ouroboros/src/irmd/oap/tests/common.h, branch 0.24.0

irmd: Move AUTH test macros to OAP common.h

2026-07-08T09:02:24+00:00

The ML-DSA OAP test defined CLI_AUTH/NO_CLI_AUTH and passed them for the srv_auth parameters of the re-key tests. Rename to the neutral AUTH/NO_AUTH already used by oap_test.c and move the pair to the shared common.h. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Expand and parametrize OAP tests

2026-07-08T09:02:23+00:00

Parametrize the re-key roundtrips over the full (srv_auth, cli_auth) matrix. Add a KEM re-key axis, request-ID and cleartext-echo tamper tests, and an unsupported cipher/kdf/digest NID cluster guarded by an assertion. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Harden OAP handshake and add cert-less re-key

2026-06-29T06:33:00+00:00

Adds support for: Server key confirmation: the session key is bound to the negotiated algorithm via the HKDF info. The server returns a key-confirmation tag (rsp_tag, replacing the bare request-hash echo), so a cipher downgrade or key desync is detected. The cleartext path keeps a request echo, compared in constant time. Sealed server identity: AEAD-seal the certificate, signature and piggybacked data in the encrypted response (kex and rsp_tag move ahead as AAD), hiding the server identity and response sizes. Cert-less re-key: let the client omit its certificate, verifying the peer against the cached certificate. On PQC flows, ephemeral server-encap KEX (preserving forward secrecy) is used, even if the original flow allocation was client-encap. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Add issuer and digest pinning to OAP

2026-06-29T06:32:58+00:00

A peer certificate that verifies against the CA store could have been issued by any trusted CA, and a peer could pick any supported digest for its signature. Tighten the authentication contract with two local policies. cacert= pins the issuing CA: a peer certificate, if presented, must chain through the pinned CA. Whether a certificate is mandatory at all remains controlled by auth= alone. digest= now also pins the signature digest: a classical peer must sign with the locally configured digest, and may not omit the digest NID to fall back to the key's default digest. PQC signatures (ML-DSA, SLH-DSA) have an intrinsic digest and may be NID_undef. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Specify peer authentication contract

2026-06-29T06:32:58+00:00

OAP accepted requests and responses without a certificate even when the peer was expected to authenticate. An on-path attacker could strip the certificate and signature from a flow allocation response and substitute its own key exchange, silently downgrading the handshake to unauthenticated. Add an auth=required|optional policy to enc.conf, enforced per role: a client config requires the server to present a valid certificate, a server config requires the same from the client. Default is required for client side (https), optional server side. The client side default can be changed via OAP_CLIENT_AUTH_DEFAULT for testing. Replace the bare 'none' keyword with encryption=none, which disables encryption only: the digest and the authentication policy are kept, so authenticated but unencrypted flows can be configured. Configs using bare 'none' are now rejected. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

lib: Add post-quantum cryptography support

2026-01-19T07:29:29+00:00

This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication (ML-DSA). Supported key exchange algorithms: ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448 Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024 Supported ciphers: AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305 CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr Supported HKDFs: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 Supported Digests for DSA: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when available. KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles: one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles: kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy) kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key) The enc.conf file format supports: kex= # Key exchange algorithm cipher= # Symmetric cipher kdf= # Key derivation function digest= # Digest for DSA kem_mode= # Server (default) or client none # Disable encryption The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication infrastructure for integrity and replay protection. Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c). Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0 (required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders