ouroboros/src/irmd/oap/hdr.c, branch 0.24.0

irmd: Avoid in-place byteswap in OAP header

2026-07-19T09:44:35+00:00

gcc 12 -fanalyzer misclassifies kex_len = hton16(kex_len) followed by memcpy(&kex_len) as a read of an uninitialized value. Write the swapped value through the scratch variable like every other field in write_oap_fixed(). Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Fix OAP re-key header encode

2026-07-08T09:02:23+00:00

The oap_hdr_encode() function validated its own output by re-decoding with rekey hardcoded false. The case where the client signs a re-key failed its own self-check because the cert is not sent again. Now uses a flag on the encode() to signal the signed re-key without certificate. Also fixes a double free after a failed self-decode check. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

oap: Rename kex_config loaders to sec_config

2026-06-29T06:33:00+00:00

Leftover from the kex_config->enc_config->sec_config rename. Finished by renames load_kex_config and the cli/srv variants to load_sec_config, the kcfg variables to scfg, and fixes the "KEX config"/"encryption config" comments. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Harden OAP handshake and add cert-less re-key

2026-06-29T06:33:00+00:00

Adds support for: Server key confirmation: the session key is bound to the negotiated algorithm via the HKDF info. The server returns a key-confirmation tag (rsp_tag, replacing the bare request-hash echo), so a cipher downgrade or key desync is detected. The cleartext path keeps a request echo, compared in constant time. Sealed server identity: AEAD-seal the certificate, signature and piggybacked data in the encrypted response (kex and rsp_tag move ahead as AAD), hiding the server identity and response sizes. Cert-less re-key: let the client omit its certificate, verifying the peer against the cached certificate. On PQC flows, ephemeral server-encap KEX (preserving forward secrecy) is used, even if the original flow allocation was client-encap. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

build: Update copyright to 2026

2026-02-18T06:54:56+00:00

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

irmd: Clean up key exchange debug logs

2026-02-18T06:53:16+00:00

This cleans up a few debug logs related to encryption to not show KEM info for non-KEM algorithms. Also removes refcount logs for the PUP. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders

lib: Add post-quantum cryptography support

2026-01-19T07:29:29+00:00

This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication (ML-DSA). Supported key exchange algorithms: ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448 Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096 ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024 Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024 Supported ciphers: AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305 CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr Supported HKDFs: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 Supported Digests for DSA: sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512, blake2b512, blake2s256 PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when available. KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles: one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles: kem_mode=server # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy) kem_mode=client # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key) The enc.conf file format supports: kex= # Key exchange algorithm cipher= # Symmetric cipher kdf= # Key derivation function digest= # Digest for DSA kem_mode= # Server (default) or client none # Disable encryption The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication infrastructure for integrity and replay protection. Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c). Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0 (required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL. Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders