From d85326a119c34789055c388fcd18bb0161fbfd21 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Date: Sat, 14 Feb 2026 14:33:50 +0100
Subject: irmd: Add strength-based crypto negotiation

Each side's configured cipher, KDF, and KEX algorithm now
represents a minimum security floor ("at least this strong").

Cipher and KDF use strongest-wins: the server compares ranks
and selects the stronger of client vs server config. The
negotiated values are sent in the response header. The client
verifies the server's response meets its own minimum, which
prevents downgrade attacks on the wire.

KEX uses a minimum-floor check: the server extracts the
client's algorithm from its public key and rejects if it
ranks below the server's configured algorithm. A server
configured with ML-KEM will reject all classical algorithms.

Special case: for client-encap KEM, the client has already
derived its key using its KDF, so the server must use the
same KDF and can only reject if it is too weak.

The supported_nids arrays are ordered weakest to strongest
and serve as the single source of truth for ranking.

Cipher ranking (weakest to strongest):
  aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr,
  aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm,
  chacha20-poly1305

KDF ranking (weakest to strongest):
  blake2s256, sha256, sha3-256, sha384,
  sha3-384, blake2b512, sha512, sha3-512

KEX ranking (weakest to strongest):
  ffdhe2048, prime256v1, X25519, ffdhe3072,
  secp384r1, ffdhe4096, X448, secp521r1,
  ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024,
  X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024

Negotiation outcomes:
  strong srv cipher + weak cli cipher  -> use strongest
  weak srv cipher + strong cli cipher  -> use strongest
  srv encryption + cli none            -> server rejects
  srv none + cli encryption            -> use client's
  strong srv KEX + weak cli KEX        -> server rejects
  weak srv KEX + strong cli KEX        -> succeeds
  wire tamper to weaker cipher         -> client rejects

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens <dimitri@ouroboros.rocks>
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders <sander@ouroboros.rocks>
---
 src/lib/crypt.c | 70 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
 1 file changed, 59 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)

(limited to 'src/lib/crypt.c')

diff --git a/src/lib/crypt.c b/src/lib/crypt.c
index 8c29cbb3..92da803d 100644
--- a/src/lib/crypt.c
+++ b/src/lib/crypt.c
@@ -56,15 +56,16 @@ static const struct nid_map cipher_nid_map[] = {
         {NID_undef,             NULL}
 };
 
+/* Ordered in strength preference, lowest first */
 const uint16_t crypt_supported_nids[] = {
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+        NID_aes_128_ctr,
+        NID_aes_192_ctr,
+        NID_aes_256_ctr,
         NID_aes_128_gcm,
         NID_aes_192_gcm,
         NID_aes_256_gcm,
         NID_chacha20_poly1305,
-        NID_aes_128_ctr,
-        NID_aes_192_ctr,
-        NID_aes_256_ctr,
 #endif
         NID_undef
 };
@@ -86,16 +87,17 @@ static const struct nid_map kex_nid_map[] = {
         {NID_undef,            NULL}
 };
 
+/* Ordered in strength preference, lowest first */
 const uint16_t kex_supported_nids[] = {
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+        NID_ffdhe2048,
         NID_X9_62_prime256v1,
-        NID_secp384r1,
-        NID_secp521r1,
         NID_X25519,
-        NID_X448,
-        NID_ffdhe2048,
         NID_ffdhe3072,
+        NID_secp384r1,
         NID_ffdhe4096,
+        NID_X448,
+        NID_secp521r1,
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL_PQC
         NID_MLKEM512,
         NID_MLKEM768,
@@ -119,16 +121,17 @@ static const struct nid_map md_nid_map[] = {
         {NID_undef,      NULL}
 };
 
+/* Ordered in strength preference, lowest first */
 const uint16_t md_supported_nids[] = {
 #ifdef HAVE_OPENSSL
+        NID_blake2s256,
         NID_sha256,
-        NID_sha384,
-        NID_sha512,
         NID_sha3_256,
+        NID_sha384,
         NID_sha3_384,
-        NID_sha3_512,
         NID_blake2b512,
-        NID_blake2s256,
+        NID_sha512,
+        NID_sha3_512,
 #endif
         NID_undef
 };
@@ -544,6 +547,51 @@ int md_validate_nid(int nid)
         return -ENOTSUP;
 }
 
+int crypt_cipher_rank(int nid)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+                return 0;
+
+        for (i = 0; crypt_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+                if ((int) crypt_supported_nids[i] == nid)
+                        return i + 1;
+        }
+
+        return -1;
+}
+
+int crypt_kdf_rank(int nid)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+                return 0;
+
+        for (i = 0; md_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+                if ((int) md_supported_nids[i] == nid)
+                        return i + 1;
+        }
+
+        return -1;
+}
+
+int crypt_kex_rank(int nid)
+{
+        int i;
+
+        if (nid == NID_undef)
+                return 0;
+
+        for (i = 0; kex_supported_nids[i] != NID_undef; i++) {
+                if ((int) kex_supported_nids[i] == nid)
+                        return i + 1;
+        }
+
+        return -1;
+}
+
 /* Hash length now returned by md_digest() */
 
 int crypt_encrypt(struct crypt_ctx * ctx,
-- 
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