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<title>ouroboros/src/irmd/oap/auth.c, branch 0.24.0</title>
<subtitle>Ouroboros main repository</subtitle>
<id>https://ouroboros.rocks/cgit/ouroboros/atom?h=0.24.0</id>
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<updated>2026-06-29T06:33:00+00:00</updated>
<entry>
<title>irmd: Harden OAP handshake and add cert-less re-key</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T06:33:00+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-21T12:07:00+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:55a8136859d82d9bdb8f85abb25290177ca7e561</id>
<content type='text'>
Adds support for:

Server key confirmation: the session key is bound to the
negotiated algorithm via the HKDF info. The server returns a
key-confirmation tag (rsp_tag, replacing the bare request-hash echo),
so a cipher downgrade or key desync is detected. The cleartext path
keeps a request echo, compared in constant time.

Sealed server identity: AEAD-seal the certificate, signature and
piggybacked data in the encrypted response (kex and rsp_tag move
ahead as AAD), hiding the server identity and response sizes.

Cert-less re-key: let the client omit its certificate, verifying the
peer against the cached certificate. On PQC flows, ephemeral
server-encap KEX (preserving forward secrecy) is used, even if the
original flow allocation was client-encap.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib: Group sec_config authentication fields</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T06:32:59+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-21T11:18:35+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:a169a1cef5332a409efc2db07bcc1ae9b72f217e</id>
<content type='text'>
Nest the flat req_auth and cacert members of struct sec_config into a
sub-struct a { req; cacert; }, keeping the authentication settings
together.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>irmd: Bound the OAP replay cache</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T06:32:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T19:11:06+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:89807593faaa0472372fb267e12b03a2d6485805</id>
<content type='text'>
Replace the linked-list cache with three timestamp-generation hash
buckets, each capped at OAP_REPLAY_MAX entries.

A bucket is an open-addressed hash set whose slots count as live only
while slot.gen equals the bucket generation, so a stale bucket clears
in O(1) by bumping its generation instead of being scanned and pruned.

On overflow the cache fails closed - it rejects the header rather than
evicting the oldest entry. Under flood, dropping a genuine entry would
let that header be replayed, so refusing new entries is the safer
degradation than evict-oldest (fail-open) behaviour.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>irmd: Reject OAP peer crt with unusable CN</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T06:32:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T18:26:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://ouroboros.rocks/cgit/ouroboros/commit/?id=dce27129b74f906e0d1c086858f360228d5cbc83'/>
<id>urn:sha1:dce27129b74f906e0d1c086858f360228d5cbc83</id>
<content type='text'>
Added checks for CN &gt; NAME_SIZE.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>irmd: Add issuer and digest pinning to OAP</title>
<updated>2026-06-29T06:32:58+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-06-12T17:34:27+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://ouroboros.rocks/cgit/ouroboros/commit/?id=977bcac2d56a8793ed93b4aac7016ef36b51a07f'/>
<id>urn:sha1:977bcac2d56a8793ed93b4aac7016ef36b51a07f</id>
<content type='text'>
A peer certificate that verifies against the CA store could have
been issued by any trusted CA, and a peer could pick any supported
digest for its signature. Tighten the authentication contract with
two local policies.

cacert= pins the issuing CA: a peer certificate, if presented, must
chain through the pinned CA. Whether a certificate is mandatory at
all remains controlled by auth= alone.

digest= now also pins the signature digest: a classical peer must sign
with the locally configured digest, and may not omit the digest NID to
fall back to the key's default digest. PQC signatures (ML-DSA,
SLH-DSA) have an intrinsic digest and may be NID_undef.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>irmd: Drop replayed flow alloc requests</title>
<updated>2026-05-20T06:17:05+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-05-01T21:41:49+00:00</published>
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<id>urn:sha1:2ddcad3989cd8d2314453ed31ff43e122118663f</id>
<content type='text'>
A duplicating link could deliver the same alloc request twice.
OAP detected the replay but still replied over the wire, so the
requester saw a second flow_alloc_reply on an already-allocated
flow and reg_respond_alloc tripped its PENDING-state assertion.

Add EREPLAY so the OAP server can signal replays distinctly;
flow_accept drops them silently. As a safety net, reg_respond_alloc
warn-drops late replies instead of asserting.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib: Fix missing cleanup in authentication path</title>
<updated>2026-03-14T10:23:24+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-03-03T08:00:18+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://ouroboros.rocks/cgit/ouroboros/commit/?id=369d1c90453be23270a30229cbf4f731e4080407'/>
<id>urn:sha1:369d1c90453be23270a30229cbf4f731e4080407</id>
<content type='text'>
When auth_verify_crt fails (e.g., missing root CA),
crypt_get_pubkey_crt has already allocated pk but only crt was freed.

Adds a crypt_cleanup() function to wrap OpenSSL_cleanup(), as OpenSSL
lazily initializes a global decoder/provider registry the first time
PEM_read_bio or OSSL_DECODER_CTX_new_for_pkey is called, and this
leaves some memory owned by OpenSSL that triggers the leak sanitizer.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>build: Update copyright to 2026</title>
<updated>2026-02-18T06:54:56+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-02-15T09:21:02+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://ouroboros.rocks/cgit/ouroboros/commit/?id=0d72b59c2964208ea34ce2322978344d7ff1a223'/>
<id>urn:sha1:0d72b59c2964208ea34ce2322978344d7ff1a223</id>
<content type='text'>
Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
<entry>
<title>lib: Add post-quantum cryptography support</title>
<updated>2026-01-19T07:29:29+00:00</updated>
<author>
<name>Dimitri Staessens</name>
<email>dimitri@ouroboros.rocks</email>
</author>
<published>2026-01-07T15:44:34+00:00</published>
<link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='https://ouroboros.rocks/cgit/ouroboros/commit/?id=60b04305d70614580b4f883c0a147507edef3779'/>
<id>urn:sha1:60b04305d70614580b4f883c0a147507edef3779</id>
<content type='text'>
This adds initial support for runtime-configurable encryption and
post-quantum Key Encapsulation Mechanisms (KEMs) and authentication
(ML-DSA).

Supported key exchange algorithms:

  ECDH: prime256v1, secp384r1, secp521r1, X25519, X448
  Finite Field DH: ffdhe2048, ffdhe3072, ffdhe4096
  ML-KEM (FIPS 203): ML-KEM-512, ML-KEM-768, ML-KEM-1024
  Hybrid KEMs: X25519MLKEM768, X448MLKEM1024

Supported ciphers:
  AEAD: aes-128-gcm, aes-192-gcm, aes-256-gcm, chacha20-poly1305
  CTR: aes-128-ctr, aes-192-ctr, aes-256-ctr

Supported HKDFs:
  sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
  blake2b512, blake2s256

Supported Digests for DSA:
  sha256, sha384, sha512, sha3-256, sha3-384, sha3-512,
  blake2b512, blake2s256

PQC support requires OpenSSL 3.4.0+ and is detected automatically via
CMake. A DISABLE_PQC option allows building without PQC even when
available.

KEMs differ from traditional DH in that they require asymmetric roles:
one party encapsulates to the other's public key. This creates a
coordination problem during simultaneous reconnection attempts. The
kem_mode configuration parameter resolves this by pre-assigning roles:

  kem_mode=server  # Server encapsulates (1-RTT, full forward secrecy)
  kem_mode=client  # Client encapsulates (0-RTT, cached server key)

The enc.conf file format supports:

  kex=&lt;algorithm&gt;      # Key exchange algorithm
  cipher=&lt;algorithm&gt;   # Symmetric cipher
  kdf=&lt;KDF&gt;            # Key derivation function
  digest=&lt;digest&gt;      # Digest for DSA
  kem_mode=&lt;mode&gt;      # Server (default) or client
  none                 # Disable encryption

The OAP protocol is extended to negotiate algorithms and exchange KEX
data. All KEX messages are signed using existing authentication
infrastructure for integrity and replay protection.

Tests are split into base and _pqc variants to handle conditional PQC
compilation (kex_test.c/kex_test_pqc.c, oap_test.c/oap_test_pqc.c).

Bumped minimum required OpenSSL version for encryption to 3.0
(required for HKDF API). 1.1.1 is long time EOL.

Signed-off-by: Dimitri Staessens &lt;dimitri@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
Signed-off-by: Sander Vrijders &lt;sander@ouroboros.rocks&gt;
</content>
</entry>
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