } else if (strcmp(value, "client") == 0) {
+ cfg->x.mode = KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP;
+ } else {
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+/* Parse key exchange config from file */
+int load_sec_config_file(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ const char * path)
+{
+ FILE * fp;
+ int ret;
+
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+ assert(path != NULL);
+
+ fp = fopen(path, "r");
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ /* File doesn't exist - disable encryption */
+ CLEAR_KEX_ALGO(cfg);
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ ret = parse_sec_config(cfg, fp);
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int kex_pkp_create(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ void ** pkp,
+ uint8_t * pk)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
assert(pkp != NULL);
+
*pkp = NULL;
- return openssl_ecdh_pkp_create(pkp, pk);
+
+ if (cfg->x.str == NULL || kex_validate_nid(cfg->x.nid) < 0)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
+ return openssl_pkp_create(cfg->x.str, (EVP_PKEY **) pkp, pk);
#else
+ (void) cfg;
(void) pkp;
(void) pk;
@@ -57,12 +269,12 @@ int crypt_dh_pkp_create(void ** pkp,
#endif
}
-void crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp)
+void kex_pkp_destroy(void * pkp)
{
if (pkp == NULL)
return;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- openssl_ecdh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ openssl_pkp_destroy((EVP_PKEY *) pkp);
#else
(void) pkp;
@@ -70,12 +282,18 @@ void crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp)
#endif
}
-int crypt_dh_derive(void * pkp,
- buffer_t pk,
- uint8_t * s)
+int kex_dhe_derive(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ void * pkp,
+ buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * s)
{
+ assert(cfg != NULL);
+
+ if (kex_validate_nid(cfg->x.nid) < 0)
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- return openssl_ecdh_derive(pkp, pk, s);
+ return openssl_dhe_derive((EVP_PKEY *) pkp, pk, cfg->k.nid, s);
#else
(void) pkp;
(void) pk;
@@ -86,6 +304,244 @@ int crypt_dh_derive(void * pkp,
#endif
}
+ssize_t kex_kem_encap(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_kem_encap(pk, ct, kdf, s);
+#else
+ (void) pk;
+ (void) ct;
+ (void) kdf;
+
+ memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ return -ECRYPT;
+#endif
+}
+
+ssize_t kex_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_kem_encap_raw(pk, ct, kdf, s);
+#else
+ (void) pk;
+ (void) ct;
+ (void) kdf;
+
+ memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ return -ECRYPT;
+#endif
+}
+
+int kex_kem_decap(void * pkp,
+ buffer_t ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_kem_decap((EVP_PKEY *) pkp, ct, kdf, s);
+#else
+ (void) pkp;
+ (void) ct;
+ (void) kdf;
+
+ memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ return -ECRYPT;
+#endif
+}
+
+int kex_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_get_algo_from_pk_der(pk, algo);
+#else
+ (void) pk;
+ algo[0] = '\0';
+
+ return -ECRYPT;
+#endif
+}
+
+int kex_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_get_algo_from_pk_raw(pk, algo);
+#else
+ (void) pk;
+ algo[0] = '\0';
+
+ return -ECRYPT;
+#endif
+}
+
+int kex_validate_algo(const char * algo)
+{
+ if (algo == NULL)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ /* Use NID validation instead of string array */
+ return kex_validate_nid(kex_str_to_nid(algo));
+}
+
+int crypt_validate_nid(int nid)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (p->nid == nid)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+
+const char * crypt_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (p->nid == nid)
+ return p->name;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+uint16_t crypt_str_to_nid(const char * cipher)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ if (cipher == NULL)
+ return NID_undef;
+
+ /* fast, check if cipher pointer is in the map */
+ for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (cipher == p->name)
+ return p->nid;
+ }
+
+ for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (strcmp(p->name, cipher) == 0)
+ return p->nid;
+ }
+
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+const char * kex_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (p->nid == nid)
+ return p->name;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+uint16_t kex_str_to_nid(const char * algo)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ if (algo == NULL)
+ return NID_undef;
+
+ /* Fast path: check if algo pointer is in the map */
+ for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (algo == p->name)
+ return p->nid;
+ }
+
+ /* Slow path: string comparison */
+ for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (strcmp(p->name, algo) == 0)
+ return p->nid;
+ }
+
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int kex_validate_nid(int nid)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (p->nid == nid)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+const char * md_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (p->nid == nid)
+ return p->name;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+uint16_t md_str_to_nid(const char * kdf)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ if (kdf == NULL)
+ return NID_undef;
+
+ /* Fast path: check if kdf pointer is in the map */
+ for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (kdf == p->name)
+ return p->nid;
+ }
+
+ /* Slow path: string comparison */
+ for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (strcmp(p->name, kdf) == 0)
+ return p->nid;
+ }
+
+ return NID_undef;
+}
+
+int md_validate_nid(int nid)
+{
+ const struct nid_map * p;
+
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return -EINVAL;
+
+ for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) {
+ if (p->nid == nid)
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return -ENOTSUP;
+}
+
+/* Hash length now returned by md_digest() */
+
int crypt_encrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx,
buffer_t in,
buffer_t * out)
@@ -94,7 +550,7 @@ int crypt_encrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx,
assert(ctx->ctx != NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- return openssl_encrypt(ctx->ctx, ctx->key, in, out);
+ return openssl_encrypt(ctx->ctx, in, out);
#else
(void) ctx;
(void) in;
@@ -112,7 +568,7 @@ int crypt_decrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx,
assert(ctx->ctx != NULL);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- return openssl_decrypt(ctx->ctx, ctx->key, in, out);
+ return openssl_decrypt(ctx->ctx, in, out);
#else
(void) ctx;
(void) in;
@@ -122,20 +578,21 @@ int crypt_decrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx,
#endif
}
-struct crypt_ctx * crypt_create_ctx(const uint8_t * key)
+struct crypt_ctx * crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
struct crypt_ctx * crypt;
+ if (crypt_validate_nid(sk->nid) != 0)
+ return NULL;
+
crypt = malloc(sizeof(*crypt));
if (crypt == NULL)
goto fail_crypt;
memset(crypt, 0, sizeof(*crypt));
- if (key != NULL)
- memcpy(crypt->key, key, SYMMKEYSZ);
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- crypt->ctx=openssl_crypt_create_ctx();
+ crypt->ctx = openssl_crypt_create_ctx(sk);
if (crypt->ctx == NULL)
goto fail_ctx;
#endif
@@ -204,11 +661,72 @@ int crypt_load_pubkey_str(const char * str,
#endif
}
+int crypt_load_pubkey_file(const char * path,
+ void ** key)
+{
+ *key = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_load_pubkey_file(path, key);
+#else
+ (void) path;
+
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int crypt_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ assert(buf != NULL);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_load_pubkey_file_to_der(path, buf);
+#else
+ (void) path;
+
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ buf->len = 0;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int crypt_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ assert(buf != NULL);
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_load_pubkey_raw_file(path, buf);
+#else
+ (void) path;
+
+ buf->data = NULL;
+ buf->len = 0;
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+int crypt_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ void ** key)
+{
+ *key = NULL;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_load_privkey_raw_file(path, key);
+#else
+ (void) path;
+
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
int crypt_cmp_key(const void * key1,
const void * key2)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- return openssl_cmp_key(key1, key2);
+ return openssl_cmp_key((const EVP_PKEY *) key1,
+ (const EVP_PKEY *) key2);
#else
(void) key1;
(void) key2;
@@ -223,7 +741,7 @@ void crypt_free_key(void * key)
return;
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- openssl_free_key(key);
+ openssl_free_key((EVP_PKEY *) key);
#endif
}
@@ -343,6 +861,19 @@ int crypt_check_crt_name(void * crt,
#endif
}
+int crypt_get_crt_name(void * crt,
+ char * name)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_get_crt_name(crt, name);
+#else
+ (void) crt;
+ (void) name;
+
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
struct auth_ctx * auth_create_ctx(void)
{
struct auth_ctx * ctx;
@@ -406,13 +937,15 @@ int auth_verify_crt(struct auth_ctx * ctx,
}
int auth_sign(void * pkp,
+ int md_nid,
buffer_t msg,
buffer_t * sig)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- return openssl_sign(pkp, msg, sig);
+ return openssl_sign((EVP_PKEY *) pkp, md_nid, msg, sig);
#else
(void) pkp;
+ (void) md_nid;
(void) msg;
(void) sig;
@@ -423,16 +956,82 @@ int auth_sign(void * pkp,
}
int auth_verify_sig(void * pk,
+ int md_nid,
buffer_t msg,
buffer_t sig)
{
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- return openssl_verify_sig(pk, msg, sig);
+ return openssl_verify_sig((EVP_PKEY *) pk, md_nid, msg, sig);
#else
(void) pk;
+ (void) md_nid;
(void) msg;
(void) sig;
return 0;
#endif
}
+
+ssize_t md_digest(int md_nid,
+ buffer_t in,
+ uint8_t * out)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_md_digest(md_nid, in, out);
+#else
+ (void) md_nid;
+ (void) in;
+ (void) out;
+
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+ssize_t md_len(int md_nid)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_md_len(md_nid);
+#else
+ (void) md_nid;
+ return -1;
+#endif
+}
+
+int crypt_secure_malloc_init(size_t max)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_secure_malloc_init(max, SECMEM_GUARD);
+#else
+ return 0;
+#endif
+}
+
+void crypt_secure_malloc_fini(void)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ openssl_secure_malloc_fini();
+#endif
+}
+
+void * crypt_secure_malloc(size_t size)
+{
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ return openssl_secure_malloc(size);
+#else
+ return malloc(size);
+#endif
+}
+
+void crypt_secure_free(void * ptr,
+ size_t size)
+{
+ if (ptr == NULL)
+ return;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ openssl_secure_free(ptr, size);
+#else
+ memset(ptr, 0, size);
+ free(ptr);
+#endif
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c
index 291a3418..71a69c1c 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c
@@ -23,6 +23,10 @@
* Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
*/
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+
+#include <config.h>
+
#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/hash.h>
@@ -32,31 +36,239 @@
#include <openssl/evp.h>
#include <openssl/bio.h>
#include <openssl/ec.h>
+#include <openssl/err.h>
+#include <openssl/kdf.h>
#include <openssl/pem.h>
#include <openssl/sha.h>
+#include <openssl/provider.h>
#include <openssl/x509v3.h>
#include <openssl/x509_vfy.h>
#include <assert.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+
+#define IS_EC_GROUP(str) (strcmp(str, "EC") == 0)
+#define IS_DH_GROUP(str) (strcmp(str, "DH") == 0)
+
+#define HKDF_INFO_DHE "o7s-ossl-dhe"
+#define HKDF_INFO_ENCAP "o7s-ossl-encap"
+#define HKDF_SALT_LEN 32 /* SHA-256 output size */
+
+struct ossl_crypt_ctx {
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX * evp_ctx;
+ const EVP_CIPHER * cipher;
+ uint8_t * key;
+ int ivsz;
+ int tagsz;
+};
+
+struct kdf_info {
+ buffer_t secret;
+ int nid;
+ buffer_t salt;
+ buffer_t info;
+ buffer_t key;
+};
+
+/* Convert hash NID to OpenSSL digest name string for HKDF */
+static const char * hash_nid_to_digest_name(int nid)
+{
+ const EVP_MD * md;
+ const char * name;
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return "SHA256"; /* fallback to SHA-256 */
+
+ name = EVP_MD_get0_name(md);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ return "SHA256"; /* fallback to SHA-256 */
+
+ return name;
+}
+
+/* Extract public key bytes from a key pair for salt derivation */
+static int get_pk_bytes_from_key(EVP_PKEY * key,
+ buffer_t * pk)
+{
+ const char * name;
+ int ret;
+
+ assert(key != NULL);
+ assert(pk != NULL);
+
+ name = EVP_PKEY_get0_type_name(key);
+ if (name == NULL)
+ goto fail_name;
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(name)) {
+ pk->len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key, &pk->data);
+ if (pk->len == 0)
+ goto fail_name;
+ } else {
+ /* Pure ML-KEM: use DER encoding to match encap */
+ pk->data = NULL;
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(key, &pk->data);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto fail_name;
+ pk->len = (size_t) ret;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+ fail_name:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+/* Derive salt from public key bytes by hashing them */
+static int derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * salt,
+ size_t salt_len)
+{
+ uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned hash_len;
+
+ assert(pk.data != NULL);
+ assert(salt != NULL);
+
+ if (EVP_Digest(pk.data, pk.len, hash, &hash_len,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1)
+ goto fail_digest;
+
+ memcpy(salt, hash, salt_len < hash_len ? salt_len : hash_len);
+
+ return 0;
+ fail_digest:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+/* Derive salt from two public key byte buffers (DHE) in canonical order */
+static int derive_salt_from_pk_bytes_dhe(buffer_t local,
+ buffer_t remote,
+ uint8_t * salt,
+ size_t salt_len)
+{
+ uint8_t * concat;
+ size_t concat_len;
+ uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE];
+ unsigned hash_len;
+ size_t min_len;
+ int cmp;
+
+ assert(local.data != NULL);
+ assert(remote.data != NULL);
+ assert(salt != NULL);
+
+ concat_len = local.len + remote.len;
+ concat = OPENSSL_malloc(concat_len);
+ if (concat == NULL)
+ goto fail_malloc;
+
+ /* Canonical order: compare and concatenate smaller first */
+ min_len = local.len < remote.len ? local.len : remote.len;
+ cmp = memcmp(local.data, remote.data, min_len);
+ if (cmp < 0 || (cmp == 0 && local.len < remote.len)) {
+ memcpy(concat, local.data, local.len);
+ memcpy(concat + local.len, remote.data, remote.len);
+ } else {
+ memcpy(concat, remote.data, remote.len);
+ memcpy(concat + remote.len, local.data, local.len);
+ }
+
+ if (EVP_Digest(concat, concat_len, hash, &hash_len,
+ EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1)
+ goto fail_digest;
+
+ OPENSSL_free(concat);
+
+ memcpy(salt, hash, salt_len < hash_len ? salt_len : hash_len);
+
+ return 0;
+ fail_digest:
+ OPENSSL_free(concat);
+ fail_malloc:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+/* Derive key using HKDF */
+#define OPc_u_str OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string
+#define OPc_o_str OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string
+static int derive_key_hkdf(struct kdf_info * ki)
+{
+ EVP_KDF * kdf;
+ EVP_KDF_CTX * kctx;
+ OSSL_PARAM params[5];
+ const char * digest;
+ int idx;
+
+ digest = hash_nid_to_digest_name(ki->nid);
+
+ kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "HKDF", NULL);
+ if (kdf == NULL)
+ goto fail_fetch;
+
+ kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf);
+ if (kctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_ctx;
+
+ idx = 0;
+ params[idx++] = OPc_u_str("digest", (char *) digest, 0);
+ params[idx++] = OPc_o_str("key", ki->secret.data, ki->secret.len);
+ params[idx++] = OPc_o_str("salt", ki->salt.data, ki->salt.len);
+ params[idx++] = OPc_o_str("info", ki->info.data, ki->info.len);
+
+ params[idx] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end();
+
+ if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, ki->key.data, ki->key.len, params) != 1)
+ goto fail_derive;
+
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_derive:
+ EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx);
+ fail_ctx:
+ EVP_KDF_free(kdf);
+ fail_fetch:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
/*
* Derive the common secret from
- * - your public key pair (kp)
- * - the remote public key (pub).
+ * - your public key pair (pkp)
+ * - the remote public key bytes (remote_pk).
* Store it in a preallocated buffer (s).
*/
-static int __openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(EVP_PKEY * kp,
- EVP_PKEY * pub,
- uint8_t * s)
+static int __openssl_dhe_derive(EVP_PKEY * pkp,
+ EVP_PKEY * pub,
+ buffer_t remote_pk,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
{
- EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx;
- int ret;
- uint8_t * secret;
- size_t secret_len;
-
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(kp, NULL);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx;
+ struct kdf_info ki;
+ buffer_t local_pk;
+ int ret;
+ uint8_t * secret;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ uint8_t salt_buf[HKDF_SALT_LEN];
+
+ /* Extract local public key bytes */
+ local_pk.data = NULL;
+ ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkp, &local_pk.data);
+ if (ret <= 0)
+ goto fail_local;
+ local_pk.len = (size_t) ret;
+
+ /* Derive salt from both public keys */
+ if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes_dhe(local_pk, remote_pk, salt_buf,
+ HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkp, NULL);
if (ctx == NULL)
- goto fail_new;
+ goto fail_salt;
ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
@@ -81,37 +293,78 @@ static int __openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(EVP_PKEY * kp,
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_derive;
- /* Hash the secret for use as AES key. */
- mem_hash(HASH_SHA3_256, s, secret, secret_len);
+ ki.nid = kdf;
+ ki.secret.len = secret_len;
+ ki.secret.data = secret;
+ ki.info.len = strlen(HKDF_INFO_DHE);
+ ki.info.data = (uint8_t *) HKDF_INFO_DHE;
+ ki.key.len = SYMMKEYSZ;
+ ki.key.data = s;
+ ki.salt.len = HKDF_SALT_LEN;
+ ki.salt.data = salt_buf;
+
+ /* Derive symmetric key from shared secret using HKDF */
+ ret = derive_key_hkdf(&ki);
OPENSSL_free(secret);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(local_pk.data);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
return 0;
fail_derive:
OPENSSL_free(secret);
fail_ctx:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- fail_new:
+ fail_salt:
+ OPENSSL_free(local_pk.data);
+ fail_local:
return -ECRYPT;
}
-static int __openssl_ecdh_gen_key(void ** kp)
+static int __openssl_dhe_gen_key(const char * algo,
+ EVP_PKEY ** kp)
{
EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY_CTX * kctx = NULL;
EVP_PKEY * params = NULL;
+ int nid;
+ int type;
int ret;
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL);
+ assert(algo != NULL);
+ assert(kp != NULL);
+
+ nid = OBJ_txt2nid(algo);
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return -ECRYPT;
+
+ /* X25519 and X448: direct keygen context */
+ if (nid == EVP_PKEY_X25519 || nid == EVP_PKEY_X448) {
+ kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(nid, NULL);
+ if (kctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_kctx;
+
+ goto keygen;
+ }
+ /* EC and FFDHE: parameter generation first */
+ type = (strncmp(algo, "ffdhe", 5) == 0) ? EVP_PKEY_DH : EVP_PKEY_EC;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(type, NULL);
if (ctx == NULL)
- goto fail_new_id;
+ goto fail_ctx;
ret = EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(ctx);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_paramgen;
- ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, NID_X9_62_prime256v1);
+ if (type == EVP_PKEY_EC)
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid);
+ else /* EVP_PKEY_DH */
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_nid(ctx, nid);
+
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_paramgen;
@@ -121,187 +374,556 @@ static int __openssl_ecdh_gen_key(void ** kp)
kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(params, NULL);
if (kctx == NULL)
- goto fail_keygen_init;
+ goto fail_kctx;
+ EVP_PKEY_free(params);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ keygen:
ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_keygen;
- ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, (EVP_PKEY **) kp);
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, kp);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_keygen;
- EVP_PKEY_free(params);
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
return 0;
+
fail_keygen:
EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
- fail_keygen_init:
- EVP_PKEY_free(params);
+ return -ECRYPT;
+ fail_kctx:
+ if (params != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_free(params);
fail_paramgen:
- EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
- fail_new_id:
+ if (ctx != NULL)
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ fail_ctx:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+static int __openssl_kem_gen_key(const char * algo,
+ EVP_PKEY ** kp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX * kctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ assert(algo != NULL);
+ assert(kp != NULL);
+
+ /* PQC KEM (ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024) or hybrid */
+ kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algo, NULL);
+ if (kctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_kctx;
+
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_keygen;
+
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, kp);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_keygen;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_keygen:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx);
+ fail_kctx:
return -ECRYPT;
}
-ssize_t openssl_ecdh_pkp_create(void ** pkp,
- uint8_t * pk)
+/* Determine hybrid KEM algorithm from raw key/ciphertext length */
+static const char * __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(size_t len)
+{
+ switch(len) {
+ case X25519MLKEM768_PKSZ:
+ return "X25519MLKEM768";
+ case X25519MLKEM768_CTSZ:
+ return "X25519MLKEM768";
+ case X448MLKEM1024_PKSZ:
+ return "X448MLKEM1024";
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+static int __openssl_kex_gen_key(const char * algo,
+ EVP_PKEY ** kp)
{
- uint8_t * pos;
- ssize_t len;
+ assert(algo != NULL);
+ assert(kp != NULL);
+
+ /* Dispatch based on algorithm name prefix */
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ return __openssl_kem_gen_key(algo, kp);
+
+ return __openssl_dhe_gen_key(algo, kp);
+}
+ssize_t openssl_pkp_create(const char * algo,
+ EVP_PKEY ** pkp,
+ uint8_t * pk)
+{
+ uint8_t * pos;
+ buffer_t raw;
+ ssize_t len;
+
+ assert(algo != NULL);
assert(pkp != NULL);
assert(*pkp == NULL);
assert(pk != NULL);
- if (__openssl_ecdh_gen_key(pkp) < 0)
+ if (__openssl_kex_gen_key(algo, pkp) < 0)
goto fail_key;
- pos = pk; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use pk! */
- len = i2d_PUBKEY(*pkp, &pos);
- if (len < 0)
- goto fail_pubkey;
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) { /* Raw encode hybrid KEM */
+ raw.len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(*pkp, &raw.data);
+ if (raw.len == 0)
+ goto fail_pubkey;
+
+ memcpy(pk, raw.data, raw.len);
+ OPENSSL_free(raw.data);
+
+ return (ssize_t) raw.len;
+ } else { /* DER encode standard algorithms */
+ pos = pk; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use pk! */
+ len = i2d_PUBKEY(*pkp, &pos);
+ if (len < 0)
+ goto fail_pubkey;
- return len;
+ return len;
+ }
fail_pubkey:
EVP_PKEY_free(*pkp);
fail_key:
return -ECRYPT;
}
-void openssl_ecdh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp)
+/* Common KEM encapsulation - pub key and salt already prepared */
+static ssize_t __openssl_kem_encap(EVP_PKEY * pub,
+ uint8_t * salt,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx;
+ struct kdf_info ki;
+ uint8_t * secret;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ size_t ct_len;
+ int ret;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_ctx;
+
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_encap;
+
+ /* Get required lengths */
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, NULL, &ct_len, NULL, &secret_len);
+ if (ret != 1 || ct_len > MSGBUFSZ)
+ goto fail_encap;
+
+ /* Allocate buffer for secret */
+ secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len);
+ if (secret == NULL)
+ goto fail_encap;
+
+ /* Perform encapsulation */
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, ct, &ct_len, secret, &secret_len);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_secret;
+
+ ki.secret.len = secret_len;
+ ki.secret.data = secret;
+ ki.nid = kdf;
+ ki.info.len = strlen(HKDF_INFO_ENCAP);
+ ki.info.data = (uint8_t *) HKDF_INFO_ENCAP;
+ ki.key.len = SYMMKEYSZ;
+ ki.key.data = s;
+ ki.salt.len = HKDF_SALT_LEN;
+ ki.salt.data = salt;
+
+ /* Derive symmetric key from shared secret using HKDF */
+ ret = derive_key_hkdf(&ki);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(secret);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return -ECRYPT;
+
+ return (ssize_t) ct_len;
+
+ fail_secret:
+ OPENSSL_free(secret);
+ fail_encap:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ fail_ctx:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+/* ML-KEM encapsulation - DER-encoded public key */
+ssize_t openssl_kem_encap(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY * pub;
+ uint8_t * pos;
+ uint8_t salt[HKDF_SALT_LEN];
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ assert(pk.data != NULL);
+ assert(ct != NULL);
+ assert(s != NULL);
+
+ if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(pk, salt, HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ pos = pk.data;
+ pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) pk.len);
+ if (pub == NULL)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ ret = __openssl_kem_encap(pub, salt, ct, kdf, s);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub);
+
+ return ret;
+ fail_salt:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+/* Hybrid KEM encapsulation: raw-encoded public key */
+ssize_t openssl_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY * pub;
+ const char * algo;
+ uint8_t salt[HKDF_SALT_LEN];
+ ssize_t ret;
+
+ assert(pk.data != NULL);
+ assert(ct != NULL);
+ assert(s != NULL);
+
+ if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(pk, salt, HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(pk.len);
+ if (algo == NULL)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ pub = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, algo, NULL,
+ pk.data, pk.len);
+ if (pub == NULL)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ ret = __openssl_kem_encap(pub, salt, ct, kdf, s);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub);
+
+ return ret;
+ fail_salt:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+/* KEM decapsulation - used by party that generated the keypair */
+int openssl_kem_decap(EVP_PKEY * priv,
+ buffer_t ct,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx;
+ struct kdf_info ki;
+ buffer_t pk;
+ uint8_t * secret;
+ size_t secret_len;
+ int ret;
+ uint8_t salt[HKDF_SALT_LEN];
+
+ /* Extract public key bytes from private key */
+ if (get_pk_bytes_from_key(priv, &pk) < 0)
+ goto fail_pk;
+
+ if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(pk, salt, HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(priv, NULL);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_salt;
+
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_ctx;
+
+ /* Get required secret length */
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, NULL, &secret_len, ct.data, ct.len);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_ctx;
+
+ /* Allocate buffer for secret */
+ secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len);
+ if (secret == NULL)
+ goto fail_ctx;
+
+ /* Perform decapsulation */
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secret_len, ct.data, ct.len);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_secret;
+
+ ki.secret.len = secret_len;
+ ki.secret.data = secret;
+ ki.nid = kdf;
+ ki.info.len = strlen(HKDF_INFO_ENCAP);
+ ki.info.data = (uint8_t *) HKDF_INFO_ENCAP;
+ ki.key.len = SYMMKEYSZ;
+ ki.key.data = s;
+ ki.salt.len = HKDF_SALT_LEN;
+ ki.salt.data = salt;
+
+ /* Derive symmetric key from shared secret using HKDF */
+ ret = derive_key_hkdf(&ki);
+
+ OPENSSL_free(secret);
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ OPENSSL_free(pk.data);
+
+ if (ret != 0)
+ return ret;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_secret:
+ OPENSSL_free(secret);
+ fail_ctx:
+ EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx);
+ fail_salt:
+ OPENSSL_free(pk.data);
+ fail_pk:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+void openssl_pkp_destroy(EVP_PKEY * pkp)
+{
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkp);
+}
+
+int __openssl_get_curve(EVP_PKEY * pub,
+ char * algo)
+{
+ int ret;
+ size_t len = KEX_ALGO_BUFSZ;
+
+ ret = EVP_PKEY_get_utf8_string_param(pub, "group", algo, len, &len);
+ return ret == 1 ? 0 : -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo)
+{
+ uint8_t * pos;
+ EVP_PKEY * pub;
+ char * type_str;
+
+ assert(pk.data != NULL);
+ assert(algo != NULL);
+
+ pos = pk.data;
+ pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) pk.len);
+ if (pub == NULL)
+ goto fail_decode;
+
+ type_str = (char *) EVP_PKEY_get0_type_name(pub);
+ if (type_str == NULL)
+ goto fail_pub;
+
+ strcpy(algo, type_str);
+
+ if ((IS_EC_GROUP(algo) || IS_DH_GROUP(algo)) &&
+ __openssl_get_curve(pub, algo) < 0)
+ goto fail_pub;
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub);
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_pub:
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pub);
+ fail_decode:
+ return -ECRYPT;
+}
+
+int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo)
{
- EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *) pkp);
+ const char * hybrid_algo;
+
+ assert(pk.data != NULL);
+ assert(algo != NULL);
+
+ hybrid_algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(pk.len);
+ if (hybrid_algo == NULL)
+ return -ECRYPT;
+
+ strcpy(algo, hybrid_algo);
+
+ return 0;
}
-int openssl_ecdh_derive(void * pkp,
- buffer_t pk,
- uint8_t * s)
+int openssl_dhe_derive(EVP_PKEY * pkp,
+ buffer_t pk,
+ int kdf,
+ uint8_t * s)
{
uint8_t * pos;
EVP_PKEY * pub;
+ assert(pkp != NULL);
+ assert(pk.data != NULL);
+ assert(s != NULL);
+
+ /* X.509 DER decoding for DHE */
pos = pk.data; /* d2i_PUBKEY increments pos, don't use key ptr! */
pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) pk.len);
if (pub == NULL)
- goto fail_pubkey;
+ goto fail_decode;
- if (__openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(pkp, pub, s) < 0)
- goto fail_key;
+ if (__openssl_dhe_derive(pkp, pub, pk, kdf, s) < 0)
+ goto fail_derive;
EVP_PKEY_free(pub);
return 0;
- fail_pubkey:
+ fail_derive:
EVP_PKEY_free(pub);
- fail_key:
+ fail_decode:
return -ECRYPT;
}
-/*
- * AES encryption calls. If FRCT is disabled, we should generate a
- * 128-bit random IV and append it to the packet. If the flow is
- * reliable, we could initialize the context once, and consider the
- * stream a single encrypted message to avoid initializing the
- * encryption context for each packet.
- */
-
-int openssl_encrypt(void * ctx,
- uint8_t * key,
- buffer_t in,
- buffer_t * out)
+int openssl_encrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx,
+ buffer_t in,
+ buffer_t * out)
{
- uint8_t * ptr;
- uint8_t * iv;
- int in_sz;
- int out_sz;
- int tmp_sz;
- int ret;
+ uint8_t * ptr;
+ uint8_t * iv;
+ int in_sz;
+ int out_sz;
+ int tmp_sz;
+ int ret;
+
+ assert(ctx != NULL);
in_sz = (int) in.len;
- out->data = malloc(in.len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + IVSZ);
+ out->data = malloc(in.len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + \
+ ctx->ivsz + ctx->tagsz);
if (out->data == NULL)
goto fail_malloc;
iv = out->data;
- ptr = out->data + IVSZ;
+ ptr = out->data + ctx->ivsz;
- if (random_buffer(iv, IVSZ) < 0)
- goto fail_iv;
+ if (random_buffer(iv, ctx->ivsz) < 0)
+ goto fail_encrypt;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx->evp_ctx);
- ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
+ ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ctx->cipher, NULL, ctx->key, iv);
if (ret != 1)
- goto fail_iv;
+ goto fail_encrypt;
- ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, in.data, in_sz);
+ ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, in.data, in_sz);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_encrypt;
out_sz = tmp_sz;
- ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz);
+ ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_encrypt;
out_sz += tmp_sz;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
+ /* For AEAD ciphers, get and append the authentication tag */
+ if (ctx->tagsz > 0) {
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->evp_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG,
+ ctx->tagsz, ptr + out_sz);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_encrypt;
+ out_sz += ctx->tagsz;
+ }
assert(out_sz >= in_sz);
- out->len = (size_t) out_sz + IVSZ;
+ out->len = (size_t) out_sz + ctx->ivsz;
return 0;
fail_encrypt:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- fail_iv:
free(out->data);
fail_malloc:
clrbuf(*out);
return -ECRYPT;
}
-int openssl_decrypt(void * ctx,
- uint8_t * key,
- buffer_t in,
- buffer_t * out)
+int openssl_decrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx,
+ buffer_t in,
+ buffer_t * out)
{
- uint8_t * ptr;
- uint8_t * iv;
- uint8_t * input;
- int ret;
- int out_sz;
- int in_sz;
- int tmp_sz;
-
- in_sz = (int) in.len - IVSZ;
- if (in_sz < 0)
+ uint8_t * ptr;
+ uint8_t * iv;
+ uint8_t * input;
+ int ret;
+ int out_sz;
+ int in_sz;
+ int tmp_sz;
+
+ assert(ctx != NULL);
+
+ in_sz = (int) in.len - ctx->ivsz;
+ if (in_sz < ctx->tagsz)
return -ECRYPT;
- out->data = malloc(in_sz);
+ in_sz -= ctx->tagsz;
+
+ out->data = malloc(in_sz + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH);
if (out->data == NULL)
goto fail_malloc;
iv = in.data;
ptr = out->data;
- input = in.data + IVSZ;
+ input = in.data + ctx->ivsz;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx->evp_ctx);
- ret = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv);
+ ret = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ctx->cipher, NULL, ctx->key, iv);
if (ret != 1)
- goto fail_decrypt_init;
+ goto fail_decrypt;
+
+ /* For AEAD ciphers, set the expected authentication tag */
+ if (ctx->tagsz > 0) {
+ uint8_t * tag = input + in_sz;
+ ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->evp_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG,
+ ctx->tagsz, tag);
+ if (ret != 1)
+ goto fail_decrypt;
+ }
- ret = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, input, in_sz);
+ ret = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, input, in_sz);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_decrypt;
out_sz = tmp_sz;
- ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz);
+ ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_decrypt;
@@ -313,22 +935,65 @@ int openssl_decrypt(void * ctx,
return 0;
fail_decrypt:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx);
- fail_decrypt_init:
free(out->data);
fail_malloc:
clrbuf(*out);
return -ECRYPT;
}
-void * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(void)
+struct ossl_crypt_ctx * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
- return (void *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx;
+
+ assert(sk != NULL);
+ assert(sk->key != NULL);
+
+ ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx));
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_malloc;
+
+ memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx));
+
+ ctx->key = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(SYMMKEYSZ);
+ if (ctx->key == NULL)
+ goto fail_key;
+
+ memcpy(ctx->key, sk->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ ctx->cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(sk->nid);
+ if (ctx->cipher == NULL)
+ goto fail_cipher;
+
+ ctx->ivsz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ctx->cipher);
+
+ /* Set tag size for AEAD ciphers (GCM, CCM, OCB, ChaCha20-Poly1305) */
+ if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
+ ctx->tagsz = 16; /* Standard AEAD tag length (128 bits) */
+
+ ctx->evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx->evp_ctx == NULL)
+ goto fail_cipher;
+
+ return ctx;
+
+ fail_cipher:
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ctx->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ fail_key:
+ free(ctx);
+ fail_malloc:
+ return NULL;
}
-void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(void * ctx)
+void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx)
{
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *) ctx);
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return;
+
+ if (ctx->key != NULL)
+ OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ctx->key, SYMMKEYSZ);
+
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->evp_ctx);
+ free(ctx);
}
/* AUTHENTICATION */
@@ -442,14 +1107,24 @@ int openssl_load_privkey_file(const char * path,
{
FILE * fp;
EVP_PKEY * pkey;
+ unsigned long err;
+ char errbuf[256];
fp = fopen(path, "r");
- if (fp == NULL)
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s\n", path);
goto fail_file;
+ }
pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, "");
- if (pkey == NULL)
+ if (pkey == NULL) {
+ err = ERR_get_error();
+ ERR_error_string_n(err, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf));
+ fprintf(stderr,
+ "OpenSSL error loading privkey from %s: %s\n",
+ path, errbuf);
goto fail_key;
+ }
fclose(fp);
@@ -518,6 +1193,48 @@ int openssl_load_pubkey_file(const char * path,
return -1;
}
+int openssl_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ FILE * fp;
+ EVP_PKEY * pkey;
+ int ret;
+
+ assert(path != NULL);
+ assert(buf != NULL);
+
+ memset(buf, 0, sizeof(*buf));
+
+ fp = fopen(path, "r");
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ goto fail_file;
+
+ pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ goto fail_key;
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ /* Extract public key bytes in DER format */
+ ret = get_pk_bytes_from_key(pkey, buf);
+
+ EVP_PKEY_free(pkey);
+
+ if (ret < 0)
+ goto fail_extract;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_extract:
+ clrbuf(*buf);
+ return -1;
+ fail_key:
+ fclose(fp);
+ fail_file:
+ clrbuf(*buf);
+ return -1;
+}
+
int openssl_load_pubkey_str(const char * str,
void ** key)
{
@@ -547,28 +1264,123 @@ int openssl_load_pubkey_str(const char * str,
return -1;
}
-int openssl_cmp_key(const void * key1,
- const void * key2)
+int openssl_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf)
+{
+ FILE * fp;
+ uint8_t tmp_buf[MSGBUFSZ];
+ size_t bytes_read;
+ const char * algo;
+
+ assert(path != NULL);
+ assert(buf != NULL);
+
+ fp = fopen(path, "rb");
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ goto fail_file;
+
+ bytes_read = fread(tmp_buf, 1, MSGBUFSZ, fp);
+ if (bytes_read == 0)
+ goto fail_read;
+
+ /* Validate that this is a known hybrid KEM format */
+ algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(bytes_read);
+ if (algo == NULL)
+ goto fail_read;
+
+ buf->data = malloc(bytes_read);
+ if (buf->data == NULL)
+ goto fail_malloc;
+
+ memcpy(buf->data, tmp_buf, bytes_read);
+ buf->len = bytes_read;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_malloc:
+ fail_read:
+ fclose(fp);
+ fail_file:
+ clrbuf(*buf);
+ return -1;
+}
+
+/* Determine hybrid KEM algorithm from raw private key length */
+static const char * __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_sk_len(size_t len)
+{
+ switch(len) {
+ case X25519MLKEM768_SKSZ:
+ return "X25519MLKEM768";
+ case X448MLKEM1024_SKSZ:
+ return "X448MLKEM1024";
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return NULL;
+}
+
+int openssl_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ void ** key)
{
- EVP_PKEY * pkey1;
- EVP_PKEY * pkey2;
+ FILE * fp;
+ uint8_t tmp_buf[4096];
+ size_t bytes_read;
+ const char * algo;
+ EVP_PKEY * pkey;
+
+ assert(path != NULL);
+ assert(key != NULL);
+
+ fp = fopen(path, "rb");
+ if (fp == NULL)
+ goto fail_file;
+
+ bytes_read = fread(tmp_buf, 1, sizeof(tmp_buf), fp);
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ if (bytes_read == 0)
+ goto fail_read;
+
+ /* Determine algorithm from key size */
+ algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_sk_len(bytes_read);
+ if (algo == NULL)
+ goto fail_read;
+
+ pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algo, NULL,
+ tmp_buf, bytes_read);
+ /* Clear sensitive data from stack */
+ OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, bytes_read);
+ if (pkey == NULL)
+ goto fail_read;
+
+ *key = (void *) pkey;
+
+ return 0;
+
+ fail_read:
+ fail_file:
+ *key = NULL;
+ return -1;
+}
+
+int openssl_cmp_key(const EVP_PKEY * key1,
+ const EVP_PKEY * key2)
+{
assert(key1 != NULL);
assert(key2 != NULL);
- pkey1 = (EVP_PKEY *) key1;
- pkey2 = (EVP_PKEY *) key2;
-
#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L
- return EVP_PKEY_eq(pkey1, pkey2) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
+ return EVP_PKEY_eq(key1, key2) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
#else
- return EVP_PKEY_cmp(pkey1, pkey2) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
+ return EVP_PKEY_cmp(key1, key2) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
#endif
}
-void openssl_free_key(void * key)
+void openssl_free_key(EVP_PKEY * key)
{
- EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *) key);
+ EVP_PKEY_free(key);
}
int openssl_check_crt_name(void * crt,
@@ -600,6 +1412,41 @@ int openssl_check_crt_name(void * crt,
return -1;
}
+int openssl_get_crt_name(void * crt,
+ char * name)
+{
+ char * subj;
+ char * cn;
+ char * end;
+ X509 * xcrt;
+
+ xcrt = (X509 *) crt;
+
+ subj = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(xcrt), NULL, 0);
+ if (subj == NULL)
+ goto fail_subj;
+
+ cn = strstr(subj, "CN=");
+ if (cn == NULL)
+ goto fail_cn;
+
+ cn += 3; /* Skip "CN=" */
+
+ /* Find end of CN (comma or slash for next field) */
+ end = strpbrk(cn, ",/");
+ if (end != NULL)
+ *end = '\0';
+
+ strcpy(name, cn);
+ free(subj);
+
+ return 0;
+ fail_cn:
+ free(subj);
+ fail_subj:
+ return -1;
+}
+
int openssl_crt_str(const void * crt,
char * str)
{
@@ -704,37 +1551,48 @@ int openssl_verify_crt(void * store,
return -1;
}
-int openssl_sign(void * pkp,
+static const EVP_MD * select_md(EVP_PKEY * pkey,
+ int nid)
+{
+ if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) < 0)
+ return NULL; /* Provider-based (PQC) */
+
+ if (nid == NID_undef)
+ return NULL; /* Classical requires explicit nid */
+
+ return EVP_get_digestbynid(nid);
+}
+
+int openssl_sign(EVP_PKEY * pkp,
+ int nid,
buffer_t msg,
buffer_t * sig)
{
- EVP_PKEY * pkey;
- EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx;
- size_t required;
+ EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx;
+ const EVP_MD * md;
+ size_t required;
assert(pkp != NULL);
assert(sig != NULL);
- pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) pkp;
-
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (!mdctx)
goto fail_ctx;
- if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1)
- goto fail_digest;
+ md = select_md(pkp, nid);
- if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, msg.data, msg.len) != 1)
+ if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkp) != 1)
goto fail_digest;
- if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, NULL, &required) != 1)
+ /* Get required signature buffer size */
+ if (EVP_DigestSign(mdctx, NULL, &required, msg.data, msg.len) != 1)
goto fail_digest;
sig->data = malloc(required);
if (sig->data == NULL)
goto fail_digest;
- if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, sig->data, &required) != 1)
+ if (EVP_DigestSign(mdctx, sig->data, &required, msg.data, msg.len) != 1)
goto fail_sign;
sig->len = required;
@@ -751,29 +1609,27 @@ int openssl_sign(void * pkp,
return -1;
}
-int openssl_verify_sig(void * pk,
- buffer_t msg,
- buffer_t sig)
+int openssl_verify_sig(EVP_PKEY * pk,
+ int nid,
+ buffer_t msg,
+ buffer_t sig)
{
- EVP_PKEY * pkey;
- EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx;
- int ret;
+ EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx;
+ const EVP_MD * md;
+ int ret;
assert(pk != NULL);
- pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) pk;
-
mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (!mdctx)
goto fail_ctx;
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1)
- goto fail_digest;
+ md = select_md(pk, nid);
- if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mdctx, msg.data, msg.len) != 1)
+ if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pk) != 1)
goto fail_digest;
- ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mdctx, sig.data, sig.len);
+ ret = EVP_DigestVerify(mdctx, sig.data, sig.len, msg.data, msg.len);
if (ret != 1)
goto fail_digest;
@@ -786,3 +1642,55 @@ int openssl_verify_sig(void * pk,
clrbuf(sig);
return -1;
}
+
+ssize_t openssl_md_digest(int nid,
+ buffer_t in,
+ uint8_t * out)
+{
+ const EVP_MD * md;
+ unsigned int len;
+
+ assert(in.data != NULL);
+ assert(out != NULL);
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ if (EVP_Digest(in.data, in.len, out, &len, md, NULL) != 1)
+ return -1;
+
+ return (ssize_t) len;
+}
+
+ssize_t openssl_md_len(int nid)
+{
+ const EVP_MD * md;
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid);
+ if (md == NULL)
+ return -1;
+
+ return (ssize_t) EVP_MD_get_size(md);
+}
+
+int openssl_secure_malloc_init(size_t max,
+ size_t guard)
+{
+ return CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(max, guard) == 1 ? 0 : -1;
+}
+
+void openssl_secure_malloc_fini(void)
+{
+ CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done();
+}
+
+void * openssl_secure_malloc(size_t size)
+{
+ return OPENSSL_secure_malloc(size);
+}
+
+void openssl_secure_free(void * ptr)
+{
+ OPENSSL_secure_free(ptr);
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h
index d4ee73b9..c28d0b4d 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h
+++ b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h
@@ -26,28 +26,52 @@
#ifndef OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_OPENSSL_H
#define OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_OPENSSL_H
-ssize_t openssl_ecdh_pkp_create(void ** pkp,
- uint8_t * pk);
+struct ossl_crypt_ctx;
-void openssl_ecdh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp);
+ssize_t openssl_pkp_create(const char * algo,
+ EVP_PKEY ** pkp,
+ uint8_t * pk);
-int openssl_ecdh_derive(void * pkp,
- buffer_t pk,
- uint8_t * s);
+void openssl_pkp_destroy(EVP_PKEY * pkp);
-int openssl_encrypt(void * ctx,
- uint8_t * key,
- buffer_t in,
- buffer_t * out);
+int openssl_dhe_derive(EVP_PKEY * pkp,
+ buffer_t pk,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
-int openssl_decrypt(void * ctx,
- uint8_t * key,
- buffer_t in,
- buffer_t * out);
+ssize_t openssl_kem_encap(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
-void * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(void);
+/* no X509 DER support yet for DHKEM public keys */
+ssize_t openssl_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ uint8_t * ct,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
-void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(void * ctx);
+int openssl_kem_decap(EVP_PKEY * priv,
+ buffer_t ct,
+ int kdf_nid,
+ uint8_t * s);
+
+int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo);
+
+int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk,
+ char * algo);
+
+int openssl_encrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx,
+ buffer_t in,
+ buffer_t * out);
+
+int openssl_decrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx,
+ buffer_t in,
+ buffer_t * out);
+
+struct ossl_crypt_ctx * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk);
+
+void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx);
/* AUTHENTICATION */
@@ -76,15 +100,25 @@ int openssl_load_pubkey_file(const char * path,
int openssl_load_pubkey_str(const char * str,
void ** key);
+int openssl_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf);
+int openssl_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ buffer_t * buf);
+
+int openssl_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path,
+ void ** key);
-int openssl_cmp_key(const void * key1,
- const void * key2);
+int openssl_cmp_key(const EVP_PKEY * key1,
+ const EVP_PKEY * key2);
-void openssl_free_key(void * key);
+void openssl_free_key(EVP_PKEY * key);
int openssl_check_crt_name(void * crt,
const char * name);
+int openssl_get_crt_name(void * crt,
+ char * name);
+
int openssl_crt_str(const void * crt,
char * str);
@@ -101,12 +135,31 @@ int openssl_auth_add_crt_to_store(void * store,
int openssl_verify_crt(void * store,
void * crt);
-int openssl_sign(void * pkp,
+int openssl_sign(EVP_PKEY * pkp,
+ int md_nid,
buffer_t msg,
buffer_t * sig);
-int openssl_verify_sig(void * pk,
- buffer_t msg,
- buffer_t sig);
+int openssl_verify_sig(EVP_PKEY * pk,
+ int md_nid,
+ buffer_t msg,
+ buffer_t sig);
+
+ssize_t openssl_md_digest(int md_nid,
+ buffer_t in,
+ uint8_t * out);
+
+ssize_t openssl_md_len(int md_nid);
+
+/* Secure memory allocation */
+int openssl_secure_malloc_init(size_t max,
+ size_t guard);
+
+void openssl_secure_malloc_fini(void);
+
+void * openssl_secure_malloc(size_t size);
+
+void openssl_secure_free(void * ptr,
+ size_t size);
#endif /* OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_OPENSSL_H */
diff --git a/src/lib/dev.c b/src/lib/dev.c
index cb483aca..2c0dbf28 100644
--- a/src/lib/dev.c
+++ b/src/lib/dev.c
@@ -502,8 +502,10 @@ static void flow_fini(int fd)
pthread_rwlock_unlock(&ai.lock);
}
+#define IS_ENCRYPTED(crypt) ((crypt)->nid != NID_undef)
+#define IS_ORDERED(flow) (flow.qs.in_order != 0)
static int flow_init(struct flow_info * info,
- buffer_t * sk)
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
struct timespec now;
struct flow * flow;
@@ -542,16 +544,15 @@ static int flow_init(struct flow_info * info,
flow->rcv_act = now;
flow->crypt = NULL;
- if (sk!= NULL && sk->data != NULL) {
- assert(sk->len == SYMMKEYSZ);
- flow->crypt = crypt_create_ctx(sk->data);
+ if (IS_ENCRYPTED(sk)) {
+ flow->crypt = crypt_create_ctx(sk);
if (flow->crypt == NULL)
goto fail_crypt;
}
assert(flow->frcti == NULL);
- if (info->qs.in_order != 0) {
+ if (IS_ORDERED(flow->info)) {
flow->frcti = frcti_create(fd, DELT_A, DELT_R, info->mpl);
if (flow->frcti == NULL)
goto fail_frcti;
@@ -708,6 +709,11 @@ static void init(int argc,
goto fail_timerwheel;
}
+ if (crypt_secure_malloc_init(PROC_SECMEM_MAX) < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: Could not init secure malloc.\n");
+ goto fail_timerwheel;
+ }
+
#if defined PROC_FLOW_STATS
if (strstr(argv[0], "ipcpd") == NULL) {
sprintf(procstr, "proc.%d", getpid());
@@ -823,12 +829,13 @@ __attribute__((section(FINI_SECTION))) __typeof__(fini) * __fini = fini;
int flow_accept(qosspec_t * qs,
const struct timespec * timeo)
{
- struct flow_info flow;
- uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
- buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
- buffer_t sk;
- int fd;
- int err;
+ struct flow_info flow;
+ struct crypt_sk crypt;
+ uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
+ buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
+ uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int fd;
+ int err;
#ifdef QOS_DISABLE_CRC
if (qs != NULL)
@@ -846,13 +853,15 @@ int flow_accept(qosspec_t * qs,
if (err < 0)
return err;
- err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &sk);
+ crypt.key = key;
+
+ err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- fd = flow_init(&flow, &sk);
+ fd = flow_init(&flow, &crypt);
- freebuf(sk);
+ explicit_bzero(key, SYMMKEYSZ);
if (qs != NULL)
*qs = flow.qs;
@@ -864,12 +873,13 @@ int flow_alloc(const char * dst,
qosspec_t * qs,
const struct timespec * timeo)
{
- struct flow_info flow;
- uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
- buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
- buffer_t sk; /* symmetric key */
- int fd;
- int err;
+ struct flow_info flow;
+ struct crypt_sk crypt;
+ uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
+ buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
+ uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int fd;
+ int err;
#ifdef QOS_DISABLE_CRC
if (qs != NULL)
@@ -890,13 +900,15 @@ int flow_alloc(const char * dst,
return err;
}
- err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &sk);
+ crypt.key = key;
+
+ err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- fd = flow_init(&flow, &sk);
+ fd = flow_init(&flow, &crypt);
- freebuf(sk);
+ explicit_bzero(key, SYMMKEYSZ);
if (qs != NULL)
*qs = flow.qs;
@@ -907,11 +919,13 @@ int flow_alloc(const char * dst,
int flow_join(const char * dst,
const struct timespec * timeo)
{
- struct flow_info flow;
- uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
- buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
- int fd;
- int err;
+ struct flow_info flow;
+ struct crypt_sk crypt;
+ uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
+ buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
+ uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int fd;
+ int err;
memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow));
@@ -925,11 +939,15 @@ int flow_join(const char * dst,
if (err < 0)
return err;
- err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, NULL);
+ crypt.key = key;
+
+ err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt);
if (err < 0)
return err;
- fd = flow_init(&flow, NULL);
+ fd = flow_init(&flow, &crypt);
+
+ explicit_bzero(key, SYMMKEYSZ);
return fd;
}
@@ -1785,7 +1803,8 @@ ssize_t fevent(struct flow_set * set,
int np1_flow_alloc(pid_t n_pid,
int flow_id)
{
- struct flow_info flow;
+ struct flow_info flow;
+ struct crypt_sk crypt = { .nid = NID_undef, .key = NULL };
memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow));
@@ -1795,7 +1814,7 @@ int np1_flow_alloc(pid_t n_pid,
flow.mpl = 0;
flow.n_1_pid = n_pid; /* This "flow" is upside-down! */
- return flow_init(&flow, NULL);
+ return flow_init(&flow, &crypt);
}
int np1_flow_dealloc(int flow_id,
@@ -1859,9 +1878,11 @@ int ipcp_flow_req_arr(const buffer_t * dst,
const buffer_t * data)
{
struct flow_info flow;
- uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
- buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
- int err;
+ uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE];
+ buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf};
+ struct crypt_sk crypt;
+ uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int err;
memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow));
@@ -1878,17 +1899,23 @@ int ipcp_flow_req_arr(const buffer_t * dst,
if (err < 0)
return err;
- err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, NULL);
+ crypt.key = key;
+
+ err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt);
if (err < 0)
return err;
+ assert(crypt.nid == NID_undef); /* np1 flows are not encrypted */
+
/* inverted for np1_flow */
flow.n_1_pid = flow.n_pid;
flow.n_pid = getpid();
flow.mpl = 0;
flow.qs = qos_np1;
- return flow_init(&flow, NULL);
+ crypt.nid = NID_undef;
+
+ return flow_init(&flow, &crypt);
}
int ipcp_flow_alloc_reply(int fd,
diff --git a/src/lib/pb/irm.proto b/src/lib/pb/irm.proto
index 75f5f350..5d0ee611 100644
--- a/src/lib/pb/irm.proto
+++ b/src/lib/pb/irm.proto
@@ -91,8 +91,9 @@ message irm_msg {
optional sint32 mpl = 20;
optional string comp = 21;
optional bytes pk = 22; /* piggyback */
- optional bytes symmkey = 23;
- optional uint32 timeo_sec = 24;
- optional uint32 timeo_nsec = 25;
- optional sint32 result = 26;
+ optional uint32 timeo_sec = 23;
+ optional uint32 timeo_nsec = 24;
+ optional sint32 result = 25;
+ optional bytes sym_key = 26; /* symmetric encryption key */
+ optional sint32 cipher_nid = 27; /* cipher NID */
}
diff --git a/src/lib/protobuf.c b/src/lib/protobuf.c
index 6df4e810..bd6c179e 100644
--- a/src/lib/protobuf.c
+++ b/src/lib/protobuf.c
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#define _DEFAULT_SOURCE
#include <ouroboros/protobuf.h>
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -96,6 +97,8 @@ struct flow_info flow_info_msg_to_s(const flow_info_msg_t * msg)
assert(msg != NULL);
+ memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s));
+
s.id = msg->id;
s.n_pid = msg->n_pid;
s.n_1_pid = msg->n_1_pid;
diff --git a/src/lib/serdes-irm.c b/src/lib/serdes-irm.c
index 3aea0617..a0fdbec2 100644
--- a/src/lib/serdes-irm.c
+++ b/src/lib/serdes-irm.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include "config.h"
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/errno.h>
#include <ouroboros/serdes-irm.h>
#include <ouroboros/protobuf.h>
@@ -133,16 +134,13 @@ int flow_join__irm_req_ser(buffer_t * buf,
IRM_MSG_CODE__IRM_FLOW_JOIN);
}
-int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf,
- struct flow_info * flow,
- buffer_t * sk)
+int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf,
+ struct flow_info * flow,
+ struct crypt_sk * sk)
{
irm_msg_t * msg;
int err;
- if (sk != NULL)
- sk->data = NULL;
-
msg = irm_msg__unpack(NULL, buf->len, buf->data);
if (msg == NULL) {
err = -EIRMD;
@@ -166,13 +164,15 @@ int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf,
*flow = flow_info_msg_to_s(msg->flow_info);
- if (sk != NULL) {
- sk->len = msg->symmkey.len;
- sk->data = msg->symmkey.data;
+ if (msg->has_cipher_nid)
+ sk->nid = msg->cipher_nid;
+ else
+ sk->nid = NID_undef;
- msg->symmkey.data = NULL;
- msg->symmkey.len = 0;
- }
+ if (msg->sym_key.len == SYMMKEYSZ)
+ memcpy(sk->key, msg->sym_key.data, SYMMKEYSZ);
+ else
+ memset(sk->key, 0, SYMMKEYSZ);
irm_msg__free_unpacked(msg, NULL);
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt
index 69fdf18b..6ab69bd1 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
get_filename_component(PARENT_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR} DIRECTORY)
get_filename_component(PARENT_DIR ${PARENT_PATH} NAME)
+compute_test_prefix()
+
create_test_sourcelist(${PARENT_DIR}_tests test_suite.c
# Add new tests here
auth_test.c
+ auth_test_pqc.c
bitmap_test.c
btree_test.c
crc32_test.c
crypt_test.c
hash_test.c
+ kex_test.c
+ kex_test_pqc.c
md5_test.c
sha3_test.c
shm_rbuff_test.c
@@ -33,8 +38,11 @@ endif()
foreach (test ${tests_to_run})
get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE)
- add_test(${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
+ add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name})
endforeach (test)
-set_property(TEST auth_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
-set_property(TEST crypt_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/auth_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/auth_test_pqc PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/crypt_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/kex_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
+set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/kex_test_pqc PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1)
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c b/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c
index 896c42b0..16c88f31 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c
+++ b/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c
@@ -22,111 +22,14 @@
#include "config.h"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/random.h>
#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
-#define TEST_MSG_SIZE 1500
+#include <test/certs.h>
-/*
-* Certificates created following the guide
-* Building an openssl certificate authority
-* on
-* https://community.f5.com/kb/technicalarticles/
-*/
-
-/* Root certificate for CA ca.unittest.o7s */
-static const char * root_ca_crt = \
-"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
-"MIICXTCCAgOgAwIBAgIURlENlCOy1OsA/AXFscPUQ2li8OYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
-"fDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAKBgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAK\n"
-"BgNVBAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UECwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51\n"
-"bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWASAwHhcNMjUwODAzMTg1MzE1WhcN\n"
-"NDUwNzI5MTg1MzE1WjB8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQ4wDAYD\n"
-"VQQHDAVHaGVudDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n"
-"GDAWBgNVBAMMD2NhLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEQMA4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYBIDBZMBMG\n"
-"ByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEPMseCScbd/d5TlHmyYVszn/YGVeNdUCnFR\n"
-"naOr95WlTNo3MyKKBuoiEFwHhjPASgXr/VDVjJLSyM3JUPebAcGjYzBhMB0GA1Ud\n"
-"DgQWBBQkxjMILHH6lZ+rnCMnD/63GO3y1zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQkxjMILHH6lZ+r\n"
-"nCMnD/63GO3y1zAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBhjAKBggq\n"
-"hkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiEA1jVJWW4idkCgAYv0m2LT9C33Dq42aLyRkJ+9YdzDqLwC\n"
-"IHT6MS4I0k52YP/hxoqWVBbpOW79PKYMRLyXTk1r7+Fa\n"
-"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-
-
-/* Certificate for intermediary im.unittest.o7s used for signing */
-static const char * intermediate_ca_crt = \
-"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
-"MIICbTCCAhOgAwIBAgICEAMwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwfDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n"
-"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAKBgNVBAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UE\n"
-"CwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkq\n"
-"hkiG9w0BCQEWASAwHhcNMjUwODAzMTkwMjU3WhcNNDUwNzI5MTkwMjU3WjBaMQsw\n"
-"CQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsM\n"
-"DHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEYMBYGA1UEAwwPaW0udW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMFkwEwYHKoZI\n"
-"zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEdlra08XItIPtVl5veaq4UF6LIcBXj2mZFqKNEXFh\n"
-"l9uAz6UAbIc+FUPNfom6dwKbg/AjQ82a100eh6K/jCY7eKOBpjCBozAdBgNVHQ4E\n"
-"FgQUy8Go8BIO6i0lJ+mgBr9lvh2L0eswHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUJMYzCCxx+pWfq5wj\n"
-"Jw/+txjt8tcwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYwEQYD\n"
-"VR0fBAowCDAGoASgAoYAMCoGCCsGAQUFBwEBBB4wHDAMBggrBgEFBQcwAoYAMAwG\n"
-"CCsGAQUFBzABhgAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAN3ZYhqu6mVLGidmONsbANk5\n"
-"rzT6aHJcmvj19OxMusaXAiBKy0gBFCri/GLizi4wZo09wf31yZMqfr8IrApvPaLw\n"
-"qA==\n"
-"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-
-/* Server test-1.unittest.o7s private-public key pair */
-static const char * server_ec_pkp = \
-"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
-"MHcCAQEEIA4/bcmquVvGrY4+TtfnFSy1SpXs896r5xJjGuD6NmGRoAoGCCqGSM49\n"
-"AwEHoUQDQgAE4BSOhv36q4bCMLSkJaCvzwZ3pPy2M0YzRKFKeV48tG5eD+MBaTrT\n"
-"eoHUcRfpz0EO/inq3FVDzEoAQ2NWpnz0kA==\n"
-"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n";
-
-/* Public key for the Private key */
-static const char * server_ec_pk = \
-"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
-"MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE4BSOhv36q4bCMLSkJaCvzwZ3pPy2\n"
-"M0YzRKFKeV48tG5eD+MBaTrTeoHUcRfpz0EO/inq3FVDzEoAQ2NWpnz0kA==\n"
-"-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n";
-
-/* Valid signed server certificate for test-1.unittest.o7s */
-#define SSC_TEXT_SIZE 2295 /* size of cleartext certificate */
-static const char * signed_server_crt = \
-"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
-"MIIDiTCCAy+gAwIBAgICEAUwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwWjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n"
-"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n"
-"GDAWBgNVBAMMD2ltLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNTA4MDgxODQ4NTNaFw00NTA4\n"
-"MDMxODQ4NTNaMG4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMQwwCgYDVQQIDANPVkwxDjAMBgNVBAcM\n"
-"BUdoZW50MQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsMDHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEcMBoG\n"
-"A1UEAwwTdGVzdC0xLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEH\n"
-"A0IABOAUjob9+quGwjC0pCWgr88Gd6T8tjNGM0ShSnlePLRuXg/jAWk603qB1HEX\n"
-"6c9BDv4p6txVQ8xKAENjVqZ89JCjggHPMIIByzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBEGCWCGSAGG\n"
-"+EIBAQQEAwIGQDA4BglghkgBhvhCAQ0EKxYpbzdzIHVuaXR0ZXN0IEdlbmVyYXRl\n"
-"ZCBTZXJ2ZXIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFI+htsK0xxy6e1CqCyxn7mqi\n"
-"wRrpMIGoBgNVHSMEgaAwgZ2AFMvBqPASDuotJSfpoAa/Zb4di9HroYGApH4wfDEL\n"
-"MAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAKBgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAKBgNV\n"
-"BAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UECwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51bml0\n"
-"dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWASCCAhADMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAT\n"
-"BgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAoBgNVHR8EITAfMB2gG6AZhhdodHRwczovL291\n"
-"cm9ib3Jvcy5yb2NrczBYBggrBgEFBQcBAQRMMEowIwYIKwYBBQUHMAKGF2h0dHBz\n"
-"Oi8vb3Vyb2Jvcm9zLnJvY2tzMCMGCCsGAQUFBzABhhdodHRwczovL291cm9ib3Jv\n"
-"cy5yb2NrczAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiBZuw/Yb2pq925H7pEiOXr4fMo0wknz\n"
-"ktkxoHAFbjQEPQIhAMInHI7lvRmS0IMw1wBF/WlUZWKvhyU/TeMIZfk/JGCS\n"
-"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
-
-/* Self-signed by server test-1.unittest.o7s using its key */
-static const char * server_crt = \
-"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n"
-"MIIBfjCCASWgAwIBAgIUB5VYxp7i+sgYjvLiwfpf0W5NfqQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n"
-"HjEcMBoGA1UEAwwTdGVzdC0xLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNTA4MDMxOTI4MzVa\n"
-"Fw00NTA3MjkxOTI4MzVaMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMME3Rlc3QtMS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mw\n"
-"WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATgFI6G/fqrhsIwtKQloK/PBnek/LYz\n"
-"RjNEoUp5Xjy0bl4P4wFpOtN6gdRxF+nPQQ7+KercVUPMSgBDY1amfPSQo0EwPzAe\n"
-"BgNVHREEFzAVghN0ZXN0LTEudW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSPobbCtMcc\n"
-"untQqgssZ+5qosEa6TAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiAoFC/rqgrRXmMUx4y5cPbv\n"
-"jOKpoL3FpehRgGkPatmL/QIgMRHc2TSGo6q1SG22Xt1dHAIBsaN2AlSfhjKULMH5\n"
-"gRo=\n"
-"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n";
+#define TEST_MSG_SIZE 1500
static int test_auth_create_destroy_ctx(void)
{
@@ -156,7 +59,7 @@ static int test_load_free_crt(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt, &crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load certificate string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
@@ -178,7 +81,7 @@ static int test_crypt_get_pubkey_crt(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load server certificate from string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
@@ -208,7 +111,7 @@ static int test_check_crt_name(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load certificate from string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
@@ -241,7 +144,7 @@ static int test_load_free_privkey(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_ec_pkp, &key) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, &key) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
@@ -262,7 +165,7 @@ static int test_load_free_pubkey(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &key) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &key) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load server public key from string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
@@ -285,12 +188,12 @@ static int test_crypt_check_pubkey_crt(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load public certificate from string.\n");
goto fail_crt;
}
- if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &pk) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &pk) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load public key from string.\n");
goto fail_pubkey;
}
@@ -337,7 +240,7 @@ static int test_store_add(void)
goto fail_create;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ec, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
@@ -369,7 +272,7 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void)
void * _server_crt;
void * _signed_server_crt;
void * _root_ca_crt;
- void * _intermediate_ca_crt;
+ void * _im_ca_crt;
TEST_START();
@@ -379,24 +282,24 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void)
goto fail_create_ctx;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(server_crt, &_server_crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(server_crt_ec, &_server_crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load self-signed crt from string.\n");
goto fail_load_server_crt;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &_signed_server_crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &_signed_server_crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load signed crt from string.\n");
goto fail_load_signed_server_crt;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ec, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n");
goto fail_load_root_ca_crt;
}
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(intermediate_ca_crt, &_intermediate_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(im_ca_crt_ec, &_im_ca_crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load intermediate crt from string.\n");
- goto fail_load_intermediate_ca_crt;
+ goto fail_load_im_ca_crt;
}
if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _root_ca_crt) < 0) {
@@ -404,7 +307,7 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void)
goto fail_verify;
}
- if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _intermediate_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _im_ca_crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to add intermediate ca crt to auth store.\n");
goto fail_verify;
}
@@ -419,7 +322,7 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void)
goto fail_verify;
}
- crypt_free_crt(_intermediate_ca_crt);
+ crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt);
crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt);
crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt);
crypt_free_crt(_server_crt);
@@ -430,8 +333,8 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void)
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_verify:
- crypt_free_crt(_intermediate_ca_crt);
- fail_load_intermediate_ca_crt:
+ crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt);
+ fail_load_im_ca_crt:
crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt);
fail_load_root_ca_crt:
crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt);
@@ -462,22 +365,22 @@ int test_auth_sign(void)
goto fail_init;
}
- if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_ec_pkp, &pkp) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, &pkp) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n");
goto fail_init;
}
- if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &pk) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &pk) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load public key.\n");
goto fail_pubkey;
}
- if (auth_sign(pkp, msg, &sig) < 0) {
+ if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) {
printf("Failed to sign message.\n");
goto fail_sign;
}
- if (auth_verify_sig(pk, msg, sig) < 0) {
+ if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, sig) < 0) {
printf("Failed to verify signature.\n");
goto fail_verify;
}
@@ -519,17 +422,17 @@ int test_auth_bad_signature(void)
goto fail_init;
}
- if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_ec_pkp, &pkp) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, &pkp) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n");
goto fail_init;
}
- if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &pk) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &pk) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load public key.\n");
goto fail_pubkey;
}
- if (auth_sign(pkp, msg, &sig) < 0) {
+ if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) {
printf("Failed to sign message.\n");
goto fail_sign;
}
@@ -546,7 +449,7 @@ int test_auth_bad_signature(void)
goto fail_malloc;
}
- if (auth_verify_sig(pk, msg, fake_sig) == 0) {
+ if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, fake_sig) == 0) {
printf("Failed to detect bad signature.\n");
goto fail_verify;
}
@@ -579,7 +482,7 @@ int test_crt_str(void)
TEST_START();
- if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) {
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) {
printf("Failed to load certificate from string.\n");
goto fail_load;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c b/src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..349636d2
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,356 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Test of the PQC authentication functions (ML-DSA-65)
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <test/test.h>
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+
+#include <test/certs_pqc.h>
+
+#define TEST_MSG_SIZE 1500
+
+static int test_auth_create_destroy_ctx(void)
+{
+ struct auth_ctx * ctx;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ ctx = auth_create_ctx();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to create auth context.\n");
+ goto fail_create;
+ }
+
+ auth_destroy_ctx(ctx);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_create:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_load_free_crt(void)
+{
+ void * crt;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ml, &crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_crt(crt);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_load:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_load_free_privkey(void)
+{
+ void * key;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, &key) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(key);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_load:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_load_free_pubkey(void)
+{
+ void * key;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ml, &key) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load server public key from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(key);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_load:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_verify_crt(void)
+{
+ struct auth_ctx * auth;
+ void * _server_crt;
+ void * _signed_server_crt;
+ void * _root_ca_crt;
+ void * _im_ca_crt;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ auth = auth_create_ctx();
+ if (auth == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to create auth context.\n");
+ goto fail_create_ctx;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(server_crt_ml, &_server_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load self-signed crt from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load_server_crt;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ml, &_signed_server_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load signed crt from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load_signed_server_crt;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ml, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load_root_ca_crt;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_crt_str(im_ca_crt_ml, &_im_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load intermediate crt from string.\n");
+ goto fail_load_im_ca_crt;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _root_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to add root ca crt to auth store.\n");
+ goto fail_verify;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _im_ca_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to add intermediate ca crt to auth store.\n");
+ goto fail_verify;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_verify_crt(auth, _signed_server_crt) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to verify signed crt with ca crt.\n");
+ goto fail_verify;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_verify_crt(auth, _server_crt) == 0) {
+ printf("Failed to detect untrusted crt.\n");
+ goto fail_verify;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt);
+ crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt);
+ crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt);
+ crypt_free_crt(_server_crt);
+
+ auth_destroy_ctx(auth);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_verify:
+ crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt);
+ fail_load_im_ca_crt:
+ crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt);
+ fail_load_root_ca_crt:
+ crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt);
+ fail_load_signed_server_crt:
+ crypt_free_crt(_server_crt);
+ fail_load_server_crt:
+ auth_destroy_ctx(auth);
+ fail_create_ctx:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_auth_sign(void)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[TEST_MSG_SIZE];
+ void * pkp;
+ void * pk;
+ buffer_t msg;
+ buffer_t sig;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ msg.data = buf;
+ msg.len = sizeof(buf);
+
+ if (random_buffer(msg.data, msg.len) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to generate random message.\n");
+ goto fail_init;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, &pkp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n");
+ goto fail_init;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ml, &pk) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load public key from string.\n");
+ goto fail_pubkey;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to sign message.\n");
+ goto fail_sign;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, sig) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to verify signature.\n");
+ goto fail_verify;
+ }
+
+ freebuf(sig);
+
+ crypt_free_key(pk);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_verify:
+ freebuf(sig);
+ fail_sign:
+ crypt_free_key(pk);
+ fail_pubkey:
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+ fail_init:
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_auth_bad_signature(void)
+{
+ uint8_t buf[TEST_MSG_SIZE];
+ void * pkp;
+ void * pk;
+ buffer_t msg;
+ buffer_t sig;
+ buffer_t fake_sig;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ msg.data = buf;
+ msg.len = sizeof(buf);
+
+ if (random_buffer(msg.data, msg.len) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to generate random message.\n");
+ goto fail_init;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, &pkp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n");
+ goto fail_init;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ml, &pk) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load public key from string.\n");
+ goto fail_pubkey;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to sign message.\n");
+ goto fail_sign;
+ }
+
+ fake_sig.data = malloc(sig.len);
+ if (fake_sig.data == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to allocate memory for fake signature.\n");
+ goto fail_malloc;
+ }
+
+ fake_sig.len = sig.len;
+ if (random_buffer(fake_sig.data, fake_sig.len) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to generate random fake signature.\n");
+ goto fail_malloc;
+ }
+
+ if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, fake_sig) == 0) {
+ printf("Failed to detect bad ML-DSA-65 signature.\n");
+ goto fail_verify;
+ }
+
+ freebuf(fake_sig);
+ freebuf(sig);
+
+ crypt_free_key(pk);
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_verify:
+ freebuf(fake_sig);
+ fail_malloc:
+ freebuf(sig);
+ fail_sign:
+ crypt_free_key(pk);
+ fail_pubkey:
+ crypt_free_key(pkp);
+ fail_init:
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int auth_test_pqc(int argc,
+ char ** argv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ (void) argc;
+ (void) argv;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
+ ret |= test_auth_create_destroy_ctx();
+ ret |= test_load_free_crt();
+ ret |= test_load_free_privkey();
+ ret |= test_load_free_pubkey();
+ ret |= test_verify_crt();
+ ret |= test_auth_sign();
+ ret |= test_auth_bad_signature();
+#else
+ (void) test_auth_create_destroy_ctx;
+ (void) test_load_free_crt;
+ (void) test_load_free_privkey;
+ (void) test_load_free_pubkey;
+ (void) test_verify_crt;
+ (void) test_auth_sign;
+ (void) test_auth_bad_signature;
+
+ ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c b/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c
index e7a09e8f..906059be 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c
+++ b/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c
@@ -22,45 +22,32 @@
#include "config.h"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
-#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
-#define TEST_PACKET_SIZE 1500
-
-static int test_crypt_create_destroy(void)
-{
- struct crypt_ctx * ctx;
-
- TEST_START();
-
- ctx = crypt_create_ctx(NULL);
- if (ctx == NULL) {
- printf("Failed to initialize cryptography.\n");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- crypt_destroy_ctx(ctx);
+#include <stdio.h>
- TEST_SUCCESS();
+#define TEST_PACKET_SIZE 1500
- return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
- fail:
- TEST_FAIL();
- return TEST_RC_FAIL;
-}
+extern const uint16_t crypt_supported_nids[];
+extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
-static int test_crypt_create_destroy_with_key(void)
+static int test_crypt_create_destroy(void)
{
struct crypt_ctx * ctx;
uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ struct crypt_sk sk = {
+ .nid = NID_aes_256_gcm,
+ .key = key
+ };
TEST_START();
memset(key, 0, sizeof(key));
- ctx = crypt_create_ctx(key);
+ ctx = crypt_create_ctx(&sk);
if (ctx == NULL) {
printf("Failed to initialize cryptography.\n");
goto fail;
@@ -76,100 +63,22 @@ static int test_crypt_create_destroy_with_key(void)
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
-static int test_crypt_dh_pkp_create_destroy(void)
-{
- void * pkp;
- uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ];
-
- TEST_START();
-
- if (crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp, buf) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to create DH PKP.");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp);
-
- TEST_SUCCESS();
-
- return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
- fail:
- TEST_FAIL();
- return TEST_RC_FAIL;
-}
-
-static int test_crypt_dh_derive(void)
-{
- void * pkp1;
- void * pkp2;
- buffer_t pk1;
- buffer_t pk2;
- ssize_t len;
- uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
- uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
- uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ];
- uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ];
-
- TEST_START();
-
- len = crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp1, buf1);
- if (len < 0) {
- printf("Failed to create first key pair.");
- goto fail_pkp1;
- }
-
- pk1.len = (size_t) len;
- pk1.data = buf1;
-
- len = crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp2, buf2);
- if (len < 0) {
- printf("Failed to create second key pair.");
- goto fail_pkp2;
- }
-
- pk2.len = (size_t) len;
- pk2.data = buf2;
-
- if (crypt_dh_derive(pkp1, pk2, s1) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to derive first key.");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (crypt_dh_derive(pkp2, pk1, s2) < 0) {
- printf("Failed to derive second key.");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
- printf("Derived keys do not match.");
- goto fail;
- }
-
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
-
- TEST_SUCCESS();
-
- return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
- fail:
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
- fail_pkp2:
- crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
- fail_pkp1:
- TEST_FAIL();
- return TEST_RC_FAIL;
-}
-
-int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void)
+static int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(int nid)
{
uint8_t pkt[TEST_PACKET_SIZE];
- uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
struct crypt_ctx * ctx;
+ uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ struct crypt_sk sk = {
+ .nid = NID_aes_256_gcm,
+ .key = key
+ };
buffer_t in;
buffer_t out;
buffer_t out2;
+ const char * cipher;
- TEST_START();
+ cipher = crypt_nid_to_str(nid);
+ TEST_START("(%s)", cipher);
if (random_buffer(key, sizeof(key)) < 0) {
printf("Failed to generate random key.\n");
@@ -181,7 +90,7 @@ int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void)
goto fail_init;
}
- ctx = crypt_create_ctx(key);
+ ctx = crypt_create_ctx(&sk);
if (ctx == NULL) {
printf("Failed to initialize cryptography.\n");
goto fail_init;
@@ -219,7 +128,7 @@ int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void)
freebuf(out2);
freebuf(out);
- TEST_SUCCESS();
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", cipher);
return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
fail_chk:
@@ -229,10 +138,122 @@ int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void)
fail_encrypt:
crypt_destroy_ctx(ctx);
fail_init:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", cipher);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_encrypt_decrypt_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; crypt_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++)
+ ret |= test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(crypt_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+
+static int test_cipher_nid_values(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ /* Loop over all supported ciphers and verify NIDs match OpenSSL's */
+ for (i = 0; crypt_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ uint16_t our_nid = crypt_supported_nids[i];
+ const char * str = crypt_nid_to_str(our_nid);
+ const EVP_CIPHER * cipher;
+ int openssl_nid;
+
+ if (str == NULL) {
+ printf("crypt_nid_to_str failed for NID %u\n", our_nid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(str);
+ if (cipher == NULL) {
+ printf("OpenSSL doesn't recognize cipher '%s'\n", str);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ openssl_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher);
+
+ if (our_nid != openssl_nid) {
+ printf("NID mismatch for '%s': ours=%u, OpenSSL=%d\n",
+ str, our_nid, openssl_nid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Test reverse conversion */
+ if (crypt_str_to_nid(str) != our_nid) {
+ printf("crypt_str_to_nid failed for '%s'\n", str);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Test error cases */
+ if (crypt_str_to_nid("invalid") != NID_undef) {
+ printf("crypt_str_to_nid: no NID_undef for invalid.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_nid_to_str(9999) != NULL) {
+ printf("crypt_nid_to_str should return NULL for invalid NID\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (crypt_str_to_nid(NULL) != NID_undef) {
+ printf("crypt_str_to_nid should return NID_undef for NULL\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
TEST_FAIL();
return TEST_RC_FAIL;
}
+static int test_md_nid_values(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ for (i = 0; md_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ uint16_t our_nid = md_supported_nids[i];
+ const EVP_MD * md;
+ int openssl_nid;
+
+ md = EVP_get_digestbynid(our_nid);
+ if (md == NULL) {
+ printf("OpenSSL doesn't recognize NID %u\n", our_nid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ openssl_nid = EVP_MD_nid(md);
+ if (our_nid != openssl_nid) {
+ printf("NID mismatch: ours=%u, OpenSSL=%d\n",
+ our_nid, openssl_nid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+#endif
+
int crypt_test(int argc,
char ** argv)
{
@@ -242,17 +263,10 @@ int crypt_test(int argc,
(void) argv;
ret |= test_crypt_create_destroy();
- ret |= test_crypt_create_destroy_with_key();
+ ret |= test_encrypt_decrypt_all();
#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
- ret |= test_crypt_dh_pkp_create_destroy();
- ret |= test_crypt_dh_derive();
- ret |= test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt();
-#else
- (void) test_crypt_dh_pkp_create_destroy;
- (void) test_crypt_dh_derive;
- (void) test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt;
-
- ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+ ret |= test_cipher_nid_values();
+ ret |= test_md_nid_values();
#endif
return ret;
}
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c b/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c
index 970d9185..fb428b47 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c
+++ b/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c
@@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
*/
#include <ouroboros/hash.h>
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <stdint.h>
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/kex_test.c b/src/lib/tests/kex_test.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..58cf8b43
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tests/kex_test.c
@@ -0,0 +1,844 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024
+ *
+ * Test of the key exchange functions
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <test/test.h>
+#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#endif
+
+/* Test configuration strings */
+#define KEX_CONFIG_CUSTOM \
+ "kex=X25519\n"
+
+#define KEX_CONFIG_NONE \
+ "none\n"
+
+#define KEX_CONFIG_WHITESPACE \
+ "# Comment line\n" \
+ "kex = X448" \
+ "\n" \
+ "# Another comment\n"
+
+#define KEX_CONFIG_CIPHER \
+ "kex=X25519\n" \
+ "cipher=chacha20-poly1305\n"
+
+#define KEX_CONFIG_DIGEST \
+ "kex=X25519\n" \
+ "digest=sha384\n"
+
+/* Test key material for key loading tests */
+#define X25519_PRIVKEY_PEM \
+ "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n" \
+ "MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VuBCIEIJDd3+/0k2IZlaH5sZ9Z2e5J8dV2U0nsXaSUm70ZaMhL\n" \
+ "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+
+#define X25519_PUBKEY_PEM \
+ "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" \
+ "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEAKYLIycSZtLFlwAX07YWWgBAYhEnRxHfgK1TVw9+mtBs=\n" \
+ "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+
+/* Helper macro to open string constant as FILE stream */
+#define FMEMOPEN_STR(str) fmemopen((void *) (str), strlen(str), "r")
+
+extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
+
+int parse_sec_config(struct sec_config * cfg,
+ FILE * fp);
+
+static int test_kex_create_destroy(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config cfg;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg));
+ cfg.x.nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1;
+ cfg.x.str = kex_nid_to_str(cfg.x.nid);
+ cfg.c.nid = NID_aes_256_gcm;
+ cfg.c.str = crypt_nid_to_str(cfg.c.nid);
+
+ if (cfg.x.nid == NID_undef || cfg.c.nid == NID_undef) {
+ printf("Failed to initialize kex config.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_dh_pkp_create_destroy(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp;
+ uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ];
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, "prime256v1");
+
+ if (kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create DH PKP.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_get_algo_from_pk(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp;
+ buffer_t pk;
+ ssize_t len;
+ uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ];
+ char extracted_algo[256];
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create key pair.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk.data = buf;
+
+ /* Use raw decode for hybrid KEMs, DER for others */
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) {
+ if (kex_get_algo_from_pk_raw(pk, extracted_algo) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to extract algo from pk.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+ } else {
+ if (kex_get_algo_from_pk_der(pk, extracted_algo) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to extract algo from pk.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* All algorithms should now return the specific group name */
+ if (strcmp(extracted_algo, algo) != 0) {
+ printf("Algo mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n",
+ algo, extracted_algo);
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_get_algo_from_pk_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+ ret |= test_kex_get_algo_from_pk(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_dhe_derive(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp1;
+ void * pkp2;
+ buffer_t pk1;
+ buffer_t pk2;
+ ssize_t len;
+ uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ];
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp1, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create first key pair for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk1.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk1.data = buf1;
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp2, buf2);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create second key pair for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp1;
+ }
+
+ pk2.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk2.data = buf2;
+
+ if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex, pkp1, pk2, s1) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to derive first key for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp2;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex, pkp2, pk1, s2) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to derive second key for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp2;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Derived keys do not match for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp2;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp2:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
+ fail_pkp1:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_validate_algo(void)
+{
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (kex_validate_algo("prime256v1") != 0) {
+ printf("prime256v1 should be valid.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_validate_algo("X25519") != 0) {
+ printf("X25519 should be valid.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
+ if (kex_validate_algo("ML-KEM-768") != 0) {
+ printf("ML-KEM-768 should be valid.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ if (kex_validate_algo("ffdhe2048") != 0) {
+ printf("ffdhe2048 should be valid.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_validate_algo("invalid_algo") == 0) {
+ printf("invalid_algo should be rejected.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_validate_algo("rsa2048") == 0) {
+ printf("rsa2048 should be rejected.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_validate_algo(NULL) == 0) {
+ printf("NULL should be rejected.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp;
+ buffer_t pk;
+ ssize_t len;
+ uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s[SYMMKEYSZ];
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create key pair.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk.data = buf;
+
+ /* Corrupt the public key */
+ buf[0] ^= 0xFF;
+ buf[len - 1] ^= 0xFF;
+
+ if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex, pkp, pk, s) == 0) {
+ printf("Should fail with corrupted public key.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex1;
+ struct sec_config kex2;
+ void * pkp1;
+ void * pkp2;
+ buffer_t pk2;
+ ssize_t len;
+ uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ const char * algo1 = "X25519";
+ const char * algo2 = "X448";
+
+ TEST_START("(%s vs %s)", algo1, algo2);
+
+ memset(&kex1, 0, sizeof(kex1));
+ memset(&kex2, 0, sizeof(kex2));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex1, algo1);
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex2, algo2);
+
+ if (kex_pkp_create(&kex1, &pkp1, buf1) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create first key pair.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex2, &pkp2, buf2);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create second key pair.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp1;
+ }
+
+ pk2.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk2.data = buf2;
+
+ /* Try to derive with mismatched algorithms */
+ if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex1, pkp1, pk2, s) == 0) {
+ printf("Should fail with mismatched algorithms.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp2;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s vs %s)", algo1, algo2);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp2:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
+ fail_pkp1:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s vs %s)", algo1, algo2);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_load_dhe_privkey(void)
+{
+ void * key;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(X25519_PRIVKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load X25519 private key.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(key);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_load_dhe_pubkey(void)
+{
+ void * key;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(X25519_PUBKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load X25519 public key.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(key);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/obj_mac.h>
+
+static int test_kex_nid_values(void)
+{
+ int i;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ /* Verify all KEX algorithm NIDs match OpenSSL's */
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ uint16_t our_nid = kex_supported_nids[i];
+ const char * kex_name;
+ int openssl_nid;
+
+ kex_name = kex_nid_to_str(our_nid);
+ if (kex_name == NULL) {
+ printf("kex_nid_to_str failed for NID %u\n", our_nid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Test reverse conversion */
+ if (kex_str_to_nid(kex_name) != our_nid) {
+ printf("kex_str_to_nid failed for '%s'\n", kex_name);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ /* Get OpenSSL's NID for this name */
+ openssl_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(kex_name);
+ if (openssl_nid != NID_undef) {
+ /* OpenSSL recognizes this algorithm */
+ if (our_nid != openssl_nid) {
+ printf("NID mismatch for '%s': "
+ "ours=%d, OpenSSL=%d\n",
+ kex_name, our_nid, openssl_nid);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ } else {
+ /* Verify no NID collision with different algorithm */
+ const char * ossl_name = OBJ_nid2sn(our_nid);
+ if (ossl_name != NULL &&
+ strcmp(ossl_name, kex_name) != 0) {
+ printf("NID collision for '%d': "
+ "ours=%s, OpenSSL=%s\n",
+ our_nid, kex_name, ossl_name);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ /* Test error cases */
+ if (kex_str_to_nid("invalid") != NID_undef) {
+ printf("kex_str_to_nid should return NID_undef for invalid\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_nid_to_str(9999) != NULL) {
+ printf("kex_nid_to_str should return NULL for invalid NID\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex_str_to_nid(NULL) != NID_undef) {
+ printf("kex_str_to_nid should return NID_undef for NULL\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+#endif
+
+static int test_kex_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ /* KEM tests are in kex_test_pqc.c */
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_dhe_derive(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ /* Test corruption for all DHE algorithms */
+ /* KEM error injection tests are in kex_test_pqc.c */
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_parse_config_empty(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ FILE * fp;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+
+ fp = FMEMOPEN_STR("");
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to parse empty config.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "prime256v1") != 0) {
+ printf("Empty config should use prime256v1.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_parse_config_custom(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ FILE * fp;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+
+ fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_CUSTOM);
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to parse custom config.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X25519") != 0) {
+ printf("Algorithm not set correctly.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_parse_config_none(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ FILE * fp;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+
+ fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_NONE);
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to parse 'none' config.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex.x.nid != NID_undef) {
+ printf("'none' keyword should disable encryption.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_parse_config_whitespace(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ FILE * fp;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+
+ fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_WHITESPACE);
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to parse config with comments.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X448") != 0) {
+ printf("Algorithm with whitespace not parsed correctly.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_parse_config_cipher(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ FILE * fp;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+
+ fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_CIPHER);
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to parse cipher config.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X25519") != 0) {
+ printf("Algorithm not set correctly.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex.c.nid != NID_chacha20_poly1305) {
+ printf("Cipher not set correctly.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_parse_config_digest(void)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ FILE * fp;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+
+ fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_DIGEST);
+ if (fp == NULL) {
+ printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to parse digest config.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X25519") != 0) {
+ printf("Algorithm not set correctly.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ if (kex.d.nid != NID_sha384) {
+ printf("Digest not set correctly.\n");
+ fclose(fp);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ fclose(fp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+int kex_test(int argc,
+ char ** argv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ (void) argc;
+ (void) argv;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_create_destroy();
+ ret |= test_kex_parse_config_empty();
+ ret |= test_kex_parse_config_none();
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+ ret |= test_kex_parse_config_custom();
+ ret |= test_kex_parse_config_whitespace();
+ ret |= test_kex_parse_config_cipher();
+ ret |= test_kex_parse_config_digest();
+ ret |= test_kex_nid_values();
+ ret |= test_kex_dh_pkp_create_destroy();
+ ret |= test_kex_all();
+ ret |= test_kex_validate_algo();
+ ret |= test_kex_get_algo_from_pk_all();
+ ret |= test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo();
+ ret |= test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey_all();
+ ret |= test_kex_load_dhe_privkey();
+ ret |= test_kex_load_dhe_pubkey();
+#else
+ (void) test_kex_parse_config_custom;
+ (void) test_kex_parse_config_whitespace;
+ (void) test_kex_parse_config_cipher;
+ (void) test_kex_parse_config_digest;
+ (void) test_kex_dh_pkp_create_destroy;
+ (void) test_kex_all;
+ (void) test_kex_validate_algo;
+ (void) test_kex_get_algo_from_pk_all;
+ (void) test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo();
+ (void) test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey_all;
+ (void) test_kex_load_dhe_privkey;
+ (void) test_kex_load_dhe_pubkey;
+
+ ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c b/src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..d4579eca
--- /dev/null
+++ b/src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c
@@ -0,0 +1,549 @@
+/*
+ * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026
+ *
+ * Test of the post-quantum key exchange functions
+ *
+ * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
+ * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
+ *
+ * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as
+ * published by the Free Software Foundation.
+ *
+ * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/.
+ */
+
+#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
+
+#include "config.h"
+
+#include <test/test.h>
+#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+#include <ouroboros/crypt.h>
+#include <ouroboros/random.h>
+
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <stdlib.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+#include <openssl/evp.h>
+#include <openssl/x509.h>
+#endif
+
+extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[];
+extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[];
+
+static int get_random_kdf(void)
+{
+ static int idx = 0;
+ int count;
+
+ if (md_supported_nids[0] == NID_undef)
+ return NID_undef;
+
+ for (count = 0; md_supported_nids[count] != NID_undef; count++)
+ ;
+
+ return md_supported_nids[(idx++) % count];
+}
+
+/* ML-KEM-768 test key material */
+
+#define MLKEM768_PRIVKEY_PEM \
+ "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n" \
+ "MIIJvgIBADALBglghkgBZQMEBAIEggmqMIIJpgRA+QIIiQLQkS5fl5RluSmgXRjZ\n" \
+ "YU16W4TVt0dmnBP41rLTTRT3S8CRtkb+xmoFAcWTfEzbdr5pp3g2CBRx+APXTwSC\n" \
+ "CWBll6AecTd1Kqdyix3zNQcthDBP0XnwdTHDqkKuFzMP58Y+0gc9Bo+W0xBOK2ZK\n" \
+ "gcAmix3YLJuDS8Teep/Tdc7KIm5AaLNoI8BIMgKC/ASsW8kC+78BV4OIgqNWurS9\n" \
+ "BrTiCmiag7c+6DsVDJHJ4kfcccwUDBKiW0v+LAkk1HXBcx6usrwuFC0H3ICli2sC\n" \
+ "o5DfGL7g4kWHhobXjAZnxn298C8FGmLQK5kah4nZiJ+MuHqrirziCGTLKkY1a8vC\n" \
+ "GFgzfHIcvB4dtyi9dxZmWpSXqDf2AVNgqrD2C7WQEULQOKxm/I8Mw31Yp8TC6SAP\n" \
+ "RzM4cBAXF00W4Rce05O0am/ga5dStAhikMESyckCoEGlPFFXOmjy1HmOasI+AbGk\n" \
+ "2BKp6cfbImbjd0ePdCSFEgIQwAQHm7+4UoZR2JmNwSI1AC2P4FMRAIaD2A69i6LC\n" \
+ "kFniGcOog5m09nw5FqZmeEfNs6yyFGSX16D1YyjuooAFGlU0FFX7aKwsYM8t1gkS\n" \
+ "YSUfMxIW9yzhSW4vZHuGyxlxBMr1y51RZrW8gnvW5p/Ip5yDBJRahY6KMWT15C14\n" \
+ "C2rIe8U+d4Xi5IMI3D1JNpwFebYhKs3/ManxoU7Fwwa0GzQrgLYU5KhqO8/hopnl\n" \
+ "8mQH+BPh+TR5lqYawS7HZXFJE8JzOnCtOSgB6Hz2U7oG9ik8h0FRqVD3ak20EmZU\n" \
+ "c7gpGW8Odc51uaIBzDu4ej4dGgwo4awYaX4ugLOutHqGqRfCjIVb6XQ4m35p4KKi\n" \
+ "qBVQ211aIhavUIgNECJ7WUETilXyyHLB9x3EFJdidEfSRUxLYJNAC5XM2WFCyhnE\n" \
+ "pKmossSNq6ZOqBjPegE0J6zfNg65dR/OlIdGVDgrVTIpwYAUzBMW2nTnCa00EmPj\n" \
+ "F7tRscHI8qb/QlnRVEUN+S+A2CtVIH1c666zOoRFRI9G4bmVoa8k2x0ANB51tCns\n" \
+ "vAYqkMybIgMvWwbqoAxeW0G1O3qObGXtgs94BzhAEM3RbG/hy3GR1qUNSk/qyDKc\n" \
+ "t1qpiaao0aLVsnpb28eBIk6+q0I82reGdV31OYvUpnVxRbRPFXEFs5PNS3s/7I8a\n" \
+ "SlSLUGOh+mhrUzDPSJCzgEvOmrwrRxe3F52tS0nAt6Z5zKToASHphoISUi7lGX1F\n" \
+ "Owx62qhSqqlI98bKqh7yQRZYrHXqE0bscAHCcIaZ8RVya42JHDCoQWyxqBuLOWEl\n" \
+ "+Fz6vI5DqEnJkA7ke49EvBAOJ58lxAXQIV5remtzYGPKdyG2oamiFHiLVQDzGX/l\n" \
+ "aFNMGXRWcK4/Y3mnkJvx9QGtq6KstQN/J4a51ZeX5YwNBcoY9UcFS6kHRW5rR3UM\n" \
+ "tEZj5VN8BL9nyWM9h7hUSHQboaxO7M5qswfXB8f21xR16T40Ki4nawx/6zHGCQsc\n" \
+ "uKr5SaCV88tghqJYHBorU5iKB5KsLDSHqYYrNo/Vy8W6kMA2jGAO24d4G32DSshR\n" \
+ "sEF9W1nuAHK/5ste01G5KmX2KhdZBE37oGhM98HRQ6hU8qwuKrhdV7vZis5C8LXY\n" \
+ "7MbDyDt1NnFqWFc6lYeVa6eRcmYzeAbXahrxwiiaLIdHXD95aZ/0S6+tKBGgQzwm\n" \
+ "ZsbwdXhl+n+yqDNE6Sow2bwueqhDwZVWoMCv5SK+HAGPtcZ7UU9oWrqpiL085m7F\n" \
+ "5G49KJUEZadVtj4Z9zrkeQkida+4I7v3Y3MzsWsGJww7YhTDJpsxxmSm85bHwx98\n" \
+ "hZXSqckJTL4c2nBzgrBlukIT9Wl+qItMthVvABPzp4wGZhdgKrEIRl3yCnhhUgpL\n" \
+ "lUxYegwWDMEjZxKlSbIyl5p9lCS8w2lsBzsQ2FJiAy/MWLa56aA+wFs3C8smZ6Cf\n" \
+ "p5NWa8Rm+k898GWBxZivhF03CBOZ42du0YUZdCPoA5V1KC6bh4JyWFI49VFbQFMG\n" \
+ "gwAqc0ErAH3iMammKC9746WWagnUIG3o8LygZrusuGeTohXJhVUTJDw2s0rzNhbw\n" \
+ "5IyookkY5BWENKFKTIgdBxvYelOKwbGE8Z36FEW0ABlmx7SRCKWlNVjSEAIXmMiQ\n" \
+ "VLdQF33QVYD9RR5chja254VuJH4plo+5JwiKWz8LlCIBm7CVkifZMLofmMk3s3L4\n" \
+ "sXtE+Bhfm5Plk3RrgDdlHH+hK7gk61XGdynGjDY7aLtCKZ0SMsVskSLom1pbIR5M\n" \
+ "KLYsQ1Pse4mhfDOFCkWFLI5TShGMuIoo1k7XeIE6g8QoUlV5EXyWHHhIVaE4yWGP\n" \
+ "AVgEp0UswKFeeo3SoCAeADA3U88ymxpBJp73yDIqok5dM3SgkjfPWZDkgkAI8WHs\n" \
+ "CKKeqrSOs1kkE3JXtE7kcTHT6XHo162TmgGkqMVwOQ3EmR6FRpYxJhZvuVbjJsSx\n" \
+ "YjW3ScnR4Zivoi7q95ypco331pIlIZpqV0NydUpMyQaz1cnoPKYDh1xa6LhcqEKK\n" \
+ "8a68iXjQgzgqQBDABonVybNDtlJ5lnTTuKhak8PBFAmmhj1JdrPqoIvQRCmLaark\n" \
+ "J7/q9RLtk6kTOJ0qtLe2qqwCxJwyoMd2Q5F4+xTWZHu90ljRdcnYewarqcKzoL27\n" \
+ "tcpTOmVz88I1hYVUJEV7aB36QMhTS1dquTqJZCD0hBPWAMToEoD4OFvKWmbFmzaW\n" \
+ "xrMc4ECYeDAAKYs2YqoXSLfAixBmZjb6UDB61l2GA58pFJW0ZwN8S5tApA2NRi+7\n" \
+ "oC/zgMgBGHft6E0+OUVb8It89pY1t7ybq5+fkBvEixDId3f1pK3gqcaYqG/YhoMJ\n" \
+ "MJWkqYxCNGmdZ8gFo46V6K+4xZUblQWKypN6+RYO4kDh0koppWGEULjgBoCH+V8E\n" \
+ "7GcoE8SRdQY1BIMoRVWb8Ur8ZYIVU8lqgaZPlWM3oRCiWk0kRxexFF0i5WlILIK9\n" \
+ "GT8saX+bmRd9KSy3JrpPhQn59CpJBRxz8WKdJ3wwtqE/2TbxQhLooEWHYVrZEG5E\n" \
+ "SkIoOkUAJUR+CzLLFDMdUE8w3CasE4ys+hco7AA5TAms24A1FXcxMgNb6VHA0bi5\n" \
+ "c8rPCZvjubLXR4A0/A2Ualo4cy3UAr9k0rbZOJnjqk8eExkeaxbyh42cJpU75i4O\n" \
+ "NLYsRZJkg9bkCpPgZKb707sPZO72CX3h/lQdXVgGkZ7Tqd1qzM+JOhSWvrYiBLa+\n" \
+ "5IKSmFwT+5sw1InEesXwRN09000U90vAkbZG/sZqBQHFk3xM23a+aad4NggUcfgD\n" \
+ "108=\n" \
+ "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n"
+
+#define MLKEM768_PUBKEY_PEM \
+ "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" \
+ "MIIEsjALBglghkgBZQMEBAIDggShAMPIO3U2cWpYVzqVh5Vrp5FyZjN4BtdqGvHC\n" \
+ "KJosh0dcP3lpn/RLr60oEaBDPCZmxvB1eGX6f7KoM0TpKjDZvC56qEPBlVagwK/l\n" \
+ "Ir4cAY+1xntRT2hauqmIvTzmbsXkbj0olQRlp1W2Phn3OuR5CSJ1r7gju/djczOx\n" \
+ "awYnDDtiFMMmmzHGZKbzlsfDH3yFldKpyQlMvhzacHOCsGW6QhP1aX6oi0y2FW8A\n" \
+ "E/OnjAZmF2AqsQhGXfIKeGFSCkuVTFh6DBYMwSNnEqVJsjKXmn2UJLzDaWwHOxDY\n" \
+ "UmIDL8xYtrnpoD7AWzcLyyZnoJ+nk1ZrxGb6Tz3wZYHFmK+EXTcIE5njZ27RhRl0\n" \
+ "I+gDlXUoLpuHgnJYUjj1UVtAUwaDACpzQSsAfeIxqaYoL3vjpZZqCdQgbejwvKBm\n" \
+ "u6y4Z5OiFcmFVRMkPDazSvM2FvDkjKiiSRjkFYQ0oUpMiB0HG9h6U4rBsYTxnfoU\n" \
+ "RbQAGWbHtJEIpaU1WNIQAheYyJBUt1AXfdBVgP1FHlyGNrbnhW4kfimWj7knCIpb\n" \
+ "PwuUIgGbsJWSJ9kwuh+YyTezcvixe0T4GF+bk+WTdGuAN2Ucf6EruCTrVcZ3KcaM\n" \
+ "Njtou0IpnRIyxWyRIuibWlshHkwotixDU+x7iaF8M4UKRYUsjlNKEYy4iijWTtd4\n" \
+ "gTqDxChSVXkRfJYceEhVoTjJYY8BWASnRSzAoV56jdKgIB4AMDdTzzKbGkEmnvfI\n" \
+ "MiqiTl0zdKCSN89ZkOSCQAjxYewIop6qtI6zWSQTcle0TuRxMdPpcejXrZOaAaSo\n" \
+ "xXA5DcSZHoVGljEmFm+5VuMmxLFiNbdJydHhmK+iLur3nKlyjffWkiUhmmpXQ3J1\n" \
+ "SkzJBrPVyeg8pgOHXFrouFyoQorxrryJeNCDOCpAEMAGidXJs0O2UnmWdNO4qFqT\n" \
+ "w8EUCaaGPUl2s+qgi9BEKYtpquQnv+r1Eu2TqRM4nSq0t7aqrALEnDKgx3ZDkXj7\n" \
+ "FNZke73SWNF1ydh7BqupwrOgvbu1ylM6ZXPzwjWFhVQkRXtoHfpAyFNLV2q5Oolk\n" \
+ "IPSEE9YAxOgSgPg4W8paZsWbNpbGsxzgQJh4MAApizZiqhdIt8CLEGZmNvpQMHrW\n" \
+ "XYYDnykUlbRnA3xLm0CkDY1GL7ugL/OAyAEYd+3oTT45RVvwi3z2ljW3vJurn5+Q\n" \
+ "G8SLEMh3d/WkreCpxpiob9iGgwkwlaSpjEI0aZ1nyAWjjpXor7jFlRuVBYrKk3r5\n" \
+ "Fg7iQOHSSimlYYRQuOAGgIf5XwTsZygTxJF1BjUEgyhFVZvxSvxlghVTyWqBpk+V\n" \
+ "YzehEKJaTSRHF7EUXSLlaUgsgr0ZPyxpf5uZF30pLLcmuk+FCfn0KkkFHHPxYp0n\n" \
+ "fDC2oT/ZNvFCEuigRYdhWtkQbkRKQig6RQAlRH4LMssUMx1QTzDcJqwTjKz6Fyjs\n" \
+ "ADlMCazbgDUVdzEyA1vpUcDRuLlzys8Jm+O5stdHgDT8DZRqWjhzLdQCv2TSttk4\n" \
+ "meOqTx4TGR5rFvKHjZwmlTvmLg40tixFkmSD1uQKk+BkpvvTuw9k7vYJfeH+VB1d\n" \
+ "WAaRntOp\n" \
+ "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"
+
+/* Helper macro to open string constant as FILE stream */
+#define FMEMOPEN_STR(str) fmemopen((void *) (str), strlen(str), "r")
+
+static int test_kex_load_kem_privkey(void)
+{
+ void * key;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_privkey_str(MLKEM768_PRIVKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load ML-KEM-768 private key.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(key);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_load_kem_pubkey(void)
+{
+ void * key;
+
+ TEST_START();
+
+ if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(MLKEM768_PUBKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to load ML-KEM-768 public key.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ crypt_free_key(key);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS();
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL();
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp;
+ buffer_t pk;
+ buffer_t ct;
+ ssize_t len;
+ ssize_t ct_len;
+ uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int kdf;
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ kdf = get_random_kdf();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create key pair for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk.data = buf1;
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo))
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk, buf2, kdf, s1);
+ else
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk, buf2, kdf, s1);
+
+ if (ct_len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to encapsulate for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ ct.len = (size_t) ct_len;
+ ct.data = buf2;
+
+ if (kex_kem_decap(pkp, ct, kdf, s2) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to decapsulate for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) {
+ printf("Shared secrets don't match for %s.\n", algo);
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp;
+ buffer_t pk;
+ buffer_t ct;
+ ssize_t len;
+ ssize_t ct_len;
+ uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ int kdf;
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ kdf = get_random_kdf();
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create key pair.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk.data = buf1;
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo))
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk, buf2, kdf, s1);
+ else
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk, buf2, kdf, s1);
+
+ if (ct_len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to encapsulate.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ ct.len = (size_t) ct_len;
+ ct.data = buf2;
+
+ /* Corrupt the ciphertext */
+ buf2[0] ^= 0xFF;
+ buf2[ct_len - 1] ^= 0xFF;
+
+ /* ML-KEM uses implicit rejection */
+ if (kex_kem_decap(pkp, ct, kdf, s2) < 0) {
+ printf("Decapsulation failed unexpectedly.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ /* The shared secrets should NOT match with corrupted CT */
+ if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) == 0) {
+ printf("Corrupted ciphertext produced same secret.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp1;
+ void * pkp2;
+ buffer_t pk1;
+ buffer_t ct;
+ ssize_t len;
+ ssize_t ct_len;
+ uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf3[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ];
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp1, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create first key pair.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk1.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk1.data = buf1;
+
+ if (kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp2, buf2) < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create second key pair.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp1;
+ }
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo))
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk1, buf3, NID_sha256, s1);
+ else
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk1, buf3, NID_sha256, s1);
+
+ if (ct_len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to encapsulate.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp2;
+ }
+
+ ct.len = (size_t) ct_len;
+ ct.data = buf3;
+
+ if (kex_kem_decap(pkp2, ct, NID_sha256, s2) == 0) {
+ if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) == 0) {
+ printf("Wrong keypair produced same secret.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp2;
+ }
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp2:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2);
+ fail_pkp1:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext(const char * algo)
+{
+ struct sec_config kex;
+ void * pkp;
+ buffer_t pk;
+ buffer_t ct;
+ ssize_t len;
+ ssize_t ct_len;
+ uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ];
+ uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ];
+ uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ];
+
+ TEST_START("(%s)", algo);
+
+ memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex));
+ SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo);
+
+ len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf1);
+ if (len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to create key pair.\n");
+ goto fail;
+ }
+
+ pk.len = (size_t) len;
+ pk.data = buf1;
+
+ if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo))
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk, buf2, NID_sha256, s1);
+ else
+ ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk, buf2, NID_sha256, s1);
+
+ if (ct_len < 0) {
+ printf("Failed to encapsulate.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ /* Truncate the ciphertext */
+ ct.len = (size_t) ct_len / 2;
+ ct.data = buf2;
+
+ if (kex_kem_decap(pkp, ct, NID_sha256, s2) == 0) {
+ printf("Should fail with truncated ciphertext.\n");
+ goto fail_pkp;
+ }
+
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+
+ TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo);
+
+ return TEST_RC_SUCCESS;
+ fail_pkp:
+ kex_pkp_destroy(pkp);
+ fail:
+ TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo);
+ return TEST_RC_FAIL;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_kem(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+static int test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext_all(void)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+ int i;
+
+ for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+ const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]);
+
+ if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo))
+ continue;
+
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext(algo);
+ }
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+int kex_test_pqc(int argc,
+ char ** argv)
+{
+ int ret = 0;
+
+ (void) argc;
+ (void) argv;
+
+#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
+ ret |= test_kex_load_kem_privkey();
+ ret |= test_kex_load_kem_pubkey();
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_all();
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext_all();
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair_all();
+ ret |= test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext_all();
+#else
+ (void) test_kex_load_kem_privkey;
+ (void) test_kex_load_kem_pubkey;
+ (void) test_kex_kem_all;
+ (void) test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext_all;
+ (void) test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair_all;
+ (void) test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext_all;
+
+ ret = TEST_RC_SKIP;
+#endif
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c b/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c
index bbf2323b..952f9529 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c
+++ b/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L
#include <ouroboros/sockets.h>
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <assert.h>
#include <stdio.h>
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/time_test.c b/src/lib/tests/time_test.c
index 2b75b873..4685310b 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/time_test.c
+++ b/src/lib/tests/time_test.c
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
#include <ouroboros/time.h>
#include <stdio.h>
diff --git a/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c b/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c
index 98d4fab3..41bce964 100644
--- a/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c
+++ b/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@
#include "tpm.c"
-#include <ouroboros/test.h>
+#include <test/test.h>
static void * test_func(void * o)
{
diff --git a/src/lib/utils.c b/src/lib/utils.c
index fd275f63..74f8ce4f 100644
--- a/src/lib/utils.c
+++ b/src/lib/utils.c
@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@
#include <ouroboros/utils.h>
+#include <ctype.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
@@ -67,6 +68,24 @@ char * path_strip(const char * src)
return dst;
}
+char * trim_whitespace(char * str)
+{
+ char * end;
+
+ while (isspace((unsigned char) *str))
+ str++;
+
+ if (*str == '\0')
+ return str;
+
+ /* Trim trailing space */
+ end = str + strlen(str) - 1;
+ while (end > str && isspace((unsigned char)*end))
+ *end-- = '\0';
+
+ return str;
+}
+
size_t argvlen(const char ** argv)
{
size_t argc = 0;
diff --git a/src/tools/irm/irm_name_create.c b/src/tools/irm/irm_name_create.c
index 22341d2e..b132d355 100644
--- a/src/tools/irm/irm_name_create.c
+++ b/src/tools/irm/irm_name_create.c
@@ -51,10 +51,10 @@
#define RR "round-robin"
#define SPILL "spillover"
-#define SENC "<security_dir>/server/<name>/enc.cfg"
+#define SENC "<security_dir>/server/<name>/enc.conf"
#define SCRT "<security_dir>/server/<name>/crt.pem"
#define SKEY "<security_dir>/server/<name>/key.pem"
-#define CENC "<security_dir>/client/<name>/enc.cfg"
+#define CENC "<security_dir>/client/<name>/enc.conf"
#define CCRT "<security_dir>/client/<name>/crt.pem"
#define CKEY "<security_dir>/client/<name>/key.pem"