diff options
| author | Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> | 2026-01-07 16:44:34 +0100 |
|---|---|---|
| committer | Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> | 2026-01-19 08:29:29 +0100 |
| commit | 60b04305d70614580b4f883c0a147507edef3779 (patch) | |
| tree | 08e0513f39a17cbd31712d09d32354a63acd5a24 /src/lib | |
| parent | 8aa6ab4d29df80adde0d512244d43d38264bf32e (diff) | |
| download | ouroboros-60b04305d70614580b4f883c0a147507edef3779.tar.gz ouroboros-60b04305d70614580b4f883c0a147507edef3779.zip | |
lib: Add post-quantum cryptography support
This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and
post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication
(ML-DSA).
Supported key exchange algorithms:
ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448
Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024
Supported ciphers:
AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305
CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr
Supported HKDFs:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
Supported Digests for DSA:
sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
blake2b512, blake2s256
PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via
CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when
available.
KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles:
one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a
coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The
kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles:
kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy)
kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key)
The enc.conf file format supports:
kex=<algorithm> # Key exchange algorithm
cipher=<algorithm> # Symmetric cipher
kdf=<KDF> # Key derivation function
digest=<digest> # Digest for DSA
kem_mode=<mode> # Server (default) or client
none # Disable encryption
The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX
data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication
infrastructure for integrity and replay protection.
Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC
compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c).
Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0
(required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib')
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/config.h.in | 4 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/crypt.c | 647 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/crypt/openssl.c | 1190 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/crypt/openssl.h | 99 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/dev.c | 101 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/pb/irm.proto | 9 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/protobuf.c | 3 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/serdes-irm.c | 24 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt | 14 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/auth_test.c | 157 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c | 356 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c | 262 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/hash_test.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/kex_test.c | 844 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c | 549 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/time_test.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c | 2 | ||||
| -rw-r--r-- | src/lib/utils.c | 19 |
19 files changed, 3786 insertions, 500 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/config.h.in b/src/lib/config.h.in index 4533b00e..b34e6a7b 100644 --- a/src/lib/config.h.in +++ b/src/lib/config.h.in @@ -23,9 +23,11 @@ #cmakedefine HAVE_SYS_RANDOM #cmakedefine HAVE_LIBGCRYPT #cmakedefine HAVE_OPENSSL - #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#cmakedefine HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC #define HAVE_ENCRYPTION +#define PROC_SECMEM_MAX @PROC_SECMEM_MAX@ +#define SECMEM_GUARD @SECMEM_GUARD@ #endif #define SYS_MAX_FLOWS @SYS_MAX_FLOWS@ diff --git a/src/lib/crypt.c b/src/lib/crypt.c index 8b18140e..a050fe38 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt.c @@ -22,32 +22,244 @@ #include <config.h> -#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> #include <ouroboros/errno.h> +#include <ouroboros/random.h> +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> + #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - #include "crypt/openssl.h" -#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */ +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include "crypt/openssl.h" +#endif #include <assert.h> +#include <stdio.h> #include <string.h> +#include <sys/stat.h> + +struct nid_map { + uint16_t nid; + const char * name; +}; + +static const struct nid_map cipher_nid_map[] = { + {NID_aes_128_gcm, "aes-128-gcm"}, + {NID_aes_192_gcm, "aes-192-gcm"}, + {NID_aes_256_gcm, "aes-256-gcm"}, + {NID_chacha20_poly1305, "chacha20-poly1305"}, + {NID_aes_128_ctr, "aes-128-ctr"}, + {NID_aes_192_ctr, "aes-192-ctr"}, + {NID_aes_256_ctr, "aes-256-ctr"}, + {NID_undef, NULL} +}; + +const uint16_t crypt_supported_nids[] = { +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + NID_aes_128_gcm, + NID_aes_192_gcm, + NID_aes_256_gcm, + NID_chacha20_poly1305, + NID_aes_128_ctr, + NID_aes_192_ctr, + NID_aes_256_ctr, +#endif + NID_undef +}; + +static const struct nid_map kex_nid_map[] = { + {NID_X9_62_prime256v1, "prime256v1"}, + {NID_secp384r1, "secp384r1"}, + {NID_secp521r1, "secp521r1"}, + {NID_X25519, "X25519"}, + {NID_X448, "X448"}, + {NID_ffdhe2048, "ffdhe2048"}, + {NID_ffdhe3072, "ffdhe3072"}, + {NID_ffdhe4096, "ffdhe4096"}, + {NID_MLKEM512, "ML-KEM-512"}, + {NID_MLKEM768, "ML-KEM-768"}, + {NID_MLKEM1024, "ML-KEM-1024"}, + {NID_X25519MLKEM768, "X25519MLKEM768"}, + {NID_X448MLKEM1024, "X448MLKEM1024"}, + {NID_undef, NULL} +}; + +const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[] = { +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + NID_X9_62_prime256v1, + NID_secp384r1, + NID_secp521r1, + NID_X25519, + NID_X448, + NID_ffdhe2048, + NID_ffdhe3072, + NID_ffdhe4096, +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC + NID_MLKEM512, + NID_MLKEM768, + NID_MLKEM1024, + NID_X25519MLKEM768, + NID_X448MLKEM1024, +#endif +#endif + NID_undef +}; + +static const struct nid_map md_nid_map[] = { + {NID_sha256, "sha256"}, + {NID_sha384, "sha384"}, + {NID_sha512, "sha512"}, + {NID_sha3_256, "sha3-256"}, + {NID_sha3_384, "sha3-384"}, + {NID_sha3_512, "sha3-512"}, + {NID_blake2b512, "blake2b512"}, + {NID_blake2s256, "blake2s256"}, + {NID_undef, NULL} +}; + +const uint16_t md_supported_nids[] = { +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + NID_sha256, + NID_sha384, + NID_sha512, + NID_sha3_256, + NID_sha3_384, + NID_sha3_512, + NID_blake2b512, + NID_blake2s256, +#endif + NID_undef +}; struct crypt_ctx { - void * ctx; - uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + void * ctx; /* Encryption context */ }; struct auth_ctx { void * store; }; -int crypt_dh_pkp_create(void ** pkp, - uint8_t * pk) +static int parse_kex_value(const char * value, + struct sec_config * cfg) +{ + SET_KEX_ALGO(cfg, value); + if (cfg->x.nid == NID_undef) + return -ENOTSUP; + + return 0; +} + +/* not in header, but non-static for unit testing */ +int parse_sec_config(struct sec_config * cfg, + FILE * fp) +{ + char line[256]; + char * equals; + char * key; + char * value; + + assert(cfg != NULL); + assert(fp != NULL); + + /* Set defaults */ + SET_KEX_ALGO_NID(cfg, NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + cfg->x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP; + SET_KEX_KDF_NID(cfg, NID_sha256); + SET_KEX_CIPHER_NID(cfg, NID_aes_256_gcm); + SET_KEX_DIGEST_NID(cfg, NID_sha256); + + while (fgets(line, sizeof(line), fp) != NULL) { + char * trimmed; + + /* Skip comments and empty lines */ + if (line[0] == '#' || line[0] == '\n') + continue; + + /* Check for 'none' keyword */ + trimmed = trim_whitespace(line); + if (strcmp(trimmed, "none") == 0) { + memset(cfg, 0, sizeof(*cfg)); + return 0; + } + + /* Find the = separator */ + equals = strchr(line, '='); + if (equals == NULL) + continue; + + /* Split into key and value */ + *equals = '\0'; + key = trim_whitespace(line); + value = trim_whitespace(equals + 1); + + /* Parse key exchange field */ + if (strcmp(key, "kex") == 0) { + if (parse_kex_value(value, cfg) < 0) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(key, "cipher") == 0) { + SET_KEX_CIPHER(cfg, value); + if (cfg->c.nid == NID_undef) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(key, "kdf") == 0) { + SET_KEX_KDF(cfg, value); + if (cfg->k.nid == NID_undef) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(key, "digest") == 0) { + SET_KEX_DIGEST(cfg, value); + if (cfg->d.nid == NID_undef) + return -EINVAL; + } else if (strcmp(key, "kem_mode") == 0) { + if (strcmp(value, "server") == 0) { + cfg->x.mode = KEM_MODE_SERVER_ENCAP; + } else if (strcmp(value, "client") == 0) { + cfg->x.mode = KEM_MODE_CLIENT_ENCAP; + } else { + return -EINVAL; + } + } + } + + return 0; +} + +/* Parse key exchange config from file */ +int load_sec_config_file(struct sec_config * cfg, + const char * path) +{ + FILE * fp; + int ret; + + assert(cfg != NULL); + assert(path != NULL); + + fp = fopen(path, "r"); + if (fp == NULL) { + /* File doesn't exist - disable encryption */ + CLEAR_KEX_ALGO(cfg); + return 0; + } + + ret = parse_sec_config(cfg, fp); + + fclose(fp); + + return ret; +} + +int kex_pkp_create(struct sec_config * cfg, + void ** pkp, + uint8_t * pk) { #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + assert(cfg != NULL); assert(pkp != NULL); + *pkp = NULL; - return openssl_ecdh_pkp_create(pkp, pk); + + if (cfg->x.str == NULL || kex_validate_nid(cfg->x.nid) < 0) + return -ENOTSUP; + + return openssl_pkp_create(cfg->x.str, (EVP_PKEY **) pkp, pk); #else + (void) cfg; (void) pkp; (void) pk; @@ -57,12 +269,12 @@ int crypt_dh_pkp_create(void ** pkp, #endif } -void crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp) +void kex_pkp_destroy(void * pkp) { if (pkp == NULL) return; #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - openssl_ecdh_pkp_destroy(pkp); + openssl_pkp_destroy((EVP_PKEY *) pkp); #else (void) pkp; @@ -70,12 +282,18 @@ void crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp) #endif } -int crypt_dh_derive(void * pkp, - buffer_t pk, - uint8_t * s) +int kex_dhe_derive(struct sec_config * cfg, + void * pkp, + buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * s) { + assert(cfg != NULL); + + if (kex_validate_nid(cfg->x.nid) < 0) + return -ENOTSUP; + #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - return openssl_ecdh_derive(pkp, pk, s); + return openssl_dhe_derive((EVP_PKEY *) pkp, pk, cfg->k.nid, s); #else (void) pkp; (void) pk; @@ -86,6 +304,244 @@ int crypt_dh_derive(void * pkp, #endif } +ssize_t kex_kem_encap(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_kem_encap(pk, ct, kdf, s); +#else + (void) pk; + (void) ct; + (void) kdf; + + memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ); + + return -ECRYPT; +#endif +} + +ssize_t kex_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_kem_encap_raw(pk, ct, kdf, s); +#else + (void) pk; + (void) ct; + (void) kdf; + + memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ); + + return -ECRYPT; +#endif +} + +int kex_kem_decap(void * pkp, + buffer_t ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_kem_decap((EVP_PKEY *) pkp, ct, kdf, s); +#else + (void) pkp; + (void) ct; + (void) kdf; + + memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ); + + return -ECRYPT; +#endif +} + +int kex_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk, + char * algo) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_get_algo_from_pk_der(pk, algo); +#else + (void) pk; + algo[0] = '\0'; + + return -ECRYPT; +#endif +} + +int kex_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk, + char * algo) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_get_algo_from_pk_raw(pk, algo); +#else + (void) pk; + algo[0] = '\0'; + + return -ECRYPT; +#endif +} + +int kex_validate_algo(const char * algo) +{ + if (algo == NULL) + return -EINVAL; + + /* Use NID validation instead of string array */ + return kex_validate_nid(kex_str_to_nid(algo)); +} + +int crypt_validate_nid(int nid) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + if (nid == NID_undef) + return -EINVAL; + + for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (p->nid == nid) + return 0; + } + + return -ENOTSUP; +} + + +const char * crypt_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (p->nid == nid) + return p->name; + } + + return NULL; +} + +uint16_t crypt_str_to_nid(const char * cipher) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + if (cipher == NULL) + return NID_undef; + + /* fast, check if cipher pointer is in the map */ + for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (cipher == p->name) + return p->nid; + } + + for (p = cipher_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (strcmp(p->name, cipher) == 0) + return p->nid; + } + + return NID_undef; +} + +const char * kex_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (p->nid == nid) + return p->name; + } + + return NULL; +} + +uint16_t kex_str_to_nid(const char * algo) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + if (algo == NULL) + return NID_undef; + + /* Fast path: check if algo pointer is in the map */ + for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (algo == p->name) + return p->nid; + } + + /* Slow path: string comparison */ + for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (strcmp(p->name, algo) == 0) + return p->nid; + } + + return NID_undef; +} + +int kex_validate_nid(int nid) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + if (nid == NID_undef) + return -EINVAL; + + for (p = kex_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (p->nid == nid) + return 0; + } + + return -ENOTSUP; +} + +const char * md_nid_to_str(uint16_t nid) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (p->nid == nid) + return p->name; + } + + return NULL; +} + +uint16_t md_str_to_nid(const char * kdf) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + if (kdf == NULL) + return NID_undef; + + /* Fast path: check if kdf pointer is in the map */ + for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (kdf == p->name) + return p->nid; + } + + /* Slow path: string comparison */ + for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (strcmp(p->name, kdf) == 0) + return p->nid; + } + + return NID_undef; +} + +int md_validate_nid(int nid) +{ + const struct nid_map * p; + + if (nid == NID_undef) + return -EINVAL; + + for (p = md_nid_map; p->name != NULL; p++) { + if (p->nid == nid) + return 0; + } + + return -ENOTSUP; +} + +/* Hash length now returned by md_digest() */ + int crypt_encrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx, buffer_t in, buffer_t * out) @@ -94,7 +550,7 @@ int crypt_encrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx, assert(ctx->ctx != NULL); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - return openssl_encrypt(ctx->ctx, ctx->key, in, out); + return openssl_encrypt(ctx->ctx, in, out); #else (void) ctx; (void) in; @@ -112,7 +568,7 @@ int crypt_decrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx, assert(ctx->ctx != NULL); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - return openssl_decrypt(ctx->ctx, ctx->key, in, out); + return openssl_decrypt(ctx->ctx, in, out); #else (void) ctx; (void) in; @@ -122,20 +578,21 @@ int crypt_decrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx, #endif } -struct crypt_ctx * crypt_create_ctx(const uint8_t * key) +struct crypt_ctx * crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk) { struct crypt_ctx * crypt; + if (crypt_validate_nid(sk->nid) != 0) + return NULL; + crypt = malloc(sizeof(*crypt)); if (crypt == NULL) goto fail_crypt; memset(crypt, 0, sizeof(*crypt)); - if (key != NULL) - memcpy(crypt->key, key, SYMMKEYSZ); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - crypt->ctx=openssl_crypt_create_ctx(); + crypt->ctx = openssl_crypt_create_ctx(sk); if (crypt->ctx == NULL) goto fail_ctx; #endif @@ -204,11 +661,72 @@ int crypt_load_pubkey_str(const char * str, #endif } +int crypt_load_pubkey_file(const char * path, + void ** key) +{ + *key = NULL; + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_load_pubkey_file(path, key); +#else + (void) path; + + return 0; +#endif +} + +int crypt_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path, + buffer_t * buf) +{ + assert(buf != NULL); + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_load_pubkey_file_to_der(path, buf); +#else + (void) path; + + buf->data = NULL; + buf->len = 0; + return 0; +#endif +} + +int crypt_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path, + buffer_t * buf) +{ + assert(buf != NULL); + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_load_pubkey_raw_file(path, buf); +#else + (void) path; + + buf->data = NULL; + buf->len = 0; + return 0; +#endif +} + +int crypt_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path, + void ** key) +{ + *key = NULL; + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_load_privkey_raw_file(path, key); +#else + (void) path; + + return 0; +#endif +} + int crypt_cmp_key(const void * key1, const void * key2) { #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - return openssl_cmp_key(key1, key2); + return openssl_cmp_key((const EVP_PKEY *) key1, + (const EVP_PKEY *) key2); #else (void) key1; (void) key2; @@ -223,7 +741,7 @@ void crypt_free_key(void * key) return; #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - openssl_free_key(key); + openssl_free_key((EVP_PKEY *) key); #endif } @@ -343,6 +861,19 @@ int crypt_check_crt_name(void * crt, #endif } +int crypt_get_crt_name(void * crt, + char * name) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_get_crt_name(crt, name); +#else + (void) crt; + (void) name; + + return 0; +#endif +} + struct auth_ctx * auth_create_ctx(void) { struct auth_ctx * ctx; @@ -406,13 +937,15 @@ int auth_verify_crt(struct auth_ctx * ctx, } int auth_sign(void * pkp, + int md_nid, buffer_t msg, buffer_t * sig) { #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - return openssl_sign(pkp, msg, sig); + return openssl_sign((EVP_PKEY *) pkp, md_nid, msg, sig); #else (void) pkp; + (void) md_nid; (void) msg; (void) sig; @@ -423,16 +956,82 @@ int auth_sign(void * pkp, } int auth_verify_sig(void * pk, + int md_nid, buffer_t msg, buffer_t sig) { #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - return openssl_verify_sig(pk, msg, sig); + return openssl_verify_sig((EVP_PKEY *) pk, md_nid, msg, sig); #else (void) pk; + (void) md_nid; (void) msg; (void) sig; return 0; #endif } + +ssize_t md_digest(int md_nid, + buffer_t in, + uint8_t * out) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_md_digest(md_nid, in, out); +#else + (void) md_nid; + (void) in; + (void) out; + + return -1; +#endif +} + +ssize_t md_len(int md_nid) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_md_len(md_nid); +#else + (void) md_nid; + return -1; +#endif +} + +int crypt_secure_malloc_init(size_t max) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_secure_malloc_init(max, SECMEM_GUARD); +#else + return 0; +#endif +} + +void crypt_secure_malloc_fini(void) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + openssl_secure_malloc_fini(); +#endif +} + +void * crypt_secure_malloc(size_t size) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_secure_malloc(size); +#else + return malloc(size); +#endif +} + +void crypt_secure_free(void * ptr, + size_t size) +{ + if (ptr == NULL) + return; + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + openssl_secure_free(ptr, size); +#else + memset(ptr, 0, size); + free(ptr); +#endif +} diff --git a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c index 291a3418..71a69c1c 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c +++ b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.c @@ -23,6 +23,10 @@ * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/. */ +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L + +#include <config.h> + #include <ouroboros/errno.h> #include <ouroboros/crypt.h> #include <ouroboros/hash.h> @@ -32,31 +36,239 @@ #include <openssl/evp.h> #include <openssl/bio.h> #include <openssl/ec.h> +#include <openssl/err.h> +#include <openssl/kdf.h> #include <openssl/pem.h> #include <openssl/sha.h> +#include <openssl/provider.h> #include <openssl/x509v3.h> #include <openssl/x509_vfy.h> #include <assert.h> +#include <stdio.h> + +#define IS_EC_GROUP(str) (strcmp(str, "EC") == 0) +#define IS_DH_GROUP(str) (strcmp(str, "DH") == 0) + +#define HKDF_INFO_DHE "o7s-ossl-dhe" +#define HKDF_INFO_ENCAP "o7s-ossl-encap" +#define HKDF_SALT_LEN 32 /* SHA-256 output size */ + +struct ossl_crypt_ctx { + EVP_CIPHER_CTX * evp_ctx; + const EVP_CIPHER * cipher; + uint8_t * key; + int ivsz; + int tagsz; +}; + +struct kdf_info { + buffer_t secret; + int nid; + buffer_t salt; + buffer_t info; + buffer_t key; +}; + +/* Convert hash NID to OpenSSL digest name string for HKDF */ +static const char * hash_nid_to_digest_name(int nid) +{ + const EVP_MD * md; + const char * name; + + md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid); + if (md == NULL) + return "SHA256"; /* fallback to SHA-256 */ + + name = EVP_MD_get0_name(md); + if (name == NULL) + return "SHA256"; /* fallback to SHA-256 */ + + return name; +} + +/* Extract public key bytes from a key pair for salt derivation */ +static int get_pk_bytes_from_key(EVP_PKEY * key, + buffer_t * pk) +{ + const char * name; + int ret; + + assert(key != NULL); + assert(pk != NULL); + + name = EVP_PKEY_get0_type_name(key); + if (name == NULL) + goto fail_name; + + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(name)) { + pk->len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(key, &pk->data); + if (pk->len == 0) + goto fail_name; + } else { + /* Pure ML-KEM: use DER encoding to match encap */ + pk->data = NULL; + ret = i2d_PUBKEY(key, &pk->data); + if (ret <= 0) + goto fail_name; + pk->len = (size_t) ret; + } + + return 0; + fail_name: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* Derive salt from public key bytes by hashing them */ +static int derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * salt, + size_t salt_len) +{ + uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned hash_len; + + assert(pk.data != NULL); + assert(salt != NULL); + + if (EVP_Digest(pk.data, pk.len, hash, &hash_len, + EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1) + goto fail_digest; + + memcpy(salt, hash, salt_len < hash_len ? salt_len : hash_len); + + return 0; + fail_digest: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* Derive salt from two public key byte buffers (DHE) in canonical order */ +static int derive_salt_from_pk_bytes_dhe(buffer_t local, + buffer_t remote, + uint8_t * salt, + size_t salt_len) +{ + uint8_t * concat; + size_t concat_len; + uint8_t hash[EVP_MAX_MD_SIZE]; + unsigned hash_len; + size_t min_len; + int cmp; + + assert(local.data != NULL); + assert(remote.data != NULL); + assert(salt != NULL); + + concat_len = local.len + remote.len; + concat = OPENSSL_malloc(concat_len); + if (concat == NULL) + goto fail_malloc; + + /* Canonical order: compare and concatenate smaller first */ + min_len = local.len < remote.len ? local.len : remote.len; + cmp = memcmp(local.data, remote.data, min_len); + if (cmp < 0 || (cmp == 0 && local.len < remote.len)) { + memcpy(concat, local.data, local.len); + memcpy(concat + local.len, remote.data, remote.len); + } else { + memcpy(concat, remote.data, remote.len); + memcpy(concat + remote.len, local.data, local.len); + } + + if (EVP_Digest(concat, concat_len, hash, &hash_len, + EVP_sha256(), NULL) != 1) + goto fail_digest; + + OPENSSL_free(concat); + + memcpy(salt, hash, salt_len < hash_len ? salt_len : hash_len); + + return 0; + fail_digest: + OPENSSL_free(concat); + fail_malloc: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* Derive key using HKDF */ +#define OPc_u_str OSSL_PARAM_construct_utf8_string +#define OPc_o_str OSSL_PARAM_construct_octet_string +static int derive_key_hkdf(struct kdf_info * ki) +{ + EVP_KDF * kdf; + EVP_KDF_CTX * kctx; + OSSL_PARAM params[5]; + const char * digest; + int idx; + + digest = hash_nid_to_digest_name(ki->nid); + + kdf = EVP_KDF_fetch(NULL, "HKDF", NULL); + if (kdf == NULL) + goto fail_fetch; + + kctx = EVP_KDF_CTX_new(kdf); + if (kctx == NULL) + goto fail_ctx; + + idx = 0; + params[idx++] = OPc_u_str("digest", (char *) digest, 0); + params[idx++] = OPc_o_str("key", ki->secret.data, ki->secret.len); + params[idx++] = OPc_o_str("salt", ki->salt.data, ki->salt.len); + params[idx++] = OPc_o_str("info", ki->info.data, ki->info.len); + + params[idx] = OSSL_PARAM_construct_end(); + + if (EVP_KDF_derive(kctx, ki->key.data, ki->key.len, params) != 1) + goto fail_derive; + + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + + return 0; + + fail_derive: + EVP_KDF_CTX_free(kctx); + fail_ctx: + EVP_KDF_free(kdf); + fail_fetch: + return -ECRYPT; +} /* * Derive the common secret from - * - your public key pair (kp) - * - the remote public key (pub). + * - your public key pair (pkp) + * - the remote public key bytes (remote_pk). * Store it in a preallocated buffer (s). */ -static int __openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(EVP_PKEY * kp, - EVP_PKEY * pub, - uint8_t * s) +static int __openssl_dhe_derive(EVP_PKEY * pkp, + EVP_PKEY * pub, + buffer_t remote_pk, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) { - EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx; - int ret; - uint8_t * secret; - size_t secret_len; - - ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(kp, NULL); + EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx; + struct kdf_info ki; + buffer_t local_pk; + int ret; + uint8_t * secret; + size_t secret_len; + uint8_t salt_buf[HKDF_SALT_LEN]; + + /* Extract local public key bytes */ + local_pk.data = NULL; + ret = i2d_PUBKEY(pkp, &local_pk.data); + if (ret <= 0) + goto fail_local; + local_pk.len = (size_t) ret; + + /* Derive salt from both public keys */ + if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes_dhe(local_pk, remote_pk, salt_buf, + HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0) + goto fail_salt; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pkp, NULL); if (ctx == NULL) - goto fail_new; + goto fail_salt; ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx); if (ret != 1) @@ -81,37 +293,78 @@ static int __openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(EVP_PKEY * kp, if (ret != 1) goto fail_derive; - /* Hash the secret for use as AES key. */ - mem_hash(HASH_SHA3_256, s, secret, secret_len); + ki.nid = kdf; + ki.secret.len = secret_len; + ki.secret.data = secret; + ki.info.len = strlen(HKDF_INFO_DHE); + ki.info.data = (uint8_t *) HKDF_INFO_DHE; + ki.key.len = SYMMKEYSZ; + ki.key.data = s; + ki.salt.len = HKDF_SALT_LEN; + ki.salt.data = salt_buf; + + /* Derive symmetric key from shared secret using HKDF */ + ret = derive_key_hkdf(&ki); OPENSSL_free(secret); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(local_pk.data); + + if (ret != 0) + return ret; return 0; fail_derive: OPENSSL_free(secret); fail_ctx: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); - fail_new: + fail_salt: + OPENSSL_free(local_pk.data); + fail_local: return -ECRYPT; } -static int __openssl_ecdh_gen_key(void ** kp) +static int __openssl_dhe_gen_key(const char * algo, + EVP_PKEY ** kp) { EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY_CTX * kctx = NULL; EVP_PKEY * params = NULL; + int nid; + int type; int ret; - ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); + assert(algo != NULL); + assert(kp != NULL); + + nid = OBJ_txt2nid(algo); + if (nid == NID_undef) + return -ECRYPT; + + /* X25519 and X448: direct keygen context */ + if (nid == EVP_PKEY_X25519 || nid == EVP_PKEY_X448) { + kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(nid, NULL); + if (kctx == NULL) + goto fail_kctx; + + goto keygen; + } + /* EC and FFDHE: parameter generation first */ + type = (strncmp(algo, "ffdhe", 5) == 0) ? EVP_PKEY_DH : EVP_PKEY_EC; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(type, NULL); if (ctx == NULL) - goto fail_new_id; + goto fail_ctx; ret = EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(ctx); if (ret != 1) goto fail_paramgen; - ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + if (type == EVP_PKEY_EC) + ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, nid); + else /* EVP_PKEY_DH */ + ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_dh_nid(ctx, nid); + if (ret != 1) goto fail_paramgen; @@ -121,187 +374,556 @@ static int __openssl_ecdh_gen_key(void ** kp) kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(params, NULL); if (kctx == NULL) - goto fail_keygen_init; + goto fail_kctx; + EVP_PKEY_free(params); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + keygen: ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx); if (ret != 1) goto fail_keygen; - ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, (EVP_PKEY **) kp); + ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, kp); if (ret != 1) goto fail_keygen; - EVP_PKEY_free(params); EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); return 0; + fail_keygen: EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); - fail_keygen_init: - EVP_PKEY_free(params); + return -ECRYPT; + fail_kctx: + if (params != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_free(params); fail_paramgen: - EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); - fail_new_id: + if (ctx != NULL) + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + fail_ctx: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +static int __openssl_kem_gen_key(const char * algo, + EVP_PKEY ** kp) +{ + EVP_PKEY_CTX * kctx; + int ret; + + assert(algo != NULL); + assert(kp != NULL); + + /* PQC KEM (ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024) or hybrid */ + kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, algo, NULL); + if (kctx == NULL) + goto fail_kctx; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_keygen; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, kp); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_keygen; + + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); + + return 0; + + fail_keygen: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); + fail_kctx: return -ECRYPT; } -ssize_t openssl_ecdh_pkp_create(void ** pkp, - uint8_t * pk) +/* Determine hybrid KEM algorithm from raw key/ciphertext length */ +static const char * __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(size_t len) +{ + switch(len) { + case X25519MLKEM768_PKSZ: + return "X25519MLKEM768"; + case X25519MLKEM768_CTSZ: + return "X25519MLKEM768"; + case X448MLKEM1024_PKSZ: + return "X448MLKEM1024"; + default: + break; + } + + return NULL; +} + +static int __openssl_kex_gen_key(const char * algo, + EVP_PKEY ** kp) { - uint8_t * pos; - ssize_t len; + assert(algo != NULL); + assert(kp != NULL); + + /* Dispatch based on algorithm name prefix */ + if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + return __openssl_kem_gen_key(algo, kp); + + return __openssl_dhe_gen_key(algo, kp); +} +ssize_t openssl_pkp_create(const char * algo, + EVP_PKEY ** pkp, + uint8_t * pk) +{ + uint8_t * pos; + buffer_t raw; + ssize_t len; + + assert(algo != NULL); assert(pkp != NULL); assert(*pkp == NULL); assert(pk != NULL); - if (__openssl_ecdh_gen_key(pkp) < 0) + if (__openssl_kex_gen_key(algo, pkp) < 0) goto fail_key; - pos = pk; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use pk! */ - len = i2d_PUBKEY(*pkp, &pos); - if (len < 0) - goto fail_pubkey; + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) { /* Raw encode hybrid KEM */ + raw.len = EVP_PKEY_get1_encoded_public_key(*pkp, &raw.data); + if (raw.len == 0) + goto fail_pubkey; + + memcpy(pk, raw.data, raw.len); + OPENSSL_free(raw.data); + + return (ssize_t) raw.len; + } else { /* DER encode standard algorithms */ + pos = pk; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use pk! */ + len = i2d_PUBKEY(*pkp, &pos); + if (len < 0) + goto fail_pubkey; - return len; + return len; + } fail_pubkey: EVP_PKEY_free(*pkp); fail_key: return -ECRYPT; } -void openssl_ecdh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp) +/* Common KEM encapsulation - pub key and salt already prepared */ +static ssize_t __openssl_kem_encap(EVP_PKEY * pub, + uint8_t * salt, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx; + struct kdf_info ki; + uint8_t * secret; + size_t secret_len; + size_t ct_len; + int ret; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(pub, NULL); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto fail_ctx; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate_init(ctx, NULL); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_encap; + + /* Get required lengths */ + ret = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, NULL, &ct_len, NULL, &secret_len); + if (ret != 1 || ct_len > MSGBUFSZ) + goto fail_encap; + + /* Allocate buffer for secret */ + secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len); + if (secret == NULL) + goto fail_encap; + + /* Perform encapsulation */ + ret = EVP_PKEY_encapsulate(ctx, ct, &ct_len, secret, &secret_len); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_secret; + + ki.secret.len = secret_len; + ki.secret.data = secret; + ki.nid = kdf; + ki.info.len = strlen(HKDF_INFO_ENCAP); + ki.info.data = (uint8_t *) HKDF_INFO_ENCAP; + ki.key.len = SYMMKEYSZ; + ki.key.data = s; + ki.salt.len = HKDF_SALT_LEN; + ki.salt.data = salt; + + /* Derive symmetric key from shared secret using HKDF */ + ret = derive_key_hkdf(&ki); + + OPENSSL_free(secret); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + + if (ret != 0) + return -ECRYPT; + + return (ssize_t) ct_len; + + fail_secret: + OPENSSL_free(secret); + fail_encap: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + fail_ctx: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* ML-KEM encapsulation - DER-encoded public key */ +ssize_t openssl_kem_encap(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY * pub; + uint8_t * pos; + uint8_t salt[HKDF_SALT_LEN]; + ssize_t ret; + + assert(pk.data != NULL); + assert(ct != NULL); + assert(s != NULL); + + if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(pk, salt, HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0) + goto fail_salt; + + pos = pk.data; + pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) pk.len); + if (pub == NULL) + goto fail_salt; + + ret = __openssl_kem_encap(pub, salt, ct, kdf, s); + + EVP_PKEY_free(pub); + + return ret; + fail_salt: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* Hybrid KEM encapsulation: raw-encoded public key */ +ssize_t openssl_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY * pub; + const char * algo; + uint8_t salt[HKDF_SALT_LEN]; + ssize_t ret; + + assert(pk.data != NULL); + assert(ct != NULL); + assert(s != NULL); + + if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(pk, salt, HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0) + goto fail_salt; + + algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(pk.len); + if (algo == NULL) + goto fail_salt; + + pub = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_public_key_ex(NULL, algo, NULL, + pk.data, pk.len); + if (pub == NULL) + goto fail_salt; + + ret = __openssl_kem_encap(pub, salt, ct, kdf, s); + + EVP_PKEY_free(pub); + + return ret; + fail_salt: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* KEM decapsulation - used by party that generated the keypair */ +int openssl_kem_decap(EVP_PKEY * priv, + buffer_t ct, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx; + struct kdf_info ki; + buffer_t pk; + uint8_t * secret; + size_t secret_len; + int ret; + uint8_t salt[HKDF_SALT_LEN]; + + /* Extract public key bytes from private key */ + if (get_pk_bytes_from_key(priv, &pk) < 0) + goto fail_pk; + + if (derive_salt_from_pk_bytes(pk, salt, HKDF_SALT_LEN) < 0) + goto fail_salt; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(priv, NULL); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto fail_salt; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate_init(ctx, NULL); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_ctx; + + /* Get required secret length */ + ret = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, NULL, &secret_len, ct.data, ct.len); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_ctx; + + /* Allocate buffer for secret */ + secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len); + if (secret == NULL) + goto fail_ctx; + + /* Perform decapsulation */ + ret = EVP_PKEY_decapsulate(ctx, secret, &secret_len, ct.data, ct.len); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_secret; + + ki.secret.len = secret_len; + ki.secret.data = secret; + ki.nid = kdf; + ki.info.len = strlen(HKDF_INFO_ENCAP); + ki.info.data = (uint8_t *) HKDF_INFO_ENCAP; + ki.key.len = SYMMKEYSZ; + ki.key.data = s; + ki.salt.len = HKDF_SALT_LEN; + ki.salt.data = salt; + + /* Derive symmetric key from shared secret using HKDF */ + ret = derive_key_hkdf(&ki); + + OPENSSL_free(secret); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + OPENSSL_free(pk.data); + + if (ret != 0) + return ret; + + return 0; + + fail_secret: + OPENSSL_free(secret); + fail_ctx: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + fail_salt: + OPENSSL_free(pk.data); + fail_pk: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +void openssl_pkp_destroy(EVP_PKEY * pkp) +{ + EVP_PKEY_free(pkp); +} + +int __openssl_get_curve(EVP_PKEY * pub, + char * algo) +{ + int ret; + size_t len = KEX_ALGO_BUFSZ; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_get_utf8_string_param(pub, "group", algo, len, &len); + return ret == 1 ? 0 : -ECRYPT; +} + +int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk, + char * algo) +{ + uint8_t * pos; + EVP_PKEY * pub; + char * type_str; + + assert(pk.data != NULL); + assert(algo != NULL); + + pos = pk.data; + pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) pk.len); + if (pub == NULL) + goto fail_decode; + + type_str = (char *) EVP_PKEY_get0_type_name(pub); + if (type_str == NULL) + goto fail_pub; + + strcpy(algo, type_str); + + if ((IS_EC_GROUP(algo) || IS_DH_GROUP(algo)) && + __openssl_get_curve(pub, algo) < 0) + goto fail_pub; + + EVP_PKEY_free(pub); + return 0; + + fail_pub: + EVP_PKEY_free(pub); + fail_decode: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk, + char * algo) { - EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *) pkp); + const char * hybrid_algo; + + assert(pk.data != NULL); + assert(algo != NULL); + + hybrid_algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(pk.len); + if (hybrid_algo == NULL) + return -ECRYPT; + + strcpy(algo, hybrid_algo); + + return 0; } -int openssl_ecdh_derive(void * pkp, - buffer_t pk, - uint8_t * s) +int openssl_dhe_derive(EVP_PKEY * pkp, + buffer_t pk, + int kdf, + uint8_t * s) { uint8_t * pos; EVP_PKEY * pub; + assert(pkp != NULL); + assert(pk.data != NULL); + assert(s != NULL); + + /* X.509 DER decoding for DHE */ pos = pk.data; /* d2i_PUBKEY increments pos, don't use key ptr! */ pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) pk.len); if (pub == NULL) - goto fail_pubkey; + goto fail_decode; - if (__openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(pkp, pub, s) < 0) - goto fail_key; + if (__openssl_dhe_derive(pkp, pub, pk, kdf, s) < 0) + goto fail_derive; EVP_PKEY_free(pub); return 0; - fail_pubkey: + fail_derive: EVP_PKEY_free(pub); - fail_key: + fail_decode: return -ECRYPT; } -/* - * AES encryption calls. If FRCT is disabled, we should generate a - * 128-bit random IV and append it to the packet. If the flow is - * reliable, we could initialize the context once, and consider the - * stream a single encrypted message to avoid initializing the - * encryption context for each packet. - */ - -int openssl_encrypt(void * ctx, - uint8_t * key, - buffer_t in, - buffer_t * out) +int openssl_encrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx, + buffer_t in, + buffer_t * out) { - uint8_t * ptr; - uint8_t * iv; - int in_sz; - int out_sz; - int tmp_sz; - int ret; + uint8_t * ptr; + uint8_t * iv; + int in_sz; + int out_sz; + int tmp_sz; + int ret; + + assert(ctx != NULL); in_sz = (int) in.len; - out->data = malloc(in.len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + IVSZ); + out->data = malloc(in.len + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH + \ + ctx->ivsz + ctx->tagsz); if (out->data == NULL) goto fail_malloc; iv = out->data; - ptr = out->data + IVSZ; + ptr = out->data + ctx->ivsz; - if (random_buffer(iv, IVSZ) < 0) - goto fail_iv; + if (random_buffer(iv, ctx->ivsz) < 0) + goto fail_encrypt; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx->evp_ctx); - ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); + ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ctx->cipher, NULL, ctx->key, iv); if (ret != 1) - goto fail_iv; + goto fail_encrypt; - ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, in.data, in_sz); + ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, in.data, in_sz); if (ret != 1) goto fail_encrypt; out_sz = tmp_sz; - ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz); + ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz); if (ret != 1) goto fail_encrypt; out_sz += tmp_sz; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); + /* For AEAD ciphers, get and append the authentication tag */ + if (ctx->tagsz > 0) { + ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->evp_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG, + ctx->tagsz, ptr + out_sz); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_encrypt; + out_sz += ctx->tagsz; + } assert(out_sz >= in_sz); - out->len = (size_t) out_sz + IVSZ; + out->len = (size_t) out_sz + ctx->ivsz; return 0; fail_encrypt: - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - fail_iv: free(out->data); fail_malloc: clrbuf(*out); return -ECRYPT; } -int openssl_decrypt(void * ctx, - uint8_t * key, - buffer_t in, - buffer_t * out) +int openssl_decrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx, + buffer_t in, + buffer_t * out) { - uint8_t * ptr; - uint8_t * iv; - uint8_t * input; - int ret; - int out_sz; - int in_sz; - int tmp_sz; - - in_sz = (int) in.len - IVSZ; - if (in_sz < 0) + uint8_t * ptr; + uint8_t * iv; + uint8_t * input; + int ret; + int out_sz; + int in_sz; + int tmp_sz; + + assert(ctx != NULL); + + in_sz = (int) in.len - ctx->ivsz; + if (in_sz < ctx->tagsz) return -ECRYPT; - out->data = malloc(in_sz); + in_sz -= ctx->tagsz; + + out->data = malloc(in_sz + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); if (out->data == NULL) goto fail_malloc; iv = in.data; ptr = out->data; - input = in.data + IVSZ; + input = in.data + ctx->ivsz; - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx); + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(ctx->evp_ctx); - ret = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx, EVP_aes_256_cbc(), NULL, key, iv); + ret = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ctx->cipher, NULL, ctx->key, iv); if (ret != 1) - goto fail_decrypt_init; + goto fail_decrypt; + + /* For AEAD ciphers, set the expected authentication tag */ + if (ctx->tagsz > 0) { + uint8_t * tag = input + in_sz; + ret = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx->evp_ctx, EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG, + ctx->tagsz, tag); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_decrypt; + } - ret = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, input, in_sz); + ret = EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr, &tmp_sz, input, in_sz); if (ret != 1) goto fail_decrypt; out_sz = tmp_sz; - ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz); + ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(ctx->evp_ctx, ptr + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz); if (ret != 1) goto fail_decrypt; @@ -313,22 +935,65 @@ int openssl_decrypt(void * ctx, return 0; fail_decrypt: - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(ctx); - fail_decrypt_init: free(out->data); fail_malloc: clrbuf(*out); return -ECRYPT; } -void * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(void) +struct ossl_crypt_ctx * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk) { - return (void *) EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx; + + assert(sk != NULL); + assert(sk->key != NULL); + + ctx = malloc(sizeof(*ctx)); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto fail_malloc; + + memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); + + ctx->key = OPENSSL_secure_malloc(SYMMKEYSZ); + if (ctx->key == NULL) + goto fail_key; + + memcpy(ctx->key, sk->key, SYMMKEYSZ); + + ctx->cipher = EVP_get_cipherbynid(sk->nid); + if (ctx->cipher == NULL) + goto fail_cipher; + + ctx->ivsz = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(ctx->cipher); + + /* Set tag size for AEAD ciphers (GCM, CCM, OCB, ChaCha20-Poly1305) */ + if (EVP_CIPHER_flags(ctx->cipher) & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER) + ctx->tagsz = 16; /* Standard AEAD tag length (128 bits) */ + + ctx->evp_ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (ctx->evp_ctx == NULL) + goto fail_cipher; + + return ctx; + + fail_cipher: + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ctx->key, SYMMKEYSZ); + fail_key: + free(ctx); + fail_malloc: + return NULL; } -void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(void * ctx) +void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx) { - EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free((EVP_CIPHER_CTX *) ctx); + if (ctx == NULL) + return; + + if (ctx->key != NULL) + OPENSSL_secure_clear_free(ctx->key, SYMMKEYSZ); + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx->evp_ctx); + free(ctx); } /* AUTHENTICATION */ @@ -442,14 +1107,24 @@ int openssl_load_privkey_file(const char * path, { FILE * fp; EVP_PKEY * pkey; + unsigned long err; + char errbuf[256]; fp = fopen(path, "r"); - if (fp == NULL) + if (fp == NULL) { + fprintf(stderr, "Failed to open %s\n", path); goto fail_file; + } pkey = PEM_read_PrivateKey(fp, NULL, NULL, ""); - if (pkey == NULL) + if (pkey == NULL) { + err = ERR_get_error(); + ERR_error_string_n(err, errbuf, sizeof(errbuf)); + fprintf(stderr, + "OpenSSL error loading privkey from %s: %s\n", + path, errbuf); goto fail_key; + } fclose(fp); @@ -518,6 +1193,48 @@ int openssl_load_pubkey_file(const char * path, return -1; } +int openssl_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path, + buffer_t * buf) +{ + FILE * fp; + EVP_PKEY * pkey; + int ret; + + assert(path != NULL); + assert(buf != NULL); + + memset(buf, 0, sizeof(*buf)); + + fp = fopen(path, "r"); + if (fp == NULL) + goto fail_file; + + pkey = PEM_read_PUBKEY(fp, NULL, NULL, NULL); + if (pkey == NULL) + goto fail_key; + + fclose(fp); + + /* Extract public key bytes in DER format */ + ret = get_pk_bytes_from_key(pkey, buf); + + EVP_PKEY_free(pkey); + + if (ret < 0) + goto fail_extract; + + return 0; + + fail_extract: + clrbuf(*buf); + return -1; + fail_key: + fclose(fp); + fail_file: + clrbuf(*buf); + return -1; +} + int openssl_load_pubkey_str(const char * str, void ** key) { @@ -547,28 +1264,123 @@ int openssl_load_pubkey_str(const char * str, return -1; } -int openssl_cmp_key(const void * key1, - const void * key2) +int openssl_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path, + buffer_t * buf) +{ + FILE * fp; + uint8_t tmp_buf[MSGBUFSZ]; + size_t bytes_read; + const char * algo; + + assert(path != NULL); + assert(buf != NULL); + + fp = fopen(path, "rb"); + if (fp == NULL) + goto fail_file; + + bytes_read = fread(tmp_buf, 1, MSGBUFSZ, fp); + if (bytes_read == 0) + goto fail_read; + + /* Validate that this is a known hybrid KEM format */ + algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_len(bytes_read); + if (algo == NULL) + goto fail_read; + + buf->data = malloc(bytes_read); + if (buf->data == NULL) + goto fail_malloc; + + memcpy(buf->data, tmp_buf, bytes_read); + buf->len = bytes_read; + + return 0; + + fail_malloc: + fail_read: + fclose(fp); + fail_file: + clrbuf(*buf); + return -1; +} + +/* Determine hybrid KEM algorithm from raw private key length */ +static const char * __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_sk_len(size_t len) +{ + switch(len) { + case X25519MLKEM768_SKSZ: + return "X25519MLKEM768"; + case X448MLKEM1024_SKSZ: + return "X448MLKEM1024"; + default: + break; + } + + return NULL; +} + +int openssl_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path, + void ** key) { - EVP_PKEY * pkey1; - EVP_PKEY * pkey2; + FILE * fp; + uint8_t tmp_buf[4096]; + size_t bytes_read; + const char * algo; + EVP_PKEY * pkey; + + assert(path != NULL); + assert(key != NULL); + + fp = fopen(path, "rb"); + if (fp == NULL) + goto fail_file; + + bytes_read = fread(tmp_buf, 1, sizeof(tmp_buf), fp); + fclose(fp); + + if (bytes_read == 0) + goto fail_read; + + /* Determine algorithm from key size */ + algo = __openssl_hybrid_algo_from_sk_len(bytes_read); + if (algo == NULL) + goto fail_read; + + pkey = EVP_PKEY_new_raw_private_key_ex(NULL, algo, NULL, + tmp_buf, bytes_read); + /* Clear sensitive data from stack */ + OPENSSL_cleanse(tmp_buf, bytes_read); + if (pkey == NULL) + goto fail_read; + + *key = (void *) pkey; + + return 0; + + fail_read: + fail_file: + *key = NULL; + return -1; +} + +int openssl_cmp_key(const EVP_PKEY * key1, + const EVP_PKEY * key2) +{ assert(key1 != NULL); assert(key2 != NULL); - pkey1 = (EVP_PKEY *) key1; - pkey2 = (EVP_PKEY *) key2; - #if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER >= 0x30000000L - return EVP_PKEY_eq(pkey1, pkey2) == 1 ? 0 : -1; + return EVP_PKEY_eq(key1, key2) == 1 ? 0 : -1; #else - return EVP_PKEY_cmp(pkey1, pkey2) == 1 ? 0 : -1; + return EVP_PKEY_cmp(key1, key2) == 1 ? 0 : -1; #endif } -void openssl_free_key(void * key) +void openssl_free_key(EVP_PKEY * key) { - EVP_PKEY_free((EVP_PKEY *) key); + EVP_PKEY_free(key); } int openssl_check_crt_name(void * crt, @@ -600,6 +1412,41 @@ int openssl_check_crt_name(void * crt, return -1; } +int openssl_get_crt_name(void * crt, + char * name) +{ + char * subj; + char * cn; + char * end; + X509 * xcrt; + + xcrt = (X509 *) crt; + + subj = X509_NAME_oneline(X509_get_subject_name(xcrt), NULL, 0); + if (subj == NULL) + goto fail_subj; + + cn = strstr(subj, "CN="); + if (cn == NULL) + goto fail_cn; + + cn += 3; /* Skip "CN=" */ + + /* Find end of CN (comma or slash for next field) */ + end = strpbrk(cn, ",/"); + if (end != NULL) + *end = '\0'; + + strcpy(name, cn); + free(subj); + + return 0; + fail_cn: + free(subj); + fail_subj: + return -1; +} + int openssl_crt_str(const void * crt, char * str) { @@ -704,37 +1551,48 @@ int openssl_verify_crt(void * store, return -1; } -int openssl_sign(void * pkp, +static const EVP_MD * select_md(EVP_PKEY * pkey, + int nid) +{ + if (EVP_PKEY_get_id(pkey) < 0) + return NULL; /* Provider-based (PQC) */ + + if (nid == NID_undef) + return NULL; /* Classical requires explicit nid */ + + return EVP_get_digestbynid(nid); +} + +int openssl_sign(EVP_PKEY * pkp, + int nid, buffer_t msg, buffer_t * sig) { - EVP_PKEY * pkey; - EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx; - size_t required; + EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx; + const EVP_MD * md; + size_t required; assert(pkp != NULL); assert(sig != NULL); - pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) pkp; - mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!mdctx) goto fail_ctx; - if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1) - goto fail_digest; + md = select_md(pkp, nid); - if (EVP_DigestSignUpdate(mdctx, msg.data, msg.len) != 1) + if (EVP_DigestSignInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pkp) != 1) goto fail_digest; - if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, NULL, &required) != 1) + /* Get required signature buffer size */ + if (EVP_DigestSign(mdctx, NULL, &required, msg.data, msg.len) != 1) goto fail_digest; sig->data = malloc(required); if (sig->data == NULL) goto fail_digest; - if (EVP_DigestSignFinal(mdctx, sig->data, &required) != 1) + if (EVP_DigestSign(mdctx, sig->data, &required, msg.data, msg.len) != 1) goto fail_sign; sig->len = required; @@ -751,29 +1609,27 @@ int openssl_sign(void * pkp, return -1; } -int openssl_verify_sig(void * pk, - buffer_t msg, - buffer_t sig) +int openssl_verify_sig(EVP_PKEY * pk, + int nid, + buffer_t msg, + buffer_t sig) { - EVP_PKEY * pkey; - EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx; - int ret; + EVP_MD_CTX * mdctx; + const EVP_MD * md; + int ret; assert(pk != NULL); - pkey = (EVP_PKEY *) pk; - mdctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new(); if (!mdctx) goto fail_ctx; - if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdctx, NULL, EVP_sha256(), NULL, pkey) != 1) - goto fail_digest; + md = select_md(pk, nid); - if (EVP_DigestVerifyUpdate(mdctx, msg.data, msg.len) != 1) + if (EVP_DigestVerifyInit(mdctx, NULL, md, NULL, pk) != 1) goto fail_digest; - ret = EVP_DigestVerifyFinal(mdctx, sig.data, sig.len); + ret = EVP_DigestVerify(mdctx, sig.data, sig.len, msg.data, msg.len); if (ret != 1) goto fail_digest; @@ -786,3 +1642,55 @@ int openssl_verify_sig(void * pk, clrbuf(sig); return -1; } + +ssize_t openssl_md_digest(int nid, + buffer_t in, + uint8_t * out) +{ + const EVP_MD * md; + unsigned int len; + + assert(in.data != NULL); + assert(out != NULL); + + md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid); + if (md == NULL) + return -1; + + if (EVP_Digest(in.data, in.len, out, &len, md, NULL) != 1) + return -1; + + return (ssize_t) len; +} + +ssize_t openssl_md_len(int nid) +{ + const EVP_MD * md; + + md = EVP_get_digestbynid(nid); + if (md == NULL) + return -1; + + return (ssize_t) EVP_MD_get_size(md); +} + +int openssl_secure_malloc_init(size_t max, + size_t guard) +{ + return CRYPTO_secure_malloc_init(max, guard) == 1 ? 0 : -1; +} + +void openssl_secure_malloc_fini(void) +{ + CRYPTO_secure_malloc_done(); +} + +void * openssl_secure_malloc(size_t size) +{ + return OPENSSL_secure_malloc(size); +} + +void openssl_secure_free(void * ptr) +{ + OPENSSL_secure_free(ptr); +} diff --git a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h index d4ee73b9..c28d0b4d 100644 --- a/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h +++ b/src/lib/crypt/openssl.h @@ -26,28 +26,52 @@ #ifndef OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_OPENSSL_H #define OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_OPENSSL_H -ssize_t openssl_ecdh_pkp_create(void ** pkp, - uint8_t * pk); +struct ossl_crypt_ctx; -void openssl_ecdh_pkp_destroy(void * pkp); +ssize_t openssl_pkp_create(const char * algo, + EVP_PKEY ** pkp, + uint8_t * pk); -int openssl_ecdh_derive(void * pkp, - buffer_t pk, - uint8_t * s); +void openssl_pkp_destroy(EVP_PKEY * pkp); -int openssl_encrypt(void * ctx, - uint8_t * key, - buffer_t in, - buffer_t * out); +int openssl_dhe_derive(EVP_PKEY * pkp, + buffer_t pk, + int kdf_nid, + uint8_t * s); -int openssl_decrypt(void * ctx, - uint8_t * key, - buffer_t in, - buffer_t * out); +ssize_t openssl_kem_encap(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf_nid, + uint8_t * s); -void * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(void); +/* no X509 DER support yet for DHKEM public keys */ +ssize_t openssl_kem_encap_raw(buffer_t pk, + uint8_t * ct, + int kdf_nid, + uint8_t * s); -void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(void * ctx); +int openssl_kem_decap(EVP_PKEY * priv, + buffer_t ct, + int kdf_nid, + uint8_t * s); + +int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_der(buffer_t pk, + char * algo); + +int openssl_get_algo_from_pk_raw(buffer_t pk, + char * algo); + +int openssl_encrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx, + buffer_t in, + buffer_t * out); + +int openssl_decrypt(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx, + buffer_t in, + buffer_t * out); + +struct ossl_crypt_ctx * openssl_crypt_create_ctx(struct crypt_sk * sk); + +void openssl_crypt_destroy_ctx(struct ossl_crypt_ctx * ctx); /* AUTHENTICATION */ @@ -76,15 +100,25 @@ int openssl_load_pubkey_file(const char * path, int openssl_load_pubkey_str(const char * str, void ** key); +int openssl_load_pubkey_file_to_der(const char * path, + buffer_t * buf); +int openssl_load_pubkey_raw_file(const char * path, + buffer_t * buf); + +int openssl_load_privkey_raw_file(const char * path, + void ** key); -int openssl_cmp_key(const void * key1, - const void * key2); +int openssl_cmp_key(const EVP_PKEY * key1, + const EVP_PKEY * key2); -void openssl_free_key(void * key); +void openssl_free_key(EVP_PKEY * key); int openssl_check_crt_name(void * crt, const char * name); +int openssl_get_crt_name(void * crt, + char * name); + int openssl_crt_str(const void * crt, char * str); @@ -101,12 +135,31 @@ int openssl_auth_add_crt_to_store(void * store, int openssl_verify_crt(void * store, void * crt); -int openssl_sign(void * pkp, +int openssl_sign(EVP_PKEY * pkp, + int md_nid, buffer_t msg, buffer_t * sig); -int openssl_verify_sig(void * pk, - buffer_t msg, - buffer_t sig); +int openssl_verify_sig(EVP_PKEY * pk, + int md_nid, + buffer_t msg, + buffer_t sig); + +ssize_t openssl_md_digest(int md_nid, + buffer_t in, + uint8_t * out); + +ssize_t openssl_md_len(int md_nid); + +/* Secure memory allocation */ +int openssl_secure_malloc_init(size_t max, + size_t guard); + +void openssl_secure_malloc_fini(void); + +void * openssl_secure_malloc(size_t size); + +void openssl_secure_free(void * ptr, + size_t size); #endif /* OUROBOROS_LIB_CRYPT_OPENSSL_H */ diff --git a/src/lib/dev.c b/src/lib/dev.c index cb483aca..2c0dbf28 100644 --- a/src/lib/dev.c +++ b/src/lib/dev.c @@ -502,8 +502,10 @@ static void flow_fini(int fd) pthread_rwlock_unlock(&ai.lock); } +#define IS_ENCRYPTED(crypt) ((crypt)->nid != NID_undef) +#define IS_ORDERED(flow) (flow.qs.in_order != 0) static int flow_init(struct flow_info * info, - buffer_t * sk) + struct crypt_sk * sk) { struct timespec now; struct flow * flow; @@ -542,16 +544,15 @@ static int flow_init(struct flow_info * info, flow->rcv_act = now; flow->crypt = NULL; - if (sk!= NULL && sk->data != NULL) { - assert(sk->len == SYMMKEYSZ); - flow->crypt = crypt_create_ctx(sk->data); + if (IS_ENCRYPTED(sk)) { + flow->crypt = crypt_create_ctx(sk); if (flow->crypt == NULL) goto fail_crypt; } assert(flow->frcti == NULL); - if (info->qs.in_order != 0) { + if (IS_ORDERED(flow->info)) { flow->frcti = frcti_create(fd, DELT_A, DELT_R, info->mpl); if (flow->frcti == NULL) goto fail_frcti; @@ -708,6 +709,11 @@ static void init(int argc, goto fail_timerwheel; } + if (crypt_secure_malloc_init(PROC_SECMEM_MAX) < 0) { + fprintf(stderr, "FATAL: Could not init secure malloc.\n"); + goto fail_timerwheel; + } + #if defined PROC_FLOW_STATS if (strstr(argv[0], "ipcpd") == NULL) { sprintf(procstr, "proc.%d", getpid()); @@ -823,12 +829,13 @@ __attribute__((section(FINI_SECTION))) __typeof__(fini) * __fini = fini; int flow_accept(qosspec_t * qs, const struct timespec * timeo) { - struct flow_info flow; - uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; - buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; - buffer_t sk; - int fd; - int err; + struct flow_info flow; + struct crypt_sk crypt; + uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; + buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; + uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + int fd; + int err; #ifdef QOS_DISABLE_CRC if (qs != NULL) @@ -846,13 +853,15 @@ int flow_accept(qosspec_t * qs, if (err < 0) return err; - err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &sk); + crypt.key = key; + + err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt); if (err < 0) return err; - fd = flow_init(&flow, &sk); + fd = flow_init(&flow, &crypt); - freebuf(sk); + explicit_bzero(key, SYMMKEYSZ); if (qs != NULL) *qs = flow.qs; @@ -864,12 +873,13 @@ int flow_alloc(const char * dst, qosspec_t * qs, const struct timespec * timeo) { - struct flow_info flow; - uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; - buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; - buffer_t sk; /* symmetric key */ - int fd; - int err; + struct flow_info flow; + struct crypt_sk crypt; + uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; + buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; + uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + int fd; + int err; #ifdef QOS_DISABLE_CRC if (qs != NULL) @@ -890,13 +900,15 @@ int flow_alloc(const char * dst, return err; } - err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &sk); + crypt.key = key; + + err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt); if (err < 0) return err; - fd = flow_init(&flow, &sk); + fd = flow_init(&flow, &crypt); - freebuf(sk); + explicit_bzero(key, SYMMKEYSZ); if (qs != NULL) *qs = flow.qs; @@ -907,11 +919,13 @@ int flow_alloc(const char * dst, int flow_join(const char * dst, const struct timespec * timeo) { - struct flow_info flow; - uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; - buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; - int fd; - int err; + struct flow_info flow; + struct crypt_sk crypt; + uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; + buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; + uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + int fd; + int err; memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow)); @@ -925,11 +939,15 @@ int flow_join(const char * dst, if (err < 0) return err; - err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, NULL); + crypt.key = key; + + err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt); if (err < 0) return err; - fd = flow_init(&flow, NULL); + fd = flow_init(&flow, &crypt); + + explicit_bzero(key, SYMMKEYSZ); return fd; } @@ -1785,7 +1803,8 @@ ssize_t fevent(struct flow_set * set, int np1_flow_alloc(pid_t n_pid, int flow_id) { - struct flow_info flow; + struct flow_info flow; + struct crypt_sk crypt = { .nid = NID_undef, .key = NULL }; memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow)); @@ -1795,7 +1814,7 @@ int np1_flow_alloc(pid_t n_pid, flow.mpl = 0; flow.n_1_pid = n_pid; /* This "flow" is upside-down! */ - return flow_init(&flow, NULL); + return flow_init(&flow, &crypt); } int np1_flow_dealloc(int flow_id, @@ -1859,9 +1878,11 @@ int ipcp_flow_req_arr(const buffer_t * dst, const buffer_t * data) { struct flow_info flow; - uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; - buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; - int err; + uint8_t buf[SOCK_BUF_SIZE]; + buffer_t msg = {SOCK_BUF_SIZE, buf}; + struct crypt_sk crypt; + uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + int err; memset(&flow, 0, sizeof(flow)); @@ -1878,17 +1899,23 @@ int ipcp_flow_req_arr(const buffer_t * dst, if (err < 0) return err; - err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, NULL); + crypt.key = key; + + err = flow__irm_result_des(&msg, &flow, &crypt); if (err < 0) return err; + assert(crypt.nid == NID_undef); /* np1 flows are not encrypted */ + /* inverted for np1_flow */ flow.n_1_pid = flow.n_pid; flow.n_pid = getpid(); flow.mpl = 0; flow.qs = qos_np1; - return flow_init(&flow, NULL); + crypt.nid = NID_undef; + + return flow_init(&flow, &crypt); } int ipcp_flow_alloc_reply(int fd, diff --git a/src/lib/pb/irm.proto b/src/lib/pb/irm.proto index 75f5f350..5d0ee611 100644 --- a/src/lib/pb/irm.proto +++ b/src/lib/pb/irm.proto @@ -91,8 +91,9 @@ message irm_msg { optional sint32 mpl = 20; optional string comp = 21; optional bytes pk = 22; /* piggyback */ - optional bytes symmkey = 23; - optional uint32 timeo_sec = 24; - optional uint32 timeo_nsec = 25; - optional sint32 result = 26; + optional uint32 timeo_sec = 23; + optional uint32 timeo_nsec = 24; + optional sint32 result = 25; + optional bytes sym_key = 26; /* symmetric encryption key */ + optional sint32 cipher_nid = 27; /* cipher NID */ } diff --git a/src/lib/protobuf.c b/src/lib/protobuf.c index 6df4e810..bd6c179e 100644 --- a/src/lib/protobuf.c +++ b/src/lib/protobuf.c @@ -23,6 +23,7 @@ #define _DEFAULT_SOURCE #include <ouroboros/protobuf.h> +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> @@ -96,6 +97,8 @@ struct flow_info flow_info_msg_to_s(const flow_info_msg_t * msg) assert(msg != NULL); + memset(&s, 0, sizeof(s)); + s.id = msg->id; s.n_pid = msg->n_pid; s.n_1_pid = msg->n_1_pid; diff --git a/src/lib/serdes-irm.c b/src/lib/serdes-irm.c index 3aea0617..a0fdbec2 100644 --- a/src/lib/serdes-irm.c +++ b/src/lib/serdes-irm.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include "config.h" +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> #include <ouroboros/errno.h> #include <ouroboros/serdes-irm.h> #include <ouroboros/protobuf.h> @@ -133,16 +134,13 @@ int flow_join__irm_req_ser(buffer_t * buf, IRM_MSG_CODE__IRM_FLOW_JOIN); } -int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf, - struct flow_info * flow, - buffer_t * sk) +int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf, + struct flow_info * flow, + struct crypt_sk * sk) { irm_msg_t * msg; int err; - if (sk != NULL) - sk->data = NULL; - msg = irm_msg__unpack(NULL, buf->len, buf->data); if (msg == NULL) { err = -EIRMD; @@ -166,13 +164,15 @@ int flow__irm_result_des(buffer_t * buf, *flow = flow_info_msg_to_s(msg->flow_info); - if (sk != NULL) { - sk->len = msg->symmkey.len; - sk->data = msg->symmkey.data; + if (msg->has_cipher_nid) + sk->nid = msg->cipher_nid; + else + sk->nid = NID_undef; - msg->symmkey.data = NULL; - msg->symmkey.len = 0; - } + if (msg->sym_key.len == SYMMKEYSZ) + memcpy(sk->key, msg->sym_key.data, SYMMKEYSZ); + else + memset(sk->key, 0, SYMMKEYSZ); irm_msg__free_unpacked(msg, NULL); diff --git a/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt b/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt index 69fdf18b..6ab69bd1 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt +++ b/src/lib/tests/CMakeLists.txt @@ -1,14 +1,19 @@ get_filename_component(PARENT_PATH ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR} DIRECTORY) get_filename_component(PARENT_DIR ${PARENT_PATH} NAME) +compute_test_prefix() + create_test_sourcelist(${PARENT_DIR}_tests test_suite.c # Add new tests here auth_test.c + auth_test_pqc.c bitmap_test.c btree_test.c crc32_test.c crypt_test.c hash_test.c + kex_test.c + kex_test_pqc.c md5_test.c sha3_test.c shm_rbuff_test.c @@ -33,8 +38,11 @@ endif() foreach (test ${tests_to_run}) get_filename_component(test_name ${test} NAME_WE) - add_test(${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name}) + add_test(${TEST_PREFIX}/${test_name} ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/${PARENT_DIR}_test ${test_name}) endforeach (test) -set_property(TEST auth_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) -set_property(TEST crypt_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) +set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/auth_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) +set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/auth_test_pqc PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) +set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/crypt_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) +set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/kex_test PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) +set_property(TEST ${TEST_PREFIX}/kex_test_pqc PROPERTY SKIP_RETURN_CODE 1) diff --git a/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c b/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c index 896c42b0..16c88f31 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c +++ b/src/lib/tests/auth_test.c @@ -22,111 +22,14 @@ #include "config.h" -#include <ouroboros/test.h> +#include <test/test.h> #include <ouroboros/crypt.h> #include <ouroboros/random.h> #include <ouroboros/utils.h> -#define TEST_MSG_SIZE 1500 +#include <test/certs.h> -/* -* Certificates created following the guide -* Building an openssl certificate authority -* on -* https://community.f5.com/kb/technicalarticles/ -*/ - -/* Root certificate for CA ca.unittest.o7s */ -static const char * root_ca_crt = \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" -"MIICXTCCAgOgAwIBAgIURlENlCOy1OsA/AXFscPUQ2li8OYwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n" -"fDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAKBgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAK\n" -"BgNVBAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UECwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51\n" -"bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWASAwHhcNMjUwODAzMTg1MzE1WhcN\n" -"NDUwNzI5MTg1MzE1WjB8MQswCQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQ4wDAYD\n" -"VQQHDAVHaGVudDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n" -"GDAWBgNVBAMMD2NhLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEQMA4GCSqGSIb3DQEJARYBIDBZMBMG\n" -"ByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEHA0IABEPMseCScbd/d5TlHmyYVszn/YGVeNdUCnFR\n" -"naOr95WlTNo3MyKKBuoiEFwHhjPASgXr/VDVjJLSyM3JUPebAcGjYzBhMB0GA1Ud\n" -"DgQWBBQkxjMILHH6lZ+rnCMnD/63GO3y1zAfBgNVHSMEGDAWgBQkxjMILHH6lZ+r\n" -"nCMnD/63GO3y1zAPBgNVHRMBAf8EBTADAQH/MA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIBhjAKBggq\n" -"hkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiEA1jVJWW4idkCgAYv0m2LT9C33Dq42aLyRkJ+9YdzDqLwC\n" -"IHT6MS4I0k52YP/hxoqWVBbpOW79PKYMRLyXTk1r7+Fa\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; - - -/* Certificate for intermediary im.unittest.o7s used for signing */ -static const char * intermediate_ca_crt = \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" -"MIICbTCCAhOgAwIBAgICEAMwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwfDELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n" -"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAKBgNVBAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UE\n" -"CwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkq\n" -"hkiG9w0BCQEWASAwHhcNMjUwODAzMTkwMjU3WhcNNDUwNzI5MTkwMjU3WjBaMQsw\n" -"CQYDVQQGEwJCRTEMMAoGA1UECAwDT1ZMMQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsM\n" -"DHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEYMBYGA1UEAwwPaW0udW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMFkwEwYHKoZI\n" -"zj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAEdlra08XItIPtVl5veaq4UF6LIcBXj2mZFqKNEXFh\n" -"l9uAz6UAbIc+FUPNfom6dwKbg/AjQ82a100eh6K/jCY7eKOBpjCBozAdBgNVHQ4E\n" -"FgQUy8Go8BIO6i0lJ+mgBr9lvh2L0eswHwYDVR0jBBgwFoAUJMYzCCxx+pWfq5wj\n" -"Jw/+txjt8tcwEgYDVR0TAQH/BAgwBgEB/wIBADAOBgNVHQ8BAf8EBAMCAYYwEQYD\n" -"VR0fBAowCDAGoASgAoYAMCoGCCsGAQUFBwEBBB4wHDAMBggrBgEFBQcwAoYAMAwG\n" -"CCsGAQUFBzABhgAwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIDSAAwRQIhAN3ZYhqu6mVLGidmONsbANk5\n" -"rzT6aHJcmvj19OxMusaXAiBKy0gBFCri/GLizi4wZo09wf31yZMqfr8IrApvPaLw\n" -"qA==\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; - -/* Server test-1.unittest.o7s private-public key pair */ -static const char * server_ec_pkp = \ -"-----BEGIN EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n" -"MHcCAQEEIA4/bcmquVvGrY4+TtfnFSy1SpXs896r5xJjGuD6NmGRoAoGCCqGSM49\n" -"AwEHoUQDQgAE4BSOhv36q4bCMLSkJaCvzwZ3pPy2M0YzRKFKeV48tG5eD+MBaTrT\n" -"eoHUcRfpz0EO/inq3FVDzEoAQ2NWpnz0kA==\n" -"-----END EC PRIVATE KEY-----\n"; - -/* Public key for the Private key */ -static const char * server_ec_pk = \ -"-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" -"MFkwEwYHKoZIzj0CAQYIKoZIzj0DAQcDQgAE4BSOhv36q4bCMLSkJaCvzwZ3pPy2\n" -"M0YzRKFKeV48tG5eD+MBaTrTeoHUcRfpz0EO/inq3FVDzEoAQ2NWpnz0kA==\n" -"-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n"; - -/* Valid signed server certificate for test-1.unittest.o7s */ -#define SSC_TEXT_SIZE 2295 /* size of cleartext certificate */ -static const char * signed_server_crt = \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" -"MIIDiTCCAy+gAwIBAgICEAUwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIwWjELMAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAK\n" -"BgNVBAgMA09WTDEMMAoGA1UECgwDbzdzMRUwEwYDVQQLDAx1bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mx\n" -"GDAWBgNVBAMMD2ltLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNTA4MDgxODQ4NTNaFw00NTA4\n" -"MDMxODQ4NTNaMG4xCzAJBgNVBAYTAkJFMQwwCgYDVQQIDANPVkwxDjAMBgNVBAcM\n" -"BUdoZW50MQwwCgYDVQQKDANvN3MxFTATBgNVBAsMDHVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czEcMBoG\n" -"A1UEAwwTdGVzdC0xLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czBZMBMGByqGSM49AgEGCCqGSM49AwEH\n" -"A0IABOAUjob9+quGwjC0pCWgr88Gd6T8tjNGM0ShSnlePLRuXg/jAWk603qB1HEX\n" -"6c9BDv4p6txVQ8xKAENjVqZ89JCjggHPMIIByzAJBgNVHRMEAjAAMBEGCWCGSAGG\n" -"+EIBAQQEAwIGQDA4BglghkgBhvhCAQ0EKxYpbzdzIHVuaXR0ZXN0IEdlbmVyYXRl\n" -"ZCBTZXJ2ZXIgQ2VydGlmaWNhdGUwHQYDVR0OBBYEFI+htsK0xxy6e1CqCyxn7mqi\n" -"wRrpMIGoBgNVHSMEgaAwgZ2AFMvBqPASDuotJSfpoAa/Zb4di9HroYGApH4wfDEL\n" -"MAkGA1UEBhMCQkUxDDAKBgNVBAgMA09WTDEOMAwGA1UEBwwFR2hlbnQxDDAKBgNV\n" -"BAoMA283czEVMBMGA1UECwwMdW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMRgwFgYDVQQDDA9jYS51bml0\n" -"dGVzdC5vN3MxEDAOBgkqhkiG9w0BCQEWASCCAhADMA4GA1UdDwEB/wQEAwIFoDAT\n" -"BgNVHSUEDDAKBggrBgEFBQcDATAoBgNVHR8EITAfMB2gG6AZhhdodHRwczovL291\n" -"cm9ib3Jvcy5yb2NrczBYBggrBgEFBQcBAQRMMEowIwYIKwYBBQUHMAKGF2h0dHBz\n" -"Oi8vb3Vyb2Jvcm9zLnJvY2tzMCMGCCsGAQUFBzABhhdodHRwczovL291cm9ib3Jv\n" -"cy5yb2NrczAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNIADBFAiBZuw/Yb2pq925H7pEiOXr4fMo0wknz\n" -"ktkxoHAFbjQEPQIhAMInHI7lvRmS0IMw1wBF/WlUZWKvhyU/TeMIZfk/JGCS\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; - -/* Self-signed by server test-1.unittest.o7s using its key */ -static const char * server_crt = \ -"-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----\n" -"MIIBfjCCASWgAwIBAgIUB5VYxp7i+sgYjvLiwfpf0W5NfqQwCgYIKoZIzj0EAwIw\n" -"HjEcMBoGA1UEAwwTdGVzdC0xLnVuaXR0ZXN0Lm83czAeFw0yNTA4MDMxOTI4MzVa\n" -"Fw00NTA3MjkxOTI4MzVaMB4xHDAaBgNVBAMME3Rlc3QtMS51bml0dGVzdC5vN3Mw\n" -"WTATBgcqhkjOPQIBBggqhkjOPQMBBwNCAATgFI6G/fqrhsIwtKQloK/PBnek/LYz\n" -"RjNEoUp5Xjy0bl4P4wFpOtN6gdRxF+nPQQ7+KercVUPMSgBDY1amfPSQo0EwPzAe\n" -"BgNVHREEFzAVghN0ZXN0LTEudW5pdHRlc3QubzdzMB0GA1UdDgQWBBSPobbCtMcc\n" -"untQqgssZ+5qosEa6TAKBggqhkjOPQQDAgNHADBEAiAoFC/rqgrRXmMUx4y5cPbv\n" -"jOKpoL3FpehRgGkPatmL/QIgMRHc2TSGo6q1SG22Xt1dHAIBsaN2AlSfhjKULMH5\n" -"gRo=\n" -"-----END CERTIFICATE-----\n"; +#define TEST_MSG_SIZE 1500 static int test_auth_create_destroy_ctx(void) { @@ -156,7 +59,7 @@ static int test_load_free_crt(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt, &crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load certificate string.\n"); goto fail_load; } @@ -178,7 +81,7 @@ static int test_crypt_get_pubkey_crt(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load server certificate from string.\n"); goto fail_load; } @@ -208,7 +111,7 @@ static int test_check_crt_name(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load certificate from string.\n"); goto fail_load; } @@ -241,7 +144,7 @@ static int test_load_free_privkey(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_ec_pkp, &key) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, &key) < 0) { printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n"); goto fail_load; } @@ -262,7 +165,7 @@ static int test_load_free_pubkey(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &key) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &key) < 0) { printf("Failed to load server public key from string.\n"); goto fail_load; } @@ -285,12 +188,12 @@ static int test_crypt_check_pubkey_crt(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load public certificate from string.\n"); goto fail_crt; } - if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &pk) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &pk) < 0) { printf("Failed to load public key from string.\n"); goto fail_pubkey; } @@ -337,7 +240,7 @@ static int test_store_add(void) goto fail_create; } - if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ec, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n"); goto fail_load; } @@ -369,7 +272,7 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void) void * _server_crt; void * _signed_server_crt; void * _root_ca_crt; - void * _intermediate_ca_crt; + void * _im_ca_crt; TEST_START(); @@ -379,24 +282,24 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void) goto fail_create_ctx; } - if (crypt_load_crt_str(server_crt, &_server_crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(server_crt_ec, &_server_crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load self-signed crt from string.\n"); goto fail_load_server_crt; } - if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &_signed_server_crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &_signed_server_crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load signed crt from string.\n"); goto fail_load_signed_server_crt; } - if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ec, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n"); goto fail_load_root_ca_crt; } - if (crypt_load_crt_str(intermediate_ca_crt, &_intermediate_ca_crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(im_ca_crt_ec, &_im_ca_crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load intermediate crt from string.\n"); - goto fail_load_intermediate_ca_crt; + goto fail_load_im_ca_crt; } if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _root_ca_crt) < 0) { @@ -404,7 +307,7 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void) goto fail_verify; } - if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _intermediate_ca_crt) < 0) { + if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _im_ca_crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to add intermediate ca crt to auth store.\n"); goto fail_verify; } @@ -419,7 +322,7 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void) goto fail_verify; } - crypt_free_crt(_intermediate_ca_crt); + crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt); crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt); crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt); crypt_free_crt(_server_crt); @@ -430,8 +333,8 @@ static int test_verify_crt(void) return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; fail_verify: - crypt_free_crt(_intermediate_ca_crt); - fail_load_intermediate_ca_crt: + crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt); + fail_load_im_ca_crt: crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt); fail_load_root_ca_crt: crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt); @@ -462,22 +365,22 @@ int test_auth_sign(void) goto fail_init; } - if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_ec_pkp, &pkp) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, &pkp) < 0) { printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n"); goto fail_init; } - if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &pk) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &pk) < 0) { printf("Failed to load public key.\n"); goto fail_pubkey; } - if (auth_sign(pkp, msg, &sig) < 0) { + if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) { printf("Failed to sign message.\n"); goto fail_sign; } - if (auth_verify_sig(pk, msg, sig) < 0) { + if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, sig) < 0) { printf("Failed to verify signature.\n"); goto fail_verify; } @@ -519,17 +422,17 @@ int test_auth_bad_signature(void) goto fail_init; } - if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_ec_pkp, &pkp) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ec, &pkp) < 0) { printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n"); goto fail_init; } - if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_ec_pk, &pk) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ec, &pk) < 0) { printf("Failed to load public key.\n"); goto fail_pubkey; } - if (auth_sign(pkp, msg, &sig) < 0) { + if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) { printf("Failed to sign message.\n"); goto fail_sign; } @@ -546,7 +449,7 @@ int test_auth_bad_signature(void) goto fail_malloc; } - if (auth_verify_sig(pk, msg, fake_sig) == 0) { + if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, fake_sig) == 0) { printf("Failed to detect bad signature.\n"); goto fail_verify; } @@ -579,7 +482,7 @@ int test_crt_str(void) TEST_START(); - if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt, &crt) < 0) { + if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ec, &crt) < 0) { printf("Failed to load certificate from string.\n"); goto fail_load; } diff --git a/src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c b/src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..349636d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tests/auth_test_pqc.c @@ -0,0 +1,356 @@ +/* + * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026 + * + * Test of the PQC authentication functions (ML-DSA-65) + * + * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> + * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/. + */ + +#include "config.h" + +#include <test/test.h> +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> +#include <ouroboros/random.h> +#include <ouroboros/utils.h> + +#include <test/certs_pqc.h> + +#define TEST_MSG_SIZE 1500 + +static int test_auth_create_destroy_ctx(void) +{ + struct auth_ctx * ctx; + + TEST_START(); + + ctx = auth_create_ctx(); + if (ctx == NULL) { + printf("Failed to create auth context.\n"); + goto fail_create; + } + + auth_destroy_ctx(ctx); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_create: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_load_free_crt(void) +{ + void * crt; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ml, &crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n"); + goto fail_load; + } + + crypt_free_crt(crt); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_load: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_load_free_privkey(void) +{ + void * key; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, &key) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n"); + goto fail_load; + } + + crypt_free_key(key); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_load: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_load_free_pubkey(void) +{ + void * key; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ml, &key) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load server public key from string.\n"); + goto fail_load; + } + + crypt_free_key(key); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_load: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_verify_crt(void) +{ + struct auth_ctx * auth; + void * _server_crt; + void * _signed_server_crt; + void * _root_ca_crt; + void * _im_ca_crt; + + TEST_START(); + + auth = auth_create_ctx(); + if (auth == NULL) { + printf("Failed to create auth context.\n"); + goto fail_create_ctx; + } + + if (crypt_load_crt_str(server_crt_ml, &_server_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load self-signed crt from string.\n"); + goto fail_load_server_crt; + } + + if (crypt_load_crt_str(signed_server_crt_ml, &_signed_server_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load signed crt from string.\n"); + goto fail_load_signed_server_crt; + } + + if (crypt_load_crt_str(root_ca_crt_ml, &_root_ca_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load root crt from string.\n"); + goto fail_load_root_ca_crt; + } + + if (crypt_load_crt_str(im_ca_crt_ml, &_im_ca_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load intermediate crt from string.\n"); + goto fail_load_im_ca_crt; + } + + if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _root_ca_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to add root ca crt to auth store.\n"); + goto fail_verify; + } + + if (auth_add_crt_to_store(auth, _im_ca_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to add intermediate ca crt to auth store.\n"); + goto fail_verify; + } + + if (auth_verify_crt(auth, _signed_server_crt) < 0) { + printf("Failed to verify signed crt with ca crt.\n"); + goto fail_verify; + } + + if (auth_verify_crt(auth, _server_crt) == 0) { + printf("Failed to detect untrusted crt.\n"); + goto fail_verify; + } + + crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt); + crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt); + crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt); + crypt_free_crt(_server_crt); + + auth_destroy_ctx(auth); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_verify: + crypt_free_crt(_im_ca_crt); + fail_load_im_ca_crt: + crypt_free_crt(_root_ca_crt); + fail_load_root_ca_crt: + crypt_free_crt(_signed_server_crt); + fail_load_signed_server_crt: + crypt_free_crt(_server_crt); + fail_load_server_crt: + auth_destroy_ctx(auth); + fail_create_ctx: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_auth_sign(void) +{ + uint8_t buf[TEST_MSG_SIZE]; + void * pkp; + void * pk; + buffer_t msg; + buffer_t sig; + + TEST_START(); + + msg.data = buf; + msg.len = sizeof(buf); + + if (random_buffer(msg.data, msg.len) < 0) { + printf("Failed to generate random message.\n"); + goto fail_init; + } + + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, &pkp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n"); + goto fail_init; + } + + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ml, &pk) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load public key from string.\n"); + goto fail_pubkey; + } + + if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) { + printf("Failed to sign message.\n"); + goto fail_sign; + } + + if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, sig) < 0) { + printf("Failed to verify signature.\n"); + goto fail_verify; + } + + freebuf(sig); + + crypt_free_key(pk); + crypt_free_key(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_verify: + freebuf(sig); + fail_sign: + crypt_free_key(pk); + fail_pubkey: + crypt_free_key(pkp); + fail_init: + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_auth_bad_signature(void) +{ + uint8_t buf[TEST_MSG_SIZE]; + void * pkp; + void * pk; + buffer_t msg; + buffer_t sig; + buffer_t fake_sig; + + TEST_START(); + + msg.data = buf; + msg.len = sizeof(buf); + + if (random_buffer(msg.data, msg.len) < 0) { + printf("Failed to generate random message.\n"); + goto fail_init; + } + + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(server_pkp_ml, &pkp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load server key pair from string.\n"); + goto fail_init; + } + + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(server_pk_ml, &pk) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load public key from string.\n"); + goto fail_pubkey; + } + + if (auth_sign(pkp, 0, msg, &sig) < 0) { + printf("Failed to sign message.\n"); + goto fail_sign; + } + + fake_sig.data = malloc(sig.len); + if (fake_sig.data == NULL) { + printf("Failed to allocate memory for fake signature.\n"); + goto fail_malloc; + } + + fake_sig.len = sig.len; + if (random_buffer(fake_sig.data, fake_sig.len) < 0) { + printf("Failed to generate random fake signature.\n"); + goto fail_malloc; + } + + if (auth_verify_sig(pk, 0, msg, fake_sig) == 0) { + printf("Failed to detect bad ML-DSA-65 signature.\n"); + goto fail_verify; + } + + freebuf(fake_sig); + freebuf(sig); + + crypt_free_key(pk); + crypt_free_key(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_verify: + freebuf(fake_sig); + fail_malloc: + freebuf(sig); + fail_sign: + crypt_free_key(pk); + fail_pubkey: + crypt_free_key(pkp); + fail_init: + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +int auth_test_pqc(int argc, + char ** argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + (void) argc; + (void) argv; + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC + ret |= test_auth_create_destroy_ctx(); + ret |= test_load_free_crt(); + ret |= test_load_free_privkey(); + ret |= test_load_free_pubkey(); + ret |= test_verify_crt(); + ret |= test_auth_sign(); + ret |= test_auth_bad_signature(); +#else + (void) test_auth_create_destroy_ctx; + (void) test_load_free_crt; + (void) test_load_free_privkey; + (void) test_load_free_pubkey; + (void) test_verify_crt; + (void) test_auth_sign; + (void) test_auth_bad_signature; + + ret = TEST_RC_SKIP; +#endif + return ret; +} diff --git a/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c b/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c index e7a09e8f..906059be 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c +++ b/src/lib/tests/crypt_test.c @@ -22,45 +22,32 @@ #include "config.h" -#include <ouroboros/test.h> -#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> +#include <test/test.h> #include <ouroboros/random.h> +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> #include <ouroboros/utils.h> -#define TEST_PACKET_SIZE 1500 - -static int test_crypt_create_destroy(void) -{ - struct crypt_ctx * ctx; - - TEST_START(); - - ctx = crypt_create_ctx(NULL); - if (ctx == NULL) { - printf("Failed to initialize cryptography.\n"); - goto fail; - } - - crypt_destroy_ctx(ctx); +#include <stdio.h> - TEST_SUCCESS(); +#define TEST_PACKET_SIZE 1500 - return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; - fail: - TEST_FAIL(); - return TEST_RC_FAIL; -} +extern const uint16_t crypt_supported_nids[]; +extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[]; -static int test_crypt_create_destroy_with_key(void) +static int test_crypt_create_destroy(void) { struct crypt_ctx * ctx; uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + struct crypt_sk sk = { + .nid = NID_aes_256_gcm, + .key = key + }; TEST_START(); memset(key, 0, sizeof(key)); - ctx = crypt_create_ctx(key); + ctx = crypt_create_ctx(&sk); if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Failed to initialize cryptography.\n"); goto fail; @@ -76,100 +63,22 @@ static int test_crypt_create_destroy_with_key(void) return TEST_RC_FAIL; } -static int test_crypt_dh_pkp_create_destroy(void) -{ - void * pkp; - uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; - - TEST_START(); - - if (crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp, buf) < 0) { - printf("Failed to create DH PKP."); - goto fail; - } - - crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp); - - TEST_SUCCESS(); - - return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; - fail: - TEST_FAIL(); - return TEST_RC_FAIL; -} - -static int test_crypt_dh_derive(void) -{ - void * pkp1; - void * pkp2; - buffer_t pk1; - buffer_t pk2; - ssize_t len; - uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; - uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; - uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ]; - uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ]; - - TEST_START(); - - len = crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp1, buf1); - if (len < 0) { - printf("Failed to create first key pair."); - goto fail_pkp1; - } - - pk1.len = (size_t) len; - pk1.data = buf1; - - len = crypt_dh_pkp_create(&pkp2, buf2); - if (len < 0) { - printf("Failed to create second key pair."); - goto fail_pkp2; - } - - pk2.len = (size_t) len; - pk2.data = buf2; - - if (crypt_dh_derive(pkp1, pk2, s1) < 0) { - printf("Failed to derive first key."); - goto fail; - } - - if (crypt_dh_derive(pkp2, pk1, s2) < 0) { - printf("Failed to derive second key."); - goto fail; - } - - if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) { - printf("Derived keys do not match."); - goto fail; - } - - crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp2); - crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp1); - - TEST_SUCCESS(); - - return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; - fail: - crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp2); - fail_pkp2: - crypt_dh_pkp_destroy(pkp1); - fail_pkp1: - TEST_FAIL(); - return TEST_RC_FAIL; -} - -int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void) +static int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(int nid) { uint8_t pkt[TEST_PACKET_SIZE]; - uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; struct crypt_ctx * ctx; + uint8_t key[SYMMKEYSZ]; + struct crypt_sk sk = { + .nid = NID_aes_256_gcm, + .key = key + }; buffer_t in; buffer_t out; buffer_t out2; + const char * cipher; - TEST_START(); + cipher = crypt_nid_to_str(nid); + TEST_START("(%s)", cipher); if (random_buffer(key, sizeof(key)) < 0) { printf("Failed to generate random key.\n"); @@ -181,7 +90,7 @@ int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void) goto fail_init; } - ctx = crypt_create_ctx(key); + ctx = crypt_create_ctx(&sk); if (ctx == NULL) { printf("Failed to initialize cryptography.\n"); goto fail_init; @@ -219,7 +128,7 @@ int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void) freebuf(out2); freebuf(out); - TEST_SUCCESS(); + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", cipher); return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; fail_chk: @@ -229,10 +138,122 @@ int test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(void) fail_encrypt: crypt_destroy_ctx(ctx); fail_init: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", cipher); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_encrypt_decrypt_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; crypt_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) + ret |= test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(crypt_supported_nids[i]); + + return ret; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> + +static int test_cipher_nid_values(void) +{ + int i; + + TEST_START(); + + /* Loop over all supported ciphers and verify NIDs match OpenSSL's */ + for (i = 0; crypt_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + uint16_t our_nid = crypt_supported_nids[i]; + const char * str = crypt_nid_to_str(our_nid); + const EVP_CIPHER * cipher; + int openssl_nid; + + if (str == NULL) { + printf("crypt_nid_to_str failed for NID %u\n", our_nid); + goto fail; + } + + cipher = EVP_get_cipherbyname(str); + if (cipher == NULL) { + printf("OpenSSL doesn't recognize cipher '%s'\n", str); + goto fail; + } + + openssl_nid = EVP_CIPHER_nid(cipher); + + if (our_nid != openssl_nid) { + printf("NID mismatch for '%s': ours=%u, OpenSSL=%d\n", + str, our_nid, openssl_nid); + goto fail; + } + + /* Test reverse conversion */ + if (crypt_str_to_nid(str) != our_nid) { + printf("crypt_str_to_nid failed for '%s'\n", str); + goto fail; + } + } + + /* Test error cases */ + if (crypt_str_to_nid("invalid") != NID_undef) { + printf("crypt_str_to_nid: no NID_undef for invalid.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (crypt_nid_to_str(9999) != NULL) { + printf("crypt_nid_to_str should return NULL for invalid NID\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (crypt_str_to_nid(NULL) != NID_undef) { + printf("crypt_str_to_nid should return NID_undef for NULL\n"); + goto fail; + } + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: TEST_FAIL(); return TEST_RC_FAIL; } +static int test_md_nid_values(void) +{ + int i; + + TEST_START(); + + for (i = 0; md_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + uint16_t our_nid = md_supported_nids[i]; + const EVP_MD * md; + int openssl_nid; + + md = EVP_get_digestbynid(our_nid); + if (md == NULL) { + printf("OpenSSL doesn't recognize NID %u\n", our_nid); + goto fail; + } + + openssl_nid = EVP_MD_nid(md); + if (our_nid != openssl_nid) { + printf("NID mismatch: ours=%u, OpenSSL=%d\n", + our_nid, openssl_nid); + goto fail; + } + } + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} +#endif + int crypt_test(int argc, char ** argv) { @@ -242,17 +263,10 @@ int crypt_test(int argc, (void) argv; ret |= test_crypt_create_destroy(); - ret |= test_crypt_create_destroy_with_key(); + ret |= test_encrypt_decrypt_all(); #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL - ret |= test_crypt_dh_pkp_create_destroy(); - ret |= test_crypt_dh_derive(); - ret |= test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt(); -#else - (void) test_crypt_dh_pkp_create_destroy; - (void) test_crypt_dh_derive; - (void) test_crypt_encrypt_decrypt; - - ret = TEST_RC_SKIP; + ret |= test_cipher_nid_values(); + ret |= test_md_nid_values(); #endif return ret; } diff --git a/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c b/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c index 970d9185..fb428b47 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c +++ b/src/lib/tests/hash_test.c @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ */ #include <ouroboros/hash.h> -#include <ouroboros/test.h> +#include <test/test.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <stdint.h> diff --git a/src/lib/tests/kex_test.c b/src/lib/tests/kex_test.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..58cf8b43 --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tests/kex_test.c @@ -0,0 +1,844 @@ +/* + * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2024 + * + * Test of the key exchange functions + * + * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> + * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/. + */ + +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L + +#include "config.h" + +#include <test/test.h> +#include <ouroboros/utils.h> +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#endif + +/* Test configuration strings */ +#define KEX_CONFIG_CUSTOM \ + "kex=X25519\n" + +#define KEX_CONFIG_NONE \ + "none\n" + +#define KEX_CONFIG_WHITESPACE \ + "# Comment line\n" \ + "kex = X448" \ + "\n" \ + "# Another comment\n" + +#define KEX_CONFIG_CIPHER \ + "kex=X25519\n" \ + "cipher=chacha20-poly1305\n" + +#define KEX_CONFIG_DIGEST \ + "kex=X25519\n" \ + "digest=sha384\n" + +/* Test key material for key loading tests */ +#define X25519_PRIVKEY_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n" \ + "MC4CAQAwBQYDK2VuBCIEIJDd3+/0k2IZlaH5sZ9Z2e5J8dV2U0nsXaSUm70ZaMhL\n" \ + "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + +#define X25519_PUBKEY_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" \ + "MCowBQYDK2VuAyEAKYLIycSZtLFlwAX07YWWgBAYhEnRxHfgK1TVw9+mtBs=\n" \ + "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + +/* Helper macro to open string constant as FILE stream */ +#define FMEMOPEN_STR(str) fmemopen((void *) (str), strlen(str), "r") + +extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[]; + +int parse_sec_config(struct sec_config * cfg, + FILE * fp); + +static int test_kex_create_destroy(void) +{ + struct sec_config cfg; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&cfg, 0, sizeof(cfg)); + cfg.x.nid = NID_X9_62_prime256v1; + cfg.x.str = kex_nid_to_str(cfg.x.nid); + cfg.c.nid = NID_aes_256_gcm; + cfg.c.str = crypt_nid_to_str(cfg.c.nid); + + if (cfg.x.nid == NID_undef || cfg.c.nid == NID_undef) { + printf("Failed to initialize kex config.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_dh_pkp_create_destroy(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp; + uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, "prime256v1"); + + if (kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf) < 0) { + printf("Failed to create DH PKP.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_get_algo_from_pk(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp; + buffer_t pk; + ssize_t len; + uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; + char extracted_algo[256]; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create key pair.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + pk.len = (size_t) len; + pk.data = buf; + + /* Use raw decode for hybrid KEMs, DER for others */ + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) { + if (kex_get_algo_from_pk_raw(pk, extracted_algo) < 0) { + printf("Failed to extract algo from pk.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + } else { + if (kex_get_algo_from_pk_der(pk, extracted_algo) < 0) { + printf("Failed to extract algo from pk.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + } + + /* All algorithms should now return the specific group name */ + if (strcmp(extracted_algo, algo) != 0) { + printf("Algo mismatch: expected %s, got %s.\n", + algo, extracted_algo); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_get_algo_from_pk_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + ret |= test_kex_get_algo_from_pk(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_kex_dhe_derive(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp1; + void * pkp2; + buffer_t pk1; + buffer_t pk2; + ssize_t len; + uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ]; + uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ]; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp1, buf1); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create first key pair for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail; + } + + pk1.len = (size_t) len; + pk1.data = buf1; + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp2, buf2); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create second key pair for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp1; + } + + pk2.len = (size_t) len; + pk2.data = buf2; + + if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex, pkp1, pk2, s1) < 0) { + printf("Failed to derive first key for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp2; + } + + if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex, pkp2, pk1, s2) < 0) { + printf("Failed to derive second key for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp2; + } + + if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) { + printf("Derived keys do not match for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp2; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2); + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp2: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2); + fail_pkp1: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_validate_algo(void) +{ + TEST_START(); + + if (kex_validate_algo("prime256v1") != 0) { + printf("prime256v1 should be valid.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex_validate_algo("X25519") != 0) { + printf("X25519 should be valid.\n"); + goto fail; + } + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC + if (kex_validate_algo("ML-KEM-768") != 0) { + printf("ML-KEM-768 should be valid.\n"); + goto fail; + } +#endif + + if (kex_validate_algo("ffdhe2048") != 0) { + printf("ffdhe2048 should be valid.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex_validate_algo("invalid_algo") == 0) { + printf("invalid_algo should be rejected.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex_validate_algo("rsa2048") == 0) { + printf("rsa2048 should be rejected.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex_validate_algo(NULL) == 0) { + printf("NULL should be rejected.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp; + buffer_t pk; + ssize_t len; + uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s[SYMMKEYSZ]; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create key pair.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + pk.len = (size_t) len; + pk.data = buf; + + /* Corrupt the public key */ + buf[0] ^= 0xFF; + buf[len - 1] ^= 0xFF; + + if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex, pkp, pk, s) == 0) { + printf("Should fail with corrupted public key.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex1; + struct sec_config kex2; + void * pkp1; + void * pkp2; + buffer_t pk2; + ssize_t len; + uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s[SYMMKEYSZ]; + const char * algo1 = "X25519"; + const char * algo2 = "X448"; + + TEST_START("(%s vs %s)", algo1, algo2); + + memset(&kex1, 0, sizeof(kex1)); + memset(&kex2, 0, sizeof(kex2)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex1, algo1); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex2, algo2); + + if (kex_pkp_create(&kex1, &pkp1, buf1) < 0) { + printf("Failed to create first key pair.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex2, &pkp2, buf2); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create second key pair.\n"); + goto fail_pkp1; + } + + pk2.len = (size_t) len; + pk2.data = buf2; + + /* Try to derive with mismatched algorithms */ + if (kex_dhe_derive(&kex1, pkp1, pk2, s) == 0) { + printf("Should fail with mismatched algorithms.\n"); + goto fail_pkp2; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2); + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s vs %s)", algo1, algo2); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp2: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2); + fail_pkp1: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s vs %s)", algo1, algo2); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_load_dhe_privkey(void) +{ + void * key; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(X25519_PRIVKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load X25519 private key.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + crypt_free_key(key); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_load_dhe_pubkey(void) +{ + void * key; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(X25519_PUBKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load X25519 public key.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + crypt_free_key(key); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/obj_mac.h> + +static int test_kex_nid_values(void) +{ + int i; + + TEST_START(); + + /* Verify all KEX algorithm NIDs match OpenSSL's */ + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + uint16_t our_nid = kex_supported_nids[i]; + const char * kex_name; + int openssl_nid; + + kex_name = kex_nid_to_str(our_nid); + if (kex_name == NULL) { + printf("kex_nid_to_str failed for NID %u\n", our_nid); + goto fail; + } + + /* Test reverse conversion */ + if (kex_str_to_nid(kex_name) != our_nid) { + printf("kex_str_to_nid failed for '%s'\n", kex_name); + goto fail; + } + + /* Get OpenSSL's NID for this name */ + openssl_nid = OBJ_txt2nid(kex_name); + if (openssl_nid != NID_undef) { + /* OpenSSL recognizes this algorithm */ + if (our_nid != openssl_nid) { + printf("NID mismatch for '%s': " + "ours=%d, OpenSSL=%d\n", + kex_name, our_nid, openssl_nid); + goto fail; + } + } else { + /* Verify no NID collision with different algorithm */ + const char * ossl_name = OBJ_nid2sn(our_nid); + if (ossl_name != NULL && + strcmp(ossl_name, kex_name) != 0) { + printf("NID collision for '%d': " + "ours=%s, OpenSSL=%s\n", + our_nid, kex_name, ossl_name); + goto fail; + } + } + } + + /* Test error cases */ + if (kex_str_to_nid("invalid") != NID_undef) { + printf("kex_str_to_nid should return NID_undef for invalid\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex_nid_to_str(9999) != NULL) { + printf("kex_nid_to_str should return NULL for invalid NID\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex_str_to_nid(NULL) != NID_undef) { + printf("kex_str_to_nid should return NID_undef for NULL\n"); + goto fail; + } + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} +#endif + +static int test_kex_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + + /* KEM tests are in kex_test_pqc.c */ + if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + continue; + + ret |= test_kex_dhe_derive(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + /* Test corruption for all DHE algorithms */ + /* KEM error injection tests are in kex_test_pqc.c */ + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + + if (IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + continue; + + ret |= test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_kex_parse_config_empty(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + FILE * fp; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + + fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(""); + if (fp == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to parse empty config.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "prime256v1") != 0) { + printf("Empty config should use prime256v1.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + fclose(fp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_parse_config_custom(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + FILE * fp; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + + fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_CUSTOM); + if (fp == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to parse custom config.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X25519") != 0) { + printf("Algorithm not set correctly.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + fclose(fp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_parse_config_none(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + FILE * fp; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + + fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_NONE); + if (fp == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to parse 'none' config.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex.x.nid != NID_undef) { + printf("'none' keyword should disable encryption.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + fclose(fp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_parse_config_whitespace(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + FILE * fp; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + + fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_WHITESPACE); + if (fp == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to parse config with comments.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X448") != 0) { + printf("Algorithm with whitespace not parsed correctly.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + fclose(fp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_parse_config_cipher(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + FILE * fp; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + + fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_CIPHER); + if (fp == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to parse cipher config.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X25519") != 0) { + printf("Algorithm not set correctly.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex.c.nid != NID_chacha20_poly1305) { + printf("Cipher not set correctly.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + fclose(fp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_parse_config_digest(void) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + FILE * fp; + + TEST_START(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + + fp = FMEMOPEN_STR(KEX_CONFIG_DIGEST); + if (fp == NULL) { + printf("Failed to open memory stream.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + if (parse_sec_config(&kex, fp) < 0) { + printf("Failed to parse digest config.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (strcmp(kex.x.str, "X25519") != 0) { + printf("Algorithm not set correctly.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + if (kex.d.nid != NID_sha384) { + printf("Digest not set correctly.\n"); + fclose(fp); + goto fail; + } + + fclose(fp); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +int kex_test(int argc, + char ** argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + (void) argc; + (void) argv; + + ret |= test_kex_create_destroy(); + ret |= test_kex_parse_config_empty(); + ret |= test_kex_parse_config_none(); +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + ret |= test_kex_parse_config_custom(); + ret |= test_kex_parse_config_whitespace(); + ret |= test_kex_parse_config_cipher(); + ret |= test_kex_parse_config_digest(); + ret |= test_kex_nid_values(); + ret |= test_kex_dh_pkp_create_destroy(); + ret |= test_kex_all(); + ret |= test_kex_validate_algo(); + ret |= test_kex_get_algo_from_pk_all(); + ret |= test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo(); + ret |= test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey_all(); + ret |= test_kex_load_dhe_privkey(); + ret |= test_kex_load_dhe_pubkey(); +#else + (void) test_kex_parse_config_custom; + (void) test_kex_parse_config_whitespace; + (void) test_kex_parse_config_cipher; + (void) test_kex_parse_config_digest; + (void) test_kex_dh_pkp_create_destroy; + (void) test_kex_all; + (void) test_kex_validate_algo; + (void) test_kex_get_algo_from_pk_all; + (void) test_kex_dhe_wrong_algo(); + (void) test_kex_dhe_corrupted_pubkey_all; + (void) test_kex_load_dhe_privkey; + (void) test_kex_load_dhe_pubkey; + + ret = TEST_RC_SKIP; +#endif + return ret; +} diff --git a/src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c b/src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..d4579eca --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/tests/kex_test_pqc.c @@ -0,0 +1,549 @@ +/* + * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2026 + * + * Test of the post-quantum key exchange functions + * + * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> + * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> + * + * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify + * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License version 2 as + * published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the + * GNU General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License + * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/. + */ + +#define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L + +#include "config.h" + +#include <test/test.h> +#include <ouroboros/utils.h> +#include <ouroboros/crypt.h> +#include <ouroboros/random.h> + +#include <stdio.h> +#include <stdlib.h> +#include <unistd.h> + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/x509.h> +#endif + +extern const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[]; +extern const uint16_t md_supported_nids[]; + +static int get_random_kdf(void) +{ + static int idx = 0; + int count; + + if (md_supported_nids[0] == NID_undef) + return NID_undef; + + for (count = 0; md_supported_nids[count] != NID_undef; count++) + ; + + return md_supported_nids[(idx++) % count]; +} + +/* ML-KEM-768 test key material */ + +#define MLKEM768_PRIVKEY_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN PRIVATE KEY-----\n" \ + "MIIJvgIBADALBglghkgBZQMEBAIEggmqMIIJpgRA+QIIiQLQkS5fl5RluSmgXRjZ\n" \ + "YU16W4TVt0dmnBP41rLTTRT3S8CRtkb+xmoFAcWTfEzbdr5pp3g2CBRx+APXTwSC\n" \ + "CWBll6AecTd1Kqdyix3zNQcthDBP0XnwdTHDqkKuFzMP58Y+0gc9Bo+W0xBOK2ZK\n" \ + "gcAmix3YLJuDS8Teep/Tdc7KIm5AaLNoI8BIMgKC/ASsW8kC+78BV4OIgqNWurS9\n" \ + "BrTiCmiag7c+6DsVDJHJ4kfcccwUDBKiW0v+LAkk1HXBcx6usrwuFC0H3ICli2sC\n" \ + "o5DfGL7g4kWHhobXjAZnxn298C8FGmLQK5kah4nZiJ+MuHqrirziCGTLKkY1a8vC\n" \ + "GFgzfHIcvB4dtyi9dxZmWpSXqDf2AVNgqrD2C7WQEULQOKxm/I8Mw31Yp8TC6SAP\n" \ + "RzM4cBAXF00W4Rce05O0am/ga5dStAhikMESyckCoEGlPFFXOmjy1HmOasI+AbGk\n" \ + "2BKp6cfbImbjd0ePdCSFEgIQwAQHm7+4UoZR2JmNwSI1AC2P4FMRAIaD2A69i6LC\n" \ + "kFniGcOog5m09nw5FqZmeEfNs6yyFGSX16D1YyjuooAFGlU0FFX7aKwsYM8t1gkS\n" \ + "YSUfMxIW9yzhSW4vZHuGyxlxBMr1y51RZrW8gnvW5p/Ip5yDBJRahY6KMWT15C14\n" \ + "C2rIe8U+d4Xi5IMI3D1JNpwFebYhKs3/ManxoU7Fwwa0GzQrgLYU5KhqO8/hopnl\n" \ + "8mQH+BPh+TR5lqYawS7HZXFJE8JzOnCtOSgB6Hz2U7oG9ik8h0FRqVD3ak20EmZU\n" \ + "c7gpGW8Odc51uaIBzDu4ej4dGgwo4awYaX4ugLOutHqGqRfCjIVb6XQ4m35p4KKi\n" \ + "qBVQ211aIhavUIgNECJ7WUETilXyyHLB9x3EFJdidEfSRUxLYJNAC5XM2WFCyhnE\n" \ + "pKmossSNq6ZOqBjPegE0J6zfNg65dR/OlIdGVDgrVTIpwYAUzBMW2nTnCa00EmPj\n" \ + "F7tRscHI8qb/QlnRVEUN+S+A2CtVIH1c666zOoRFRI9G4bmVoa8k2x0ANB51tCns\n" \ + "vAYqkMybIgMvWwbqoAxeW0G1O3qObGXtgs94BzhAEM3RbG/hy3GR1qUNSk/qyDKc\n" \ + "t1qpiaao0aLVsnpb28eBIk6+q0I82reGdV31OYvUpnVxRbRPFXEFs5PNS3s/7I8a\n" \ + "SlSLUGOh+mhrUzDPSJCzgEvOmrwrRxe3F52tS0nAt6Z5zKToASHphoISUi7lGX1F\n" \ + "Owx62qhSqqlI98bKqh7yQRZYrHXqE0bscAHCcIaZ8RVya42JHDCoQWyxqBuLOWEl\n" \ + "+Fz6vI5DqEnJkA7ke49EvBAOJ58lxAXQIV5remtzYGPKdyG2oamiFHiLVQDzGX/l\n" \ + "aFNMGXRWcK4/Y3mnkJvx9QGtq6KstQN/J4a51ZeX5YwNBcoY9UcFS6kHRW5rR3UM\n" \ + "tEZj5VN8BL9nyWM9h7hUSHQboaxO7M5qswfXB8f21xR16T40Ki4nawx/6zHGCQsc\n" \ + "uKr5SaCV88tghqJYHBorU5iKB5KsLDSHqYYrNo/Vy8W6kMA2jGAO24d4G32DSshR\n" \ + "sEF9W1nuAHK/5ste01G5KmX2KhdZBE37oGhM98HRQ6hU8qwuKrhdV7vZis5C8LXY\n" \ + "7MbDyDt1NnFqWFc6lYeVa6eRcmYzeAbXahrxwiiaLIdHXD95aZ/0S6+tKBGgQzwm\n" \ + "ZsbwdXhl+n+yqDNE6Sow2bwueqhDwZVWoMCv5SK+HAGPtcZ7UU9oWrqpiL085m7F\n" \ + "5G49KJUEZadVtj4Z9zrkeQkida+4I7v3Y3MzsWsGJww7YhTDJpsxxmSm85bHwx98\n" \ + "hZXSqckJTL4c2nBzgrBlukIT9Wl+qItMthVvABPzp4wGZhdgKrEIRl3yCnhhUgpL\n" \ + "lUxYegwWDMEjZxKlSbIyl5p9lCS8w2lsBzsQ2FJiAy/MWLa56aA+wFs3C8smZ6Cf\n" \ + "p5NWa8Rm+k898GWBxZivhF03CBOZ42du0YUZdCPoA5V1KC6bh4JyWFI49VFbQFMG\n" \ + "gwAqc0ErAH3iMammKC9746WWagnUIG3o8LygZrusuGeTohXJhVUTJDw2s0rzNhbw\n" \ + "5IyookkY5BWENKFKTIgdBxvYelOKwbGE8Z36FEW0ABlmx7SRCKWlNVjSEAIXmMiQ\n" \ + "VLdQF33QVYD9RR5chja254VuJH4plo+5JwiKWz8LlCIBm7CVkifZMLofmMk3s3L4\n" \ + "sXtE+Bhfm5Plk3RrgDdlHH+hK7gk61XGdynGjDY7aLtCKZ0SMsVskSLom1pbIR5M\n" \ + "KLYsQ1Pse4mhfDOFCkWFLI5TShGMuIoo1k7XeIE6g8QoUlV5EXyWHHhIVaE4yWGP\n" \ + "AVgEp0UswKFeeo3SoCAeADA3U88ymxpBJp73yDIqok5dM3SgkjfPWZDkgkAI8WHs\n" \ + "CKKeqrSOs1kkE3JXtE7kcTHT6XHo162TmgGkqMVwOQ3EmR6FRpYxJhZvuVbjJsSx\n" \ + "YjW3ScnR4Zivoi7q95ypco331pIlIZpqV0NydUpMyQaz1cnoPKYDh1xa6LhcqEKK\n" \ + "8a68iXjQgzgqQBDABonVybNDtlJ5lnTTuKhak8PBFAmmhj1JdrPqoIvQRCmLaark\n" \ + "J7/q9RLtk6kTOJ0qtLe2qqwCxJwyoMd2Q5F4+xTWZHu90ljRdcnYewarqcKzoL27\n" \ + "tcpTOmVz88I1hYVUJEV7aB36QMhTS1dquTqJZCD0hBPWAMToEoD4OFvKWmbFmzaW\n" \ + "xrMc4ECYeDAAKYs2YqoXSLfAixBmZjb6UDB61l2GA58pFJW0ZwN8S5tApA2NRi+7\n" \ + "oC/zgMgBGHft6E0+OUVb8It89pY1t7ybq5+fkBvEixDId3f1pK3gqcaYqG/YhoMJ\n" \ + "MJWkqYxCNGmdZ8gFo46V6K+4xZUblQWKypN6+RYO4kDh0koppWGEULjgBoCH+V8E\n" \ + "7GcoE8SRdQY1BIMoRVWb8Ur8ZYIVU8lqgaZPlWM3oRCiWk0kRxexFF0i5WlILIK9\n" \ + "GT8saX+bmRd9KSy3JrpPhQn59CpJBRxz8WKdJ3wwtqE/2TbxQhLooEWHYVrZEG5E\n" \ + "SkIoOkUAJUR+CzLLFDMdUE8w3CasE4ys+hco7AA5TAms24A1FXcxMgNb6VHA0bi5\n" \ + "c8rPCZvjubLXR4A0/A2Ualo4cy3UAr9k0rbZOJnjqk8eExkeaxbyh42cJpU75i4O\n" \ + "NLYsRZJkg9bkCpPgZKb707sPZO72CX3h/lQdXVgGkZ7Tqd1qzM+JOhSWvrYiBLa+\n" \ + "5IKSmFwT+5sw1InEesXwRN09000U90vAkbZG/sZqBQHFk3xM23a+aad4NggUcfgD\n" \ + "108=\n" \ + "-----END PRIVATE KEY-----\n" + +#define MLKEM768_PUBKEY_PEM \ + "-----BEGIN PUBLIC KEY-----\n" \ + "MIIEsjALBglghkgBZQMEBAIDggShAMPIO3U2cWpYVzqVh5Vrp5FyZjN4BtdqGvHC\n" \ + "KJosh0dcP3lpn/RLr60oEaBDPCZmxvB1eGX6f7KoM0TpKjDZvC56qEPBlVagwK/l\n" \ + "Ir4cAY+1xntRT2hauqmIvTzmbsXkbj0olQRlp1W2Phn3OuR5CSJ1r7gju/djczOx\n" \ + "awYnDDtiFMMmmzHGZKbzlsfDH3yFldKpyQlMvhzacHOCsGW6QhP1aX6oi0y2FW8A\n" \ + "E/OnjAZmF2AqsQhGXfIKeGFSCkuVTFh6DBYMwSNnEqVJsjKXmn2UJLzDaWwHOxDY\n" \ + "UmIDL8xYtrnpoD7AWzcLyyZnoJ+nk1ZrxGb6Tz3wZYHFmK+EXTcIE5njZ27RhRl0\n" \ + "I+gDlXUoLpuHgnJYUjj1UVtAUwaDACpzQSsAfeIxqaYoL3vjpZZqCdQgbejwvKBm\n" \ + "u6y4Z5OiFcmFVRMkPDazSvM2FvDkjKiiSRjkFYQ0oUpMiB0HG9h6U4rBsYTxnfoU\n" \ + "RbQAGWbHtJEIpaU1WNIQAheYyJBUt1AXfdBVgP1FHlyGNrbnhW4kfimWj7knCIpb\n" \ + "PwuUIgGbsJWSJ9kwuh+YyTezcvixe0T4GF+bk+WTdGuAN2Ucf6EruCTrVcZ3KcaM\n" \ + "Njtou0IpnRIyxWyRIuibWlshHkwotixDU+x7iaF8M4UKRYUsjlNKEYy4iijWTtd4\n" \ + "gTqDxChSVXkRfJYceEhVoTjJYY8BWASnRSzAoV56jdKgIB4AMDdTzzKbGkEmnvfI\n" \ + "MiqiTl0zdKCSN89ZkOSCQAjxYewIop6qtI6zWSQTcle0TuRxMdPpcejXrZOaAaSo\n" \ + "xXA5DcSZHoVGljEmFm+5VuMmxLFiNbdJydHhmK+iLur3nKlyjffWkiUhmmpXQ3J1\n" \ + "SkzJBrPVyeg8pgOHXFrouFyoQorxrryJeNCDOCpAEMAGidXJs0O2UnmWdNO4qFqT\n" \ + "w8EUCaaGPUl2s+qgi9BEKYtpquQnv+r1Eu2TqRM4nSq0t7aqrALEnDKgx3ZDkXj7\n" \ + "FNZke73SWNF1ydh7BqupwrOgvbu1ylM6ZXPzwjWFhVQkRXtoHfpAyFNLV2q5Oolk\n" \ + "IPSEE9YAxOgSgPg4W8paZsWbNpbGsxzgQJh4MAApizZiqhdIt8CLEGZmNvpQMHrW\n" \ + "XYYDnykUlbRnA3xLm0CkDY1GL7ugL/OAyAEYd+3oTT45RVvwi3z2ljW3vJurn5+Q\n" \ + "G8SLEMh3d/WkreCpxpiob9iGgwkwlaSpjEI0aZ1nyAWjjpXor7jFlRuVBYrKk3r5\n" \ + "Fg7iQOHSSimlYYRQuOAGgIf5XwTsZygTxJF1BjUEgyhFVZvxSvxlghVTyWqBpk+V\n" \ + "YzehEKJaTSRHF7EUXSLlaUgsgr0ZPyxpf5uZF30pLLcmuk+FCfn0KkkFHHPxYp0n\n" \ + "fDC2oT/ZNvFCEuigRYdhWtkQbkRKQig6RQAlRH4LMssUMx1QTzDcJqwTjKz6Fyjs\n" \ + "ADlMCazbgDUVdzEyA1vpUcDRuLlzys8Jm+O5stdHgDT8DZRqWjhzLdQCv2TSttk4\n" \ + "meOqTx4TGR5rFvKHjZwmlTvmLg40tixFkmSD1uQKk+BkpvvTuw9k7vYJfeH+VB1d\n" \ + "WAaRntOp\n" \ + "-----END PUBLIC KEY-----\n" + +/* Helper macro to open string constant as FILE stream */ +#define FMEMOPEN_STR(str) fmemopen((void *) (str), strlen(str), "r") + +static int test_kex_load_kem_privkey(void) +{ + void * key; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_privkey_str(MLKEM768_PRIVKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load ML-KEM-768 private key.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + crypt_free_key(key); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_load_kem_pubkey(void) +{ + void * key; + + TEST_START(); + + if (crypt_load_pubkey_str(MLKEM768_PUBKEY_PEM, &key) < 0) { + printf("Failed to load ML-KEM-768 public key.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + crypt_free_key(key); + + TEST_SUCCESS(); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail: + TEST_FAIL(); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_kem(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp; + buffer_t pk; + buffer_t ct; + ssize_t len; + ssize_t ct_len; + uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ]; + uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ]; + int kdf; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + kdf = get_random_kdf(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf1); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create key pair for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail; + } + + pk.len = (size_t) len; + pk.data = buf1; + + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) + ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk, buf2, kdf, s1); + else + ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk, buf2, kdf, s1); + + if (ct_len < 0) { + printf("Failed to encapsulate for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + ct.len = (size_t) ct_len; + ct.data = buf2; + + if (kex_kem_decap(pkp, ct, kdf, s2) < 0) { + printf("Failed to decapsulate for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) != 0) { + printf("Shared secrets don't match for %s.\n", algo); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp; + buffer_t pk; + buffer_t ct; + ssize_t len; + ssize_t ct_len; + uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ]; + uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ]; + int kdf; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + kdf = get_random_kdf(); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf1); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create key pair.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + pk.len = (size_t) len; + pk.data = buf1; + + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) + ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk, buf2, kdf, s1); + else + ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk, buf2, kdf, s1); + + if (ct_len < 0) { + printf("Failed to encapsulate.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + ct.len = (size_t) ct_len; + ct.data = buf2; + + /* Corrupt the ciphertext */ + buf2[0] ^= 0xFF; + buf2[ct_len - 1] ^= 0xFF; + + /* ML-KEM uses implicit rejection */ + if (kex_kem_decap(pkp, ct, kdf, s2) < 0) { + printf("Decapsulation failed unexpectedly.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + /* The shared secrets should NOT match with corrupted CT */ + if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) == 0) { + printf("Corrupted ciphertext produced same secret.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp1; + void * pkp2; + buffer_t pk1; + buffer_t ct; + ssize_t len; + ssize_t ct_len; + uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf3[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ]; + uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ]; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp1, buf1); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create first key pair.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + pk1.len = (size_t) len; + pk1.data = buf1; + + if (kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp2, buf2) < 0) { + printf("Failed to create second key pair.\n"); + goto fail_pkp1; + } + + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) + ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk1, buf3, NID_sha256, s1); + else + ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk1, buf3, NID_sha256, s1); + + if (ct_len < 0) { + printf("Failed to encapsulate.\n"); + goto fail_pkp2; + } + + ct.len = (size_t) ct_len; + ct.data = buf3; + + if (kex_kem_decap(pkp2, ct, NID_sha256, s2) == 0) { + if (memcmp(s1, s2, SYMMKEYSZ) == 0) { + printf("Wrong keypair produced same secret.\n"); + goto fail_pkp2; + } + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2); + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp2: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp2); + fail_pkp1: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp1); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext(const char * algo) +{ + struct sec_config kex; + void * pkp; + buffer_t pk; + buffer_t ct; + ssize_t len; + ssize_t ct_len; + uint8_t buf1[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t buf2[MSGBUFSZ]; + uint8_t s1[SYMMKEYSZ]; + uint8_t s2[SYMMKEYSZ]; + + TEST_START("(%s)", algo); + + memset(&kex, 0, sizeof(kex)); + SET_KEX_ALGO(&kex, algo); + + len = kex_pkp_create(&kex, &pkp, buf1); + if (len < 0) { + printf("Failed to create key pair.\n"); + goto fail; + } + + pk.len = (size_t) len; + pk.data = buf1; + + if (IS_HYBRID_KEM(algo)) + ct_len = kex_kem_encap_raw(pk, buf2, NID_sha256, s1); + else + ct_len = kex_kem_encap(pk, buf2, NID_sha256, s1); + + if (ct_len < 0) { + printf("Failed to encapsulate.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + /* Truncate the ciphertext */ + ct.len = (size_t) ct_len / 2; + ct.data = buf2; + + if (kex_kem_decap(pkp, ct, NID_sha256, s2) == 0) { + printf("Should fail with truncated ciphertext.\n"); + goto fail_pkp; + } + + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + + TEST_SUCCESS("(%s)", algo); + + return TEST_RC_SUCCESS; + fail_pkp: + kex_pkp_destroy(pkp); + fail: + TEST_FAIL("(%s)", algo); + return TEST_RC_FAIL; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + + if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + continue; + + ret |= test_kex_kem(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + + if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + continue; + + ret |= test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + + if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + continue; + + ret |= test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +static int test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext_all(void) +{ + int ret = 0; + int i; + + for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) { + const char * algo = kex_nid_to_str(kex_supported_nids[i]); + + if (!IS_KEM_ALGORITHM(algo)) + continue; + + ret |= test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext(algo); + } + + return ret; +} + +int kex_test_pqc(int argc, + char ** argv) +{ + int ret = 0; + + (void) argc; + (void) argv; + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC + ret |= test_kex_load_kem_privkey(); + ret |= test_kex_load_kem_pubkey(); + ret |= test_kex_kem_all(); + ret |= test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext_all(); + ret |= test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair_all(); + ret |= test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext_all(); +#else + (void) test_kex_load_kem_privkey; + (void) test_kex_load_kem_pubkey; + (void) test_kex_kem_all; + (void) test_kex_kem_corrupted_ciphertext_all; + (void) test_kex_kem_wrong_keypair_all; + (void) test_kex_kem_truncated_ciphertext_all; + + ret = TEST_RC_SKIP; +#endif + return ret; +} diff --git a/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c b/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c index bbf2323b..952f9529 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c +++ b/src/lib/tests/sockets_test.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200112L #include <ouroboros/sockets.h> -#include <ouroboros/test.h> +#include <test/test.h> #include <assert.h> #include <stdio.h> diff --git a/src/lib/tests/time_test.c b/src/lib/tests/time_test.c index 2b75b873..4685310b 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/time_test.c +++ b/src/lib/tests/time_test.c @@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ #define _POSIX_C_SOURCE 200809L -#include <ouroboros/test.h> +#include <test/test.h> #include <ouroboros/time.h> #include <stdio.h> diff --git a/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c b/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c index 98d4fab3..41bce964 100644 --- a/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c +++ b/src/lib/tests/tpm_test.c @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ #include "tpm.c" -#include <ouroboros/test.h> +#include <test/test.h> static void * test_func(void * o) { diff --git a/src/lib/utils.c b/src/lib/utils.c index fd275f63..74f8ce4f 100644 --- a/src/lib/utils.c +++ b/src/lib/utils.c @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ #include <ouroboros/utils.h> +#include <ctype.h> #include <stdlib.h> #include <string.h> @@ -67,6 +68,24 @@ char * path_strip(const char * src) return dst; } +char * trim_whitespace(char * str) +{ + char * end; + + while (isspace((unsigned char) *str)) + str++; + + if (*str == '\0') + return str; + + /* Trim trailing space */ + end = str + strlen(str) - 1; + while (end > str && isspace((unsigned char)*end)) + *end-- = '\0'; + + return str; +} + size_t argvlen(const char ** argv) { size_t argc = 0; |
