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author | Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> | 2019-08-02 19:12:34 +0200 |
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committer | Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> | 2019-08-03 12:10:57 +0200 |
commit | 9e8d603d14561095fb8d08871319a315d3bf6763 (patch) | |
tree | 7a87c212fcd642a8696145b4246a4fc4cf964e10 /src/lib/crypt.c | |
parent | 8a37ffbf8c0776a38f2de18a63e885383960ee68 (diff) | |
download | ouroboros-9e8d603d14561095fb8d08871319a315d3bf6763.tar.gz ouroboros-9e8d603d14561095fb8d08871319a315d3bf6763.zip |
lib: Add per-message encryption with OpenSSL
This adds a per-message symmetric encryption using the OpenSSL
library. At flow allocation, an Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman exchange
is performed to derive a shared secret, which is then hashed using
SHA3-256 to be used as a key for symmetric AES-256 encryption. Each
message on an encrypted flow adds a small crypto header that includes
a random 128-bit Initialization Vector (IV). If the server does not
have OpenSSL enabled, the flow allocation will fail with an -ECRYPT
error.
Future optimizations are to piggyback the public keys on the flow
allocation message, and to enable per-flow encryption that maintains
the context of the encryption over multiple packets and doesn't
require sending IVs.
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
Diffstat (limited to 'src/lib/crypt.c')
-rw-r--r-- | src/lib/crypt.c | 490 |
1 files changed, 490 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/src/lib/crypt.c b/src/lib/crypt.c new file mode 100644 index 00000000..94f1b50e --- /dev/null +++ b/src/lib/crypt.c @@ -0,0 +1,490 @@ +/* + * Ouroboros - Copyright (C) 2016 - 2019 + * + * Elliptic curve Diffie-Hellman key exchange and + * AES encryption for flows using OpenSSL + * + * Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks> + * Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks> + * + * This library is free software; you can redistribute it and/or + * modify it under the terms of the GNU Lesser General Public License + * version 2.1 as published by the Free Software Foundation. + * + * This library is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, + * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of + * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU + * Lesser General Public License for more details. + * + * You should have received a copy of the GNU Lesser General Public + * License along with this library; if not, write to the Free Software + * Foundation, Inc., http://www.fsf.org/about/contact/. + */ + +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + +#include <openssl/evp.h> +#include <openssl/ec.h> +#include <openssl/pem.h> + +#define MSGBUFSZ 2048 +#define IVSZ 16 +#define DH_TIMEO 2 /* seconds */ +/* SYMMKEYSZ defined in dev.c */ + +/* + * Derive the common secret from + * your public key pair (kp) + * the remote public key (pub). + * Store it in a preallocated buffer (s). + */ +static int __openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(EVP_PKEY * kp, + EVP_PKEY * pub, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx; + int ret; + uint8_t * secret; + size_t secret_len; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(kp, NULL); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto fail_new; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_init(ctx); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_ctx; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_derive_set_peer(ctx, pub); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_ctx; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, NULL, &secret_len); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_ctx; + + if (secret_len < SYMMKEYSZ) + goto fail_ctx; + + secret = OPENSSL_malloc(secret_len); + if (secret == NULL) + goto fail_ctx; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_derive(ctx, secret, &secret_len); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_derive; + + /* Hash the secret for use as AES key. */ + mem_hash(HASH_SHA3_256, s, secret, secret_len); + + OPENSSL_free(secret); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + + return 0; + + fail_derive: + OPENSSL_free(s); + fail_ctx: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + fail_new: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +static int __openssl_ecdh_gen_key(EVP_PKEY ** kp) +{ + EVP_PKEY_CTX * ctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY_CTX * kctx = NULL; + EVP_PKEY * params = NULL; + int ret; + + ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_id(EVP_PKEY_EC, NULL); + if (ctx == NULL) + goto fail_new_id; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_paramgen_init(ctx); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_paramgen; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_CTX_set_ec_paramgen_curve_nid(ctx, NID_X9_62_prime256v1); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_paramgen; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_paramgen(ctx, ¶ms); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_paramgen; + + kctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new(params, NULL); + if (kctx == NULL) + goto fail_keygen_init; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen_init(kctx); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_keygen; + + ret = EVP_PKEY_keygen(kctx, kp); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_keygen; + + EVP_PKEY_free(params); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + + return 0; + + fail_keygen: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(kctx); + fail_keygen_init: + EVP_PKEY_free(params); + fail_paramgen: + EVP_PKEY_CTX_free(ctx); + fail_new_id: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* ECDH from the server side. */ +static int openssl_ecdh_srv(int fd, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY * kp = NULL; + EVP_PKEY * pub = NULL; + uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; + ssize_t len; + int buf_sz; + uint8_t * pos; + struct timespec timeo = {DH_TIMEO,0}; + + assert(s != NULL); + + (void) fd; + (void) s; + + if (__openssl_ecdh_gen_key(&kp) < 0) + goto fail_gen_key; + + fccntl(fd, FLOWSRCVTIMEO, &timeo); + + len = flow_read(fd, buf, MSGBUFSZ); + if (len < 0) { + fccntl(fd, FLOWSRCVTIMEO, NULL); + goto fail_get_key; + } + + fccntl(fd, FLOWSRCVTIMEO, NULL); + + pos = buf; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use buf! */ + pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) len); + + pos = buf; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use buf! */ + buf_sz = i2d_PUBKEY(kp, &pos); + if (buf_sz < 0) + goto fail_get_key; + + if (flow_write(fd, buf, (size_t) buf_sz) < 0) + goto fail_get_key; + + if (__openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(kp, pub, s) < 0) + goto fail_get_key; + + EVP_PKEY_free(kp); + EVP_PKEY_free(pub); + + return 0; + + fail_get_key: + EVP_PKEY_free(kp); + fail_gen_key: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* ECDH from the client side. */ +static int openssl_ecdh_clt(int fd, + uint8_t * s) +{ + EVP_PKEY * kp = NULL; + EVP_PKEY * pub = NULL; + uint8_t buf[MSGBUFSZ]; + int buf_sz; + uint8_t * pos; + ssize_t len; + struct timespec timeo = {DH_TIMEO,0}; + + assert(s != NULL); + + (void) fd; + (void) s; + + if (__openssl_ecdh_gen_key(&kp) < 0) + goto fail_gen_key; + + pos = buf; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use buf! */ + buf_sz = i2d_PUBKEY(kp, &pos); + if (buf_sz < 0) + goto fail_get_key; + + if (flow_write(fd, buf, (size_t) buf_sz) < 0) + goto fail_get_key; + + fccntl(fd, FLOWSRCVTIMEO, &timeo); + + len = flow_read(fd, buf, MSGBUFSZ); + if (len < 0) { + fccntl(fd, FLOWSRCVTIMEO, NULL); + goto fail_get_key; + } + + fccntl(fd, FLOWSRCVTIMEO, NULL); + + pos = buf; /* i2d_PUBKEY increments the pointer, don't use buf! */ + pub = d2i_PUBKEY(NULL, (const uint8_t **) &pos, (long) len); + + if (__openssl_ecdh_derive_secret(kp, pub, s) < 0) + goto fail_get_key; + + EVP_PKEY_free(kp); + EVP_PKEY_free(pub); + + return 0; + + fail_get_key: + EVP_PKEY_free(kp); + fail_gen_key: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +/* + * AES encryption calls. If FRCT is disabled, we should generate a + * 128-bit random IV and append it to the packet. If the flow is + * reliable, we could initialize the context once, and consider the + * stream a single encrypted message to avoid initializing the + * encryption context for each packet. + */ + +static int openssl_encrypt(struct flow * f, + struct shm_du_buff * sdb) +{ + uint8_t * out; + uint8_t * in; + uint8_t * head; + uint8_t iv[IVSZ]; + int in_sz; + int out_sz; + int tmp_sz; + int ret; + + in = shm_du_buff_head(sdb); + in_sz = shm_du_buff_tail(sdb) - in; + + if (random_buffer(iv, IVSZ) < 0) + goto fail_iv; + + out = malloc(in_sz + EVP_MAX_BLOCK_LENGTH); + if (out == NULL) + goto fail_iv; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(f->ctx); + + ret = EVP_EncryptInit_ex(f->ctx, + EVP_aes_256_cbc(), + NULL, + f->key, + iv); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_encrypt_init; + + ret = EVP_EncryptUpdate(f->ctx, out, &tmp_sz, in, in_sz); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_encrypt; + + out_sz = tmp_sz; + ret = EVP_EncryptFinal_ex(f->ctx, out + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_encrypt; + + out_sz += tmp_sz; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(f->ctx); + + assert(out_sz >= in_sz); + + head = shm_du_buff_head_alloc(sdb, IVSZ); + if (head == NULL) + goto fail_encrypt; + + if (shm_du_buff_tail_alloc(sdb, out_sz - in_sz) == NULL) + goto fail_tail_alloc; + + memcpy(head, iv, IVSZ); + memcpy(in, out, out_sz); + + free(out); + + return 0; + + fail_tail_alloc: + shm_du_buff_head_release(sdb, IVSZ); + fail_encrypt: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(f->ctx); + fail_encrypt_init: + free(out); + fail_iv: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +static int openssl_decrypt(struct flow * f, + struct shm_du_buff * sdb) +{ + uint8_t * in; + uint8_t * out; + uint8_t iv[IVSZ]; + int ret; + int out_sz; + int in_sz; + int tmp_sz; + + in = shm_du_buff_head_release(sdb, IVSZ); + + memcpy(iv, in, IVSZ); + + in = shm_du_buff_head(sdb); + + in_sz = shm_du_buff_tail(sdb) - shm_du_buff_head(sdb); + + out = malloc(in_sz); + if (out == NULL) + goto fail_malloc; + + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_reset(f->ctx); + + ret = EVP_DecryptInit_ex(f->ctx, + EVP_aes_256_cbc(), + NULL, + f->key, + iv); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_decrypt_init; + + ret = EVP_DecryptUpdate(f->ctx, out, &tmp_sz, in, in_sz); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_decrypt; + + out_sz = tmp_sz; + + ret = EVP_DecryptFinal_ex(f->ctx, out + tmp_sz, &tmp_sz); + if (ret != 1) + goto fail_decrypt; + + out_sz += tmp_sz; + + assert(out_sz <= in_sz); + + shm_du_buff_tail_release(sdb, in_sz - out_sz); + + memcpy(in, out, out_sz); + + free(out); + + return 0; + + fail_decrypt: + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(f->ctx); + fail_decrypt_init: + free(out); + fail_malloc: + return -ECRYPT; + +} + +static int openssl_crypt_init(struct flow * f) +{ + f->ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new(); + if (f->ctx == NULL) + goto fail_new; + + return 0; + + fail_new: + return -ECRYPT; +} + +static void openssl_crypt_fini(struct flow * f) +{ + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(f->ctx); + f->ctx = NULL; +} + +#endif /* HAVE_OPENSSL */ + +static int crypt_dh_srv(int fd, + uint8_t * s) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_ecdh_clt(fd, s); +#else + (void) fd; + + memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ); + + return -ECRYPT; +#endif +} + +static int crypt_dh_clt(int fd, + uint8_t * s) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_ecdh_srv(fd, s); +#else + (void) fd; + + memset(s, 0, SYMMKEYSZ); + + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int crypt_encrypt(struct flow * f, + struct shm_du_buff * sdb) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_encrypt(f, sdb); +#else + (void) f; + (void) sdb; + + return 0; +#endif +} + +static int crypt_decrypt(struct flow * f, + struct shm_du_buff * sdb) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_decrypt(f, sdb); +#else + (void) f; + (void) sdb; + + return 0; +#endif +} + + +static int crypt_init(struct flow * f) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + return openssl_crypt_init(f); +#else + (void) f; + + return 0; +#endif +} + +static void crypt_fini(struct flow * f) +{ +#ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL + openssl_crypt_fini(f); +#else + (void) f; +#endif +} |